Jain Journal 1998 07

Author(s): Jain Bhawan Publication
Publisher: Jain Bhawan Publication
Catalog link: https://jainqq.org/explore/520131/1

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ISSN 0021-4043 A QUARTERLY
ON
JAINOLOGY
VOL XXXIII
No. 1 JULY
1998
10 lucht JAIN BHAWAN PUBLICATION

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Contribution of the Jaina Logicians to Indian Epistemology Dharam Chand Jain
Lord Mahavira on Pramāda D.S. Baya Shreyas
Contents
The Followers of Pārsvanätha Binod Kumar Tiwari
News on Jainism around the world

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JAIN JOURNAL
Vol. XXXIII
No. 1 July
1998
CONTRIBUTION OF THE JAINA LOGICIANS TO INDIAN EPISTEMOLOGY*
DR DHARM CHAND JAIN
PART-I
A BRIEF SURVEY OF LITERARY CONTRIBUTION Before I enter into the problem, I would like to say first of all that the term 'epistemology encompasses two dimensions of philosophy, i.e. Jñāna-mimāmsā and Pramāņa-mimāmsā. To some extent, both the dimensions are intermingled. Pramana is not absolutely different from knowledge or congnition. Particularly in Jaina tradition pramāna is always accepted as a kind of congnition. Hence all the descriptions made in Jaina canons regarding knowledge come under the scope of pramāņa. When we discuss pramāņa, we have to resort to the theory of knowledge. There is only one difference in pramāna and right knowledge (samyag-jñāna) that the right knowledge depends on right view (samyag-darsana), but pramana does not require any such view. Pramana is a kind of knowledge which is devoid of doubt (samsaya), illusion (viparyaya) and indetermination (anadhya-vasāya). In Jaina philosophy pramāṇa has been accepted as a definitive cognition of knowable thing and knowledge itself. The Jaina logicians are almost unanimous on this characteristic of pramāņa. Although at the early time of Tattvārthasūtra, there was no difference between pramana and right knowledge, that is why, Umāsvāti, the author of Tattvārthasūtra had clearly divided five types of knowledge into two kinds of pramāna without mentioning any difference between right knowledge and pramāņa. He kept matijñāna (sensuous knowledge) and śrutajñāna (scriptural or verbal knowledge, succeeding matijñāna) under the category of paroksa pramāņa (indirect pramāna) and the other three
of knowledge i.e. avadhiñana (visual intuition), manahparyāyaiñāna (intuition of mental modes) and kevalajñāna (pure and perfect knowledge) had been placed in the category of pratyakṣa pramāņa
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This is a Mahāsatī Tārābai Svāmī lecture given by the author at Chennai.

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JAIN JOURNAL: Vol-XXXIII, No. 1 July 1998 (perception). This division proves that there was not any difference between right knowledge and pramāņa. Tattvārthasūtra is the first work of Jaina system which propounded the right knowledge as pramāna (an organ of valid cognition) and divided them into two typespratyakṣa and parokṣa. This division of pramāna is based on the process of knowledge. The right knowledge which occurs directly through the soul had been called as pratyakṣa pramāņa (perception) and the right knowledge which occurs through sense organs and quasi-sense had been called as parokṣa pramāņa (other than perception or indirect knowledge).
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In Indian Philosophy all the systems other than Jaina, consider that the knowledge acquired through sense organs comes under the category of perception, but the view of earlier Jaina thinkers like Umāsvāti and Pujyapāda Devanandin who followed the notion of Jaina canonical literature, considered it in the category of parokṣa. They explain that the knowledge occurs directly through soul without the help of sense-organs comes under the concept of pratyakṣa or direct cognition.
The Jaina logicians, after interaction with other schools, accept the sensuous knowledge under the category of empirical perception or samvyāvahārika pratyakṣa. This development is first seen in the Viseṣāvasyakabhāṣya of Jinabhadragani Kṣamāśramaņa. He says jam indiyamanobhavam tam samvavaharapaccakkham (Viseṣāvasyakabhāṣya, 95) which means knowledge occurring through sense organs and quasisense is called as sāmvyavahārika pratyakṣa (empirical perception). Bhaṭṭa Akalanka and other Jaina logicians followed him. Hence they considered two types of pratyakṣa as mukhya pratyakṣa and sāmvyavahārika pratyakṣa. The perception occurred directly through the soul comes under the category of mukhya-pratyakṣa and the perception occurred through sense-organs and mind comes under the category of sāmvyavahārika pratyakṣa (empirical perception). At this stage, the Jain logicians entered into dialogue with other Indian logicians.
It may be noted that in the Anuyogadvārasūtra the word pramāņa is used in the meaning of measurement and we find four types of that pramāņa there i.e. dravyapramāņa, kṣetrapramāņa, kālapramāņa and bhāvapramāṇa. Somewhere in the Bhagavatīsūtra and Anuyogadvārasūtra the four types of pramāņa propounded by the Naiyākikas are mentioned i.e. pratyakṣa (perception) anumāna (inference), upamāna (comparison) and agama (tesimony). (Bhagavatisūtra 5.3.192)
In the Sthānangasūtra these four types of pramāņa are mentioned

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JAIN : CONTRIBUTION OF THE JAINA LOGICIANS TO INDIAN EPISTEMOLOGY 3
as the four types of hetu- (Sthānāngasūtra, 245, Suttāgame, p. 215). Sthānāngasūtra has also mentioned three types of vyavasāya i.e. pratyakşa, prātyayika and anugāmi- (Sthānāngasūtra, 245). Pandit Dalsukha Mālvaniya has mentioned in his 'Agama Yuga kā Jain Darśana' (pp. 138-139) that these three types of Vyavasāya have got a place in Siddhasena's Nyāyāvatāra and Haribhadra's Anekāntajayapatāka as the developed form of pramānai.e. pratyakşa, anumāna and agma It is true that the seeds and roots of Jaina concept of pramāņa are found in Jaina canons. The Anuyogadvārasūtra and Sthānāngasūtra have great importance in this context. In the Sthānāngasūtra perception is divided into two types i.e. kevala and nokevala. In the later development of pramānaśāstrathe Jaina logicians termed these types as sakala and vikala perception. In the Anuyogadvārasūtra and Nandisūtra perceptual knowledge is divided into two types i.e. indriya-pratyaksa and no-indriya pratyakşa. This division shows that in the later canonical literature the knowledge occurred by sense organs was included in perception.
This division of perception is not mentioned in the Tattvārthasūtra So it seems that this addition was made in the canons at a later stage. It is possible that Jinabhadraganin (6th century) developed a concept of sāņuyavahārika pratyaksa on the basis of the above mentioned division of perception in the Nandisūtra and Sthänāngasūtra.
Jaina epistemology regarding pramāna was actually systematized by Bhatta Akalanka in the eighth century A.D. The main contribution of Bhatta Akalanka was to establish smrti (recollection) pratyabhijñāna (recognition) and tarka (inductive reasoning) as independent pramāņas under the category of paroksa. This is also one of the main contributions of Jaina epistemology to Indian philosophy.
Before the advent of Akalanka (720-780 A.D.), Umāsvāti (2nd-3rd century A.D.), Pūjyapāda Devanandin (5th century A.D), Samantabhadra (6th century A.D.), Mallavādi Kşamāśramaņa (5th century A.D.), Jinabhadragani Kşamā-śramaņa (6th-7th century A.D.), Simhasūri (7th century A.D.) Sumati (7th-8th century) Pātrasvāmi (7th century), Shridatta, Kumāranandin (7th century) and Haribhadrasūri (700-770 A.D.) also contributed their mite to the Jaina epistemology to some extent. Ācārya Kundakunda attempted to prove the nature of knowledge illuminating itself and object.
One of the prominent philosophers Mallavādi Kşamāśramana flourished in the 5th century A.D. discussed all the main philosophical tenects in his famous work Dvādaśāranayacakra. He refuted several times the epistemology of other systems. Simhasūri's commentary on

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JAIN JOURNAL: Vol-XXXIII, No. 1 July 1998 it is also an authouritative work for understanding Dvādaśāranayacakra. Siddhasena Diväkara was a great logician who flourished before Bhaṭṭa Akalanka in 5th century A.D. and wrote an independent work on Jaina logic known as Nyāyāvatāra. It is a systematic work comprising 32 kārikās (Stanzas) presents a brief description of Jain pramāṇa-śāstra. S.C. Vidyabhusana mentioned Siddhasena Divākara as a father of Jaina Logic and recognised his Nyāyāvatāra as the first work of Jaina Logic (A History of Indian Logic p. 173). Hence it is an important work for Jaina Logic. Siddharṣigani, a philosopher of the 9th century A.D., wrote a comprehensive commentary on it. M.A. Dhaky is of the view that Siddharṣigani, the commentator of Nyāyāvatāra, was himself the writer of Nyāyāvatāra (Nirgranth, Ahmedabad, Vol. I), but his opinion does not seem acceptable, because if Siddharṣigani (9th century) would have written it, then he must have mentioned smriti, pratyabhijñānaand tarka as pramāņa, because before the advent of Siddharsigani, Bhaṭṭa Akalanka emphatically established them as pramāņa. Šāntisūri of Pūrṇatalagacchiya wrote a vārttika and commentary on Nyāyāvatāra, which is also an important work for the study of development of Jaina logic. Santisūri defined the perception as clarity of knowledge and propounded three types of it i.e. indriya pratyakṣa (sensuous perception), aninindriya pratyakṣa (quasisensuous perception) and yogaja pratyakṣa. (Nyāyāvatāra vārttika, 17). He defined vaisadya or vividity of knowledge as the apprehension of its content as this (Nyāyāvatāra-vārttika, 17) definition has been followed by Hemacandra in his Pramāṇa-mīmāṁsā, (Pramāņamīmāmsā 1.1.14)
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Sanmatitarka-prakarana is also an important treatise consisting of three chapters namely-Naya-mimāmsā, Jñānamimāṇsā and Jñeya-mimāmsā. Siddhasena was a great philosopher who also contributed to the establishment of the theory of non-absolutism.
Like Siddhasena Divākara, Samantabhadra's main contribution was to establish Anekäntavāda or non-absolutism, but occasionally he discussed some concepts of pramāṇa-śāstra also. His Yuktyanusāsana, Aptamimāmsä and Svayambhustotra are the main
works.
Sumati, Pätrasvāmi, Sridatta and Kumaranandin were such prominent philosophers of the 7th and 8th centuries A.D. whose works are mentioned by Buddhist and Jaina logicians, but the works have not yet been found. Sumati and Pātrasvāmi were such renowned philosophers whose names are referred by the Buddhist logician Sāntarakṣita (8th century) in his work Tattvasamgraha. Pätrasvāmi's Trilakṣaṇakadartham was a famous treatise in which the hetulakṣana

