Jain Journal 1981 01

Author(s): Jain Bhawan Publication
Publisher: Jain Bhawan Publication

Page 29

JANUARY, 1981
103
(1) Inference for one's own self (svārthānumāna): This kind of inference is deduced in one's own mind after having made repeated observations. A man by repeated observation in the kitchen and elsewhere comes to the conclusion that where there is fire there must always be smoke. He is not sure whether the hill he sees has fire or not, but noticing smoke, he at once recollecting the inseparable connection (avinābhāva) between fire and smoke, concludes that there must be fire on the hill. This is the inference for one's own self. It is psychological process of inference.
According to Dharmabhusana there are three organs of svārthanumāna viz. dharmi, sadhya and sādhana. A thing which is related positively with sādhya is called sadhana. A dharmi is the abode of the sādhya. The sādhya is also called dharma, with reference to its abode (dharmt), and the dharmi and sādhya are sometimes taken together for the sake of brevity and is called pakşa. In such a case there are only two limbs of the svārthānumāna syllogism, the paksa (thesis) and sādhana (reason).
The sadhana (hetu) is a necessary part of a syllogism, because it is the mark of that which is to be proved, which the dharmi is required to localise in the sādhya, for otherwise we might have smoke on a hill-top giving rise to an inference of the existence of fire in a lake, which would be absured. The absence of a dharmi reduces anumāna to tarka, for the absence of an abode, the inference only amounts to a repitition of the abstract relationship between the sādhya and the sādhana of a syllogism.
(2) Inference for the others sake (parārthānumāna) or syllogistic inference is the result of reasons standing in relation to invariable concomitance (vyāpti) with sādhya or in other words, it may be said that parārthānumāna is a definite cognition resulting from a statement of probane having the characteristic of necessary concomitance with the probandum. It is a logical form of inference.
Philosophers of different school hold different views as regards the constitution of syllogism. The Sankhya maintains that a syllogism consists of three parts : thesis (pakşa), reason (hetu) and example (dịşļānta). The Buddhist philosopher Acarya Dignaga also holds this view. The Mimansakas assert four parts with the addition of application (upanaya). The Naiyayikas assert five with addition of conclusion (nigamana).
The Jainas hold that the thesis (pakşa) and reson (hetu) constitute a syllogism adequate for an intelligent person. For a super-intelligent person, the statement of reason only is enough. Thus if an intelligent