Some Remarks On The Naya Mmethod

Author(s): Piotr Balcerowicz
Publisher: Piotr Balcerowicz
Catalog link: https://jainqq.org/explore/269202/1

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Some Remarks on the Naya Method
PIOTR BALCEROWICZ
The most significant and intriguing Jaina contribution to Indian philosophical heritage is beyond doubt the theory of the multiplexity of reality (anekanta-vada), that trifurcates into the method of the four standpoints (niksepa-wada, nyása vada). the method of the seven-fold modal description (sapta-bhangi'. sydd wida) and the doctrine of viewpoints (naya-vada), or the (usually) sevenfold method of conditionally valid predications. At the same time no other Jaina concept bred so much controversy as the idea that one and the same sentence can be either true or false, which seems implied by the admission of the multiplexity.
In the present paper, instead of dealing with the historical development of the concept of the nayas," I wish to clarify the ramifications that were instrumental in moulding the concept and to analyse internal dependencies within the framework of the seven viewpoints (naya), and, finally, to bricfly propose a certain interpretative basis for the naya-vada. A closer look at a sample textual material is imperative, in
The main ideas found in this paper appeared for the first time in a succinct form in Polish in BALCEROWICZ (1994),
The term sapta-bhangi (lit. 'seven-angled', 'seven-twister") usually refers to swad vada, cf. c.g. SVM 24.2-3 (p. 148.2-3): anekintamakatvanas sapla-bhangiprarüpagena sukhópannevam saditi sapi nirapita. However, it may occasionally in mediaeval period also refer to naya-vada itself, etc. Thus we can eventually speak of pramana-sapta-bhangi (which is syd-voda), maya-sapla-bhangi (which is naya-vida) and duraya-sapla-bhangi: comp. e.g. SBT, p. 16.1: ivam ca sapta-bhangi dvividha: pramana-sapta-bhangi nawa-rapia-bhangi céri, and NC 254ab (p. 128): sutteva humiti bhanga pamana naya-dunaya-bheda-juttavi/ 'There are as many as seven conditional perspectives with divisions with respect to cognitive criteria, viewpoints and defective viewpoints.
The term is well-attested not only in Jaina Agamas, but is also well known - in its not strictly technical meaning from Pali commentaries as a method of interpretation (eg.aparo navo, evum-adina navena, ti-adina nyena) and other Buddhist sources (e.g. AN 2.193: naya-her). Interestingly enough, in Buddhist sources we also come across its opposite durnava, the improper application of exposition' or 'misinterpretation (eg AN 3.178 or Jataka 4.241: durava).
Exwww in Jaina Philosophy und Religion Warsaw Indological Studies, Volume 2 (2012), pp 37-68

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SOME REMARKS ON THE NAYA METHOD
so far as it should help the reader assess whether my understanding based on these passages is correct. Otherwise, to indiscriminately speak of the general concept of the Jaina doctrine of viewpoints would, in its hollowness, resemble investigation of a crow's teeth (kaka-danta-pariksd).
The textual point of reference will be provided by Umåsväli's! Tallvarthadhigama-bhayya, Siddhasena Divakara's Sarmati-tarka-prakarana, Akalanka's works (Raja-vartrika and Laghiyas-traya). Siddharşigani's Nyaydivatāra vivyti and Mallisena's Syad-voda-manjarl, only occasionally I shall take recourse to some other Jaina works, and the focus will be more lextual philological, rather than formal-logical.
An ontological assumption underlying the theory of the multiplexity of reality (anekanta-vada) in general, and the doctrine of viewpoints (naya-vada) in particular, consists in the belief which is supposed to defy all simplistic concepts ranging from monism and clemalism (advaita) to pluralism and momentariness (ksanika-voda). In other words, the world forms a multifaceted structure, every part of which enters into specific relations and inter-dependencies with other parts of the whole. Its make-up is complex enough to allow for a vast range of statements that can be asserted from various standpoints. The ontological framework is provided by the concept of substance (dravya), which is characterised simultaneously by origination (utpada, udaya), continued existence (sthill, dhrauva) and annihilation (Ihanga, yaya, apavarga), insofar as it is endowed with qualities (guna) and transient modes (paryayu) as well as with directly experienced, though verbally inexpressible momentary occurrences (vivarta, varlana). Any truth-conducive analysis, which is supposed to map the ontological structure onto epistemological conceptual framework, should therefore take into account the individual ontological context and accompanying circumstances of any phenomenon or entity under examination. The maxim provides that truth should only be complete truth, whereas incomplete truth would be but a misnomer for utter falschood. However, limitations of practical dealings and verbal communication by necessity abstract any given thing or facet of reality from all its temporal, spatial, causal and other relations, and emphasise but onc aspect, relevant in a given moment.
Due to this infinite manifoldness of inter-dependencies, including various temporal and spatial perspectives as well as either universal or particular reference, a vast range of properties, cach of them being equally justified, could be predicated of a given entity with equal right. And that might even lead eventually to seeming contradictions. The Jainas maintain that such contradictions that ensuc from unconditional assertions standing in opposition to one another can easily be resolved when individual points of reference for each and every assertion are taken into consideration. Given such ontological presuppositions, the description on the epistemological level becomes equally complex: cach of such dichotomic categories as big-small, good-bad, existent-nonexistent, true-false, etc., that are mutually related, when dissociated from its opposite, is falsc. In other words, each thesis automatically entails its antithesis, but the model is not dialectical, in so far as the synthesis remains integrated with the very same scheme and thus contingent upon its corollaries. To correlate such individual, partial standpoints is the task of the syadvada method, which systematises possible arrangements of seemingly contradictory statements. This is evident from such Mallisena's statements as the method of modal description ... consists in all viewpoints".
Interestingly enough, it is the naya model which the Jainas used to interpret and incorporate various philosophical theories or worldviews into a consistent holistic framework, instead of the doctrine of the seven-fold modal description (saniabhangi, swid wida). Numerous Jaina authors such as Akalahku, Siddhasena Divakara in STP, Siddhasena Mahamati in his NAV 29, Mallisena in SVM 28 correlate particular theories and views represented by particular thinkers and philosophical schools only under the naya scheme.
On the other hand, the doctrine of the seven-fold modal description' (saplabhangi) is primarily discussed in three contexts that of the triple nature of reality, which is believed to consist of origination, continuation and decay', that of the relation between the universal and the particular (e.g. RVär 4.42, p. 258-259), and that of the relationship between the substance and its properties / modes. Essentially all the cxamples of the application of the doctrine of the seven-fold modal
Since there is some controversy as to whether Th is the auto-commentary of the author of the Tattvartha-sútra, I tentatively not to predetermine the issue-take TS as a work by Umaskin and Th as a commentary by Umásvali.
Not to be confused with the author of the Nyuydvatara, Siddhascna Mahamati, who flourished after Dharmakirti, ser: BALCEROWICZ (2000), BALCEROWICZ (2001: XXXIV -xxxvii), BALCEROWICZ (2001e) and BALCHROWICZ (forthcoming).
TBh 1.35: yarhad praryakyanuman pamanta-vucanaih pramanair eko thah pramivale sva-visaya nivad nu ca ta vpratipattayo bhavanti advan naya-vada iti. - 'Or else, just the way onc object is cognised by various cognitive criteria---such as perception, inference, analogy and testimony (imparted by an authoritative person-and they become no contradictories (sc. they are not at variance with each other), because
each of them is circumscribed to its own province, similar to them are expositions [by means of every conditionally valid] viewpoint.
SVM 19.76, p. 128.24: sarva-nav makena syd-vadena...