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JAIN CONTRIBUTION OF THE JAINA LOGICIANS TO INDIAN EPISTEMOLOGY 5
of Buddhist philosophy was refuted vehemently. Vidyananda mentioned in Tattvārtha-sloka-vārttika about Jalpanirnaya the work of Sridatta and in Pramāṇa-parikṣā he mentioned about Vädanyāya the work of Kūmāranandin.
In the eighth century A.D. Haribhadra-sūri (700-770 A.D.), an original thinker and profound philosopher, authoured several works. His famous philosophical works are Anekāntajaya-patākā, Śāstravārtāsamuccaya and Şaḍdarśana-samuccaya. Commentary of Gunaratnasūri is famous on Saddarśana-samuccaya and commentary of Yasovijaya is also renowned on Śāstravārtā-samuccaya.
Thus from Umāsvāti down to Haribhadrasuri, the predecessors of Bhaṭṭa Akalanka developed and enriched the Jaina epistemology.
The advent of Bhaṭṭa Akalanka had a great significance from the point of view of systematization of Jain logic and epistemology. He flourished during the period from 720 to 780 A.D. as is upheld by Pandit Mahendra Kumār Nyāyācārya in the introduction to his Akalankagranthatrayam Bhaṭṭa Akalanka has critically examined the views regarding metaphysics and epistemology of previous Indian philosophers like Diǹnāga, Dharma Kirti, Prajñākaragupta, Karnakagomi and Kumārilabhaṭṭa. He authoured two commentaries entitled Tattvārthavārtika and Aṣṭasati on Tattvārthasūtra of Umāsvāti and Aptamimāmsā of Samantabhadra respectively. In the Tattvärthavārtika Bhaṭṭa Akalanka has discussed the definition of pramāņa and accepted that pramāņa (organ of valid cognition) is valid even after it cognises the object previously cognised. He gave an instance of a lamp which illuminates the object even after the moment it is lit. Although the main subject-matter of Tattvārthasūtra is not intended to propound epistemology, in the context of description of knowledge commentator Akalanka discussed the definitions of pramāņa propounded by other Indian systems also. Aṣṭasati is a precise commentary having the size of eight hundred anuṣṭubh metres. Deep sense, few words and logical acumen are the specialities of Akalanka's style and they are more distinct in Aṣṭasati. Akalanka included some new topics in the commentary and threw a light on pramāṇa-śāstra explaining the Karika No. 101 of Aptamimāmsā. He seems impressed by Buddhist definition of pramāņa also, because he used the term 'avisamvada' for defining pramāņa. He says that Pramāņa is a kind of cognition devoid of discrepancy and indetermination.
Bhatta Akalanka wrote four independent works viz. Laghiyastraya along with the vṛtti, Nyāya-viniscaya along with the vṛtti, Pramāṇasamgraha and Siddhiviniscaya along with the vṛtti. All these four works

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JAIN JOURNAL: Vol-XXXIII, No. 1 July 1998
mainly deal with the epistemology and logic. Laghiyastraya is a composite work having three manuals (prakarana) viz. (i) Pramanapravesa (ii) Naya-praveśa and (iii) Pravacana-pravesa. Pramana-pravesa contains four chapters on (i) nature of pramāņa (ii) classification (iii) object and (iv) resultant. Naya-praveśa is mainly devoted to the description of Nayas. Pravacana-pravesa, though begins with the definition of pramāna, naya and nikṣepa, it mainly deals with śrutajñāna, a kind of paroksa pramāṇa.
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Nyayaviniscaya, another work of Akalanka, has three chapters on perception, inference and testimony.
Pramana-samgrha, an important work of Akalanka, deals with every aspect of epistemology in nine chapters. Siddhiviniscaya is also an important work regarding epistemology and logic. He defines here pramāņa as siddhi. This treatise comprises twelve chapters which are indicative of their subject-matter. Akalanka says here that every knowledge is valid due to its corresponding nature and it is invalid due to its discrepancy - Siddhiviniscaya 1.19)
If we summarise the contribution of Akalanka on the basis of his above mentioned four works, then we can point out his views as follows:
1) It was he who for the first time established recollection (smṛti), recognition (pratyabhijñāna) and inductive reasoning (tarka) as pramāņa. He has placed these under the category of paroksa pramāņa. He has said that if these cognitions are indiscrepant and devoid of doubt, illusion and indetermination (anadhyavasaya) then these are very much the means of valid cognition.
2) He upholds two types of pratyakṣa-sāmvyavahārika (empirical) and mukhya (transcendental). The types of matijñāna as avagraha (receiving), ihā (speculation) avaya (perceptual judgement) and dhāraṇā (retention) were included by him in sāmvyavahārika pratykṣa and he has accepted their sequential position as propounded in canonical literature.
3) He has accepted differences between matijñāna and śrutajñāna according to the canonical tradition and has placed the śrutajñāna under the category of paroksa pramāņa, śrutajñāna is known in epistemplogy as āgamapramāṇa.
(4) He has included upamāna pramāņa (comparison) in the recognition (pratyabhijñāna) of similarity which he conceptualised taking Samjñā of Umāsvāti as its basis. 5) He has discussed all the epistemological terms, such as hetu, sādhya, dṛṣṭānta, vyāpti etc.

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JAIN CONTRIBUTION OF THE JAINA LOGICIANS TO INDIAN EPISTEMOLOGY 7
6) he has introduced some new hetus also such as kāraṇa (cause) pūrvacara, uttaracara and sahacara.
7) Akalarka has discussed naya and nikṣepa also which has formed an integral part of epistemology.
The Jaina philosophers contributing to Indian epistemology after Bhaṭṭa Akalanka are:
Vidyānanda, Anantavirya,
Māņikyanandin, Vādirāja, Abhayadevasūri, Prabhācandra, Vädidevasüri, Hemacandra, Abhinava dharmabhūṣaṇa, Gunaratnasūri, Mallişena, Vimaladāsa and Yasovijaya. Since it is not possible to disscuss the contributions of all these logicians owing to the short time at my disposal, I think it to appraise you to the contributions of the prominent logicians.
proper
Vidyananda (775-840 AD), the first commentator of Akalanka, was a progound philosopher deeply acquainted with Jaina and other systems of Indian philosophy. He put forth a step to establish the Jaina pramana-sastra logically. He wrote three commentaries viz. Tattvärtha-sloka-vārtika on Tattvärthasūtra of Umāsvāti, Aṣṭasahasri on Aṣṭasati of Bhatta Akalanka and Yuktyanusasanālankära on yuktyanusāsana of Samantabhadra.
In these commentaries he has cogently established the Jaina philosophy and has refuted other systems. Tattvartha-sloka-vārtika, a commentary on the Tattvarthasūtra, presents an exhaustive description of Jaina epistemology. He has discussed all the five types of knowledge. He also deals with perception, recollection, (smarana), recognition (pratyabhi jñāna), reasoning (tarka), inference (anumana) and testimony (agama). Aṣṭasahasri expounds Aptamimāmsā of Samantabhadra and Aṣṭasati of Akalanńka on it, but Astasahasrihas become a kaṣṭasaharri, because its comprehension is an uphill task. Yuktyanusaranalannkāra is an important work for understanding the Jaina philosophy in general.
Apart from his commentaries Vidyananda wrote six independent works. viz. Vidyānandamahodaya, Aptaparikṣā, Pramāṇaparikṣā, Patraparikṣa, Satya-śāsana-parikṣā and śripurapārsvanathastotra. All these works are important for the study of Jaina philosophy, particullarly his pramāṇa-parikṛā is fully devoted to discussing the different aspects of epistemology. Herein Vidyānanta defines pramāņa as right cognition. He repudiated the concept of nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa mainly propounded by Buddhists. He says that perception is a kind of valid cognition and every valid cognition is regarded as determinant cognition. Vidyananda has also dicussed the definition of probans (hetu) and refuted the position of Buddhists and Naiyayikas who consider

