Jain Journal 1998 07

Author(s): Jain Bhawan Publication
Publisher: Jain Bhawan Publication

Page 17

JAIN CONTRIBUTION OF THE JAINA LOGICIANS TO INDIAN EPISTEMOLOGY 15
vāsanod-bodha-hetukā tad ityākāra smṛti. (Pramāṇa-mimāmsā.1.2.3) Almost all the philosophers from Bhaṭṭa Akalanka down to Vadidevasūri define recollection almost in the same manner. Bhaṭṭa Akalanka says that recollection is a resultant of retention, but it is also a pramāṇa, because of its resultant recognition (pratyabhijñāna).
Although Prasastapāda has mentioned recollection as a kind of vidyā (right knowledge), but he did not accept it as an independent pramana. Nyāyasutra mentions it as an attribute of soul. But none other system than Jaina has accepted it as an idependent. The Pramāņa -mīmāmsā philosophy does not consider it as pramāna, because it cognises the object previously cognised, and pramāņa in their opinion always cognises the object previously not cognised. Buddhist philosophers also give the same argument, but they present some more arguments, such as (i) it is not generated by an object, so it does not correspond to the object, (ii) if recollection is considered as pramāņa then intention, repugnance (dveṣa) etc. will also be considered as pramāņa and it will create an infinite regress, (iii) recollection deals with past object. But in view of the Jaina logicians, Buddhist view is not accurate.
The Jaina logicians Akalarka, Vidyānanda, Prabhācandra and Vadidevasūri put forth many cogent arguments to establish it as an independent pramāņa. Some of them are presented here.
1.
2.
If recollection is not regarded as a separate organ of valid condition, because it cognises the object previously cognised, then it is not a valid reason, because the recollection also cognises partly unknown from the point of view of time etc.
3.
Recollection is an organ of valid cognition, because it is an indiscrepant cognition. Whenever the recollection is found discrepant then it comes under the psuedo-organ of valid condition. The recollection which is corresponding to activity is an indiscrepant knowledge.
4.
Inference cannot be an organ of valid cognition without having recourse to recollection of invariable concomitance. Every philosopher who accepts inference as a means of valid cognition has to invariably resort to recollection of invariable concomitance. For example, when we perceive smoke on a mountain the impression of our previous cognition of smoke pervaded by fire in kitchen is awakened and we recollect it immediately.
Vidyananda says that without accepting the validity of recollection, the validity of recognition does not exist. If recollection is not valid then inductive reasoning cannot take