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description' pertain to one and the same problem: how to relate the whole and its parts, the problem entailed by the question of the relation between permanence and change. This finds corroboration in Hemacandra's Anya-yoga-vyavacchedadvātrimšikā 25 and in Mallişena's Syad-vada-manjari (SVM 25.31-36, pp. 152.34153.4).
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Occasionally, to illustrate the principle how such conditionally valid viewpoints (naya) apply to the real world and how differences between descriptions of one and the same phenomenon by means of different predications are possible, the Jainas resort to the simile, well-known in India, the elephant and the blind men, well known from Udana 4.4 (pp. 66-69). When such partial views are taken unconditionally (e.g. sad eva"), they are instances of a defective viewpoint (durnaya) and instantiation of 'the maxim of the blind people and the elephant" (andha-gaja-nyaya), known also as 'the maxim of people who are blind from birth and the elephant' (jäty-andha-hasti-nyaya). Also the maxim as an illustration of philosophical-religious views accepted unconditionally is, as a rule, used in the context of (dur)-naya-vada, not syad-väda. It occurs twice in Mallisena's Syadvädu-mañjarī (14.103-104 and 19.75-77), and in both cases in the same context of durnaya. The first instance is rather obvious: ... Simply by force of extreme disorientation produced by a defective viewpoint, foolish people deny one [aspect] and establish the other one. This is the maxim of the blind [people] and the clephant." Mallişena's second instance seems equivocal at first, because both the notions of naya and of syäd-vada are found there: ... Because no entity, which consists in infinite properties cannot be grasped properly without the method of modal description which consists in all viewpoints, for otherwise that would lead to the undesired consequence of seizing [merely] sprouts (sc. superficial,
"It is quite remarkable how widespread in other philosophical and religious schools than Buddhism the maxim became. Comp. JACOB (1907-1911: I: 3).
The gist of the defective viewpoint is its unconditionality, expressed by eva (sad eva), the proper viewpoint (naya) is indeterminate and 'open', non-exclusive (sat). whereas the modal description expressly avails itself of the modal functor in a certain sense' (syr), or 'somehow' (kathamcit). Cf. SVM 28.10-12, p. 159.14-16: durnitayas ca nayaś ca pramane ca durniti-naya-pramänäni taiḥ, kenöllekhena mivetéty äha sad eva sat syat sad iti.'Defective opinions, viewpoints as well as both cognitive criteria are (the members of the compound in Hemacandra's aphorism AYVD 28]; [they are used there in the instrumental case]. "By what manner of description [a thing] is cognised [through them]?" It is replied: (1) x is nothing but existent, (2) x is existent, (3) x is in a certain sense existent."
"SVM 14.103-104, p. 88.9-10: kevalam durnaya-prabhävita-mati-vyamoha-vasäd ekam apalapyanyatarad vyavasthapayanti bälisäḥ so 'yam andhu-gaja-nyayah.
SOME REMARKS ON THE NAYA METHOD
deficient cognition) following the maxim of the blind [people] and the elephant."" In the latter quotation we encounter, as a matter of fact, a triple-level parallelism: dharma vastu, naya syad-vada, and andha-gaja-nyaya - pallava-grahitäprasanga; in other words, an entity pertaining to its properties, the modal description pertaining to viewpoints, and the undesired consequence (prasanga) pertaining to the maxim (nyaya). Accordingly, a complex entity as a whole (vastu) is the scope of the comprehensive modal description (syad-vada), the defective form of which is the superficial, deficient cognition (pallava-grahita) that grasps only 'undeveloped sprouts, or scanty, partial data. Furthermore, a single property (dharma) is the scope of an particular viewpoint (naya), the defective form of which is exemplified by the maxim of 'the maxim of the blind people and the elephant", which is tantamount to durnaya. Thus, Mallişena's both illustrations are consistent in referring to the idea of the unconditional, defective viewpoint. This additionally supports the contention that only the (dur)naya model is employed to map philosophical opinions.
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Due to multifaceted circumstances, all assertoric sentences can only be relatively
true:
'Therefore all viewpoints with no exception are false views [when strictly] related to their respective spheres (paksa); however, [when understood] as mutually dependent, they become [viewpoints] conducive to truth.
This relativity, however, is not eventually tantamount to professing scepticism, and the Jainas are quite explicit about that.
The possibility of attaining truth is ensured jointly by the concept of comprehensive and consistence-based cognitive criteria (pramana) and partial, aspect-qualified viewpoints, as instruments of detailed examination. However, the existence of truth as such and the possibility that it can become the contents of cognition is eventually warranted, according to Jaina beliefs, by omniscience.
SVM 19.75-77, p. 128.23 25: ananta-dharmatmakasya sarvasya vastunaḥ sarvanayatmakena syad-vadena vina yathävad grahitum asakyatvät. itarathandha-gajanyayena pallava-grahita-prasangat.
11
Cf. Siddhasena Diväkara's statement in STP 1.21:
tamha savve vi naya miccha-dithi sapakkha-padibuddha!
annonṇa-nissia una havamti sammalla-sabbhāvā !!
12 TS 1.6: pramāṇa-nayair adhigamah 'The comprehension of [the categories representing reality, mentioned in TS 1.4,] is [accomplished] through cognitive criteria and [conditionally valid] viewpoints. See also n. 19.

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(kevala). The latter assumption led to such paradoxical contentions that ultimately truth consists of all false statements taken together:
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[Let there be] prosperity to Jina's words that are made of an amassment of false views, that are conducive to immortality, that are venerable, and lead to the salvific happiness.""
This relativity of every predication and the impossibility of uttering an unconditionally valid statement about the reality could theoretically lead to two more-beside scepticism-different approaches. On the one hand, it could be a reason good enough to dispense with the soundness of the discursive thinking altogether and, in this way, it would embrace the negative approach of Nagarjuna and be reflected in the structure of the tetralemma (catus-koji). The dependent character of every notion and conceptual representation, the ineffable and complex structuring of reality (prapanca), as it is reflected in the rational and dichotomic mind, inescapably involves real contradictions (virodha) and antinomies (prasanga). On the other hand, the result could as well be an all-inclusive, positive approach. Two contradictory conclusions derived from one and the same thesis do not have to falsify the initial thesis, e.g., 'things arise from a cause' and 'things do not arise from a cause' do not have to unconditionally negate the discourse about causality; 'there is motion' and 'there is no motion'; 'there is time,' 'there is a part and the whole,' etc. Such two seemingly contradictory conclusions should make us only perceptive of the fact that they may-and indeed do-pertain to different contexts. This would be the Jaina approach. Despite this, the Jaina theory of anekanta-väda has frequently, and undeservedly, been blamed to disregard the law of the excluded middle" or the law of non-contradiction in stronger or weaker sense". However,
13
Siddhasena Diväkara's concluding verse of STP 3.69: baddam miccha-damsaṇa-samaha-maiyassa amaya-sarassa jina-vayanassa bhagavao samvigga-suhahigammassa li
The criticism concerns especially the conjunction of the first two figures (svär descriptions) of the sapta-bhangi that refer to the predicated object: (1) syad asti: 'from a certain viewpoint, x exists, and (2) syad nåsti: 'from a certain viewpoint, x does not exist.'
15 Notably, the violation of the law of contradiction is said, mistakenly as it were, to he involved in either or both the third and fourth figures of the sapta-bhangi: (3) syad asty eva syan nasty eva: 'from a certain viewpoint, x exists and, from a certain viewpoint, x does not exist' (wherein two predicated features are claimed to be taken subsequently), and (4) sydd avaktavyam: 'from a certain viewpoint, x is inexpressible,' (two contrary features are believed to be predicated of a thing in question jointly and simultaneously). Comp. PANDEY (1984: 163): "[O]nly that logic is indicated by svadvada which challenges the law
SOME REMARKS ON THE NAYA METHOD
one and the same sentence (p), when negated conditionally (ie, with the particle syat-from a certain point of view'), yields not a contrary statement (p) in the sense that when combined with the initial statement p is an application of the law of the excluded middle (pv-p), but refers to a different context, viz., its point of reference of two conjuncts is different."
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of contradiction and gives some truth value to contradictory statements"; BHARUCHAKAMAT (1984: 183); MATILAL (1991: 10-11 [13-151) or GANERI (2002: 9): 'When talking about the "law of non-contradiction" in a deductive system, we must distinguish between two quite different theses: (a) the thesis that "-(p & -p)" is a theorem in the system, and (b) the thesis that it is not the case that both "p" and "-p" are theorems. The Jainas are committed to the first of these theses, but reject the second. This is the sense in which it is correct to say that the Jainas reject the "law of non-contradiction".
16 GOKHALE (1991: [77]) was right to point out that in case of anekanta-vada 'both p and not-p are true in some respect. But of course the respect in which p is true is different from the one in which not-p is true. In this way the role of the term syat in syatstatements is to dissolve the apparent contradiction between statements by pointing out that the truth of apparently contradictory statements is relative to the respective standpoints. The seeming inconsistency between, or contradictoriness of two sentences, e.g. 'it (some object) exists' and 'it (some object) does not exist that are symbolised as p and p-is due to the fact that what we have is an incomplete statement. To cite an example attested by textual sources (e.g. JTBh 1.22 § 63):
-'with respect to substance (S), a given pot x exists as being made of clay' (Aix) and 'with respect to substance (S), a given pot x does not exist as something made of water' (-2x),
-'with respect to place (P), a given pot x exists in the city of Pataliputra (Bx) and 'with respect to place (P), a given pot x does not exist in the city of Kanyakybja (-2x).
-'with respect to time (T), a given pot x exists in the autumn' (Cx) and "with
respect to time (T), a given pot x does not exist in the spring' (-C2x), -'with respect to condition (C), a given pot x exists as something black' (Dx) and "with respect to condition (C), a given pot x does not exist as something red' (-D2x).
Accordingly, the first two conditional statements, as well as their conjunction should be analysed as a range of indexed predicates:
(1) Ax, Bx, Cix, Dix,..., and
(2) -A2x, B2x, C'x, -D2x,...
Ilere A, B, C, D,... are predicates indexed with the set of parameters of substance (dravya) S. place (kşetra) = P, time (kala) = T, and condition (bhava) = C.
In this way, we neither have the case of two inconsistent statements (the adjunction of) p and p that are both theorems of the system, nor their conjunction pɅp, but

