Jain Journal 1981 01

Author(s): Jain Bhawan Publication
Publisher: Jain Bhawan Publication

Page 30

104
man is informed of smoke in a place, he will feel no difficulty in concluding that there must be fire. So it is clear that the Jaina therory of two limbed anumāna is opposed to all those views. The argument of the Jainas is that, given the thesis and reason, a man of intelligence would safely and surely come to the right conclusion.
JAIN JOURNAL
Inference, for less-intelligent persons, on the contrary, requires a long chain of premises. To teach such a person, the Jainas accept not only the five premises of a Nyaya syllogism, but they goes even further and accept ten-limbed syllogism.
The Jaina logician Samantabhadra in his Aptamimänsä refers to three-limbed syllogism: thesis, reason and example. Hemacandra refers to application and conclusion.
(1) The hill is firey (thesis)
(2) because of smoke. (reason)
(3) Wherever there is smoke there is fire, such as the kitchen. (example)
(4) This hill is smoky (application)
(5) therefore it is firey. (conclusion)
The ten-limbed syllogism referred above is found in Bhadrabahu's Dasavaikälika-niryukti. The ten-limbs are: (1) Pratijñā (proposition), (2) Pratijña-Vibhakti (the limitations of the proposition), (3) Hetu (reason), (4) Hetu-Vibhakti (limitation of reason), (5) Vipaksa (the counter proposition), (6) Vipaksa-Pratişedha (the opposition to the counter proposition), (7) Dṛṣṭanta (the example), (8) Aŝankā (doubting the validity of the example), (9) Aśankā- Pratiṣedha (removing the doubt), (10) Nigamana (the conclusion).
The Jaina logicians has pointed out that the example-premise is not necessary in the syllogistic inference. It is by the statement of the thesis and the statement of the reason that one may be made to understand the truth of inference. It may be said that the example of kitchen may help us in determing the vyāpti : "Wherever there is smoke there is fire." They point out that vyapti is already known through induction (tarka), the use of example is obviously superfluous. They hold that application and conclusion these two, like example-premises, are useless. To convince others, supporting the mark (reason) is essential; without this that is impossible even though the example, application and conclusion may be used. If the reason is not well-established it is impossible to establish the probandum in any way. Hence in an anumana, it is the reason alone