Truthfullness and Truth in Jaina Philosophy

Author(s): Peter Flugel
Publisher: ZZ_Anusandhan

Page 38

मार्च २०१०
२०३
75 Pannt, 259a: samsaya-karani yā vāk anekârthâbhidhāyitayā parasya saņśayam utpādayati, yathā saindhavamāniyatām ity atra saindhava-sabdo lavaņa-vastra-puruşa-vājisu. SCHUBRING (2000 $ 74: 157 f.): ‘All animals with two to four senses and beings with five senses express themselves in the neither true nor wrong way, but the latter will employ the first three modes just as well (Pannav. 260a) provided they have learnt to do so or carry along with them a higher ability.'
76 PannȚ, 259a: vyākstā yā prakațārthā.
77 Pannt, 259a: avyākstā atigambhira-sabdârthā avyaktâksaraprayuktā vā avibhāvitârthātvāt.
78 The Pāli equivalents of pannavaņā and pannatta are paññāpana, paññatta (MĀLVANIYĀ 1971: 212). The word pannatti <prajñapti, teaching, information, instruction, is frequently used in the canon, for instance at Viy 2.1.90, or Viy 16.6 (709) where the verbs pannaveti parūveti <prajñāpayati prarūpayati> are used in to describe Mahāvira's preaching activity. Hence, his teachings are called pannavaņā <prajñāpana>, exposition, or parūvaņa <prarūpana>, explanation (AGD 51, MĀLVANIYĀ 1971: 210). The 'proclamations' (Kundmachung) or preachings of the unattached ones are also called niggantha pāvayaņa/ pavayaņa <nirgrantha pravacana> in Viy 2.5.5 (134b), 20.8.5 (792b) and Țhāņa 176a. See SCHUBRING 2000 § 37: 73).
79 DELEU (1970: 169) writes: 'āsaissāmo is āśayisyāmah, not, as Abhay. says, āśrayisyāmaḥ.' According to the rules of speech in Ayāra 2.4.1.5 and DVS 7.8–10 one should avoid such a statement if one cannot be entirely sure.
80 PannȚ 249b: yathāvasthitârthâbhidhānād iyam prajñāpani, in MĀLVANIYĀ (1971: 211, cf. 346).
81 Contrary to MĀLVANIYĀ's (1971: 211) view that asatya-mrsā speech 'has nothing to do with norm' it is obvious that by referring to situations that ought to be both imperatives, commissives (vows), and declaratives imply normative conditions, even if used by an enlightened being. Only assertives attempt to represent situations as they are. Searle showed that from the hearer's perspective even literal speech implies a contextual horizon to be intelligible (HABERMAS 1980: 452) / (19841987 I: 337). According to Pann 246b, asatyā-mrsā speech signifies not only ohāraṇi <avadhāraņi> or determinative expressions such as 'I believe' or 'I think', but all attempts to communicate transcendental truth through
42 D:ISHEELANUSANDHANIANU-50