Lost Fragments Of Spitzer Manuscript

Author(s): Eli Franco
Publisher: Eli Franco

Page 7

Eli Franco
• Lost Fragments of the Spitzer Manuscript
the palacographical evidence presumably does not allow us to date the manuscript later than that period". Unfortunately, however, the above dating of the Abhidharmahrdaya did not find acceptance among Abhidharma scholars. While everybody seems to agree that it was written before 220 A.D. there seems to be no decisive evidence that could help us to determine even approximately how much earlier.
To come back to our fragments, folio 369 begins somewhere in the middle of the third section of the chapter Anupūrvābhisamayapariksā. The purvapakşin (369al) seems to argue that the last three noble truths are similar to the first noble truth of suffering." And (the apprehension or the object of the noble truth of) suffering is suffering. Thus, the following obtains: The rest, i.c., the other three noble truths, are also suffering, Therefore, by seeing the noble truth of) suffering one sees the rest. (I read: <yatha> (duh)kham) tatha i<at>parifistān(i) duhkham ca duhkh[a]<m>, tar praptam pariSistany api duhkhan. Tasmād dunkhadarśanat parifistadarśanam).
The next line (369a2) appears to contain the reply of the siddhantin, who derives the opposite conclusion from the alleged similarity among the truths: (If it is said that the second, third and fourth truths are like the first truth, (then) the following obtains: the first truth is like the other three. But the other three truths are not suffering. (Thus, the first truth would also not be suffering) (yatha khalv api duhkham tatha i<at>parisistäni. tat praptam: yatha parifisfani tatha duhkham, na ca duhkha...). The reason why the siddhantin rejects the identity between the first and the other truths is not clear here. I assume that it is because the first truth is itself suffering whereas the others, or at least the third and fourth truths, are not considered to be suffering, but this is not stated explicitly in the fragment and I was also unable to identify the exact Sarvästivada position on this point. According to the Sarvāstivādin the third truth is asamiskota, but the other three are not. If one considers that everything which is produced (samsksta) is duhkha, one could say that the third truth is not suffering, but the other three are. If this is the Sarvāstivāda position, then our text would seem to be incompatible with it.'
The discussion continues on the verso side of the leaf (369b). In the first line there could be a statement to the effect that the apprehension of the four truths does not occur at once, "on one occasion" (ekasamaye). In the second line it is argued that it can be admitted that one fully understands suffering as suffering, but that this does not imply that by seeing suffering one sees the other truths too (yadi khalv api (dukha duhkhat[o] ('bhi)(samdgacchar]() na ca bhavati duhkhadarsanät parisista ...). In the third line the siddhantin continues to argue that by seeing suffering one does not see the other truths because the false view of the skandhas as the Self (sarkayadysti) does not have as its object the suppression of suffering and the way that leads to the suppression of suffering (<na> bhavati duhkhadarsanāt parisistadarsanam. na hl nirodhamärgd
10 Another reference that may prove useful for the dating of the work is found in fragment 157b: 1 II punar vrkjaniti vibhāsāyām apica na hetul. gomaynill 2 III.. patatami waram garulam dhur udadhişu samudrami tamam sasthill However, I was not able to identify the quotation or to determine to which Vibhdsd (presumably one of the commentaries on the Jaanaprasthana) the author refers. The second line seems to contain a subhasita ("Garuda is the best of birds, the ocean is the best of seas, sixty..."), but I could not identify its source either. . Note that vrkra is usually a masculine noun.
1 According to ARMHLIN the Abhidharmapdaya is contemporary with the kidnaprasthana; cf. LARMELIN, Le Coeur de la Lol Suprime. Traité de Fa-Cheng Abhidharmahrdaya dstra de Dharmart Paris 1978, p. 12 (expressing disagreement with R. YAMADA who situated the Jianaprasthan before the Abhidharmahndaya). FRAUWALLNER considered the Abhidharmahrdaya to be earler than the Janaprasthana (cf. "Der Abhisamayawadah". p. 72), and WILLEMEN scems to endorse this opinion in The Essence of Metaphysics. Abhidharmahrdaya. Bruxelles 1975, p. VIII, or at least to rely on it while claiming that "200 A.D. does not seem acceptable." Cf. also WILLEMEN's introduction in K.H. Potter (ed.), Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies. Vol. VII. Abhidharma Buddhism to 150 A.D. Delhi 1996, p. 451. The title of this volume, and the place of the summary of the Abhidharmahrdaya in it would imply that the Abhidhamah daya must be considerably earlier than 150 A.D., but I suppose that in this case the title should not be taken too literally. For the most recent discussion cf. B. DESSEIN, Samtukadbhldharmahrdaya. Heart of Scholasticism with Miscellaneous Additions. Delhi 1999, vol. I. p. xxxiii, and further references in vol. II p. 13, nn. 150-151. DESSEIN also considers the work to be probably earlier than the Manaprasthana. As far as I can see there is no cogeat argument allowing for a decision one way or the other.
197 The reason for the statement is missing. Note also that the discrepancy between the transcriptions of SPITZER and of WATANABE/MIYASAKA is considerable.
10 follow here SPITZER's transcription. Note that WATANABE/MIYASAKA transcribe fasmda na instead of tasmid. If the WATANABE/MIYASAKA transcription is correct, then we obviously deal with a siddhanta statement. Indeed, in the discussion that follows the words tasman na duhkhadarande parifistadardanam occur repeatedly, and this in itself would make the WATANABE/MIYASAKA tran
scription more probable. However, the immediately preceding statement that the rest are also suffering" (parisisany api duhkham) is clearly the purvapaksa in the discussion.
CE BARRAU,Op.cit, p. 138 (th. 8); cf. also p. 197 (th. 32) for the Saripurabhidharma, p. 100 (th. 10) for the Parvasnila, and p. 221 (th. 56) for the Theravada.
110 According to BAREAU, op. cit., the Hetuvādins (p. 246, th. 3) considered all asamisktar except marga to be suffering, whereas the Theravadins (p. 233, th. 166) seem to argue that all noble truths are not suffering. The position of the Sarvāstivāda is unknown to me.
Ill interpret padi bhalv apl as yadinama ("let it be admitted") and the enclitic ca of the next sentence in an adversative sense. Otherwise the next phrase would be part of a conditional clause intro duced with yadi bhalv api and be connected with ca in its conjunctive sense. It is also possible that the apodosis (i.c., the phrase that ends with-kābhisamaydh) preceded the protasis introduced with yadi khalv api.