Book Title: Jainism as Metaphilosophy
Author(s): S Gopalan
Publisher: Satguru Publications Delhi

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Page 66
________________ 56 Jainism As Metaphilosophy the important provision that the acceptance of the one did not necessarily entail the rejection of other views, simply because thcy were 'other views'. And also because, ex hypothesi, thcy were made from divergent standpoints. In their Syādvāda theory the Jainas devised a way of avoiding categorical references by qualifying every possible proposition with the expression 'Syāt' which means "May bc". The conditional acccplance accorded to various propositions descrves to be described as an allempt at synthesising various viewpoints taken and propositions arrived at, consequent on the adoption of the analytical procedure carlicr on. Though the complexity of Rcality is well indicated by formulaling seven propositions, -all with the qualifying Syāt particle, the Jaina philosophers, by rc!erring to four factors, viz. substance (dravya), placc (kşeira), timc (käla) and mode (paryāya) seem to have indicated a many-pronged attack on the problem of unravelling the nature of Reality A brief consideration of these would be helpful in understanding the idea both of the complexity of Reality and the idea of conditional Ipredication. The idea of complexity is indicated by suggesting that for a complete description of Reality all the four factors are to be referred to and the conditional predication idea is underlined by the insistence that the factor under consideration is only one among various alternatives to be considered. We shall take up thc cxample of pol (ghata) 10 explain the four factors. The existence of the pot first and foremost connotcs ils being made of some substance,-whatcvcr il may bc--so that a positive statement derives its meaning only from the point of view of the substance of which the pol is actually made and from no other viewpoint. The description, "The pot is made of mud" would be mcaningful only if the substance used is mud, not if it is made of any other substance, copper, siiver, gold, ctc. Similarly the pol's existence can be affirmed from the point of view of the place in which it cxists and not when it is not in that place. Suppose the pot is kept on the table here. When the poi is here, on the table, it cannot be elsewhere when reference is made to the existence of the pot, in the context of the reference, not lo ils absence anywhere else. The non-existence of the pot in other places may be implied, but Jain Education International For Private & Personal Use Only www.jainelibrary.org

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