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SOME REMARKS ON THE NAYA METHOD
Jaina realism has it that even images in a dream are not purely figments of our conceptualisation but have some kind of objective basis and rational justification. By the same token, our statements pertaining to reality are claimed by the Jainas to possess some truth; however, the infinity of ontological correlations can in no way be reflected in our language due to its inherent limitations (avadharana)". That is why a range of utlerances articulated about one and the same object, seemingly standing in contradiction to each other, may take its various contexts and ramifications into consideration. Likewise, different points of reference and time of expression, different intentions and context of apparently one and the same sentence on the verbal level make it homonymic.
The way we deal with cognised objects is reflected in the Jaina scheme of nayas, and this takes place on the conceptual (svadhigama, jñanaomaka), verbal (paradhigama, wacana maka) and practical (vyavahara) level, since all these three are interconnected. A set of conditionally valid viewpoints was not only considered an ancillary theoretical device, subordinate to the theory of multiplexity of reality, and was
supposed to corroborate the latter, but, from the very beginnings of Jaina epistemology, it coexisted with cognitive criteria (pramana) as an alternative epistemic instrument
*All states of (all) substances, that are comprehended by means of all cognitive criteria, are equally] capable of being predicated of by
means of all conditionally valid] viewpoints in a detailed manner." Here, we clearly find a conviction that any given utterance functions within its given individual context and it is only within the confines delineated by this context that the sentence retains its veracity. The viewpoints (naya) organise the world of things of our practical dealings, and within their sphere of practical application they help us determine the truth-value of a proposition by way of its contextualisation within a given universe of conceivable points of reference. They are not supposed to contribute anything new to our knowledge, as Akalahka declares: 'Application of viewpoints with regard to things cognised by means of cognitive criteria is the basis of everyday practice. Accordingly, the nayas only selectively (vikaladesa) arrange comprehensive data material already acquired". In the same spirit, Yasovijaya defines conditionally valid viewpoints as particular varieties of cognitive activity that grasp one facet of a real thing, which by its nature has infinite
programa ada
rather two related statements expressed under different circumstances or with relation to different parameters.
Furthermore, the conjunction of two apparently contradictory statements p& is in fact a conjunction, which, having been disambiguated, yields no real contradiction:
(3) Afr&-A2, B & B'C'x&-CP,DU&-D... "CI. NAV 19 (17) and NAV 29.28 (p. 472): 'every sentence functions with a restriction -sarvami vākyant (wacanami) såvadharanam.
* This is implied in the passage of RVår 1.6 (p. 33.11-13): 4. adhigame-hetur dvividhan fadhigama-helur dvividhah) svadhigama-heluh paradhigama-heus ca svadhigama hefur Handtmakah pramana-nava-vikalpah. paradhigama hefur vacandtmakah tena sukhyena pramanena sd-kada-naya-samskytena putipurwayan supla-bhargimanto ji vadayah padartha udhigamavitavah. "The cause of comprehension for the categories representing reality is two-fold: the cause for one's own comprehension and the cause for the other's comprehension. The cause for one's own comprehension consists in cognition and is divided into cognitive criterion and viewpoint, whereas the cause for the other's comprehension consists in statements. Entities such as living clements etc. that are amenable to the seven-fold description should be comprehended from every angle by means of the cognitive criterion called testimony, refined through (the method of the) modal description and through the method of viewpoints.' Clearly, the idca of svadhigamacher and parddhigame-hetu directly corresponds to Siddhasenu Mahamati's distinction between the sentence for oneself (svartha vakya) and the sentence for others' (parartha-vákva) in NA 10, which was in its turn influenced by Dinnaga's and Dharmakirti's well-known division of svarthanumana and parárthanumana.
"Uttar 28.24:
davina sava-bhava savra-pamanchi jassa avaladdha /
savvlhi naya-vihiki vitara-rái ti nảyave { * Interestingly, the idea that mayas are clearly distinguished from cognitive criteria, precisely because they avail themselves of the knowledge already acquired by a pramina, complies with the Mimarinsaka's idea that cognitive criterion (praminam) contributes a new element to our cognition, or comprehends a not yet comprehended object" (anadhigatarthadhiganir), soc SB 1.1.5: quipattikast sahdasvarthena samhandhas tasya janam wpadešo valirekas carthe nupalabdhe fal pramanan hadarayanasydnapeksandr SDI, p. 45: karana-dosa-badhaka-janarahitam aghita grähi-janan pramanam; MSV SA Vrtti-kara).Ilab: Sarvasydupalabdhe the pramanyam smitiranyatha/
RVär 16 (p. 33.6-7): pramana.prakätitev artheu nya-praviter vyayahara. hetuvad abhydrhah, yatah pramana-prakasitesv arthenaya-pravplir vyavahara hefur bhavati afo syabhyarhitavam.
Comp. the unidentified quotation in RVár 1.6 (p. 33.9-10): sakaladesah pramanadhino vikalddelo nayidhinah'Complete account rests on cognitive criteria, (whereas incomplete account rests on viewpoints', as well as LT 62 and LTV ad loc. (Pravacana-pruvesia). pp. 686.2-688.2:
upayogaw srutasya dva svad-voda-naya-samjita / sydd-ddah sakalddedo nayo vikala-sarikatha //

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(dravarthika-naya), and attributive (paryavastika-rayu)or mode expressive (urydyarthika-naya)". Whereas the former emphasises continuity and essential identity of evolving things, the latter predominantly deals with the mutable character of phenomena and their transient manifestations and accentuates the attributive side of reality. Most commonly these two classes of conditionally valid viewpoints are further subdivided into seven following types:
properties (and) which has been discerned by cognitive criterion, and that) do not disprove (facets) others than this conc).23
Thus, pramanas serve as criteria of validity and reliability of our cognition and are expected to ensure the acquisition of truth, whereas the viewpoints are an attempt to contextualise any given utterance and determine in which sense it asserts truth.
The process of arrangement and selection is accomplished with the help of progressive indexation, in which cach viewpoint (naya) delimits the context by introducing indices of spatial co-ordinates, temporal factors, linguistic convention, etc. The idea of the viewpoint (naya) as a device to single out a particular aspect of an object, viz its point of reference, is underscored, for instance, by Siddhasena Mahamati in NA 29: 'The real thing, whose essence is multiplex, [forms) the domain of all acts of awareness, an object qualified by (only) onc facet is known as the province of the viewpoint.12
The assumption of the manifold character of reality in which things relate to cach other by an infinite number of relations finds its expression in the conviction that every situation can be both viewed from infinite angles as well reflected in our language: infinity of interrelations corresponds to a theoretically infinite number of predications, each retaining its validity only conditionally, viz. restricted to its particular perspective.**
Usually, but not always, conditionally valid predications are divided into two major classes: substantial (dravyasrika-naya) or substance-expressive
JT13h 2.1: pramasaparicchinnasvananta-dharmatmakarya vastuna eka-desa gråhinas tad-itaram sāpratiksepino 'dhyavasayu više nayah
Soen. 4. NA 29:
anekantamakam vastu gocarah sarva-santvidam!
eka-des-visisorto navasya visavo matah CF. STP 1.22-25.
*This idea is explicitly stated by Siddharşigani in NAV 29.12 (p. 440): samkhyuva punar ananta ill, ananta-dharmavad vastunas, tad-eka-dharma paryawasildbhiprayanam ca navadi, fathapi cirantandcdraih sarva-sangrahi-saptábhiprava par kalpana-dvarena sapta mavi pratipiditah According to the number, however, [viewpoints are infinite, because the real thing is endowed with infinite properties and because (various outlooks confined to fone) property of this (real thing) are viewpoints. Nevertheless, ancient preceptors taught that there are seven viewpoints, by means of assuming seven outlooks that collect together all possible viewpoints). The passage is quoted and claborated in SVM 28.56 60 (p. 161.1115): navas cananiah, ananta-dharma wasturas tadeka dharma.paruvastitanam vaktur abhipravandin ca navahvat tatha ca voluhan javaiya vayund-vahavaiva ceva hom nayu-aya/ [STP 3.47ab] iti.
CLR, STP 1.3. Akalanka (RVár 1.33. p. 94) has substantial (dravydstikanava) and attributive (paryddstika-naya). Kundakunda, eg. in PSA 2.22, has: davanthiena (dravdrthika) and paijayashion (paryavarthika), without any further subdivision. It is well known that Kundakunda (e.g. in SSI 353) uses also another two-fold classification of viewpoints, viz. vavahara (vyavahara-nava), or empirical, and nicchawa (niscaya nawa), or ultimate, the former not be confused with the wavahara-naya of the sevenfold naigamddi" classification. This classification in its import goes back to the earlier Buddhist distinction of the empirical truth (santvrti-satya, vyuvghara, laukika-satya) and the ultimate truth (paramdrtha-sayu), which is already attested in Katha-yath and Milinda patiha, finds its classical expression with Nagarjuna (c.g. MMK 24.8-9) and is taken over in such Yogacára works as Mahüyüna-vurulunkuru (MSA 11.3) and Ullaralantra (UiT 1.84), On Kundakunda's wawahara- nicchaya division see in this volume Jayandra Soni's 'Kundakunda and Umásváti on Anekanta-vada' (pp. 25-35, esp. p.28 II.), and Christoph Emmrich's 'How many times? Pluralism, dualism or monism in carly Jaina temporal description" (pp. 69-88, esp. p. 71 f.). *CI. STP 1.4 5:
davarthiyanawa.pavodi suddhasargaha-pariwandwisao/ padirūve puna vavana-tha-nicchao lassa vavahāro II mula-nimenampaijawa-nayassa jutuva-vayana wicchedo!
fassa tu saddaia saho-pasäha suhuma-bheva"-"The pure nature of the substance-expressive viewpoint is the province of the description [by means of the collective viewpoint). As regards (its countertype, in its turn, the empirical viewpoint of this substance expressive category consists in the determination of the meaning of an utterance. The prime support of the model expressive viewpoint is the division of the utterance expressing) the direct viewpoint. Or this, the verbal and other viewpoints are subtle[t] divisions (like branches and twigs.
" Abhayadevasri's relevant glosses in STPT. ad loc. are quite useful:
p. 315.9-10:) suddha ilyasarkirna visessarsparsawati (""Pure" means not mingled, having no association with the particular.'), p. 316.11 12:1 (Juddha padiruvann.. pratirupathi pratibimba pratinidhir il vival (countertype impure),
[p. 317.12, 349.2-3:] mulam adit nelaimenant adharah,"Ip. 349.5-6:) sakhaprasakhi ivasthula-suksmataro-darsitavat sūksmo bhede viseso yesante tatha.

