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and analysable, and therefore definable as has been explained above.
The second and third meta-ethical questions that draw our attention are : (2) What is the nature of normative judgements of ethics? Or what is the nature of ethical judgements (obligatory and value) according to the Jaina? (3) What is their justification?
Let me now state the second question more clearly. There have been recognised three kinds of knowledge : (1) Knowledge of facts; as this flower is yellow; (2) Knowledge of necessity, as 7 + 5 = 12 and (3) Knowledge of value, as A was a good man or murder is wrong. The question under discussion reduces itself to this. Are ethical judgements expressive of any cognitive content in the sense that they may be asserted true or false? Or do they simply express emotions, feelings, etc. ? The upholders of the former view are known as non-cognitivists (emotivists). When we say that Himsa is evil, are we making a true or false assertion or are we experiencing simply a feeling? Or are we doing both? According to the cognitivists, the ethical judgement, 'Hiṁsā is evil is capable of being objectively true and thus moral knowledge is objective, whereas the non-cognitivists deny both the objectivity of assertion and knowledge inasmuchas, according to them, ethical judgements are identified with feeling, emotions etc. Here the position taken by the Jaina seems to me to be this that though the statement, 'Hiṁsā is evil'is objectively true, yet it cannot be divested of the feeling element involved in experiencing the truth of the statement. In moral life knowlege and feeling cannot be separated. By implication we can derive from the Tattvārthasūtra that the path of goodness can be traversed through knowledge (Jnana) and feeling and activity. Amstcandra says that first of all
Spiritual Awakening (Samyagdarśana) and Other Essays
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