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this sort of expression of himsā and ahimsā, the Puruşārthasiddhyupāya seeks to explain falsehood and truth, stealing and non-steeling, unchastely and chastity, possession and non-possession etc. as forms of himsā and ahirsā. This way of expression regards ahiṁsā as the essence of all virtues, thus giving supreme status to ahiṁsā it deserves. In the pages to follow, I shall be using the word ahiṁsā in this comprehensive sense.
It is of capital importance to note that ahimsā presupposes, first, a world of living beings, both human and non-human, along with the fact each of them is constantly affecting the other and is being affected by the other either evenly or unevenly. Secondly, ahiṁsā presumes that life is dear to all (Savvesim jiviyaṁ piyaṁo) and for all living beings pain is disturbance, fearful and unpleasant (Savvesim Pāņāņañ. ..... assāyaṁ apariņivvānam mahabhayam dukkham”). This is also expressed by saying that just as pain is unpleasant for oneself, so also it is unpleasant for all living beings (Jaha te na piam dukkham ..... emeva savvajivānamo). Again, it is stated that to kill the other is to kill oneself (Jīva vaho appavahoo) and a being to be killed is not other than your self (Tumaṁ si nāma sa ceva jaṁ hantavvař ti mannasi!'). Thus without these two presuppositions the talk of ahiṁsā is inconceivable.
. It may be noted that these two presuppositions are psychological in nature and the statement of ahiṁsā evaluative in nature. The former are factual or descriptive assertions, while the later is a normative or a value-assertion. Does this mean that value-assertions can be derived from factual assertions, ethical conclusions can be drawn from non-ethical premises, ‘ought' .can be derived from, 'is'? This problem of the derivation of 'ought' from 'is' is an important discussion in contemporary ethics, but here I do not propose to argue from
Spiritual Awakening (Samyagdarśana) and Other Essays
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