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PIOTR BALCEROWICZ substance-expressive (dravarthika) mode-expressive (paryayarthika) 1. comprchensive (naigama)
4. direct (ju-sutra) 2. collective (sangraha)
5. verbal (sabda) 3. empirical (vyavahara)
6. ctymological (sumabhirudha)
7. factual (evan-bhuta, inthani-bhava)
Table 1 This scheme, found also in Akalanka's Raja-vārtika, is not universally followed in Jaina literature. For certain reasons (vide infra n. 80) STP does not distinguish separately nalgama-naya and speaks of only six viewpoints.
Furthermore, we find the divisions of dravydrthika-naya and paryayarthika naya neither in the canonical works such as Amuoga or Thananiga, nor in such relatively late treatises as TS, TBh, NA or NAV. As against the frequently quoted opinion (c.g. JAINI (1920: 45 ff.), SCHUBRING (1978: 161, $76)), they are entirely absent from TS and TBh. Thus, for instance, TS in Bh-recension subsumes the varieties of (5). (6) and (7) under the head of sabda-naya (vide infra).
NAV 29 classifies the seven viewpoints into two main divisions slightly differently: object-bound, operating by means of object speech-bound operating by means of speech (artha-dvdrena (prava])
(Sabda-dvarena (prava]) 1. comprehensive (naigua)
5. verbal (sabda) 2. collective (sangraha)
6. etymological (samabhirudha) 3. empirical (wvavahara)
7. factual (evant-bhuta) 4. direct (ru-sutra)
Table 2
A scheme rather similar to that of Tablc 2 is apparently followed also by TS in view of the explicit mention (TS 1.34) of the group naigama-sangraha-Vyavahararju-sūtra appended by the uniform sabda subcategory, which is subdivided only in the following aphorism of TS 1.35-this would correspond to sabda-dvarena (provrta of NAV.
Also TBh scems to share a similar model not only because of the absolute absence of dravyárthika naya and paryavarthika-naya, but also because, in the introductory part", the viewpoints 5-7 are singled out by a special preliminary description of their common feature under the head sabda (vatharthábhidhanuri sabdam), and because, in the four recapitulatory verses on p. 35.4-36.2, the stress is specifically laid on the comprehensive sabda category": 1. comprehensive (naigama) 2. collective (sangraha) 5. verbal (sabda) a partially inclusive (desa-puriksepin) 3. empirical (wawahara) a present (samprata) b all-inclusive (sarw.pariksepin) 4. clirect (phu-satra) b. etymological (samahiridha)
c. factual (evam-bhuta)
Tablc 3 Let us have a closer look at the character of cach of the viewpoints in order to examine exact relationship between them.
The comprehensive viewpoint (naiguma-naya) grasps a given phenomenon in a most general way and takes recourse to a possibly most extensive, all-inclusive context, which is referred to by a particular utterance. From the perspective of the comprehensive viewpoint, what is taken into account is a complex of meanings and connotations evoked by an utterance, irrespective of either distinctive features of individuals or of constitutive characteristics representative of a given class: 'Speech clements that are expressed in inhabited localities (sc. colloquially) (have) their meaning, and the comprehension of (such a) meaning of speech elements is what) the comprehensive viewpoint, which grasps collectively partial (denotations of a
See also PALV 6.74, p. 54.7 9: latra mila-nayuu dva dravydrthika paryayarthikabhedát. tatra dravydirthikas tredha nalgama-sangraha-vyavahara-bhedat. parvavarthikas caturdha pin-sutra-sabda-samahiridhivart-bhuta-bhedat. For the purely sevenfold division see: AnD 606 (satta mila-naya pannafta tam jahategume sanigahe vavahare mjjuste sadde samabhinidhe evanbhute) Than 552, as well as Trh 1.35, SSI 1.33, NAT 29, etc. Umasvamin's tradition of TS enumerated only five major types. The comprehensive viewpoint was divided into two subtypes, viz. selective (desa-pariksepin) and all-inclusive (sarva-pariksepin), even though Umásviti does not explicate them further in Toh, whereas the verbal viewpoint was further subdivided into three viewpoints (tinni sudda-nava): accurate (sampai-sadda-naya, samprata-nya), etymological (samabhirudha) and factual (evan-bhuva). See TS 1.34,35:34/ naigamasangraha-Vyavahara-rj-sutra-sabda navah./35/ adva-sabdau dvi-tri-bhedan. (This is according to the reading preserved in TBh 1.34-35). SSI 1.33 offers a varia lectio of TS: naigama-sangraha-wavahdra-rj-sutra-sabda-samabhirudhaivam-bhutd navah.
2TBh 1.35 (p.32.13-17): nigamesu ve 'bhihitah sabdas tesam arthah sabdarthaparijanam ca desa-samagra-grāhi naigamah. arthánām sarvaika-desa-sangrahanam sangrahah, laukika-sama upacara pravo vistytártho vyavaharah, salah sampratanam arthanam abhidhana-parijanam yw sūtrahyarharthabhidhanan sabdam, namadisu prasiddha-pürvic chabdad arthe pranyayah sampratah satsy arthes asankramah samabhirudhah warjanarthajor evum-bhūta iti.
"Esp. in verse 4cd (p. 36.2); widvād pathartha-sabdan višeşita-padanh tu sadanayam / One should understand the verbal viewpoint as (consisting of words in distinguished (sc, analysed) (meaning) in accordance with a speech element (denoting) an object

