________________
merely factual assertions we are not thereby taking any pro or con attitude towards what we are talking about. But when we make an ethical or value judgement we are not neutral in this way: it would seem paradoxical if one were to say ‘X is good', ‘Y is right, but he is absolutely indifferent to its being sought or done by himself or anyone else.' The merit of naturalism is that it regards value in the world as relative to consciousness.
According to non-naturalism, moral terms cannot be reduced to non-moral terms of science. No doubt 'good' or ‘right' have objective properties for their being recognised as such, but they are indefinable in non-ethical terms. They are of a very different kind being non-natural or nonempirical and so to speak ‘normative rather than factual'. For instance, if we say that knowledge is good', it means that it is good by virtue of the non-natural character of goodness in knowledge known to us directly and not by any empirical observations. The defect of non-naturalism is that it regards good as simple, unanalysable, and indefinable, but the merit of this position is that it regards goodness as objective and not merely subjective.
Now when the Jaina says that Subha is an experience in tune with Ahimsā, he is accepting the merit of both naturalism and non-naturalism. The statement that Subha is an experience in tune with Ahiṁsā accepts value in the world as related to consciousness and leaves room for ‘ought' expericnce. For example, to say that kindness is an experience in tune with Ahiṁsā implies that we ought to be kind. Besides, that experience is not of the type 'liked by me' or ‘approved byme' and so is not subjective or reducible to feeling but possesses an objective character, and at the same time this experience is not simple, unanalysable but complex
142
Spiritual Awakening (Samyagdarśana) and Other Essays
Jain Education International
For Personal & Private Use Only
www.jainelibrary.org
