Jaina Logic

Author(s): T G Kalghatgi
Publisher: Raja Krisen Jain Charitable Trust New Delhi

Page 78

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Syndrada
complementary and it) the two predications are not absolute assertions. The definition itself includes the clause 'avirodhena"."
107
It is very often contended that the contradictions, absolute existence and non-existence, are not objective facts, as no existence is known to have absolute existence and absolute non-existence as its characteristics. The opposition is unreal and the predication of the unreal opposition is not necessary. But, as Prof. Mukerjee points out, it cannot be denied that it is possible to conceive the existence and non-existence of a thing though not ontologically real. The predications are therefore logically necessary to rebut such a conception of absolute existence and absolute non-existence.1 The Vedantist believes in the absolute existence of the one reality The Sanyavādin does not believe in the existence of the absolute. The Jainas contend that the two may be predicated in different contexts. The first two predications are logically valid and psychologically necessary, as they serve to exclude absolute existence and absolute non-existence. The mention of the word syat functions as a necessary condition and works as a corrective against the absolute way of thought. We may, here, refer to the logical opposition of Hegel, who said that affirmation and negation are ultimately reconciled by a higher unity, for they are the aspects of the same reality. However, the reference would be limited to the dialectical process, because the Jaina is a realist and believes in the validity of empirical experience.
The third predication is syad asti nästi : 'It is, it is not'. This refers to different contexts simultaneously. For instance, in a certain sense the jar exists and in a certain other sense the jar does not exist. The building is a house in so far as the purpose of the construction was for residence. But it is not a house as it is actually used as a godown. It is very often
127. Padamarajiah (Y, J.) Jaina Theories of Reality and Knowledge, pp. 338. 128. Satkari Mukerjee Jaina Philosophy of Non-Absolaism Ch. VI.