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JAIN JOURNAL : Vol-XXXIII, No. 1 July 1998 hetu's trairūpya and pāñcarūpya repectively as its essential characteristics.
pramāņa-parīkşā is really the first composite and systematic work which expalins the complete Jaina epistemology and logic briefly.
The second commmentator of Akalanka was Anantavirya. There are four Anantaviryas referred to in Jaina literature, but he was the third Anantvirya who flourished during 950 to 990 A.D. and wrote commentaries on Pramāņa-samgrahaand Siddhiviniscayaof Akalanka. Commentary on Pramānasangraha is known as pramāṇasamgrahabhāsaya and commentary on Siddhiviniscaya is known as Siddhiviniscayatikā. pramānasamgrahabhāsyais not yet available, but its reference is found in the Siddhiviniscayatikā. It is an important commentary for understanding the development of Jaina thinking regarding episteniology.
Mānikyanandin (993-1053 AD) was the first logician who wrote an aphoristic treatise entitled Parikşāmukha which presents the Jaina system of epistemology in a nutshell. Prabhācandra a prominent philosopher wrote a voluminous commentary on it entitled prameyakamala-mārtanda Laghuanantavirya's prameyaratnamālā, Cārukīrti's prameyasatālańkāra and sāntivami's Prameyakanthikā are also famous commentaries on pariksāmukha All these commentaries depict the importance of this first aphoristic treatise of Jaina logic.
Vadirāja (1025 AD) was also a commentator of Akalanka. He wrote a commentary on Nyāyaviniscaya of Akalanka known as Nyāyaviniscayavivarana This is a big commentary comprising the size of twenty thousand Anustubh stanzas. It discusses the doctrines of several Indian philosophers like Kumārila, Prabhākara, Mandanamiśra, Vyomaśiva, Bhāsarvajña etc. and refutes them cogently. Other work of Vādirāja on Jaina epistemology is pramāna-nirņaya. It is an independent work on Jaina-nyāya. Vädirāja propounds only two types of parokṣa pramāņa as inference and testimony and includes recollection, recognition and reasoning as the subdivisions of inference.
Abhayadevasūri the commentator of Siddhasena's Sanmatitarka prakarang, was a disciple of Rājagacchiya Pradyumnasūri, Pandit Sukhalala Sanghavi & Pandit Becaradāsa Dosi have placed him during the second half of the 10th centrury and first half of the 11th century A.D. Pandit Mahendra Kumār Nyāyācārya considers him belonging to the last part of the 11th century of Vikrama Samvat, but he does not clearly say that who was earlier between Abhayadevasūri and Prabhācandra. It seems that Abhayadevasūri's commentary on

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JAIN : CONTRIBUTION OF THE JAINA LOGICIANS TO INDIAN EPISTEMOLOGY 9 Sanmatitarka was written eariler than the works of Prabhācadra becuase the issues raised in the Tattvabodhavidhāyini (ţikā on Sanmatitarka) are found more systematic in the works of Prabhācandra.
The commentary Sanmatitarkatīkā also known as Tattvabodhavidhāyiniand Vadamahārņava explains naya, jñānaand jñeya at lenght. Abhayadevasūri was a well-versed commentator on Jaina epistemology. He has a penetrating view when he refutes the other systems. The second kända of his commentary mainly deals with epistemology.
Prabhācandra, a renowned Jaina logician, has contributed a lot by writing two voluminous commentaries entitled Nyāya-kumudacandra and Prameya-kamala-mārtanda prameya-kamala-mārtandra is a commentary on Parikṣāmukha of Māņikyanandin and Nyāya kumuda candra is a commentary on Laghiyastrayaof Akalanka. Pandit Kailasacandra Sastri places him during 950 to 1020 AD in the introduction to the first part of Nyāya-kumuda-candra and Pandit Mahendra Kumar Nyāyācārya has fixed him with a minor modification during 980 to 1065 A.D. Prabhācandra has given many new cogent arguments to refute the other systemes and to establish the Jaina philosophy. He has discussed the other systems' prima facie views (pūrvapaksa) and refuted them on logical ground. Although he is credited to have written some other works like Tattvārthavștti, Śākațāyananyāsa, Sabdāmbhojabhāskara, Pravacana-sarasarojabhāskara, Gadyakathākośa, Mahāpurāņa ţippaņa, Ratnākarandațika, Samādhitantraţika, Kriyākalāpaţika, and Atmānušāsanatilaka, but scholars have divergent opinions about the authourship of some of these works.
Although Prameya-kamala-mārtaņda comes under the category of a commentary, but it seems to be an independent original work. Prabhācandra has also discussed all the other systems in detail and has subjected them to devastating criticism.
In his other commentary Nyāya-kumuda-candra, Prabhacandra discussed some new topics and presented new arguments to establish the Jaina theory of epistemology. There is no doubt that he has explained all the aspects of pramāņa in a systematic and logical style in both the commentaries.
Like Mānikyanandin, a Digamber sect, Vadidevasūri was the first Śvetāmbara Ācārya who wrote an aphoristic treatise on Jaina logic entitled Parikṣāmukha, but somewhere or other Vādidevasūri differs from Māņikyanandin as on the topics of kevali-kavalā-hāra,

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JAIN JOURNAL : Vol-XXXIII, No. 1 July 1998 emancipation of a woman etc. Vādidevasūri's pramāņa-naya-tattvāloka comprises eight chapters having two more chapters than parikşāmukha, dealing with naya and vāda also. Vādidevasūri was the first logician who systamatized the rules of vāda according to Jaina views. Another new chapter which deals with naya is also important, because it summarises the Jaina perspective on naya. A profound philosopher of the 17th century, a celebrated Jaina philosopher Ācārya Yaśovijaya, has followed his Pramāņa-naya-tattuāloka in his Jaina Tarka-Bhāṣā. Vādidevesūri himself wrote a valuable commentary as
la-ratnākara. It is a voluminous commentrary having a size of eighty four thousand Anustubhmetres. The title suāduāda-ratnakara is significant by its subject-matter. Vadidevasūri discussed those topics too which could not be taken up by Prabhācandra. The language of the work is very lucid and attractive. Syādvādaratnākara is of paramount importance since it goes one step further in developing Jaina epistemological doctrines. He was the first and the last commentator in the the Jaina sects who wrote such a big and authoritative commentary on Jaina epistemology. He dealt with all the philosophical aspects. He cogently proved the validity of karana, pūrvacara, uttaracara, sahacaraand vyāpya hetus and coined the two new terms tiryak sāmānya and ürdhvatā sāmänya in the context of pratyabhijñānaand prameya.
Hemacandrasūri, known as Kalikālasarvajña, was not only a logician, but also a poet, rhetorician, grammarian, lexicographer etc. His unique work Pramāņa-mimāmsāhas established him as an original thinker in the field of epistemology. He defines pramāņa as an authentic definitive cognition of an object. He does not feel any necessity of inserting 'sva' in the definition of pramāna, because in the opinion of Hemacandra 'Svanirņaya' does not distinguish it from illusory cognition. Prior to Hemcandra pramāna was defined as sva-para
avasāyī, svaparāvabhāsaka etc. which means pramāna is a definitive cognition of an object and of the self. Thus Hemacandra has his own views whereas Māņikyamandin inserted word apūrva in the definition of pramāna
Hemacandra repudiates his insertion and says that a cognition taking note of an object previously cognised does not la of pramāna exactly as the cognition which takes note of what is to be cognised in future. He proposes that with the point of view of modes cognition of previously cognised object is not possible, because a substance is changing every moment at the angle of its modes.
Jinesvarasūri's Pramālaksana (10th-11th centuries A.D.) Candrasenasūri's Utpādādisiddhi, Abhinavadharmabhūsana's

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JAIN : CONTRIBUTION OF THE JAINA LOGICIANS TO INDIAN EPISTEMOLOGY 11 Nyāyadipikā, Narendrasena's Pramāņa-prameya-kalikā are also important works which have enriched the Jaina epistemological literature.
In the seventeenth century Ācārya Yasovijaya (emerged as a prominent philosopher) wrote more than a hundred works. His works mainly related to Jaina epistemology are-Jainatarkabhāṣā, Jñānabindu, Astarahasritātparya-vivarana and śāstravārtāsamuccayaţikā.. Among these works former two are independent treatires and the latter two are the commentaries. Aștasahasritātparyavivarana is a commentary on Aștasahasri of Vidyānanda and Sāstravārtāsa-muccayaţikā is a commentary on Šāstravārtāsamuccaya of Haribhadrasūri.
To conclude, we can say that the Jaina epistemology has completed a long journey of development ranging from the 2nd century A.D. to the 17th century A.D. It has been enriched by a huge literature comprising aphoristic treatises, commentaries, vārttikas, bhāsyas and independent works. It goes without saying that both from the point of view of volume of literature and quality of philosophical discussion it is not less advanced, (if not more), than the Vedic logic and Buddhist logic. Some points are noted below : A. The Jaina philosophers of both the sects Digambara and
Svetambara joined their hands to develope the Jaina epistemology and logic. Jain philosophers were well-versed with all the systems of philosophy, whatever they thought appropriate for Jaina system was accepted. Their refutation of
opponent's view is based on cogent reasons. B. If the works of Sumati, Kumāranandin and Pātrakeśari are
found available, then the history of the development of Jaina
epistemology may be rewritten. c. Ūmāsvāti was the first philosopher who recognised right
knowledge as pramāna and classified the pramāna into two types i.e. pratyakṣa (perception) and parokşa. After establishment of right knowledge as pramāna all the descriptions of knowledge found in canonical literature came
under the category of pramāņa. D. The division of knowledge as indriya-pratyaksa and no-indriya
pratyaksa as found in the Nandi-sūtra seems a latter
development. E Although Nyāyāvatāra is the first systematic work on Jaina
epistemology and logic, Bhatta Akalanka systematized it. He

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JAIN JOURNAL : Vol-XXXIII, No. 1 July 1998 included recollection, recognition and reasoning as pramāna under the category of paroksa pramāna He introduced kārana,
pūrvacara, uttaracara and sahacara hetus as valid probans. F. The knowledge occurring through sense organs was first
included as empirical perception (sāmvyavahārika pratyaksa) by Jinabhadraganin. Earlier it was mentioned as indriyapratyaksa in the Nandisūtra. In the Nandi-sūtra the concept of anindriya pratyakşa (quasisense) is not mentioned. The Nandisūtra mentions about no-indriya pratyakşa, but this term
was used to denote transcendental perception. G. The mukhya pratyaksa was given a new name as pāramarthika
pratyaksa by Vādidevasūri. He further divided it into two types as sakala and vikala pratyakşaon the basis of a division found
in the Sthānānga-sūtȚa as kevala and no-kevala H. The Svetāmbara logicians are unanimous in accepting the
validity of cognition which cognises the object previously cognised. Whereas Digambara logicians like Akalannk Mānikyanandin and Prabhācandra were of opinion that it is a condition for valid cognition to be regarded as a pramāna that
it must cognise the object which is previously not cognised. I. Hemacandra for the first time mentions that mind is capable
to know all the objects. Umāsvāti says that mind is only an
instrument of Śrutajñāna. We cannot forget the scholars of the 20th century like Pandita Sukhlal Sanghavi, Dalsukha Bhai Mālavaniyā, Mahendra Kumāra Nyayacarya, Satakari Mookerjee, Becardāsa Dosi, Darbārīlala Koti and Nathamal Tāția who have contributed to bring out the literature with their perfection of editing and illustrative notes. Some of Jaina Saints and scholars are also engaged in translating the epistemological works in Hindi, Gujarati and English. Pandit Kailasa Candra Šāstri, Nagin J. Sāha, and Muni Nathamala (Ācārya Mahāprajña) and are such modern scholars who also contributed to present the Jaina views in a critical manner. The Jaina epistemological literature is undoubtedly of paramount impartance for understanding the development of Indian and Jaina thinking on epistemology.

