Jain Journal 1998 04

Author(s): Jain Bhawan Publication
Publisher: Jain Bhawan Publication

Page 34

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JAIN JOURNAL : Vol-XXXII, No. 4 April 1998 thus avoids mere conjunction of atoms, but propounds their synthetic indentification.75
We now proceed to skhandha. The aggregates of atoms exist in six different forms, nemely- (1) Gross-gross, (2) Gross, (3) Gross-fine, (4) Fine-Gross (5) Fine and lastly (6) Fine fine. 76 (1) The class of matter which, when divided, cannot restore its original state without any extraneous help is termed as gross-gross. The examples of which are wood, stone, and the like. (2) That which can be reunited on being divided without the intervention of a third something is called gross, as for example, water, oil, etc. (3) Shadow, Sunshine, etc. which are incapable of distintegration and grasp are subsumed under grossfine. (4) The object of touch, taste, smell and hearing are called fine gross. (5) The Kārmic matter etc. which are imperceptible by the senses are included into the category of fine. (6) The binary aggregates and the skandhas smaller than the Karmic matter come under the next category of fine-fine. As we have said, the generation of sound is effected by the striking of skandhas against one another. Thus Jainism take exception to the view of Nyāya-Vaiseșika which calls sound the quality of Akasa, in as much as it is capable of being sensed which would not have been possible had it been the quality of Akasa.
Next comes the reality of Dharma, Adharma, Ākāsa and Kāla. None of the philosophical systems originated in the east and west postulated the independent existence of the principle of motion (Dharma) and the principle of rest (Adharma). Besides, the idealistic thinkers have unhesitatingly brushed aside the reality even of space and time, since they find themselves in the meshes of irreconcilable contradictions. Kant regarded them as the forms of perceptions which are imposed by sensibility upon things. Hence on account of glasses of space and time attached to sensibility, the noumenal reality escapes our grip and its attainment becomes a wild goose-chase. But the Jaina who relies upon the findings of experience absolves us from the creations of a priori logic by positing the reality of Dharma, Adharma, Ākāsa and Kāla answering to the experienced motion, rest, allowance of room, and change respectively.
We shall now throw some light on the nature of motion. All the idealists are unanimous in rejecting the reality of motion and in designating it as mere appearance, phenomenal, and unworthy of being intelligibly applied to thing-in itself. The Eleatic philosopher Zeno was the first to raise the voice against the possibility of motion. But Jainism
75. Sarvatha. V. 37.