Book Title: Jainism as Metaphilosophy
Author(s): S Gopalan
Publisher: Satguru Publications Delhi

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Page 67
________________ Philosophy As Criticism-II when its existence is asserted, the reference is to the place where it actually exists. Where it does not exist, this proposition becomes invalid. The meaningfulness of the proposition concerning the pot's existence is thus contingent on its reference to its presence on the table. On the other hand, the validity of the proposition would be denied if the pot is pronounced as being present in a place where it is not. If I go to a place where the pot does not exist and say: "The pot exists here", I might be accused of giving expression to a meaningless proposition, just as it would be an invalid statement if I now say" "The pot does not exist here" eventhough the pot is present here. Likewise we may visualise the time of existence of the pot. The pot exists now on the table. But suppose I inadvertently made it fall down and break to pieces. The pot no longer exists, i.e. the same pot which existed some time back, has actually gone out of existence. Hence the proposition which asserts the existence of the pot now becomes meaningless. The meaningfulness and the meaninglessness of the proposition are derived respectively from its presence and absence at the time the proposition is given expression to. So the time at which the object exists is an important consideration for validating the proposition under discussion. The pot did not exist till the moment it was made. Nor does it exist after it is broken. The validity of the proposition asserting the pot's existence correspondingly relates only to the period during which it really exists, not to the period before it came into existence nor to the period after it went out of existence. 57 The last factor, the modal factor, may be explained thus. 'Pot', as a term of reference, points to the shape given to a lump of clay by the potter. Only a specific shape that the potter, with the dexterity of his hands, has given to the clay, deserves such a description, all other shapes deserving oter descriptions. If a pot's shape is given, 'existence' refers to this specific mode, and hence the truth-value of the proposition is derived from this specific mode of existence of clay and not from that of any other. Now we are in a position to explain the significance of the seven propositions (all with a qualifying clause, "May be") formulated as the Syädvāda doctrine. Jain Education International For Private & Personal Use Only www.jainelibrary.org

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