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speech element, consists in). Clearly, what is meant here is a colloquial, unreflected usage of an unspecified reference, which comprises indiscriminalely both the particular and the universal: 'When one says "pot" what is meant is this particular substance (sc. thing) produced by the effort (of a pl-maker, with a rounded, elongated neck (and) a rounded edge at the top (as well as with a spherical container below, (which is) suited for fetching and carrying water etc., and has been finished off by secondary operations (like baking).
Accordingly, the comprehensive viewpoint consists in the comprehension without making any distinction between such an individual thing] furnished with particular features or things belonging to its class. Conspicuously, the category of comprehensive viewpoint is absent from STP.
The collective viewpoint (sangrahe-naya) pertains cumulatively to a whole class of individuals, which constitutes the denotation of a giver utterance, and thereby it fomis a basis for any taxonomy. In fact, Umásváti defines it briefly as the synthesising of one facet out of all possible facets of things and further explicates: 'The collective viewpoint [consists in the comprehension of say.] present, past and future pots, distinguished by the name and other standpoints (niksepa)], whether with regard to one (individual) or to many things belonging to its class). At first glance, one might consider the wording ekasmin và to refer to a particular, but in fact the phraseekasmin vā bahuşu và links the whole statement to the previous section explaining the character of the comprehensive viewpoint and the phrase: lasminnekasmin višesavati taj-jatiyesi vi sarves avisesår. Accordingly, the idea of the universal is indicated here in the phrase 'present, past and future pots' (sampratátitánågatesu ghalesu). Akalanka likewise explicitly refers to the idea of the class, or the universal: "The collective viewpoint grasps everything as a whole by referring to oneness without contradicting (viz. without relinquishing. apracyavana) its own class. In other words, the scope of the comprehensive viewpoint (naigama-naya) is narrowed down by excluding the particular and laying stress on the universal alone
When only a particular specimen of the whole class of objects that has previously been defined from the perspective of the collective viewpointis selected for practical purposes and directly referred to by an utterance, or becomes
"Th 1.35 (p. 32.13-14): nigameşu we Whihirah sabdás team arthah sabdartha parijana ca desa-samagru.gråhi naigamah.
Tih 135 (p. 33.9-12): ghata i we yo 'sa cehhinirytta urdha kundaluisthyuta-via-grive hasta parimandalo jaldind dharana dharuna-samartha uffara-guna.nirvartananirypto dravy-visepas lasminnekasmin Vijesavati faj-jätveju vi Sarvesvaviseat parijina naigama-nayah. Ct. the exposition in the same spirit in NAV 29.13 (p. 441), eg: tatrapi ve paraspara-wakalitou sámánya-wisesav icchanti talsamudava-rupo nagamah-And out of these [four object-bound varieties), the comprehensive [viewpoint) consists in an aggregate of such (outlooks that consider ljointly, the universal and the particular as being disconnected from cach other' as well as NAV 29.23 (p. 455): Wawaharop sarah pradhan pasarjana-duarena kathariid ilaretarávinirishita-samanya višeya-sadhya eva; na hi samanyan doha-vähádi-krivim wpaw/wale, weydnám eva fairvipavogan, ndi visega ewa tal-kárina gora-finna lesanii wkwavisistatawi lar karana-samarthyddol... fasmál kathariid bheddhhedináv evaitau, tud-an watara-samarthakah punar niralambanatvad durnaald svi-karotili sthitum. Also the whole everyday practice can only be elected with regard to the universal and the particular, which are somehow mutually not detached, by means of the main (import and the subordinate [level), for neither the universal (alone can be employed in such actions like milking, carrying commodities), oto, because only the particulars are employed in these factions), nor the particulars alone accomplish these Jactions because these particulars) void of the universal] cow.ness would lack the efficacy to accomplish these factions], inasmuch as they would not be distinguished from tress, etc... Therefore, it is established that these two, fi.c. the universal and the particulars), are somehow truly (both) different and not different from each other. (Such a viewpoint), however, which roborates (only one of these two, le, either the universal or the particular), appropriates the status of a defective viewpoint, hecause it is) void of (any) objective substratum.' See also RVär 1.33 (p. 95.12 IT.): artha-sankalpa mätra-grái maigumah.... tad atha: kasci praghya para purusa gacchantum ahhisamiksha "kim artham gacchati bhavan' it? sa tasmal acaste prastharshamiti, ctc.
Comprehensive [viewpoint) grasps only the general idea of the purpose.... For instance someone notices a man walking, who has taken an axe with him), and asks: "For what reason are you going. Sir"? He replies to him: "I'm going) my way", etc. Here in RVär, Akalanka generally follows the examples taken from SSi 1.33.
Tih 1.35 (p. 32.14): arthana sandika-des-sangrahanam sangrahah. "TBh 35 ( 3312-342) CẤarriển wã đa sự và nămiải Viettiesta sampralátitándgatesu ghafesu sampratyayah sangrahah.
RVär 1.33 (p. 95.12 1.): svadrv-awirodhendika wipanayil samasta grahanam sangrahah. C. NAV 29.13 (p. 441): punah kevalaisimnyai varchanli taf-samaha
collective viewpoint), in its tum, is produced out of an amassment of such foutlooks) that affirm solely the universal.' See also NAV 29.23 (p. 462): tad-apalapi kevala-sámánya-prutishapakah kad-abhiprayah sangraha durnava-vapadesanisi-kurute, widesapeksayda samanwa sthapakasya sangraha nayulvaditi.- Such) a defective cutlook which denies that (multifarious object and] which determines the universal alone appropriates the designation of the defective collective viewpoint because only such a viewpoint which) determines the universal precisely with regard to the particulars is the collective viewpoint (proper).

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an object of one's action, we have an instance of the empirical viewpoint (vyavahara-nayu). It is especially in carly analyses that the commonplace aspect (laukika) and the conventional practice prevalent among people (lokopacara) is said to be emphasised in this case. Clearly, the point of reference is further limited to such individual things, or elements of a class, that can become directly subject to practical activity: 'The empirical viewpoint consists in the comprehension of precisely such (present, past and future things like pots, grasped by the collective viewpoint, comprehensible to common people and experts, and accessible to the conventional practice just as they are gross objects. This clearly nominalist perspective reflects an aspect of speech commonly encountered in linguistic usage: must frequently we refer to particular things, viz. to individuals, by means of linguistic units of general denotation that correspond to respective classes: 'The empirical viewpoint consists in appropriating a thing], which is preceded by practical application for the thing from this class of things embraced by the collective viewpoint) (utuselusmdr). Akalahka proceeds to illustrate the rule: "When one admits that any healing decoction is a medicine", then-insofar as the universal has the nature of the particular-fone knows healing efficacy of a particular fig etc. (ic. one grasps the universal] through the efficacy of the
particular, being of philosophic pertinence, are disregarded. The context for this statement is a discussion with the Buddhist. What the term višesa in this particular case is supposed to mean is the ultimate particular', viz. the momentary, insubstantial entity (visesah paramánu. laksanah ksana-ksayinah). Clearly, the author differentiates here between svalaksana (the ultimale individual) and vastu, or the real, non-momentary, gross thing." Consequently, what constitutes the point of reference for the empirical viewpoint also in NAV is indeed the particular understood as a real entity, that is graspable in daily experience, that retains its individual character but at the same time is made up of atoms, not the particular as a momentary, imperceptible atom: "Such a real thing.] like a pol, etc., which lasts for some time, which possesses grussness, which is instrumental to people's everyday practice (and) which is intended by you as really existing, is not accidental, but rather it is combined of permanent infinitesimal atoms... Thus, what is meant by laukika and lokoipacara in TBh (above p. 52, n. 37) clearly corresponds to yarha loka-graha just the way people take, n. 43) and loka-vyavahara-karirva of NAV ('accomplishing of the people's everyday practice', n. 44). Eventually, the practical aspect means the feasibility, on the part of an object, to become the object of human activity,
particular) 41
However, a relevant statement of NAV 29, taken at its face value, seems to contradict the contention that the scope of the empirical viewpoint is the particular: 'The empirical viewpoint), on the other hand, is produced out of a complex of such [outlooks that intend an entity, like a pot, etc.-(when it enters into people's everyday practice in case of which both the universal and the
"Tih 1.35 (p. 32.15): laukika-sama upacara prayo wistyrthe wavuhärah - The empirical viewpoint has an extended meaning, similar to the way common people understand it, like in the conventional practice. Cr. Tih 1.35 (p. 35.9, verse Icd): lokopacara-nivum Warahara visita vidvat -One should understand the empirical viewpoint in an extended (way) as contined to the conventional practice [prevalent among people.
PALV 6.74 p. 54.11: sangraha-grhita-bhedake wawuharah. The empirical viewpoint differentiates what has been grasped in a general way] by the collective viewpoint.
Th 1.35 (p. 34.2 3): tev evalukka-parikaka-grayspacara-garve vathastilartheu samprahyo vyuvaharah
RVär 1.33 (p. %6.20): ato vidhi-purvukame avaharanare avaharah "RVär 1.33 (p. 96.25-26): "kaş ve bhaisajyamity wkte casaminyusya videdimakalván n agrodhidi-vijes-samarthy (visessa samarthena graham).
"NAV 29.13 (.441); w punar anapekyllu-santri-samanya-wisean lokavyavaharam avatarantani gharadikan padarthom ubhipropanti tan-nicawalan vyavaharah.
NAV 29.16 (p. 445): with loku graham eva walvastu...na hi sámányan anádinidhanam ekari sangrahabhimala pramana Whimin ...ndpl visesah paramdn laksanah kşana-kavinah prumana-gocaras, luchá praviler abha var. tasmad idam eva nikhila-lokabadhitam prumāņa prasiddhan kivalkulu-Whawi-sthüratam abibhranam udakaharanády-artha-kriva nirvariana-kşama ghaddikan vasturüpam paramarthikam astu.--"Let the real thing he exactly just the way people take lit) ... For the universal with no beginning nor end, (numericallyl one, considered by the collective (viewpoint does not constitute) the scope of a cognitive criterion ... The particulars--(which are characterised by infinitesimal atums (and which are perishing in a moment (sc. momentary) do not constitute the domain of cognitive criterion, either, because they do not occur in that manner. Therefore only this [what is not subverted by opinions prevalent among people, what is well known due lo cognitive criterion, (what) possesses grossness lasting for some time, (what is capable of executing ellicient action such as fetching water, etc. (and what consists in the real thing, like a pol, etc., must be ultimately real.
"NAV 29.25 (p. 463): vad idane kivar-kala-bhavi staratam ahilhranan lokaunahara-kari ghaadikan bhavulas tátvikam abhipretan tan nakasmikum...