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JAIN CONTRIBUTION OF THE JAINA LOGICIANS TO INDIAN EPISTEMOLOGY 13
PART II
AN APPRAISAL OF CONTRIBUTIONS TO EPISTEMOLOGICAL DOCTRINES
As pointed out before the term 'epistemology' encompasses two dimensions of philosophy i.e. Jñāna-mīmāmsā and Pramana-mīmāmsā. Today I want to make it clear that Nayamimāmsā is also a dimension of epistemology which has been discussed exclusively by Jaina philosophers. Epistemology is a science of knowledge which includes all that deals with every aspect of knowing. Pramāṇamimāmsā and Nayamīmāmsā are not absolutely different from Jñānamimāṇsā. The Tattvārthasūtra of Umāsvāti propounds clearly that knowledge of an object is attained by pramāņa and naya. (Tattvārthasūtra 1.6). Herein it is also clear that Adhigama (knowledge) is a resultant and pramāņa and naya are the means. pramāņa and jñāna are the terms which are commonly found in all the systems of Indian philosophy. But the characteristic concept of 'naya' is a peculiar contribution of Jaina system of Indian epistemology. The Jaina logicians contributed their mite to establish the doctrine of naya. Although 'naya' is a part of śrutajñāna, it has been developed by the Jaina logicians as a separate branch of knowledge which denotes the different attitudes and standpoints. Another contribution of the Jaina logicians the is development of the theory of Anekāntavāda (non-absolutism) and Syādvāda. Saptabhangi naya (sevenfold predication) is also a development of non-absolutism. Thus the Jania contribution to Indian epistemology is significant for knowing a truth with different perspectives. The fivefold knowledge i.e. matijñāna (sensuous knowledge), śrutajñāna (scriptural or verbal knowledge, succeeding (matijñāna), avadhijñāna (visual intuition), manaḥparyaya jñāna (intution of mental modes) and kevala-jñāna (pure and perfect knowledge) is an original contribution of Jaina tradition which was manitained by the Jaina logicians by including it in the twofold pramāņa.
Now I want to highlight the points on which Jania logicians contributed to the Indian epistemology regarding pramāna. The main contributions of the Jaina logicians regarding pramāņa are as follows: Definition of pramāņa and its nature illuminating the self and the object.
(i)
(ii)
Establishment of recollection (smrti) as an independent pramāņa
(iii)
Establishment of recognition (pratyabhijñāna) as an independent pramāṇa

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JAIN JOURNAL : Vol-XXXIII, No. 1 July 1998 (iv) Establishment of inductive reasoning (tarka) as an independent
pramāna (v) Definition of probans (hetu) as incompatibility with the
contradictory (anyathānupapatti). (vi) Establishment of new probans such as kāraṇa, pūrvacara,
uttaracara and sahacara (vii) Particular view about the members of parārthānumāna
required (for inference for others). (viii) Nature of prameya (object) is Dravyaparyāyātmaka or
Sāmānayaviseșātmaka. Now we shall discuss the above arguments and clarify the thoughts of the Jaina logicians about these points.
i. Definition of Pramāņa
Regarding the definition of Pramāņa Jaina philosophers are unanimous in propounding it as definitive cognition. The other characteristic of pramāņa accepted by them is the nature of pramāņa illuminating the self and the object. The Jaina logicians uphold that the contact of the sense organ and object never can be a pramana They say that like object, the sense-object contact also cannot be a pre-eminent cause in generating valid knowledge, because both of them are non-revelatory, because Jaina thinkers propound that pramāna is useful for accepting the desired object and abandoning the undesirable one. Hence it must be cognition. They also accept that a valid cognition through a pramanadoes not require to prove its validity, because the knowledge is always of the nature of illuminating the self and the object. They give an example of the Sun or a lamp which illuminates itself and the object. It is true in our experience also that we know what we know. The Naiyāyikas accept that a cognition can illuminate only its object and vijñānavādins say that a knowledge always illuminates the self. The Jaina logicians clearly accept that knowledge is possessed of both the qualities in its nature. About its nature of determinate the Jaina logicians are firmly determined. Hence, they have refuted the Buddhist definition of pratyakşawhcih is devoid of determination, because they accept the pratyakșa as nirvikalpaka (non-propositional).
ii. Establishment of recollection (smrti) as Pramāpa :
Recollection is a knowledge which arises after the stimulation of memory-impression and is expressed by the pronoun 'that' (tad.) Manifestation of recollection is necessarily conditioned by stimulation of memory impression. Hemcandra defines recollection as such.

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JAIN CONTRIBUTION OF THE JAINA LOGICIANS TO INDIAN EPISTEMOLOGY 15
vāsanod-bodha-hetukā tad ityākāra smṛti. (Pramāṇa-mimāmsā.1.2.3) Almost all the philosophers from Bhaṭṭa Akalanka down to Vadidevasūri define recollection almost in the same manner. Bhaṭṭa Akalanka says that recollection is a resultant of retention, but it is also a pramāṇa, because of its resultant recognition (pratyabhijñāna).
Although Prasastapāda has mentioned recollection as a kind of vidyā (right knowledge), but he did not accept it as an independent pramana. Nyāyasutra mentions it as an attribute of soul. But none other system than Jaina has accepted it as an idependent. The Pramāņa -mīmāmsā philosophy does not consider it as pramāna, because it cognises the object previously cognised, and pramāņa in their opinion always cognises the object previously not cognised. Buddhist philosophers also give the same argument, but they present some more arguments, such as (i) it is not generated by an object, so it does not correspond to the object, (ii) if recollection is considered as pramāņa then intention, repugnance (dveṣa) etc. will also be considered as pramāņa and it will create an infinite regress, (iii) recollection deals with past object. But in view of the Jaina logicians, Buddhist view is not accurate.
The Jaina logicians Akalarka, Vidyānanda, Prabhācandra and Vadidevasūri put forth many cogent arguments to establish it as an independent pramāņa. Some of them are presented here.
1.
2.
If recollection is not regarded as a separate organ of valid condition, because it cognises the object previously cognised, then it is not a valid reason, because the recollection also cognises partly unknown from the point of view of time etc.
3.
Recollection is an organ of valid cognition, because it is an indiscrepant cognition. Whenever the recollection is found discrepant then it comes under the psuedo-organ of valid condition. The recollection which is corresponding to activity is an indiscrepant knowledge.
4.
Inference cannot be an organ of valid cognition without having recourse to recollection of invariable concomitance. Every philosopher who accepts inference as a means of valid cognition has to invariably resort to recollection of invariable concomitance. For example, when we perceive smoke on a mountain the impression of our previous cognition of smoke pervaded by fire in kitchen is awakened and we recollect it immediately.
Vidyananda says that without accepting the validity of recollection, the validity of recognition does not exist. If recollection is not valid then inductive reasoning cannot take

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6.
JAIN JOURNAL : Vol-XXXIII, No. 1 July 1998 place. Without the help of valid inductive reasoning the inference cannot occur. If inference does not take place then validity of perception can not be proved. In this way, in absence of all the pramānas object cannot be proved. Thus if we do not accept the validity of recollection all the organs of knowledge and the
knowable things will not exist in the world of reality. 5. Recollection is a valid organ of cognition because it is a means
of knowledge like a perception. The intelligent people cannot behave without the validity of recollection. If we do not accept its validity then we cannot even reach our homes. All the transaction of money will be stopped. The students will not be able to write any thing in their answer sheets at the time of examination. Thus the validity of recollection is duly established in all our activites. If recollection is understood as invalid cognition on account of its occurrence after perception then it is also not legitimate because inference also occurs after perception. As inference is a valid organ of cognition because it is devoid of
abt, illusion and indetermination, so is the recollection. because it also has the same quality. Without the memory of probans (hetu)and probandum (sādhya) the invariable relation between them cannot be established. Jayanta Bhatta in his Nyāyamañjari says that recollection is not invalid because it cognises the object previously cognised, but it is invalid because it is not generated by the object, because the object does not exist at the time of correspondence due to its momentariness. ņa smộter apramāņatvam gļhita-grāhitā-kstam
api-tuanartha-janyatuam tad aprāmāṇya-kāraṇam 11 The reason of the invalidity of recognition pointed out in this Karikā is also corresponding to the Buddhist view, but it is not proper according to Vidyānanda. He replies as under.
närthāj janmopapadyeta pratyakşasya smsteriva 1 tadvat sa eva tadbhāvād anyathā na kşana-kşayaḥ 11
Tattvārtha-śloka-vārttika (1.13.27) The reply is given to the Buddhist philosophers that in the Buddhist view even the perception also, is not generated from the object because the object does not exist at the time of correspondence due to its momentariness. Prabhācandra replies in a different way that we the Jainas do not accept the perception generated from the object. It is true that in Jaina philosophy the knowledge is a result of subsidence

