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Jainism As Metaphilosophy
and Particulars. Notwithstanding the fact that the terms ‘Universal' and “Particular' are defined differently by philosophers of different persuasions and, despite the distinction which can be drawn between philosophers' views on these (on the basis of thcir cpistemological positions), it cannot be gainsaid that there is an area of agreement between them on the fundamentals. For instance, the particular is understood as a 'specific instance, and the Universal, as something which characterises a number of 'specific particulars'. Onc of the burning problems in this area is regarding the nature of the relation between them, - more specifically finding out whether they could be distinguished from each other.
From the fact that when a complete description of an object (a “particular') is attempted, the presence of a characteristic belonging to other objects (other ‘particulars' of its kind) cannot but be conceded and the 'presence of an ‘universal' in it can thus be acknowledged, it may be surmised that the object, in some sense, incorporates within itself, both the universal and the particular. Though they may be distinguished for thought (i.e. for analytical purposes), they are, in reality, not distinct..
Among the schools of Indian philosophy, the Nyāya-Vaišeşika system is especially known for the distinction it draws between categories among which the universal (sāmánya) and particular (viseşa) are included. According to the Jaina philosophers, the Nyaya-Vaišeşikā philosophers commit a fallacy called naigamabhāsa since they maintain an absolute distinction (atyantabhinnaiva) between the various categories they propose. The fallacy arises because the distinction is asserted absolutely
The Jaina position is that though the distinction can be drawn, it is only relative. Even the non-distinction which is asserted, is not absolute. In this connection the Jaina definition of naya as a particular opinion (abhiprāya or abhimata) or a viewpoint (apeksa) - a viewpoint which does not rule out other different viewpoints and is, thereby expressive of a partial truth (vastvamsagrahı) about an object (vastu) - as entertained by a knowing agent (jñātr) is well worth remembering.
The upshot of the critical approach of the Jaina philosophers is that when one viewpoint (either of the universal or of the particular) is taken and the other (be it the particular or the universal) is set aside as irrelevant,
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