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SS
The three remaining viewpoints operate on the speech level and, in addition, analyse the verbal structure of an utterance, the domain for them being external objects that are numeable within a strictly limited range of verbal expression. What is common for the three varieties of the verbal viewpoint is declared (which in itself is not a very revealing observation) by Umasvätito be the denoting according to the meaning. The proper point of reference for the speech-bound viewpoints is therefore the thing as it enters the linguistic practice. Accordingly, all they are about is rather the Austinian how to do things with words, not how to do things with
things.
The last one in the quadruple classification of the object-bound' viewpoints that operate by means of an object' (artha-dvarena (pravita]) is the direct viewpoint (riu sūtra). It is defined as the comprehension by way of the denotative acts concerning the existent and present objects and its province is the present point of time", viz particular things that have already been pointed out by the empirical viewpoint", which are being perceived here and now. Accordingly, the direct viewpoint narrows the point of reference down to the present manifestation of an individual (vartamana-ksana-vivarti-vastu). and puts aside its past and future facels (aritanagata-vakra-parityaga)." At the same time, the direct viewpoint opens upaccording to the other tradition--the fourfold catalogue of mode-expressive viewpoints (parwiyarthika-raya), or conditionally valid attributive predications, which view things according to their transitory properties and modes and neglect their incontrovertible substantial nature and existence as substrata of those properties and modes. From such an angle, in this viewpoint, which 'grasps pure modes with regard to their antithesis (sc. substance)", the substantial and non-momentary character of an entily is entirely ignored and merely its transient aspects (generally the present moment) are taken into account: 'it neglects previously mentioned] objects belonging to the three times and embraces the object belonging to the present lime. Here, it is irrelevant which linguistic expressions we choose to refer to one and the same individual.
45 TS 135 p. 32.15-16: sutart sampratanam arthanam abhidhāna-parijana - sūtrah. " TS 1.35 p. 36.1, verse 4ab:
samprata-vişawa-grāhakan ju-suru-nayan samasato vidvat " TS 1.35 p. 34.3-4.
teyl wavahtev eva satsa sampratesu sampratuvarju-sútruh. * NAV 29.17 (n. 446): fatra rju pragunam akuilam atinagala-vakra-purilugud wartamána-ksana-vivarti-vastuno rúpanie sutrayati nisan kita darśayatiry rusurah. "In this case, the direct viewpoint is explained as follows: [it draws out, i.e. plainly demonstrates directly, ie in a straight manner, for not crookedly, (viz. by evading past and future bends for the real thing the form of the real thing, whose transient occurrence (falls to the present moment.
PALV 6.74 p. 54.11--12: suddha-puryava-grahi pratipakşa-apeksa sju-surah
RVär 1.33 (p. 96.31): purvu tri-kala-visayan atidavya wariamana-kala-visaya adalle. CI. NAV 29.26: tamat tiro-hita-ksana-wurtam alaksita-paramdu-valvity wash sarva-san vavaharika prumanair gocari-krivala ili tal-liras-kara-dvarenddesta krana-kavi-params-pratishapako 'bhipraya rusutra-durnava-sajam asnute, fad upeksavdiva tad-darsiakasya navalved it. -"Therefore, the real thing becomes the
domain (of cognition through all cognitive criteria, that are of importance in practical life, as something whose momentary transient occurrences are ruled out (se neglected) Jund) in which the fact that it is differentiated into infinitesimal atoms is not directly] observable. Thus, the outlook that determines invisible infinitesimal atoms which perish in a moment (sc. are momentary) by means of ruling out (sc. neglecting) this (persistence) receives the denotation of a defective direct viewpoint, because (such an outlook alone) which demonstrates these momentary invisible infinitesimal atoms) only by putting aside this (persistence is the direct viewpoint (proper.' SITBh 1.35 (p. 32.16-17): vatharthabhidhanan sabdam.
The following passage of NAV 29.15 (p. 450) delicates the character of the three verbal viewpoints: lasman na paramarthato 'thah sabdátirikto 'sty, upacaralah punar laukikair aparilocita-paramárthair yavahrivate. asdy apy awpacárikah sabddimako varthah pratikyana-bhangurah wikariavo, varnanah ksana-dhwanitstta-pratileh... - 'Consequently, on the level of the ultimale truth there is no extemal) object in addition to speech clements, whereas, metaphorically. [object] is used practically by common people, who do not reflect upon the ultimate truth. Also this object, cither the metaphorical one or the one having speech clement as its essence, should be held to be momentary (lit perishable at every moment), because phonemes are known to be annihilated after a moment (sc. to be momentary) ...' As a matter of fact, the preceding is incorporated in an account of a fallacious viewpoint (nayabhasa), nevertheless it is quite an accurate description of how the verbal viewpoint operates, with the proviso that the proper viewpoint (
nya) does not deny the existence of an external object, but takes the real thing and the word denoting it to point to cach other: NAV 29: atomi sabdddavo vaderarétardbhimatu-suhdarthépeksawa wabhimatan sabdártha darluvanti, tada nayas, tasyapilara haval - Consequently, when these [viewpoints like the verbal viewpoint), etc., demonstrate an object (denotatum) (denoted by a particular speech element, which is intended by a respective [viewpoint), putting aside (sc. neglecting) (the fact that) hject (denotatum) and respective speech elements are intended by (se point to) cach other, then they are proper) viewpoints, because also this (object(denotatum) exists in (sc, is related to these speech elements]

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What the majority of Jaina epistemologists named simply the verbal viewpoint (sabda-naya), Umäsväti called the accurate (or: present) verbal viewpoint (samprata-sabda-naya) and defined it as 'the cognition of an object through a speech element already well-known on [account of] such [categories like] name etc."" and as 'the comprehension of precisely those [objects, grasped by means of the direct viewpoint, like] pots, that are present, that comprise one of [such categories like] name etc. [and] that are already well-known". Two things in these passages are conspicuous: the further diminishing of the scope (teşv eva) to present (sampratesu) phenomena and the verbal reference. The verbal viewpoint (sabdanaya) was interpreted variously by the subsequent Jaina tradition, but one thing remained common: the verbal point of reference and the role of verbal (or grammatical) means of expression relevant for the interpretation." Applying the verbal viewpoint is tantamount to the recognition of the prevalent linguistic convention and to the overlooking of fine differentiation between meanings of synonymical expressions, etc., that may go back to different derivation, grammatical construction etc.: 'the verbal [viewpoint] intends, as they say, by the force of understanding, one object (denotatum) for all such linguistic units, like Indra, Sakra, Purandara, etc., that are used-in accordance with the usage-to denote [one and
56
53
TBh 1.35 (p. 32.17): nämädişu prasiddha-purvāc chabdad arthe pratyavaḥ sampratah.
TBh 1.35 (p. 34.4-5): teşv eva samprateşu nămádinām anyatama-grähisu prasiddha-purvakesu ghateşu sampratyayaḥ samprataḥ sabdaḥ.
35 Just to mention two Digambara opinions: SSi 1.33 (§ 246, p. 102): linga-samkhyasadhanadi-vyabhicara-nirvrtti-parah sabda-nayah. tatra linga-vyabhicāraḥ: pusvas täraka nakṣatram ili...[The verbal viewpoint] aims at removing discrepancy [in meaning] due to gender, number, case etc. Among these [various factors], the discrepancy [among synonyms] due to gender is e.g.: pusyas (masc., "constellation"). tárakă (fcm., "cluster of stars"), naksutram (n., "asterism"), etc., and PALV 6.74 p. 54.12-13: kala-karaka-lingānāṁ bhedät labdasya kathañcid artha-bheda-kuthanam sabda-nayah the verbal viewpoint speaks somehow of [various] differences between meanings of [one and the same] speech element depending on difference in tense, contributory factors [of an action] (semantic categories) and gender."
The above series of various names of a Vedic god has surprisingly become the standard sequence in Jaina literature. The idea may go back to Patanjali's Vyakaranamaha-bhasya (MBha under sutra 1.3.1, vol. II, p. 117): bahavo hi sabda ekarthä bhavanti, tad yatha -indraḥ śakraḥ puruhitaḥ puramdarah. kantu kosthaḥ kusula iti ekaś ca sabdo bahv-arthaḥ tad yatha--aksüḥ pādāḥ māṣā iti.
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the same] specific object (donotatum)." As Akalańka put it: 'It primarily overrides any difference [in meaning] due to gender, number, case etc. In other words, the users of the language agree upon a conventionally determined selection of verbal expressions that denote a particular individual.
If one further limits the context of an utterance and draws a distinction among synonyms which is based on their divergent derivation, viz. if one sticks to a viewpoint which, 'denies any equivalence among existing meanings, we have the case of the etymological viewpoint (samabhirudha-naya). Thus, two expressions, for instance, 'contemplation, speculation' (viturka) and 'meditation, reflection" (dhyana), that are [generally] considered synonymous, may refer to different phenomena in some particular contexts". To cite another example (NAV 29), although three epithets in an undiscriminating commonplace usage pertain to one and the same god, nonetheless the name 'Indra' refers in fact to a divine sovereign, the appellation 'Sakra' describes a being possessed of might and the epithet
57NAV 29.19 (p. 450): radhito vavanto dhvanayah kasmimścid arthe pravartante; vathendra-sakra-purandaradayah, teṣām sarveşüm apy ekam artham abhiprati kila pratiti-vasad. See also NAV 29.13 (p. 441): tatha ve rüdhitaḥ sabdānāṁ pravitim väñchanti tan-nivaha-sadhyaḥ sabda iti-'Similarly, the verbal [viewpoint] is established by a collection of such [outlooks that] affirm that the usage of speech elements [complies] with the linguistic convention; and NAV 29.27 (p. 471): tatas ca kvacid anapeksita-vyutpalli-nimittä rudhitaḥ pravartante...And therefore, they are used to denote certain [objects (denotata)] in accordance with the usage [when] the factors [accountable for their] grammatical formation [are] disregarded..."
*RVär 1.33 (p. 98.12): sa ca linga-samkhva-sadhanadi-vyabhicara-nivṛtti-paraḥ.
5 TS 1.35 p. 32.18: satsv arthesy asamkramaḥ samabhirudhah. See also NAV 29.13 (p. 441): ye tu vyutpattito dhvaninám pravṛttim väñchanti nanyatha tad-vära-janyaḥ samabhirudha iti. Further, the etymological [viewpoint] is produced out of the multitude of such [outlooks] that affirm that the usage of a linguistic units [complies] with the grammatical formation, and not otherwise.' and NAV 29.27 (p. 471): kvacil samanya-vyutpatti-sāpekṣaḥ......[they are used to denote] certain [other objects (denotata)] depending on the grammatical formation [hased on] the universal..."
TS 1.35 (p. 34.5-6): teṣām eva sampratānām (arthänüm] adhyavasayasamkramo vitarka-dhyanavat samahhirudhaḥ. Cf. JTBh 2.6: paryaya-bhede bhinnarthän abhimanyate. If there is any difference among synonyms, one means different objects, as well as PALV 6.74 p. 54.14: paryava-bhedat padartha-nänärtha-niripakam samabhirudhaḥ. Due to the difference in synonyms, the etymological viewpoint describes diverse objects [following diverse) meanings of words."

