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Bli Franco
Lost Fragments of the Spitzer Manuscript
raises the possibility of someone claiming that one can see all truths with the form of andiman, and Yafomitra explains that someone belonging to a different Buddhist school (nikdyantartya) could argue for ekabhisamaya on the basis of the two general characteristics fünyata and anätmata. * Of the proponent's reply to this objection, unfortunately, nothing is preserved in our manuscript except the disconnected words sat, asar and klefābhāva.
The section concludes with ...yaparakarane anuparvabhisamayaparked which can be understood in two ways. One could assume that prakarara refers to the name of the work, e.g., the Abhidharmaprakarana of Vasumitra. Or one may assume that prakarana refers to a chapter in the work and that this chapter was subdivided into partkşds.
In spite of this and similar passages the major schools of Conservative Buddhism. especially the Theravada and the Sarvästivada, reject this doctrine. Consciousness is not luminous or pure by nature; it is defiled by passions and actions, and the connection with them has to be severed. If consciousness were luminous by nature, it could not become defiled by the defilements. Further, the dharmas perish at every moment. Therefore, it is not the defiled luminous consciousness which is liberated. Rather, when the connection with the defilements is severed, a future consciousness is liberated, i.e., the cognition in the next moment which is a cognition of the Arhat (afaikoya-cinta) arises free from defilements.
In accordance with this opinion the siddhantin (371b3) states that the upaklesas are not adventitious to consciousness as long as both (consciousness and defilements) exist at present... Mpaklesah, tadubhayapraf(yu)(pan)n(a)tve ägantukatvam na bhavati
2) The second topic (371b2f.) begins with a reference to a parvapaksa statement that consciousness (citta) is luminous by nature (yad ucyate praktiprabhasvaram ...). This is a clear reference to a doctrine propagated by some schools of Conservative Buddhism, notably, the Mahasanghikas, the Vibhajyavādins and the Sariputräbhidharma," that consciousness is luminous by nature (cintam praktiprabhdsvaram), but can be defiled (klista, upaklista) by the defilements (klesa, upaklesa) or liberated (vipramukta) from them. In this sense it is said that "consciousness accompanied by desire is liberated" (sardgam cittam vimuccati)."
This doctrine is based on a passage in Arguttara Nikdya 161, pabhassaram idam bhikkhave cittar tar ca kho ägantukchi upakkilesehi upakkilihan. "This consciousness, monks, is luminous, and it is defiled by adventitious defilements."
In 372a1 the siddhantin could perhaps argue that the luminosity of consciousness is not perceived (... prabhasvaratvam upalabdham). If the purvapak in replies that the luminous consciousness is defiled (yad ucyate prabhasvaram upaklifyata iti yadi ...) (and this is the reason why its natural luminosity is not perceived in its present state; cf. pratyutpanna), the siddhantin answers that what is luminous cannot be defiled (... <upa>klistam prabha/svara)........ khalv api nopapadyate). Further, he asks for the cause or reason for the opponent's statement that a luminous consciousness is defiled, implying that no such cause or reason can be given, because at the time when the luminous consciousness is apprehended by a cognition consciousness is not defiled (prabhasvaram upaklifyata iti kim karanam? yada hi buddhyd prabhasvaram upalabhyate na rado[pa)(k)[(ify)<ate>).
If the purvapakşin would retort that the luminous consciousness could be perceived at another time ... da prabhasyaram..... upalabhyeta), then he would have to
136 CL AKV 926.11-12: "athapy and makarena sarvesdom satydnim dar fanamiti bryd" nikdydntariyah nyatanätmate sarvaratydndomsmdayam lakonan kytd.
117 In the following discussion I use "consciousness" for eitta and "cognition for buddhi. It seems that the two terms are not used synonymously here, in 372s it is said that the luminous (CODsciousness -I assume that prabharyara qualifies cinta) is apprehended by buddhi: buddhyd prabhasve. Tome upalabhyate
CL. BAREAU, op. cit., pp. 67-68 (th. 44). 175 (th. 28). 194 (th. 6); cf. also pp. 90 (th. 9), 147 (th. 80), 161 (th. 14), 217 (th. 24) and further references there to the Vibhard, Sariputrdbhidharma Kaththatha, Mydymusdra, etc.
> Cr the informative presentation in E. LAMOTTE, L'Enseignement de Vimalaktit. LouvainLeuven 1962, pp. 51-54. For prabhavara cittain Yogic and Madhyamaka cf. also D. SEYFORT RUEOG, La Théorie du Tathagatagarbha et du Gotra Paris 1969, esp. pp. 425-428.
19 PTS d. vol. Lp. 10.
131 One of the reasons for this rejection probably lays in the fact that the implied canonical notion of cinta as a lasting subtle element was incompatible with the doctrine of momentariness and the denial of the substance.
* C. LAMOTTE, op. cit. p. 54 and n. 37.
In the entire discussion, with a single exception, paklefa rather than lela is used; this is probably due to the canonical formulation in Anguftaranikdy 1.6 (PTS ed. vol. I, p. 10) quoted above. However, I do not think that the distinction beween kleda and paklesais relevant to the present context and there is nothing to indicate that the author has only the minor defilements in mind.
11 asume that there was a negation in the first part of the statement 1991 would like to conjecture anyada here.
