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406
A. Werder
Der sarvasarvatmakatwavida
407
theory, there is no error at all, every cognition being valid since "everything con tains everything". In discussing this prima facie strange recurrence of the server ritmakareváda, a provisional hypothesis is framed, namely that it is due to Sim. khva influence on certain theistic circles, and to these it is that Ramanuja seems to refer.
In $7 this väda is analysed both as to its essential philosophical content and the relations it has with other central tenets of the Samkhya school of thought. Before doing so it is made clear that the passages in which this vāda is mentioned, and that some of the terms used, are not explicit enough to allow by themselves to draw a distinct and complete picture, and that the exegete is, therefore, thrown back upon his own understanding and his own endeavour to think along the lines of Sam. khya. Thus, the result cannot but be hypothetical in part.
Starting from the observation that the sentence sanam sarvatmakam is parsphrased in the texts by the sentences samekam ekam ca se and surva sur watra (vidyate asti), this ontological statement is shown to mean that every-necessarily: material - phenomenon contains in itself at least one representative of each and every species of individual things ($ 7.1). Yet it cannot be overlooked that this vida is always exemplified or proved by explicitly referring to what now. adays would be called the 'alimentary chain'. The fact, easily to be observed that animal and vegetal life are mutually dependant, has obviously been interpreted by Samkhya philosophers on the assumption that e.g. a particular animal contains in Itself the matter of all those other animals and/or plants it consumes. The peculiari ty of this conception consists in that they suppose that all the individuals who have been consumed are nevertheless still existent as such. On the other hand, it can be demonstrated that the statement sarvarni sarvatmakam does not imply that every phenomenon consists only of all the others, i.e. is not at the same time also this very thing by itself (7.3). Likewise it is conspicuous that the validity of this vide extends to the inanimate evolutes of prakti, too (74).
In connection with this latter question a fragment, assigned to the Viraganih by the author of the Yuktidipiki and dealt with already by O. Strauß (cf. end of note 85), is examined; it clearly states that the exponents of Samkhya do not admit any annihilation, but only a disappearing out of being manifest, and that this holds good for the 23 tattvas (at the end of a kalpa) as well as for all the other minor evolutes of them (after a more or less limited time of manifestation). In note 85 It is shown with the help of Sankara's Vivaraña on YS 3.13 that Frauwall ner has misunderstood the technical term samsarga, occurring in this fragment; the expression has evidently to be interpreted to denote the rejoining of a phenomenon with its cause(8) after having been mantfest for some time, whereas the opposite process is called visarga in Samkhya-Yoga terminology.)
In $7.5 the additional element jātyanucchedena, frequently met with when the sentence sara sarvatmakam occurs, is taken up for consideration and the opinion is expressed that it is intended to preclude the possible misunderstanding of the Servervatmakarvavade as implying that the individual phenomenon by being sarvatmaka does not at the same time represent its own species. This vida has ob
viously been attacked quite early, and the argument was that if it were true, every thing would then be visible everywhere or in everything else. As to the answer of the exponents of Samkhya, some of the relevant passages say that they took recourse to their peculiar concept of abhivyakti, ie, they accounted for the empirical fact that a particular thing is perceived as this and only as this, by referring to place, time, shape, etc., as conditioning its manifestation,
In 7.7 still more fundamental problems connected with this vāda are discussed in some detail. The essential course of this discussion is as follows: Frauwallner has made the interesting and important observation that the origin of a given doctrine lies elsewhere than in the reasons adduced for it, and that the reasons are, on the contrary, adduced only later in order to prove the doctrine, of which the origin lies in immediate observation and perception of things.
From this it would follow that the sarvasan k atuwada is posterior in relation to the doctrine of prakrti, which, together with other reasons, it serves to justi fy. Since it cannot have been solely deduced from empirical facts nor have itself been derived from the concept of primary matter, there is greater likelihood for the assumption that it is later merely in the sense that it was later used as one of the proofs for the existence of prakti. In quest of the origin of this vada one has, there fore, to take into account the fact that it is closely related to sakaryavida. I.e. that it forms an integral constituent part of the special theory of causation the Samkhyas adhere to and propound: according to the latter wäda, a product already exists before it becomes manifest, and according to the former it is all the same still existent after it has disappeared! And both these vadas cannot be delinked from the peculiar Samkhya concept of being which was formulated by the Varsaganyab, as is clear from a fragment thus preserved by Vasubandhu in his Abhidharmakosabhâsya: yad astiasty ene tadyan nästi nästy en tad / asalo nästi sambhavah/sato rasti vinafah
Now, regarding the satkaryavada Frauwallner seems to have taken the view that it was developed secondarily only, viz. in order to meet adverse criticism directed against the reasons brought forward by Samkhys authors who wanted to prove the existence of primary matter. Thus, If Frauwallner were right, it would mean that the peculiar Samkhya concept of being, too, is of later origin - consequence alto gether improbable! Against Frauwallner, als also against the implications of his ideas about this part of the historical development of the Samkhya school of thought, It is stated that the whole problem stands in need of a thorough and critical reconsideration which may well lead to quite different results.
The resulting new picture would, to be sure, likewise have the character of a hypothesis: vet. I think it would be a stronger one. It has, of course, yet to be drawn in full detail: my own attempt is but a rough sketch. It starts from the as sumption that the Samkhya concept of being has arisen, among other fruti passages, out of Chind. Up. 6.2.1 f, where though still in terms of rather cosmological than ontological thinking - it is stated that a dar can only have originated out of a sat. Since Ramanuja, too, refers to this very teaching of Uddalaka Aruni, one has to reckon with the possibility that the peculiar concept of being which has developed