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JAIN CONTRIBUTION OF THE JAINA LOGICIANS TO INDIAN EPISTEMOLOGY 17
cum-destruction of the karma obscuring knowledge. Acārya Hemcandra gives a different argument that recollection is a valid organ of cognition without its emergence from an object, such as yogijñāna is a valid organ of cognition without its emergence from an object.
iii. Establishment of recognition (pratyabhijñā) as pramāṇa
Another contribtution of the Jaina logicians to Indian epistemology is the establishment of recognition pratyabhhijñāna as an independent organ of cognition. According to the Jaina logicians recognition is the synthetic judgement born of observation and recollection. Akalarka has used the term Samjñā, Samjñāna and pratyabhijñāna for recognition. The Jaina philosophers have included the comparison (upamāna) under recognition as one of its kinds. They did not accept comparision as a separate organ of valid cognition. The Jaina logician Vidyananda propounded two types of recognition i.e. knowledge of oneness (ekatvajñāna) and knowledge of similarity (sādṛśya jñāna).
When the object already perceived and recollected is the same at the time of recognition, the recognition is in the form of knowledge of oneness and when the object is similar to the object being perceived and recollected, the recognition is in the form of knowledge of similarity. tadevam ityekatva-nibandhanam tādṛśam evedam iti. sādṛsyanibandha (Pramāṇa-parikṣnamp.42). He is the same Devadatta so'yam devadattaḥ is the example of knowledge of oneness and as an ox so the gavaya go-sadṛso gavayah is the example of knowledge of similarity.
Manikyanandin, a profound scholar of Jaina epistemology, goes a step futher and recognises recognition on its various aspects. He says the recognition can be manifold. Some examples are: it is identical with that, it is similar to that, it is different from that, it is relatum to that. tad evedam tat sadṛśam, tadvilakṣaṇam, tat-pratiyogityādi (Parikṣāmukha 3.5) former two types of recognition have already been mentioned above. A buffalo is different from the cow is the example of tad-vilakṣaṇatva and 'this is away from that' 'this is near to that', are the examples of (tat pratiyogitva). Acarya Hemcandra corroborates the kinds proposed by Manikyanandin.
Vādidevasūri, the author of Pramana-naya-tattvāloka and Syadvādaratnākara used the new terms of tiryak sāmānya and ūrdhvatā-sāmānya relating to the definition of recognition. Tiryak sāmārya and he is the same Devadutta denotes ūrdhvatā-sāmārya. In Indian philosophy Nyāya, Vaiseṣika, Mīmāmsā, Vedānta and Kāśmira Śaivism also discuss the recognition, but they include it in perception and do not recognise it as a separate organ of valid cognition.

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JAIN JOURNAL : Vol-XXXIII, No. 1 July 1998 Jayantabhatta, a foremost Naiyāyika, accepts the validity of recognition under perception, because it is generated by sense object contact with the help of latent trace (samskāra). But the Buddhist logicians are of the opinion that recognition cannot be pramāna, because regress, illusory knowledge having no object and uncorresponding nature of it. For establishment of recognition as independent valid organ of cognition the Jaina logicians have given many arguments the main arguments are being presented here. 1. Recognition is neither merely a recollection nor merely a
perception, but it is different from both and is possessed of being a new pramāna, because it has to cognise a different object which is not cognised by mere perception and mere recollection.
So recognition is an independent organ of cognition. 2. It is a pramāņa, because it is found indiscrepant in behaviour.
Ācārya Hemacandra says that without accepting the recognition as independent pramāņa (valid organ of cognition) the logical justification of bondage and emancipation would become absolutely impossible. If it is the self same person who suffers bondage and achieves liberation, it is possible that the person can try to achieve the joy of freedom. Bhatta Akalanka maintains the sequence of recollection, recognition and inductive reasoning is the resultant of recognition. He tells that the meaning of a word can be known only if the validity of recollection is accepted. Perception is not capable to differentiate between distant and near, short and long etc., only recognition can do so. Vidyānanda says that without the acceptance of recognition we cannot know that I am the same who was child, teenager, young, and adult before and now have become an old man. (Tattvārthaílokavārtika, 1.13.46). He says that without accepting its validity of recognition Buddhists would not be able to consider the oneness between two momentary objects or svalaksana. It is necessary to accept the validity of recognition for the knowledge of similarity also. Recognition is different from inference because it recognises the
hetu (probans) only and inference is a later process. 7. The object of recognition is not cognised by recollection and
perception separately, hence it cognises the object which is not
cognised by any other pramāņa. 8. There is no contradictory cognition which affects its validity.
Thus the Jaina logicians have established the recognition as an
3.
6.

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JAIN: CONTRIBUTION OF THE JAINA LOGICIANS TO INDIAN EPISTEMOLOGY 19 independent pramāņa.It is to be noted that they include upamāna (comparison) in the category of the knowledge of similarity under recognition.
iv. Establishment of inductive reasoning (tarka) as pramāņa
It is also a significant contribution of the Jaina logicians that they established the tarka as an independent pramāṇa.. They propound that invariable relation between probans (hetu) and probandum (sādhya) can be known only by Tarka pramāņa. Tarka of inductive reasoning expresses the universal necessary concomitance between probans and probandum. Hemacandra says Inductive reasoning is the knowledge of universal concomitance conditioned by observation and non-observation (Pramāṇa-mimāmsā, 1.2.4).
In the Nyāyasūtra of Gotama tarka (reasoning) has been used for indicating inference orArthāpatti (presumptive cognition). It is only the Jaina logicians who considered tarka as a knowledge of universal concomitance. Akalanka, Vidyananda, Prabhācandra, Vādidevasūri and Hemacandra are the logicians who advanced cogent arguments for the establishment of tarka as an independent pramāņa.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
The main arguments are:
The object which is cognised by tarka is not cognised by any other pramāņa. Tark is a knowledge of universal concomitance. No other pramāņa can do so, neither perception nor inference. The validity of inference depends on tarka, because it is a knowledge of necessary concomitance and without the knowledge of necessary concomitance inference cannot arise.
It has a corresponding nature.
It is not conceivable that perception is competent to discharge the entire series of operations that are involved in the knowledge that whatever is a case of smoke is invariable the product exclusively of fire in all places and times, and not of anything else. The reason that it is not discursive and owes its genesis to the inference exerted by a datum that is present,
If Inference is competent to know the necessary-concomitance then it will result in infinite regress, because an inference will require another inference.
Thus the Jaina logicians have established tarka as independent pramāņa by presenting cogent arguments. This shows their intensive thinking about the system of epistemology and logic.

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v. Definition of probans (hetu)
One important contribution of the Jaina logicians to Indian epistemology is the definition of reason or probans (hetu). Probans is a necessary means for the occurrence of inference. Inference is the knowledge of probandum on the strength of probans. All the Indian philosophers who accept inference as an organ of valid cognition, unanimously agree that probandum (sādhya) can be known by probans (sadhana, hetu) as in the case of probandum fire on mountain can be known by probans smoke. But on the definition of probans the Indian philosophers have divergent views. The Buddhist philosophers propound three characteristics of a valid probans, viz-its subsistence in the subject (pakṣa-dharmatva), its subsistence in the homologue (sapakṣa-sattva) and the absence of the same in a heterologue (vipakṣasattva). These three characteristics of probans are also mentioned in the Prasastapādabhāṣya of Vaiseṣika philosophy. But the Nyaya philosophy admitted two new characteristics apart from the above three which are the absence of contradiction of the probandum (abādhitaviṣayatva) and the absence of a countervailing probans (asat-pratipakṣatva). The Jaina logicians have given a new idea about the characteristics of prabans that it bears only one characteristic and that is the certainty of logical impossibility (anyathānupapatti or avinābhāva) of the one in the absence of the other. Prabans cannot exist in the absence of probandum. This is the only characteristic of probans; for example, smoke a proban cannot exist in the absence of a probandum fire.
JAIN JOURNAL: Vol-XXXIII, No. 1 July 1998
The Jaina philosophers have refuted the notion of trairupya (triple characteristics) and pāñca-rūpya (five characteristics) of probans maintained by Buddhists and Naiyāyikas respectively. The Jaina philosophers right from Siddhasena down to Yasovijaya have indifferently propounded that a probans has only one characteristic and that is the certainty of logical impossibility of that (probans) in the absence of probandum. It is having the sole and solitary characteristic of standing in necessary concomitance with the probandum. Pātrasvami was profound logician who wrote a separate book Trilakṣaṇakadarthana to refute the Buddhist view. Its reference is found in Tattvasamgrha, a work of Santarakṣita, the Buddhist logician. Śantarakṣita has criticised the view of Patrasvami, but the Jaina logicians have firmly defended their views. The main arguments of the Jaina philosophers are as follows:
1. The sole and solitary characteristic of standing in necessary concomitance with the probandum is sufficient for defining probans. Three or five characteristics are not required for a valid

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JAIN CONTRIBUTION OF THE JAINA LOGICIANS TO INDIAN EPISTEMOLOGY 21 probans. There are some hetus possessed of three characteristics, but deviod of validity, e.g.
sa syāmas tasya patratvād dṛṣṭā śyamā yathetare/ iti tri-lakṣano hetur na niscityai pravartate //
Tattva-samgraha 1369 sa syāmaḥ tat-putratvād tarayāḥ anyaputravat (Pramāṇa-parikṣā p.45). He must be swarthy in complexion since he is the son of Maitreyi (a woman of swarthy complexion). It is an instance of a defective probans, because it is not necessary that every son of Maitreyi will be swarthy in complexion. So in the absence of necessary factor of universal concomitance the three characteristics are useless.
2. There are many hetus which are not possessed of triple characteristics but they are competent, because of having a unitary characteristic of necessary concomitance with the probandum; for example, tomorrow will be Thursday because today is Wednesday, Sakata constellation will arise after a muhurta, because the kṛttika constellation has just arisen, are such hetus which do not have triple characteristics (Trirūpata), but competent enough for the inferential cognition of a probandum. The only one characteristic of Anyathānupapattiis needed to define a probans Pātrakesari says
anyatha-nupapannattam yatra tatra trayeṇa kim | nanyatha-nupapannattam yatra tatra trayena kim |
Tattva-samgraha 1368.
Vidyananda gives two arguments to prove the illegitimacy of triple characteristics of probans as under
(i) It is found in fallacious probans also.
(ii) It is not a differentia to distinguish a probans from a pseudoprobans.
Acarya Hemacandra says that refutation of trairupya will also serve as a refutation of the pañcarūpya, since this is nothing but an elaboration of universal concomitance.
Thus it is a new perspective of Jaina logic which speaks of the deep and penetrative thinking of Jaina logicians.
VI. Establishment of new probans (such as kāraṇa etc)
The Jaina logicians propounded four new probans also, namely kāraṇa (cause), pūrvacara, (predecessor), uttaracara (successor), sahacara (simultaneous). These kinds of probans have not been

