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Eli Franco
Lost Fragments of the Spitzer Manuscript
_97
accept that consciousness has) two own-beings (i.c., luminousness and non-luminous ness) and the cognition too (would have two own beings) because of the double nation (of consciousness as luminous and as non-luminous). But this is not acceptable to the opponent. Therefore, there is no determination (that luminous consciousness is defiled) (tam(?) dvisvabhavam syād buddhis ca dvictva?>vyavasāyāt. anistam cal. ta<I>). Tasmát prarüpan[abhāvah.) This concludes section 3.
Section 4 considers further alternatives. First, a defiled consciousness does not apprehend a defiled consciousness; there is no determination i.e., it could not be determined that luminous consciousness is defiled (na khalv apy upaklistam upaklistam grhnati prarüpan<d>bhava ...). (If the opponent suggests that the defiled consciousness apprehends the luminous consciousness, this is also impossible.) At the time when it is defiled it is not luminous (... upaklistam na tada ...). Nor are the defiled and the nondefiled apprehended at the same time ((aply upallistanupakliste yugapad upalabhyate!"). Therefore, how could it be known that a luminous consciousness is defiled (tar katham etac chakyate jflatum prabhasvaram upaklifyata iti)?
Section 5 seems to begin with a presentation of the opponent's position in the form of a hypothesis: If the luminous nature of consciousness is destroyed by the defilements ... (yadi ca prakytir upaklefair upam dyate, prabha(svar)...). A possible reply or consequence could be that in this case consciousness too would be destroyed together with its luminous nature (... (upa)m(r)dyate prabhasva ...). The opponent must have attempted to justify his position by claiming that consciousness and luminosity are two different things and that only luminosity is destroyed. This argument is rejected as incorrect (ity ayu)[k]t(a)m). The proponent gives the reason for the fault in the opponent's view: The nature (prakrti) of a thing is its own-being (svabhāva). If that own-being is destroyed, the thing called "consciousness" would not be any longer (fya) khalv api yasya praktih sa tasya svabhāvah. să yady upamrdyate cittam iti tan na bhavati). Luminosity (and consciousness itself) become one (... prabhasvaratvam ... ekibhavanti). Further, how could (properties?) that rest on the nature of consciousness defile (consciousness itself) ((pra)[kr]tisthah katham upakle ayanti)?
373al refers again to the opponent for whom being consciousness and being luminous are different things yasyānya<c/m> cittatvam anyam prabha(sv)<aratvam> ...).
The proponent must have rejected the construed difference between consciousness and luminosity. Further, he could have argued that under the assumption of such a difference a defilement, if it comes into contact with a luminous consciousness, would become luminous itself, clearly an inadmissible consequence, just as that the luminous consciousness too, inasmuch as it comes into contact with a defilement, is supposedly defiled ((pra)bhasvaram apy upaklefam anuprāptam kli...). This interpretation is based on a parallel passage in the Vibhāsā, as summarized by Lamotte.
In 373a3 the opponent possibly attempts to establish the difference between luminosity and consciousness by taking recourse to the factor of time. Consciousness could have been luminous in the past (pra)bhasvaram asirl) and have become defiled later on. The opponent may have understood this difference as a difference in state (cf. avastha in 37361). I assume that the proponent now repeats his previous argument in his reply, namely, that if a state of consciousness is not something different from consciousness itself, then when the state is that of being defiled, consciousness is defiled. If, on the other hand, the state would be different from consciousness itself, defiling is due to an interaction between two different entities (cf. ... anyenānyasya...). Thus, the relationship between consciousness and the defiled state is the same as that between consciousness and the defilement, for the defilement is also different from consciousness (upaklešasya py any...), and thus consciousness itself would not be affected by the defiled state. The argument must have been more complicated and must have also taken into account whether a state lasts for some time (... (a)vasthā bhavati. athāvatishate ...).
The opponent may have argued that the proponent does not understand what it means to be defiled. Because consciousness is defiled by the defilements, it is suffering, and being defiled by something else it becomes itself a defilement ((upakli)yate tasmä<d> d[u](hkh)... Syānyenopaklistasyopaklefarvam...). The defilement occurs by way of a contact or conjunction (samyoga) between the two. Section 5 ends with a prasariga in which the consequence must have been that consciousness itself would be de
199 CE LAMOTTE, op. cit., p. 54 (paraphrasing Vibhagd T. 1545, k. 27, p. 140b-c): "Polerniquant avec les Vibhajyavidin, les SarvistivAdin-Vaibhàisika remarquent qu'une pensée originellement lumineuse ne peut pas être suillée par les ordures des passions adventices. Dans cette hypothese, les passions adventices, naturellement suillées, une fois associées avec la pensée originellement et naturellement lumineuse deviendraient pures. Ou, si elles restaient impures, la pensée lumineuse ne serait pas suillée par leur fait."
1 I do not understand the relationship between prabhaswaram Astr and idam dsid iti na bh.: perhaps idam dsat begins a new sentence.
14? It is possible, of course, that one has to read anawasth. In this case athavaristhate means: if there is no infinite regress.
116 I am tempted to conjecture wpaklistam anupaklistam, but that would be a lectio facilior. 19? As pointed above a negation should be added for this sentence, probably napy. 1* For the phenomenon of a singular verb with a dual subject cf. EDGERTON, BHSG 25.3.
