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A. Wezler
My interpretation of the NBhāsya passage quoted above is thus fully corroborated by Bhāsarvajña 114. In addition it has to be noted that Bhāsarvajña is more explicit than Paksilasvāmin in that he unequivocally states that what falls into these four parts is in fact the « object of valid cognition », whereas in the Nyāyabhāşya it is left open whether the four arthapadāni are at all related to the category « prameya >> and, if so, precisely in which manner 115. According to Bhāsarvajña 116, too, the category « object of valid cognition is in itself ambivalent: if it becomes the object (vişaya) of proper knowledge, i.e. if its true nature is cognized, its knowledge leads to liberation; however, if its true nature is not understood, this false knowledge has the opposite effect, i.e. causes the process of rebirth to continue. It must, however, be borne in mind that this category includes only certain entities that are to be truly cognized, viz. those which are of direct importance for the attainment of the final goal.
Bhāsarvajña's assertion that it is divided into four parts only, viz. heyam etc., is quite understandably objected to by an opponent who rightly draws attention to the fact that according to NS 1.1.9 where the different pramevas are enumerated and according to NS 1.1.10 ff. in which the individual « objects of valid cognition » are defined, there is a total of twelve of them, but not four. This objection 117 is met by Bhāsarvajña by the following arguments 118. satyam, dvādaśavidham uktam, kim tu tad dvādaśavidham api heyādirūpena caturdhā bhāvyamānam nihśreyasanimittam bhavatity ataś caturvidham uktam / sūtrakāras tu nyāyaprāptam cāturvidhyam iti manyamānaḥ sākṣān noktavān / na hi heyādirūpāniscaye śarīrādisy ahamkāranivettivairāgyot pādanadvärena tadatyantavimokso 'pavargaḥ sambhavati caturvargāntarbhūtatvāc ca dvādaśavidhasyāpi /. « It is true, [the "object of valid cognition"] is taught [in the Sütra] as twelvefold; but it functions as the cause [of attaining] liberation [only] when it, though twelvefold, is presented to the mind as fourfold, [i.e.] as having the forms of that which has to be
114. Because he follows the tradition of those Naiyāyikas who wrote commentaries on the NBhäşya, i.e. the so-called Vyākhyātāraḥ (cf. A. Wezler, in WZKSO, XIX, 1975, 135-146)?
115. The term arthapada itself does not help in answering this question, and the other passage in the NBhāşya quoted above (p. 325) can be interpreted in two different ways (cf. fn. 105).
116. Who is, however, in agreement with Paksilasvāmin [cf. Bhāşya on NS 1.1.9, 2378: asty anyad api dravyagunakarmasāmānyaviseşasamaväyäh prameyam (viz. that taught by the Vaiseşikas) tadbhedena căparisankhyeyam: asya tu (i.e. that taught in NS 1.1.9) tattvajñānād apavargo mithyājñānāt samsāra ity ata etad upadistam viseseneti //] and Uddyotakara (cf. his Värttika on the beginning of the 4th Adhyāya; ed. by V. P. Dvivedin and L. S. Dravid, KSS 33, Benares, 1916-17, 500.8-10: yas tattvajñānavişayatvena vyavatişthamānah samsāravyavacchedahetur bhavati yaś ca mohavisayatvāt samsāram pratanoti sa tattvato jñeya iti /).
117. Extending from NBhūş 437.1 to 441.23. 118. NBhūş 441.25 and 442.3.
