Tattvartha Sutra

Author(s): Sukhlal Sanghavi, K K Dixit
Publisher: L D Indology Ahmedabad

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and that might be so; but the point is that to thus emphasize that a full comprehension of the Jaina scriptures is a condition necessary for the attainment of mokṣa was no part of the Jaina's theoretical heritage. What seems to have happened is that near about the time of Umäsvāti the Jaina theoreticians became aware of the anomaly that among the Indian philosophers they were almost alone not to recognize right cognition as a means necessary for attainment of mokṣa. In view of their specific historical background it was impossible for them not to mention right faith and right conduct in this connection; so they just added right cognition to those two and declared the three to be a joint means of mokṣa. Of course, when the non-Jaina philosophers declared right cognition to be the sole means of moksa they had an implicit understanding that this right cognition is to be accompanied by something like the Jaina's 'right faith' and 'right conduct'; but the point was never made explicit. Similarly, when the Jaina philosopher spoke as if right faith and right conduct constitute a joint means of mokṣa they had an implicit understanding that these right faith and right conduct are to be accompanied by something like the non-Jaina philosopher's 'right cognition'; but the point was made explicit at so late a stage, and when it was made explicit difficulties arose on account of the rather technical position that right cognition never arises before the rise of right faith while after the rise of right faith it arises automatically.
Similarly, the Jaina authors were obviously and naturally conscious that there was something characteristic about the ideas they were propounding, but they had no tradition of saying that these ideas in their totality stood covered by a definite set of concepts. Some move in this direction was made in a passage like Sūtrakṛtānga, II. 5.12-28 and Aupapātika, 1.33 where an impressive catalogue of theoretical concepts was framed and the point emphasized that it is proper to posit these concepts and improper not to posit them. But subsequently it was realized that such a catalogue of concepts must be standardized in a manageably brief form, and hence came into existence an adjectival phrase describing the theoretical equipment of an ideal pious Jaina householder. The phrase occurs in the course of an account of the ideal pious Jaina householder that first makes its appearance in Sūtrakṛtānga 2.2.24 and is then repeated in Bhagavati 2.5, Aupapātika 2.20 and at so many other places. Here the ideal Jaina householder is said to be conversant with the following twelve concepts :