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CHAPTER I
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secondary consideration) number etc. (sankhyādi), will then be fictitious (kalpanāmātrakalpitah syāt). For, real difference (pāramārthiko bhedah) between the two cannot proceed from the identity of their nature.' Or conversely, when the anekāntavādin pleads that dravya and paryāya are different, it means that he affirms their unqualified difference. Identity will then be fictitious. For real identity (svabhāvabhedah) cannot proceed from the difference which is their basic and total nature. The truth about the whole position, according to Jitāri, is that one cannot have identity as well as difference by the same nature. The entire argument, from the Buddhist side, may be said to have been grounded on the basic truth of the fundamental Buddhistic dictum: "It cannot be right to affirm and deny a thing at once, affirmation and denial being mutually contradictory":
Thus we have seen that the same objection is raised by the two diametrically opposed systems of ontology, viz., the
1. na hi yayoḥ svabhāvabhedaḥ tayoḥ anyathā pāramārthiko bhedaḥ
sambhavati / Ibid., p. 112. 2. na ca tenaiva svabhāvena bhedaś cābhedaśca / Ibid. 3. nahyekasya ekada vidhipratiședhau parasparaviruddhau yuktau /
Again : anyānanyayoḥ anyonyapariharasthitalakşanatvāt / Kamalasila in PK. on kärikäs 316 and 1795, respectively, in TSS. The implications of this argument are again set forth, in considerable detail, with particular reference to the syädvādin's view of the universal (sāmänya) and the particular (višeşa) in the section on "The Examination of Syädvāda" (karikās 1709-1785 and the PK. thereon). The kärikäs 1726-1735, together with the comm., specifically elucidate and refute the "mutually contradictory” position of the Jainas touching, incidentally, upon the idea of diversity as conceived by the anekāntavādin.
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