Jain Journal 1998 04

Author(s): Jain Bhawan Publication
Publisher: Jain Bhawan Publication

Page 10

100
JAIN JOURNAL: Vol-XXXII, No. 4 April 1998
then it is possible to describe it as a jar made of clay. But can we describe it as 'a jar made of stone'? Certainly not. But it must be remembered that to describe every fact of reality, four conditions are to be taken into considerations: dravya, kṣetra, kāla and bhāva. Name of the substance, the place where it is, the time when it exists, and characteristics intrinsically presented in it, the time when it exists, and characteristics intrinsically presented init. Every object from its own dravya admits an affirmative predication and looked at from the paradravya admits of a negative predication. So the example given above from its own substance (clay) admits of affirmative predication, and from the view of paradravya, a negative predication. Similarly, from the point of view of kṣetra, it can be stated in two ways: if a thing is really in the room, then we can say affirmatively it is in the room, and negatively it is not in the verandah. Similarly in other two cases. For want of space I cannot dilate upon this point any more.
Supplementary to the doctrine of syād-vāda is the doctrine of nayavāda. The nayas are ways of expressing the nature of things. There are seven nayas: naigama, samgraha, vyavahāra, ṛju-sūtra, sabda, samabhirūḍha and evambhūta. Without going into detail, it can be said that the nayas are necessary in order to understand the partial true nature of a thing.
After having described briefly the doctrines of Jainism, let me now pass on to the subject of logic with particular reference to the Nyāyāvatāra.
Before Siddhasena Diväkara, another logician who talked about the subject of logic was Umāsvāti (1-85 A.D.).' He, in his Tattvārthasūtra, has divided pramāņa into two categories: parokṣa and pratyakṣa. Parokṣa (indirect knowledge) is of two kinds-mati and śruta. Pratyakṣa (direct knowledge) has three stages: avadhi, manaḥparyaya and kevala. Parokṣa knowledge is acquired by the soul through external agencies, such as, the organs of sense, whereas the pratyakṣa knowledge is acquired by the soul without external agencies. Of the Parokṣa knowledge, mati is "knowledge of existing things acquired through the senses and the mind," whereas śruta is "knowledge of things (past, present and future) acquired through reasoning and study". In the pratyakṣa knowledge again avadhi means "knowledge of things beyond the range of our perception", whereas manaḥparyāya means "knowledge derived from reading the thoughts of others, while kevala means "unobstructed, unconditional and absolute knowledge."
However, before describing the analytical contents, let me give in a chart the contents of the Nyāyāvatāra.
1. S.C. Vidyabhūṣaṇa, A History of Indian Logic, p. 169.