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PIOTR BALCEROWICZ
SOME REMARKS ON THE NAYA METHOD
These soven conditionally valid viewpoints are boldly maintained by Siddharsigani to exhaust all possibilities of the predicating of an object and to make use of all conceivable optional perspectives an object could be viewed from: 'Thus, it has been established in the above manner that these seven viewpoints listed above) collect together all possible) outlooks, because there is not any other alternative referring to the real thing that does not count among this septuplet of the viewpoints. It is emphasised by the Jainas that contradictions involved in this theory are only apparent," in so far as each of the utterances has a different point of reference. What is significant is that not some abstract, clemal sentences are dealt with in the method of conditionally valid predications, but particular concrete ulterances pronounced in a particular situation.
Even though only the seven-staged method of description is as a rule mentioned, the Jainas admitted a theoretical possibility of infinite number of thinkable viewpoints. Some instances, which are usually not mentioned in secondary literature, are to be found, e.g, in the Tattvarthadhigama-bhasya itself. While discussing the nature of liberated beings (siddha), Umasvati avails himself of two viewpoints, which he contrasts with each other, vix, the one revealing the previous existence (piirva-bhava-prajapaniya-naya), during which the particular liberated being destroyed the bondage of transmigration, and the other one revealing the present existence (pratyulpanna-bhava-prallåpaniwa-raya), vix, the condition of being emancipated". Here two different perspectives are assumed with respect to time, and one could easily add another viewpoint predicating a property or a condition of a being in next existence uttara-bhava-prajapaniya nava). Naturally. Umāsvāti does not do that with regard to liberated beings, for the liberated being is beyond any contingencies and dependencies, also temporal, and any discussion of the future existence in this particular case does not apply. However, in the commentary on the same sutra the author does speak about other properties of a liberated being, taking the viewpoint of the existence directly
preceding the moment of liberation (anantara-pascar-keta-gatika-naya) and the viewpoint of the last but one rebirth before the liberation (ekántara-pascal-kptayatika-naya). Other instances are to be found in the Agumas.
What is conspicuous in this method of description by way of applying seven conditionally valid predications is the gradual limitation of the context: from the most general onc, viz. the comprchensive viewpoint (naigama), down to the most specialised, context-restricted factual and qualified viewpoint (evan-bhūta) of narrowest extension. At the same time the informative contents gradually and cumulatively increases from the most undistinguished and contextless' naigama viewpoint to the most circumstantial and semantics-laden evan-bhuta viewpoint with most complex point of reference. Thus every subscquent viewpoint is directly related to the one preceding it and it represents a further restriction of the point of reference. This hierarchical arrangement is apparent from the expressions used by various authors that explicitly indicate that the extension of successive viewpoints is included in that of their antecedents." This twofold subordinating relation is stated by Akalanka: 'There is (such) an arrangement of these [viewpoints) because cach and every subsequent (viewpoint) has more and more refined scope and is grounded in every preceding (viewpoint)," The same idea, viz. that every subsequent viewpoint is hierarchically related to the preceding one, is expressed by many other Jaina authors including Mallisena" and Yašovijaya".
These findings are crucial for any further analysis of the logical structure of the doctrine of viewpoints (naya-vida). They also help us to evaluate such misconstrued conjectures that rest on the alleged presence of contradiction embedded in the nayastructure or claims, such as that of PANDEY'S (1984), that all nayas can hee assigned the third truth-value I indeterminale) of Lukasiewicz's three-valued system $3.
In view of the multiplex character of all phenomena and due to limitations of verbal means of expression at our disposal, it is a practical impossibility to express
"NAV 29.13 (p. 441) ad eva na kasicid vikalpo'sti vasta gacara voru naya sapiake mantar til sarvabhiprava-sangrahuliete ili sthiram. ** TS 1.35 p. 38.3 4. verse 5:
itinaya-vādas citrah kacid viruddha nátha cu visuddhah
laukika-visavetitas falva-jänarthans adhigama / -- --Such are the variegated expositions by means of conditionally valid predications, that seem contradictory with regard to something (sc. one thing). nevertheless they are subtle, transcend the province of common people and should be understood in order to know the truth.
MTH 10.7.
Egin Tih 1.35 (tesyen, lev en satsu, teşv eva samprates, teşam eva tesam evo sampratanam, clc.) or RVär 1.33 (p. 95 fr.): 1. (naigama as most general): artha sankalpa-matra, 3. (vavahara as included in sangraha): atas - elasmát, sangrahagrifa-bhedakah, clc.
RVår 133 (p. 99.17): witaróttara-suksma-visayavad esami kramah pura-purvahetukavac ca.
SVM 28.204-213 (p. 167.9 18). JTBh 2$ 9, p. 14.1 ff.
For the sake of completeness, on the subscquent pages I shall very briefly recapitulate the findings of a detailed logical analysis in BALCEROWICZ (2001b).
