Jain Journal 1981 01

Author(s): Jain Bhawan Publication
Publisher: Jain Bhawan Publication

Page 12

JANUARY 1981
the existence of others" is not favoured "since an effect is supposed to be originated during the existence of its own cause and not of another”. Otherwise, an effect cannot take place and there will be the defect of samanantarapadavirodha, according to which the efects would emerge in the distant future. The next moment is also not powerful to generate the thing, since it is not a creator. Otherwise what would be the difference between sat and asat, and kşaņika and akşanika. We could conclude, therefore, that arthakriyā is possible only in permanent-in-change charater.14
Some schools of thought opposing the doctrine of momentariness (kşaņikavāda) were rising even within Buddhist system. For instance, Santaraksita refers to the view of Vatsiputriyas who classified things under two headings momentary and non-momentary.15 The conception of soul, according to them, has also been refuted by Santaraksita. Stçherbatsky mentions the Vatsiputriyas who admitted the existence of a certain unity between the elements of a living personality. In all probability they have been influenced by the Jaina view as their arguments are very similar to the Jaina arguments raised against the view of kșanikavāda and anātmavāda.
There are, therefore, two important points of difference between the Buddhists and the Jainas in the meaning they attach to dravyavāda in their common denunciation of the view which connects this notion of arthakriyākāritva with drayyavāda. First, the Buddhist is against dravyavāda. Secondly, the Buddhist attack actually turns out, whatever his profession may be, to be on the hypothesis of the static (kūțasthanitya) dravya whereas the Jaina's attack is also on the same hypothesis but only as a contrast to his own theory of the dynamic (pariņāmi) dravya. 16
Some systems of thought accept only the universal (sāmānya) character of reality. . Advaitavadins and the Sankhyas are the typical representatives of this view. Some other schools led by the Buddhists recognise only particular (viseșa) character of reality. The third school of thought belongs to Nyaya-Vaisesikas, who treat universal and particular (sāmānya and višeșa) as absolutely distinctive entities.
According to Jainism, an entity has infinite characteristics which are divided into two categories, viz. universal and particular. Just
14 Ibid., p. 374. 15 Tattvasangraha, 352. 16 Jaina Theory and Reality of Knowledge, p. 173.