Jaina Logic

Author(s): T G Kalghatgi
Publisher: Raja Krisen Jain Charitable Trust New Delhi

Page 85

6.4
Jaina Logte own logic"*. But in the Saptubhangi tarangini we read a counter argument. If the final release and heavenly bliss are cternal and existing, where is the chance for samsara and the attempt to obtain moksa? If the other alternative is the only truth, what is the purpose of preaching such an ideal which is impossible to attain ? Radhakrishan points out that the Saptabhangi doctrine is not inconsistent with the other views of the Jainas. It is a logical corollary of the Anekantavada. All that the Jainas say is that everything is of a complex nature and real reconciles the difference in itself Attributes which are contradictory in the abstract co-exist in the world of experience,
Rāmānuja also pointed out that contradictory attributes such as existence and non-existence cannot at the same time belong to one thing any more than light and darkness However, he seems to accept the distinction between dravya and paryaya, substance and modes He also sees that the substance has permanence; paryaya implies change.
But the predications give severally partial truths. The truths presented by them are alternative truths from eifferent points of view; and the seven predications would present a complete comprehensive picture of reality. It is neither scepticism nor agnosticism, for each individual truth is valid It is supplemented and harmonised by the other predication into a single comprehensive picture of reality, as we get a harmony in orchestra by the combination of different notes.
With all their criticisms, Belvalkar makes Syadvada the most searching characteristic. Radhakrishnan observes "Samkara and Rāmīnuja criticise the Saptabhangi view on the ground of the impossibility of contradictory stributes co-existing in the same thing“ After quoting the relevant passage from Rāmánuja he proceeds to say: "The Jainas admit that a thing
138 Radhakrishnan (S)
pp. 305,
Indian Philosophy Vol. 1 (Allen Uniwin) 1931