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"Purandara' denotes a destroyer of strongholds etc., in the same manner as words like 'Indra', 'por' or 'man' have different denotata".
The issue is further elaborated by Pujyapada Devanandin (SSI,1.33 $ 247, p. 103) who takes the etymological viewpoint to deal, firstly, with homonyms out of several possible meanings of one and the same expression, in a given context we select the meaning which is current and widely accepted in the society. For instance, the word 'go' denoles a cow in accordance with the convention, even though it might theoretically refer to any 'walking creature', as a derivative of Vgam, or 'speech', as a derivative of the root Vgai, etc. When differentiating between various synonyms denoting a cow, we use the term 'go' of the derivation that corresponds to popular usage. Furthermore, what is crucial, this viewpoint forms a basis for distinguishing among a range of synonyms in correspondence to their etymologies. Thirdly, out of several meanings a word could hypothetically convey in accordance with its etymology, only the well-known conventional meaning of an expression is selected. Irrespective of minor interpretative differences, Pojyapada Devanandin agrees that the etymulogical viewpoint distinguishes between meanings on the basis of etymology or convention.
The factual viewpoint (evant-hita, ithan-bhava) functions with reference to the narrowest possible context in case of any expression. It lies down the rule according to which, out of a series of synonyms, we select such a term in a given context which describes its denotatum in the present state in the closest possible way, for instance, the appellations 'Indra', 'Sakra' and 'Purandara' can be applied to the god only when he either is actually displaying his sovereign authority (indana), or is exhibiting his might (sakana) or is destroying a stronghold, respectively. In other words, according to this viewpoint we may apply only such a term with regard to a phenomenon which describes this phenomenon in its present condition most adequately or the etymology or grammatical derivation of which corresponds most closely to the present state of an object it refers to the factual viewpoint means the grasping of the meaning mutually dependent on subtle momentary manifestation (of an object and the meaning of the word denoting it, but only (in case of these (present objects grasped by the etymological viewpoint)
"See NAV 29.20 p. 451); parvava-sabda wibhinndriha, pratiwbhakta vipanti nimittakatwil thaw w prativibhakta-vyutpantiimitakás te te bhinndrihah, watendrughafu.purwy-Vabda wibhinnária/h-Speech elements that are synonyms have different objects (denolata), because they have the factor (accountable for their grainmutical formation individually (sc. in every individual case) distinct. In this world, whatever speech clements have the factor accountable for their grammatical formation individually distinct, they have also different objects (denotata), for instance such) speech elements like "Indra", "pot", "man" have different meanings.
Ssi 1.33 $ 247, p. 103.4: gaur ir avansado veg-adisy artheu vurtamanah pašā abhiridhah. "The term "go" applicable to lit. present in) [various things such as speech (derived from the root Vgai is conventionally applied to an animal."
ssi 1.33 $247, p. 103.4-6 athavaartha-gat-arthuh anda-pravogur tatraikasvárthasydikena gatarthatat parayu-saNa pravogo'nurhakah sabda-bhedas ced asti artha-bhedendpy avusvahhavitavyum illor else, the use of words aims al (sc. Icads to the understanding of the meaning. Since one meaning has its mcaning understood through fonly one word, the use of synonymous words is meaningless. If there is difference in words, there must also be necessarily the difference in meaning."
SSI 1.33 $247, p. 103.77-8: athawa w atabhirudhah sa futra samet abhimukhvendrohanár samahirudhah.
Cr. the exposition in the same spirit in TBV 1.3 (Nava-mimasa), p. 313.15 21: eka-samjna-samahhirohaná somabhirudhus i dha wiha Ml wiruddha-lingadi wagad bhavate vastu tatka sama-bhedad api tatha Misantri-bhedah prawojana-vasat
sariketa-kurirbhir vidhivale na wasanitavi anvarha anawasthaprasakleh tato wa wante vastunah svábhidhyakah Nablas lawanto rihu-lhedah pratyarthan subdu-nivesar ndikasyrthasvanekend bhidhanam wuktim ili 'ghajah kuah kumbhah' ili vecanabhedad bhinna evarthah. krivd-Sabdarvar vi sarva-sabdánari surve pyanvarthaeva wicakah tato 'ghafale' kulite 'kaw bhati' ili cakriwi-laksana-nimitta-bhedar naimittikenapy arthena bhinnena hávam ili ghatan ily ukte kutah 'kutahiti pratipallih tena tad-arthusvanabhihiturva
* CC SSi 1.33 and NAV 29. Similarly, the word 'go' (as the derivative of Vgame) may be used in consonance with the factual viewpoint with reference to a cow only when the animal is actually walking
* TS 1.35 p. 34.6 7: teşām eva (-sampratānām arthānām) vyanjanarthayor anyonyepekşdirtha.gráirvan eram-hhaitaiti. In the same spirit TS 1.35 p. 32.18:
vyanjanarthayor evan-huta ill. -'The factual viewpoint (refers to the momentary manifestation for an object) and to the meaning of the word denoting it:' and NAV 29.13 (p. 442):
W v artamana-kala-bhavi vyuipattinimittam adhikriva sahdäh pravurtante ndovutheti mununte far-sangha-ghairah khalv evan-hhuta iti - *The factual (viewpoint), however, as one should realise, is combined out of a conglomeration of foutlooks that) maintain that specch elements function by taking account of the factor accountable for the grammatical formation and existing in the present point of time, not otherwise, as well as NAV 29.27 (p. 471): ... kvacil talkala-varti-wutpattinimindeksaveri. ..(they are used to denote) certain other objects (dencata) depending on the factors accountable for their grammatical formation that occur at their point of time (sc. when the speech elements are ultered).