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JAIN JOURNAL : Vol-XXXIII, No. 1 July 1998
accepted by other Indian systems. The Jaina logicians propose so many examples of these hetus as means of inference. There would be rain, since a particular type of clouds are seen' is an example of kārana hetu.. 'Sakata constellation would rise because otherwise the rise of kṛttika would not have been there is an example of pūrvacara hetu. Here, after the rise of krttika the rise of the sakata takes place immediately after it without exception, and therefore, the krttika indicates the rise of the sakata as its predecessor reason. 'Bharani rose before, because krttikais risingis an example of uttaracara hetu. Here the rise of krttika, which succeeds the rise of Bharani indicates it. These two pūrvacara and uttaracara are different from the cause and effect as they are mediated by the obstacle of time. The fruit of mango should be possessed of a colour because the fact of being possessed of taste cannot be justified otherwise. Here taste which is always simultaneous with the colour being not justified in its absence, indicates it. All these hetus are valid because of their invariable concomitance with thier probandum.
Ācārya Māņikyanandin clarifies that there are two types of avinābhāva-saha-avinābhāvaand krama-avinābhāva. Karana, kārya, pūrvacara and uttaracara hetus are found valid because of their kramavinābhāvaand sahacara hetu is found valid because of its sahaavinābhāva. In this way the concept of vyāpatihas also been developed by the Jaina logicians. It shows their logical acumen.
Right from Akalanka down to Vasovijaya almost all the Jaina logicians have accepted the validity of aforesaid four new hetus.
Philosophers of other systems do not consider a cause as hetu, because cause is possible even without its effect, therefore it is not an indicator of the effect. The Jaina logicians reply this question that where it is possible to ascertain that all other causes are also cooperating and there is no hindrance in its capability, then alone the cause can be the indicator of effect. We can give examples to support their thinking as-milk is sweet, because sugar has been added to it, balloon will fly up because hydrogen gas has been filled up. If cause is capable to make an effect and it is devoid of hindrance then it may be a valid hetu, but in the respect of definition of hetu as propounded by the Jaina logicians that hetu never remains in the absence of effect, but kārana (cause) hetu remains even in the absence of effect, so here it contradicts the definition of hetu propounded by the Jaina logicians. In pūrvacara hetu also the same situation has happened. When a sequence of some incidences is definitive then pūrvacara & uttar hetus are useful for a common man. Sahacara hetu is also common

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JAIN : CONTRIBUTION OF THE JAINA LOGICIANS TO INDIAN EPISTEMOLOGY 23 in our daily life. For example : back part of a wall is inferred by perceiving front part of it.
It seems that the Jaina logicians have accepted these hetus, because of their corresponding nature in behaviour.
Regarding the member of parārthānumāna, the Jaina logicians have propounded that pakşa-vacana (the statement of the thesis) and hetu (probans) these two members are sufficient for an inference for others (parärthänumäna), but for the dull minded persons they have accepted five members also.
To conclude we can say that the Jaina logicians have contributed their mite to Indian epistemology in many ways. They discussed about every aspect of Indian epistemology and logic. It seems that they have a deep study of other systems also. It is noteworthy that they developed the epistemology regarding pramāņa upholding the canonical views, but they have given due significance to the empirical view also.
Hence the Jaina epistemological literature is of paramount importance for the understanding of the epistemological thinking of other systems also, because the Jaina philosophers have presented their opponents' views honestly and systematically.
The Jaina logicians have contributed their mite to epistemological doctrines which can be summed up as follows : A. They established the nature of pramāna illuminating itself and
the object. B. They cogently established recollection, recognition, and inductive
reasoning as independent pramāṇas. c. They are very precise in defining the hetu, but they have
elaborately conceived kinds and sub-kinds of hetus.
Their view of non-absolutism helped them in developing the epistemological doctrines and they formed many new technical terms such as: sāņuyavahārika pratyakşa, tiryak sāmānya, ürdhvatāsāmānya, saha-avinābhāva, krama-avinābhāva etc. They enrich the literature on Naya and Niksepa also which are mentioned in canons for understanding a proper meaning of a word.

Page #26

LORD MAHĀVĪRA ON PRAMĀDA
Colonel D.S. BAYA SHREYAS (Retd)
When asked by his principal disciple, Ganadhara Gautama, as to how an individual ought to walk, stand, sit, lie-down, eat-drink, and speak, so as not to incur sin,' Lord Mahavira replied that an individual who walks, stands, sits, lies-down, eats-drinks and speaks carefully does not incur sin.2
What is Pramāda ?
The English equivalents of the word 'pramāda' are:
A. Carelessness,
B. Idleness,
C. Indiscretion,
D. Negligence,
E. Non-vigilence, and
F. Remissness.
Accordingly, Pramāda can be defined in two parts-firstly, neglecting to do what one is required to do (or one's duty) due to Idleness or sloth; and secondly, doing what one does carelessly, indiscreetly, negligently, without exercising due vigilence, or with undue
remiss.
Lord Mahavira's answer to Ganadhara Gautama's question lays down a premise for the conduct of spiritual practitioners or sādhakas. The premise is jayaṇāi.e. care vigilence or non-negligence. Thus jayaṇā is the opposite of pramāda, and when the Lord lays down the observance of jayaṇā in each and every action of the sadhaka. He also, by the law of reverses, lays down the avoidance of pramāda.
Another facet of pramada is idleness, inaction or neglecting to do what is essential in the pursuit of one's ultimate goal, which is nothing but spiritual salvation or nirvāṇa. Again, by the law of reverses, it means doing what ought not to be done.
1. kaham care, kaham ciṭṭhe, kahamase, kaham saye I
kaham bhunjanto, bhāsanto, pāvam kammam na bandhai? II Daśavaikālikasütra, 4/7.
2. jayam care, jayam ciṭṭhe, jayamase, jayam saye I jayam bhunjanto, bhāsanto, pāvam kammam na bandhai II Ibid, 4/8.

Page #27

SHREYAS: LORD MAHÄVĪRA ON PRAMĀDA
The Lord had all along, in His preachings, laid the most stress on this one aspect of the sādhaka's conduct. In the tenth chapter of the Uttaradhyayana-sūtra are contained as many as thirtysix reasons, each addressed to Ganadhara Gautama, as to why pramāda, or the neglect of desirable action, ought to be avoided even for a samaya or the millionth part of a second. As believers of the faith, it will be worthwhile to ponder over a few of these reasons
1. The human life is like a ripe, withered, yellowed tree-leaf, that may fall at any time-meaning that the death may come at any time. Hence, O Gautama! avoid pramāda even for a samaya.3
2. The human life is like a dew-drop at the tip of a blade of grass, that may dry up at the break of dawn or may fall to the ground at any time. Hence, O Gautama! do not succumb to pramāda even for a millionth part of a second.*
3. Short as the life-span is, it is, again, threatened by many a threat. As you have to shed the bondages of your actions (karmic bondages) of the past in such a short life, O Gautama! do not entertain pramada even for a samaya.5
25
4. (In the eternal cycle of life and death) for all the living beings, the Human life is very difficult to come by in a long time, and the fruits of karmas are very difficult to bear. Hence, O Gautama! do not let pramada overcome you even for a samaya.6
5. (With the passage of time) your body is weakening, your hair are greying, and your entire vitality is diminishing. Hence, O Gautama! do not indulge in pramada even for a samaya.? 7
6. Ailments such as fouling of body airs, wounds and eruptions, cholera and various other deadly diseases destroy your body
3. dumpattae panḍuyae jahā, nivaḍai rāigaṇāņa accae I
evam maṇuyāna jiviyam, samayam Goyama ! mā pamāyae II Uttaradhyayana-sutra, 10/1.
4. kusagge jaha osabindue, thovam citṭhai lambamānae I evaṁ maṇuyāṇa jiviyam, samayam Goyama ! mā pamāyae II Ibid., 10/2.
5. ii ittariyammi āue, jiviyae bahupaccavāyae I vihuṇāhi rayam pure kaḍam, samayaṁ Goyama! mā pamāyae II Ibid., 10/3.
6. dullahe khalu māņuse bhave, cirakālena vi savva-pāņinam I gāḍhā ya vivāga kammuņo, samayam Goyama! mā pamāyae II Ibid., 10/4.
7. parijūrai te sarirayam, kesā pāṇḍurayā havanti te I
se savvabale ya hayanti, samayam Goyama! mā pamāyae II Ibid., 10/26.

