Jain Journal 1981 01

Author(s): Jain Bhawan Publication
Publisher: Jain Bhawan Publication

Page 28

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JAIN JOURNAL
Hence an inference must have two constituents : (1) Smoke must be present in the hill. (2) Smoke must have inseparable relationship with the fire. The first one is called pakşa-dharmatva and the second one is called vyāpti.
Pakşa-dharmatva : Paksa is that in which the dharma is inferred to exist. In the inference 'the hill is firey, because it is smoky', the ‘hill' is the paksa in which the dharma i.e. 'fire' is inferred to exist. Now in this inference the hetu is smoke which is found to exist in the hill. This characteristic of the hetu is called its pakşa-dharmatva. The Buddhist logician Sankara Svamin in his book Nyāya-Praveśa first used the term pakşa-dharmatva. The Jaina logicians did not accept pakşa-dharmatva as a constituent of inference, they accept only vyāpti as the constituent of inference.
Vyāpti (invariable concomitance) is the main feature of anumāna. The term vyāpti literally means pervasion. Vyāpti is the universal attendance of the probane by the probandum in simultaneity or succession. Thus fire and smoke may abide simultaneously or the latter may follow the former. If the probane and probandum exist siumltaneously the former is called avinābhāva. In the early Nyaya literature, the term avinābhāva is frequently used as the equivalent of vyāpti. It was Uddyotakara who first used these two words yyāpti and avinābhāva in his Nyāyavārtika. We also get the conception of avinābhāva in Vatsayana's Nyāyabhāsya. Uddyotakara, Vacaspatimisra, Jayanta and some other early writers on Nyaya describe vyāpti as an unconditioned or necessary relation which is not brought about by any adventitious circumstanceanaupādhikah sambandhah. The early Jaina logicians Siddhasena, Akalanka and Manikya Nandi also used the term vyāpti as synonym for the word avinābhāva.
In western logic, inference is of two kinds: deduction and induction. Indian logicians did not classify inference into deductive and inductive inference, but they classified it as that which is useful for one's own self and that which is useful for others. The Buddhist philosopher Dignaga first introduced the distinction of inference into inference for oneself and inference for others. Subsequently, this distinction is found in Jayanta's Nyāyamañjari. Among the Jaina logicians the above distinction is first made by Siddhasena. Later Jaina logicians like Akalanka, Vidyananda, Mallisena also accept these two kinds of inference : (1) inference for one's own self (svārthānumāna) and (2) inference for others' sake (parārthānumāna) or syllogistic inference.