Jaina Logic

Author(s): T G Kalghatgi
Publisher: Raja Krisen Jain Charitable Trust New Delhi

Page 84

Syadvada
63
Recent writers on Indian philosophy have reiterated the entire charge made by Sankara and Rāmānuja and have shown that it is a kind of eclecticism, sa putting together of several partial truths' without a proper synthesis. It is therefore characterised as a sort of compromise philosophy. The halfhearted attempt of Jaina enquiry as expressed in Saptabhangi stops at giving partial truth together and does not attempt to overcome the opposition implied in them by a proper synthesis.
But if we mean by definiteness unconditional and absolute assertion, then the 'indefiniteness of the doctrine is a logical necessity. As Radhakrishnan points out'u the crticism of the Saptabhangi doctrine as of no practical utility is an expression of personal opinion and as such need not be considered.
3) Sampkara also says that the Saptabhangi doctrine is inconsistent with the other views of Jaina philosophy. The assertions of existence, non-existence and indescribability are alike applicable to the doctrine of the soul and the categories. Similarly, the final release may exist and not exist and may be indescribable.180
The dialectic of Syadvada is inconsistent with the Jaina philosophy. It could not have sprung from the same teacher and the same philosophical background. “As a mere 'anaikantika' (sic) theory of predication, the Syadvada must return upon itself and end in doubting the doubter himself."'!" Prof. Radhakrishnan after mentioning the strong points of Syadvada, says “Yet in our opinion the Jaina logic leads to a monistic idealism (by which he means 'the hypothesis of the absolute') and so far as the Jainas shrink from it they are untrue to their
135. Radhakrishnan (8) Indian Philosophy Vol. I (Allen Unwin) 1931
Pp 304. 136. a) Samkara bhagya on Vedanta Satra 11, 33.
b) Rimānuja's Bhagya on Vedanta Serra, ii, 2. 31. 137. Brahmasetra of Bidartyana, Belvalkar's Edition 1931 : Notes,