________________
Philosophy As Criticism-II
The present proposition may hence be regarded as advancing the arguments contained in propositions 1 and 2 in so far as the assertion that the pot is made of clay and denial, subsequently that it is not made of clay, are quite meaningful. While proposition 1 asserts that the pot is made of clay and proposition 2 dcnics that it is made of some other substance, proposition 3 explicitly points to the fact that a successive assertion (that the pot is made of clay) and denial (that the pot is not made of any other substance) ispossiblc. In more concrete terms, the proposition is to be understood, in terms of our example, that the pot is made of clay and no other substance.
4 The proposition "The pot is indescribablc" points to the situation where a simultaneous assertion that the pot is made of clay and a denial that it is not made of any other substance is attempted. The situation is one of indescribability or inexpressibility.
Logically it is impossible to describe mcaningfully or express intelligibly the idea that the pot is made of clay and is not made of any other substance, at the same time. No doubt, the assertion that the pot is made of clay carries with it the implication that it is not made of any other substance. But it needs explication. A simultancous explication of both ideas, if attempted, is found to be impossible. It is in this sense that the expression ‘indescribability' is to be understood.
Psychologically too it is impossiblc to conceive of the two ideas, viz. that the pot is made of clay and is not made of a different substance simultaneously. Perhaps it is because of this psychological limitation that a verbal expression of both the ideas at onc shot is not possible.
Hence this proposition is not to be understood as signifying that no description of the pot is possible, since a successive description of the basic substance of which it is made and of the substance of which it is not made is still possible. As Datta and Chatterjee point out:
under such circumstances when we are forced to predicate simultaneously, of any object, characters which are incompatible, being contrary or contradictory, our judgment, according to the Jainas, would be of the
general form "Somehow S is indescribablc."! We might also maintain that the recognition of this form of judgment shows that Jaina logic does not violate the principle of contradiction and
Jain Education International
For Private & Personal Use Only
www.jainelibrary.org
