Truthfullness and Truth in Jaina Philosophy

Author(s): Peter Flugel
Publisher: ZZ_Anusandhan

Page 35

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31THEIRA 40 (?)
ekadeśo 'ddhâddhā sā misritā yayā sā addhâddhā-misritā, yathā prathamapaurusyām eva varttamānāyām kaścit kañcana tvarayan evam vadaticala madhyâhni-bhūtam iti.
53 HABERMAS (1981: 97-117) / (1984-1987 II: 62–76), and others, showed that semantic content of normative sentences can be transformed into propositional sentences while the reverse is not always possible.
54 DVS 7.6–10:
tamhā gacchāmo, vakkhāmo, amugam vā ņe bhavissai/ aham vā ņam karissāmi, eso vā ņam karissai // 6 // evamāi u jā bhāsā esa-kālammi sankiyā / sampayāiyam atthe vā tam pi dhiro vivajjae // 7 // aiyammi ya kālammi paccuppannam aṇāgae/ jamattham tu na jāņejjā “evameyam” ti no vae // 8 // aiyammi ya kālammi paccuppannam aṇāgae/ jattha sankā bhave tam tu "evameyam” ti no vae // 9 // aiyammi ya kālammi paccuppannam aņāgae/ nissarkiyam bhave jam tu "evameyam” ti niddise // 10 //
55 See the mixed true-false utterance ‘The god of the sky' (Ayāra 2.4.1.12–13) and similar examples of mislabelling discussed in footnote 90.
56 In symbolic logic such problems are discussed under the labels such as 'no-item thesis', 'misleading form thesis', 'truth value gap thesis', and 'new truth-value thesis' (HAACK 1974: 47 ff.). According to PRIEST (1987 / 2006) the single rationale underlying the theory of different types of truth value gaps, derived from the correspondence theory of truth, is that 'for certain sentences, a there is no Fact which makes a true, neither is there a Fact which makes a true', which are to be distinguished from dialetheia, or true contradictions such that both statement A and its negation, -A, are true. In his view, the argument fails, because 'if there is no Fact which makes a true, there is a Fact which makes a true, viz. the fact that there is no Fact which makes a true' (ib., p. 54).
57 See for instance BALBIR (1987: 9) and DUNDAS (1996: 62).
58 PRIEST-ROUTLEY (1983: 14) cite Stoic and other authors from Greek antiquity defending this view.
59 'In this respect the Jains anticipate contemporary discussive logic, initiated by Jaśkowski, and they may similarly be interpreted in