Page #28

26
JAIN JOURNAL: Vol-XXXIII, No. 1 July 1998
when they (suddenly) erupt. Hence, O Gautama! do not practise pramäda even for a samaya.8
In the thirty-second chapter of the Uttaradhyayana-sutra, the Lord has indicated 95 areas of activity, which when practised, will steer the sādhaka along the path of spiritual attainment and ultimately to salvation (nirvana). These have been termed as the abodes of discretion or the Apramādasthāna..By dispelling the ignorance (ajnāna), attachment (rāga), and revulsion (dveṣa), the sädhaka is able to attain the supreme bliss (enlightenment) and the spiritual salvation (nirvāṇa). The rāga and dveṣa are the seeds of karma (the karmic bondage) and they produce the delusion (moha) of the spirit (atman). Hence the path to spiritual salvation lies in avoiding the seats of indiscretion (Pramādasthāna) and adhering to the seats of discretion (Apramādsthāna). The seats of indiscretion (Pramädasthāna) are the pursuits of bodily pleasures-the pleasures of the five sense-organs (indriyas) of touch, smell, hearing, sight and taste. These sense-organs have been termed as thieves that steal the opportunities for spiritual attainment, and under the influence of these thieves, the creatures indulge in unlimited distorted activities that hinder the soul from attaining the nirvana or mokṣa. 10
Exhorting the spiritual practitioners (sādhakas), the Lord has said that they should start on the spiritual highway while their bodies are still strong, till they are not harassed by the old age, till they have not been overpowered by disease and till their sensory organs (indriyas) have not been dulled and benumbed by the onslaught of disease and decay.11
The sum and substance of this deliberation is that pramāda or indulgence in idle pursuits, pursuit of transient bodily pleasures, indiscretion, negligence and carelessness even in the performance of
8. arai, ganḍam, visüiyā, āyankā vivihā phusanti te I
vivaḍai, viddhamsai te sarirayam, samayam Goyama! mā pamāyae II Ibid., 10/27.
9. rāgo ya doso vi ya kammabiyaṁ.
Ibid., 32/7.
10. evam viyāre amiyappayāre, āvajjai indiyacora-vasse II
Ibid., 32/104.
indiyakasāyācorā, subhāvanā sankhalāhi vajjhanti; tā te rāgadosādi na vikuvvanti I
Bhagavatiarādhanā, 1401.
11. jarā jāva na piḍei, vāhi jāva na vaḍḍhai I jāva indiya na hāyanti, tāva dhammam samāyare II

Dasavaikälika, 8/36.

Page #29

SHREYAS : LORD MAHĀVĪRA ON PRAMADA
27 essential bodily functions are hindrances in the path of spiritual advancement, and, therefore, pramāda ought not to be indulged even for a samaya or the millionth part of a second. The words of the Lord, "Samayam Goyama! mā pamāyae" have been echoing through the ages, and have been exhorting the sādhakas, through these more than two thousand five hundred years. to this day. The exhortation, though addressed to Ganadhara Gautama, is aimed at each and every individual, who has his sights set on spiritual salvation or Nirvāņa.
So, Samayam Sādhakam mā pamāyae it is, for anyone who will hear and heed.

Page #30

THE FOLLOWERS OF PĀRSVANĀTHA
BINOD KUMAR TIWARY
Pārsvanatha, the powerful religious teacher of the 9th-8th centuries B.C. has been accepted as one of the great propagators of Jain principles and ideas. He was the 23rd Tirthankara of the Jain order and traditions. As a reformer, he fought against the prevailing corrupt practices which were prevalent in the then society and religion. He preached the welfare of humanity without taking into account the caste, creed or sect.
After getting the perfect knowledge, Pārśva became the head of an enormous community. He had eight ganas and eight gaṇadharas.1 The samgha of Pārsvanatha consisted of sramaņas, nuns, lay votaries, female lay votaries and different types of saints.2 The Svetāmbaras and Digambaras give different account and number of the followers of Pārsva, but the Digambaras give their number very high, which seems to be an exaggeration. The division of Jain samgha into different branches prove his great organisational capacity.
The followers of Parsva belonged to all factions of the society. By virtue of his descent, his influence in royal family was great. He himself was a member of the royal family of Kāśī. The Jain writers inform us that Nāgnati (king of Gandhāra), Nimi (king of Videha), Dvimukha (king of Panchāla), Svayambhu (king of Hastinapura), Ravikirti of Kuśasthalapura and Karakanda (king of Kalinga) had adopted the faith of Pārsva.3
The ancient literary sources reveal that Gautama Buddha had also been under Jain influence for some time before becoming enlightened.* The statement of Buddha itself confirms this truth. Most of the facts, detailed by Buddha, are remarkably close to the conduct of Jain religion. Relating to his ascetic life, he said, 'I lived nude, took my food in hands.... uprooted my hair... and never warmed my body.'5 Some scholars are of the view that as the way shown by Parsva seemed to be very difficult and tedious, the Buddha invented the middle path which is known as madhyamapratipadā.6
1. Kalpasūtra, 160 (SBE, Vol. xxii, p. 273).
2. Ibid., 161 to 166.
3. Uttaradhyayana, 18-40-50 (SBE, Vol. XLV, p. 81).
4.
Darsanasāra, 6-9.
5. Majjhima Nikaya, Mahāsihanada Sutta, 12.
6. Veer Parinirvana, Oct. 1975, p. 15

Page #31

TIWARY: THE FOLLOWERS OF PĀRŠVANĀTHA
The teachings of Parsva were very much popular among the general people during those days. People from all walks of life were immensely influenced by it. Pārśva had a large number of such followers in Bihār and eastern U.P. regions. Mahāvira's parents were worshippers of Pārsva' and they died practising the slow starvation following Jain faith. There existed a number of monks of Pārsvanatha's order following caturyāma dharma during the time of Mahāvīra who absorved them into his order by converting them to his doctrine of pañcamahāvratas. It appears that he drew his followings largely from the non-Aryan indigenous tribes like the Yakṣas, Nāgas and Asuras and from the socalled Vratya or non-Vedic kṣatriyas.
The Uttaradhyayana-sūtra relates to the meeting of the head of Pārsva's follower Keśīkumāra and Mahāvira's ganadhara Indrabhūti. Their discussions concentrated mainly on the principles of the Jain religion. Kesi was greatly satisfied by Mahāvīra's explanation and he accepted the five great vows of Mahāvīra. Kesi and Gautam of this meeting represent the two Jain orders, the old and the new. The Bhagavati-sutra10 refers to a dispute between Kālāsavesiyaputta, a follower of Pārśva with a disciple of Mahavira. Gangeya, a follower of Pārsva, who lived at Vanijyagrāma, gave up the four vows of Pārsva and adopted the five mahāvratas of Mahavira." Before accepting the Mahāvīra's five precepts (pañca-mahāvratas), Gangeya had a discussion with Mahavira. 12 Clearing the doubts in the mind of Gargeya, Mahavira showed his respect for Pārśvanātha, acknowledging him as a superman.13 The Nayadhammakahāo11 mentions the name of Pundariya, who accepted the four vows of Pārsva. The famous disciple of Mahavira named Gautama met Udaka, a follower of Parsva and succeeded in winning over him to his side. From the dialogue between Udaka and Gautam, it appears that the followers of Pārsva and the disciples of Mahāvīra were known as the Nighantha Kumāraputta and Nigantha Nataputta respectively. It is quite interesting to know that at a place called Tungiya, 15 about five hundred pupils of Parsva embraced the five mahāvratas of Mahāvīra. 16
29
7. Acārāngasūtra, II, 15, 16.
8. This goes to prove Pārsvanatha to be the predecessor of Mahavira. 9. 23, vv. 1-89; SBE, XLV, pp. 115-129.
10. Bhagavati-sutra, 1. 975; cf. also Weber's Fragment der Bhagavati, p. 185. 11. Ibid., p. 32.
12. Vyakhyāprajñapatti, 9.32.371.
13. Pārsvanatha is called Purisadāniya in Kalpasūtra (Chapter 1, para 25). 14. Naya, 19, 20. 218.
15. This place is identified with modern Tugi, situated two km off Biharsarif according to Prachin Tirthamālā, pt. 1, p. 16.
6. Bhagavatisūtra, pp. 136 ff.

Page #32

30
JAIN JOURNAL : Vol-XXXIII, No. 1 July 1998 The Buddhist literature mentions some Niganthas who were the followers of Pārsva. These include Vappā??, Upāli18, Abhaya19, Aggivesayana Saccāka20, Dīgha Tapassi21, Aśibandhakaputra gāmini22, Deva Ninka23, Upalikka24, and Sihā.25
Not only men but lay women also joined Pārsva's order as he had allowed women to enter his order. The Nayadhammakahāo26 says that Kāli, an old maiden, joined Pārsva's order and was entrusted to Pupphachāla, the head of the nuns. Two sisters of Uppala joined the order of Pārsva, but being unable to lead the rigid life of the order, they became Brāhmin parivrājikās.27 Vijaya and Pagabbha, two female disciples of Pārsva saved Mahāvīra and Gośāla in Coorg Sannivesa.28 The Jātaka literature also mentions several lay women as followers of Pārsva and among them are Saccā, Lohā, Avandika and Padacāra etc.29
D
.
Pārsva's influence not only remained within the areas of this land, but it reached even in the far areas of Central Asia 30 and Greece. 31 Scholars have proved that the ancient city of Kasita (Caspia) appears to have been named after Kāśyapa, the gotra name of Pārsva. The Greeks of the 4th century B.C. and the Chinese pilgrims of the 6th7th centuries A.D. noticed the existence of the Nirgrantha Śramanas in that region. Hence it has reasonably been inferred that Jainism
s prevalent in places like Caspia, Aman, Samarkand and Balkha32 and the credit would certainly go to Pārsva.
Pārsva attained nirvāṇa at Sammedaśikhara (Pārsvanātha hill)33 and that's why it became a centre of Jain faith.34 Pārsvanātha preached
17. Anguttara-nikāya, II, 196 ff. 18. Majjhima-nikaya, I, 371 ff. 19. Ibid. 392 ff. 20. Ibid. 237 ff; Majjhima Nikaya Atthakatha, I, 450. 21. Ibid., 237 ff. 22. Sangutta-nikāga, V, 312 ff. 23. Ninkha is a deva who visited Buddha and uttered a verse in praise of
Nigantha Nataputta. 24. Mahāvagga. 25. Samyutta-nikāga, 1. 65 ff. 26. Naya, II, I, pp. 22 ff. 27. Women wanderers. 28. Jataka, III, t. 29. Ibid. 30. cf. J.W. McCrindle's Ancient India. 31. Beal's Siyuti, I, p. 55. 32. Cf. Jain Gazette, August 1906, p. 13, 33. Kalpasūtra, 186, (SBE, XXII, p. 275). 34. Pārsvanātha Hill is in Hazaribagha of Bihār.

