Mahavira and his Teaching

Author(s): C C Shah, Rishabhdas Ranka, Dalsukh Malvania
Publisher: Bhagwan Mahavir 2500th Nirvan Mahotsava Samiti

Page 258

CONCEPT OF SUBSTANCE IN JAINISM
251
"Kala' consists of innumerable minute particles which are indivisible. “Akāśa' is fully packed with these particles. The only one has covered the whole universe.1 Thus time is devoid of extension and for this reason it is called as "Anastıkā ya' or unextended.
Many Jaina scholars like Nemicandra has made distinction between ‘Kala' and 'Samaya'. 'Kāla is the real time which is known by continuity and 'Samaya' is that one which is marked by change. Technically, 'Kāla' is named as 'Pāramārthika Kāla' while 'Samaya' is known as 'Vyāvahārika Kāla'. 'Paramārthika Kāla' is one. It has neither beginning nor end. It is eternal and formless. The 'Vyāvahārıka Kala' or emperical time is limited and conventionally it is divided into years, months, weeks, days, hours, minutes, seconds, moments etc. According to some other Jaina scholars, 'Kala' is not an independent substance rather it is a mode of other substances.?
'Substane' has also played an important role in the Rationalism of Western philosophy. Like Jainism, Rationalism presents substance as the possessor of attributes and modes. Here, too it is permanent, real and having existence. But there is a great difference between the substance of Rationalism and that of Jainism because Rationalism accepts it as God while Jainism negates even the theory of God. Descartes, the father of modern Western philosophy and a great advocate of Rationalism declares—'God alone is a substance in the real sense of term'.3 In the words of Spinoza 'God alone is substance, and substance is God'.4 And, in Jainism there is nothing like God. In no form it is ready to accept God. In this way substance may be considered as a central point which causes both meeting as well as separation of Jainism and Rationalism.
1. 2. 3. 4.
Gunaratna on Șad, p. 163 Gunaratna on Șaļ, p. 162 History of Philosophy, Webber and Perry, p. 249 Ibid. p. 260