Jain Journal 1998 07

Author(s): Jain Bhawan Publication
Publisher: Jain Bhawan Publication

Page 12

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JAIN JOURNAL : Vol-XXXIII, No. 1 July 1998 emancipation of a woman etc. Vādidevasūri's pramāņa-naya-tattvāloka comprises eight chapters having two more chapters than parikşāmukha, dealing with naya and vāda also. Vādidevasūri was the first logician who systamatized the rules of vāda according to Jaina views. Another new chapter which deals with naya is also important, because it summarises the Jaina perspective on naya. A profound philosopher of the 17th century, a celebrated Jaina philosopher Ācārya Yaśovijaya, has followed his Pramāņa-naya-tattuāloka in his Jaina Tarka-Bhāṣā. Vādidevesūri himself wrote a valuable commentary as
la-ratnākara. It is a voluminous commentrary having a size of eighty four thousand Anustubhmetres. The title suāduāda-ratnakara is significant by its subject-matter. Vadidevasūri discussed those topics too which could not be taken up by Prabhācandra. The language of the work is very lucid and attractive. Syādvādaratnākara is of paramount importance since it goes one step further in developing Jaina epistemological doctrines. He was the first and the last commentator in the the Jaina sects who wrote such a big and authoritative commentary on Jaina epistemology. He dealt with all the philosophical aspects. He cogently proved the validity of karana, pūrvacara, uttaracara, sahacaraand vyāpya hetus and coined the two new terms tiryak sāmānya and ürdhvatā sāmänya in the context of pratyabhijñānaand prameya.
Hemacandrasūri, known as Kalikālasarvajña, was not only a logician, but also a poet, rhetorician, grammarian, lexicographer etc. His unique work Pramāņa-mimāmsāhas established him as an original thinker in the field of epistemology. He defines pramāņa as an authentic definitive cognition of an object. He does not feel any necessity of inserting 'sva' in the definition of pramāna, because in the opinion of Hemacandra 'Svanirņaya' does not distinguish it from illusory cognition. Prior to Hemcandra pramāna was defined as sva-para
avasāyī, svaparāvabhāsaka etc. which means pramāna is a definitive cognition of an object and of the self. Thus Hemacandra has his own views whereas Māņikyamandin inserted word apūrva in the definition of pramāna
Hemacandra repudiates his insertion and says that a cognition taking note of an object previously cognised does not la of pramāna exactly as the cognition which takes note of what is to be cognised in future. He proposes that with the point of view of modes cognition of previously cognised object is not possible, because a substance is changing every moment at the angle of its modes.
Jinesvarasūri's Pramālaksana (10th-11th centuries A.D.) Candrasenasūri's Utpādādisiddhi, Abhinavadharmabhūsana's