Jain Journal 1998 07

Author(s): Jain Bhawan Publication
Publisher: Jain Bhawan Publication

Page 16

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JAIN JOURNAL : Vol-XXXIII, No. 1 July 1998 (iv) Establishment of inductive reasoning (tarka) as an independent
pramāna (v) Definition of probans (hetu) as incompatibility with the
contradictory (anyathānupapatti). (vi) Establishment of new probans such as kāraṇa, pūrvacara,
uttaracara and sahacara (vii) Particular view about the members of parārthānumāna
required (for inference for others). (viii) Nature of prameya (object) is Dravyaparyāyātmaka or
Sāmānayaviseșātmaka. Now we shall discuss the above arguments and clarify the thoughts of the Jaina logicians about these points.
i. Definition of Pramāņa
Regarding the definition of Pramāņa Jaina philosophers are unanimous in propounding it as definitive cognition. The other characteristic of pramāņa accepted by them is the nature of pramāņa illuminating the self and the object. The Jaina logicians uphold that the contact of the sense organ and object never can be a pramana They say that like object, the sense-object contact also cannot be a pre-eminent cause in generating valid knowledge, because both of them are non-revelatory, because Jaina thinkers propound that pramāna is useful for accepting the desired object and abandoning the undesirable one. Hence it must be cognition. They also accept that a valid cognition through a pramanadoes not require to prove its validity, because the knowledge is always of the nature of illuminating the self and the object. They give an example of the Sun or a lamp which illuminates itself and the object. It is true in our experience also that we know what we know. The Naiyāyikas accept that a cognition can illuminate only its object and vijñānavādins say that a knowledge always illuminates the self. The Jaina logicians clearly accept that knowledge is possessed of both the qualities in its nature. About its nature of determinate the Jaina logicians are firmly determined. Hence, they have refuted the Buddhist definition of pratyakşawhcih is devoid of determination, because they accept the pratyakșa as nirvikalpaka (non-propositional).
ii. Establishment of recollection (smrti) as Pramāpa :
Recollection is a knowledge which arises after the stimulation of memory-impression and is expressed by the pronoun 'that' (tad.) Manifestation of recollection is necessarily conditioned by stimulation of memory impression. Hemcandra defines recollection as such.