Page #33

TIWARY: THE FOLLOWERS OF PĀRSVANĀTHA
his nirgrantha dharma among the aboriginals of modern South Bihar and Bengal. Even today, the followers of Pārsvanatha or his teachings can be seen within the 'Saraka' community in Manbhum, Singhabhum, Lohardagga and other districts of south Bihar and Bengal. The name of this community 'Sarāka' is nothing but a degenerated form of the word Śravaka 35 They belong to the same lineage of ancient Jain śrāvakas. During the recent past, they have embraced Hinduism, though a few of them still follow Jainism at some places. This tribe is mainly engaged in plantation, spinning, weaving and commerce. Like the orthodox Jains, the members of this community drink water after straining it and have their meals before the Sun set, with the idea to protect living beings.36
In the regions of Birbhum and Bānkurā districts of West Bengal, the serpent deity called 'Manasa' is worshipped during the months of Asāḍha, Śrāvana, Bhadrapada and Asvina37 (approximately during the period from July to October). This may be having some connection with the legend that Dharmendra had adorned Pārsvanatha's head in the shape of Nāgarāja. 38 This apparently shows that in course of time, they took to the worshipping of the very symbol which had adorned Pārsvanatha. Originally they must have been the followers of Pārsva.
The Jain religion was essentially anterior to Mahāvīra and Pārsvanatha had been an earlier historical personage. He not only gave a strong base to the Jain principles, but even paved the way for Mahavira to preach, organise and give a new shape to the Jain samgha.
35. A technical word in Jainism (meaning 'a layman'). 36. J.C. Jain. Mahāvīra, p. 10.
37. Jaina-Siddhanta-Bhaskara, Vol. II, Pt. II, p. 75.
38. J.C. Jain, op. cit.
31

Page #34

NEWS ON JAINISM AROUND THE WORLD
Summer school in Prakrit Language and Literature
The three Week Summer School was inaugurated at the Bhogilal Leherchand Institute of Indology on May 24, 1998. The Valedictory Function was held in the morning of June 14, 1998. The function started with the traditional Jaina namokāra mahāmantra and a Sarasvativandana in Prakrit.
Forty very senior teachers and research scholars in Indian Universities and Colleges, from all over the country, participated in the School, as whole-time students.
Professor S.R. Banerjee from Calcutta University, related in brief the history of activities of the Summer School for the last 10 yearly sessions. Dr (Mrs) Kapila Vatsyayan, Academic Director of the IGNCA was the chief guest, and Hon. Justice M.N. Venkatchaliah, Chairman, NHRC was the guest of honour. Shri Parasmal Bhansali, Chairman, Nakoda Parshvanath Jain Pedhi, presided. Shri Pratap Bhogilal, Chairman, BLII, Shri N.P. Jain, Vice-Chairman, BLII and Shri R.K. Jain, Hony. Secretary, Atma Vallabh Jain Smarak Shikshan Nidhi, all very actively participated in the conduct of the function and introduced different institutions connected with the BLII. Prizes to first three top students in the School were presented along with certificates to all the 40 participants.
Acārya Hemacandrasuri Puraskar was presented on this occasion to the well-known scholar of Prakrit and Sanskrit Studies, Dr. V.M. Kulkarni by Dr (Mrs) Kapila Vatsyayan, the chief guest, on behalf of Nanakchand Jaswanta Dharmarth Trust founded by Shri Deven Yashwant, Chairman.
Justice M.N. Venkatachaliah in his address quoted examples from various well-known personalities of the western world and India to convey the message that whatever we do including small jobs like sweeping, must be done whole-heartedly and excellently. He said, "Indology represents the great Indian civilization which not only speaks of the concepts of cosmology, mind and matter, the circular time and absolute truth but also integrates them all. In order to understand the cultural heritage of this great country, indology is the only way. In this age of diminishing values, objective moral values are very important

Page #35

Acharyya Hemchandra Suri Puraskar

Page #36

33
NEWS ON JAINISM AROUND THE WORLD which have been prescribed by our ancient authorities. The modern concepts of mind and cosmology etc., are the product of the recent times and these are dealt with in Indological tradition well over several thousand years back, in the history of human civilization."
Dr (Mrs) Kapila Vatsyayan, the Chief Guest, exhorted the august gathering that all Indian languages from North to South and East to West are integrally related to each other whether it is Vedic or Sanskrit, Pali or Prakrit, Tamil or Telugu, Malayalam or Mārāthī or whatever else.
Though lots of Dravidian elements are available in the Vedas also, Pali and Prakrit have played a very important role in the development of Indian culture, languages, literature and dialects as a whole. If we do not learn the history of the development of our national languages, then we cannot even study mathematics, physics and philosophy etc.
Three crores of manuscripts are lying unused in the Jain Bhāndāras. Whatever the western scholars have said about them, we have been in a way forced to accept and believe. If these mss., are micro-filmed, our Indian scholars can have access to them and these can be studied seriously and sincerely opening new vistas of knowledge of our ancient culture.
Dr. V.M. Kulkarni, the awardee of Ācārya Hemcandrasūri Puraskār, the first Director of the BLII, in his speech of acceptance of the award, briefly stated, how he has been working for well over 60 years in the field of Prakrit and Sanskrit Languages & Literature. The award has come to him only as a token of recognition of his services to ancient Indian languages and literature. The Function was conducted by Dr. V.P. Jain, Director, BLII.
Vimal Prakash Jain

Page #37

IT
INDIAN RELIGIONS JOIN HANDS Temple event shows U.S. adaptation
Lord Mahāvīra-or rather, a 5-foot marble statue of him-takes up residence in the Hindu Temple of Greater Cincinnati this weekend amid lectures, feasts and an aerial shower of flowers
The event brings together two religions that have flourished in India since ancient times : Hinduism, which covers a wide range of beliefs and practices, and Jainism, founded by Mahāvīra in the sixth century B.C. The interreligious event is made possible by the close ties that Indian immigrants have forged here and in other U.S. cities.
"In India, you wouldn't find this," said Vir Jain, a member of the Jain Center of Cincinnati and Dayton. “This temple is a Hindu temple that represents Hindu culture, and Jain is a part of Hindu culture. What we represent here is Hindu culture rather than Hindu religion.”
Cincinnati-area Jains and Hindus had talked about building a combined temple, but as fund raising for the Hindu temple dragged on, the Jains built their own in the West Chester area a few year ago. An estimated 1.200 Hindu families and about 100 Jain families live in the area.
Jains stress non violence, a multiplicity of viewpoints and freedom from possessiveness, and they believe in the peaceful co-existence of all living beings. Hindus believe the ultimate reality behind the universe is manifested as deities that vary from region to region. All Hindus share belief in the law of karma and rebirth, and the fourfold goal of human life (righteousness, worldly prosperity, enjoyment and liberation).
From the beginning, the local Hindu temple stressed unity by including deitles from all regions of Inda. South Asian religion expert Raymond Williams said this ecumenism grows out of the surge in Indian immigration since 1965.
"The community created here (in the United States) is different than any group of Indians that exists in India itself,” said Mr. Williams, a Professor of religion at Wabash College in Crawfordsville, Ind, “These people are in the process of re-creating what it means to be an American Hindu and that negotiation, as it shapes identities and commitments,

Page #38

1

Detroit Jain Temple

Page #39

INDIAN RELIGIONS JOIN HANDS
35 is reflected in the way they build temples and shrines and mosques and Sikh gurdwara and Christian churches."
Or , in the words of SamanShrutpragya, a Jain monk visiting from India: "Every religion has different philosophies and different ideas, but we try to make harmony. How can we make harmony? If you like to worship Mahāvīra, you can worship Mahāvīra. If you want to worship (Hindu deity) Krishna, you can worship Krishna."
From The Cincinnati Enquirer, Metro/Butlei, May 15, 1998. Conference on ‘Jainism and Ecology' at Harvard
An international seminar titled “Jainism and Ecology" was held at Harvard University's Center for the Study of World Religions on July 10-12,1998.
Dr. Sulekh Jain, president of the Jain Academic Foundation of North America (JAFNA) told India Abroad recently that the conference was being sponsored by the foundation jointly with the Jain Academy of the United Kingdom.
"The topic of Jainism and ecology presents many interesting challenges to scholars and leaders of the Jaina tradition," says the conference convener, Dr. Christopher Key Chapple, Professor of Theological Studies at the Harvard University's Center for the Study of World Religions.
Participants were to include Cromwell Crawford of the University of Hawaii in Honolulu, Kim R: Skoog of the University of Guam, John Koller of Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, John Cort of Denison University, Padmanabh Jaini and Kristi L. Weley, both of the University of California at Berkeley, and Paul Dundas of the University of Edinburgh in Scotland.
A large number of Jain scholars from India have also been invited to participate in the conference, Sulekh Jain said.
The topics put down for discussion include “Jain Cosmology and Ethics for the Eco-Crisis,” “Jain Biocosmology and environmental Thought," "Ahimsa as a Categorical Imperative for Environmental Care." "Jain Principle of Ahimsa and Ecology. “Ecology and Spirituality in Jain Tradition, "The Nature of Nature Jain Perspectives on the Natural World." and "Digging Ahimsa. The Limits of a Jain Environmental Ethic."
The proceedings of the conference will be published in a book form by Harvard University. (From India Abroad, July 10,1998.Sulekh Jain.)

Page #40
Monsoon 1998 Registered with the Registrar of Newspapers for India Under No. R. N. 12121/66. . If pure music had the power to beckon - Clouds and bring rain, Pure beauty may, one day, bring back Light in the blinded eye. We believe so. And therefore we tryWith our sculptures. POT POURRIE CREATIONS THE INCODA 1/A, Jatin Bagchi Road Calcutta - 700 029. Phone/Fax : 464-3074/1843 I Calcutta show room : I p-591, Purna Das Road Calcutta - 700 029. Phone No. 463-2366 Delhi show room : | 14 Kaushalaya Park Hous Khas New Delhi - 110 016 Phone No. 6528407 Jain Education By the courtesy-ANTARCTICA GRAPHIC LIMITED 1A. Vidyanagar Street, Calcutta-700 009