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These soven conditionally valid viewpoints are boldly maintained by Siddharsigani to exhaust all possibilities of the predicating of an object and to make use of all conceivable optional perspectives an object could be viewed from: 'Thus, it has been established in the above manner that these seven viewpoints listed above) collect together all possible) outlooks, because there is not any other alternative referring to the real thing that does not count among this septuplet of the viewpoints. It is emphasised by the Jainas that contradictions involved in this theory are only apparent," in so far as each of the utterances has a different point of reference. What is significant is that not some abstract, clemal sentences are dealt with in the method of conditionally valid predications, but particular concrete ulterances pronounced in a particular situation.
Even though only the seven-staged method of description is as a rule mentioned, the Jainas admitted a theoretical possibility of infinite number of thinkable viewpoints. Some instances, which are usually not mentioned in secondary literature, are to be found, e.g, in the Tattvarthadhigama-bhasya itself. While discussing the nature of liberated beings (siddha), Umasvati avails himself of two viewpoints, which he contrasts with each other, vix, the one revealing the previous existence (piirva-bhava-prajapaniya-naya), during which the particular liberated being destroyed the bondage of transmigration, and the other one revealing the present existence (pratyulpanna-bhava-prallåpaniwa-raya), vix, the condition of being emancipated". Here two different perspectives are assumed with respect to time, and one could easily add another viewpoint predicating a property or a condition of a being in next existence uttara-bhava-prajapaniya nava). Naturally. Umāsvāti does not do that with regard to liberated beings, for the liberated being is beyond any contingencies and dependencies, also temporal, and any discussion of the future existence in this particular case does not apply. However, in the commentary on the same sutra the author does speak about other properties of a liberated being, taking the viewpoint of the existence directly
preceding the moment of liberation (anantara-pascar-keta-gatika-naya) and the viewpoint of the last but one rebirth before the liberation (ekántara-pascal-kptayatika-naya). Other instances are to be found in the Agumas.
What is conspicuous in this method of description by way of applying seven conditionally valid predications is the gradual limitation of the context: from the most general onc, viz. the comprchensive viewpoint (naigama), down to the most specialised, context-restricted factual and qualified viewpoint (evan-bhūta) of narrowest extension. At the same time the informative contents gradually and cumulatively increases from the most undistinguished and contextless' naigama viewpoint to the most circumstantial and semantics-laden evan-bhuta viewpoint with most complex point of reference. Thus every subscquent viewpoint is directly related to the one preceding it and it represents a further restriction of the point of reference. This hierarchical arrangement is apparent from the expressions used by various authors that explicitly indicate that the extension of successive viewpoints is included in that of their antecedents." This twofold subordinating relation is stated by Akalanka: 'There is (such) an arrangement of these [viewpoints) because cach and every subsequent (viewpoint) has more and more refined scope and is grounded in every preceding (viewpoint)," The same idea, viz. that every subsequent viewpoint is hierarchically related to the preceding one, is expressed by many other Jaina authors including Mallisena" and Yašovijaya".
These findings are crucial for any further analysis of the logical structure of the doctrine of viewpoints (naya-vida). They also help us to evaluate such misconstrued conjectures that rest on the alleged presence of contradiction embedded in the nayastructure or claims, such as that of PANDEY'S (1984), that all nayas can hee assigned the third truth-value I indeterminale) of Lukasiewicz's three-valued system $3.
In view of the multiplex character of all phenomena and due to limitations of verbal means of expression at our disposal, it is a practical impossibility to express
"NAV 29.13 (p. 441) ad eva na kasicid vikalpo'sti vasta gacara voru naya sapiake mantar til sarvabhiprava-sangrahuliete ili sthiram. ** TS 1.35 p. 38.3 4. verse 5:
itinaya-vādas citrah kacid viruddha nátha cu visuddhah
laukika-visavetitas falva-jänarthans adhigama / -- --Such are the variegated expositions by means of conditionally valid predications, that seem contradictory with regard to something (sc. one thing). nevertheless they are subtle, transcend the province of common people and should be understood in order to know the truth.
MTH 10.7.
Egin Tih 1.35 (tesyen, lev en satsu, teşv eva samprates, teşam eva tesam evo sampratanam, clc.) or RVär 1.33 (p. 95 fr.): 1. (naigama as most general): artha sankalpa-matra, 3. (vavahara as included in sangraha): atas - elasmát, sangrahagrifa-bhedakah, clc.
RVår 133 (p. 99.17): witaróttara-suksma-visayavad esami kramah pura-purvahetukavac ca.
SVM 28.204-213 (p. 167.9 18). JTBh 2$ 9, p. 14.1 ff.
For the sake of completeness, on the subscquent pages I shall very briefly recapitulate the findings of a detailed logical analysis in BALCEROWICZ (2001b).

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the homogeneous "whole truth' about an object. Even though we may be aware of many other features and circumstances thanks to cognitive criteria (pramana), we refer to any object or situation by way of an arbitrarily selected set.of features which distinguish it from all other objects or phenomena in a particular situation in compliance with our practical demands." How such various modes of reference operate is precisely what the naya-theory attempts to formalise. The general, pramaṇa-based knowledge of an object is thus a prerequisite for any naya-based reference to the same object."
Since every statement is uttered in a particular situation, its does communicate truth as long as we keep in mind its particular context. In other words the relation between a statement and its referent is not a one-to-one relation of the sort "utterance to truth-value', e.g. 'the relation characterised by the association of the denotatum and the denoter' (väcya-vacaka-bhava-lakṣaṇa-sambandha). As a matter of fact, we are forced to use incomplete statements that are correctly understood by others, provided we are able to apply them to their particular context. Since the process of interpretation is not a simple binary function (utterance truth-value), a simple statement Devadatta is' can trivially be either true or false depending on the context." Siddharsigani explicitly states that to determine the truth-value of an utterance we have to take into account at least the intention of the speaker and the linguistic convention," beside the denoter-denotatum relation. Thus, the simple relation utterance-truth-value' is intermediated by a range of additional parameters. Altogether the Jainas distinguish seven major parameters, or interpretative factors, comprised within the consistent scheme of the nayas (see p. 58 and n. 68). For the sake of simplicity, we can subsume all such parameters, or context-indicators, under an index as follows:
62
NAV 29.10. (p. 438): tasya visayo gocaro mato 'bhipreta eka-defenänityatádidharma-laksanena visistah para-rüpebhyo vibhinno 'rthah prameya-rupaṁ.
77
NAV 29.10 (p. 438): pramaṇa-pravṛtter uttara-kala-bhavi parāmarsa[b]-- [Viewpoint is] the reflection which arises in the point of time posterior to the operation of cognitive criterion."
NAV 29.28 (p. 472): vathaneka-puruşa-sampūrṇe sadasi dvärádau sthitasya kim atra devadattaḥ samasti nástiti va dolāyamäna-buddheḥ kenacid abhidhiyate-yatha devadatto 'stiti.
NAV 29.28 (p. 473) tad-vyavacchedäbkipravena prastuta-väkya-prayogat, prayoktr-abhiprayadi-sapekṣatayaiva dhvaneh svårtha-pratipadana-samarthyar, and NAT 29 ad loc: prayoktr-abhiprayaditi. ädi-sabdát sanketäd-grahaḥ
SOME REMARKS ON THE NAYA METHOD index, 7
utterance
63
truth-value
No utterance is simply cither true or false. In order to ascertain its truth-value one has to ascribe it to its specific viewpoint type, that supplies the contextual information which is lacking. In this model all meaningful context-indicators (intermediary parameters) are comprised under the index i. The utterance yields. truth or falsehood depending on the adequate interpretation of its context which is determined by means of indexation.
Accordingly, we have the following model of the context-based interpretation of the utterances o, B. y... that belong to a class of formulas:
J =
In the model, D is the domain of admissible interpretations, i.e. a class of conceivable individuals denotable by the utterances a, B, y...; I is a class of indices i, or context-indicators; A comprises i-indexed classes of actual denotata.
The truth-value of any i-interpreted utterance a depends on the actual context represented by indices, or nayas, of the class I in the interpretation, and the paradigm index comprises the following co-ordinates:
i=
In the formula, the variable e designates the subsets of meanings belonging to the general class CED of all possible denotata of utterances a, B, y... The variable a is an element of the class C (viz. a particular individual of the class C). The variable is the point of time of reference (usually the present moment of 'now', which is steadily changing along the time axis). The variable I is the prevalent linguistic convention in accordance with which utterances a, B, y... are pronounced and understood. The variable e indicates etymology and other verbal means of expression, such as prevalent convention, relevant for the proper understanding both of apparent synonyms a, B, y... and of the difference between them based on etymology etc. The variables stands for the present status of the individual that is the denotatum of a, B. y...; in other words, s refers to present condition in which the referent actually manifests the quality by which it is being referred to by a, B. y...

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le
BIBLIOGRAPHY
In this hierarchical model every subsequent viewpoint introduces a new indexical co-ordinate: the only exception being the first naya, the comprehensive viewpoint (naigama), in the case of which the context-defining parameters remain indeterminate and the interpretation is open 1. the comprchensive (naigama): < >
the collective (sangraha) i= the empirical (vyavahara): i-
the direct (ju-sutra): 1=<,4,1 >
the verbal (sabda): = <0,0,1,I> 6. the etymological (samabhirudha): =<,2,1,1,e> 7. the factual (evan-huta): 1=
Thus, the truth-value of the utterance a is not simply llall - 1 for truth or all 0 for falsity, but rather all - 1 oral -0, in so far as the utterance a is by necessity always understood according to the interpretation at a particular point of reference I. Accordingly, the domain D of possible interpretations of the utterancesa, B.ye is mapped onto the class A of actual denotata via the context delimiled by iel.
That is why one may consistently express both 'Devadatta is' and 'Devadatta is not,' or 'hedgehog is' and 'hedgehog is not in one breath without involving any contradiction. What one actually expresses is not a Ana, but rather, for instance,
n a' ('There are hedgehogs in the world, but there is no hedgehog here and now"), or asn-1 (I have a pet hedgehog but it is not a hog that is presently in the hedge"), ctc.
Thus, at least as far as the theory of the nayas is concerned, the claim of multifaceted reality (anekánta) not only does not involve any contradiction but it also does not necessitate any admission of multi-valued logic and can be understood with the classical interpretation of the law of non-contradiction or the law of the excluded middle.
- Angultura-nikaya. 5 Vols., ed. R. Morris & E. Hardy, Pali Text
Society, London 1885-1900. AņD
- Nandi-sultan and Anuoga-ddardin (Nandi-sutra and Anuynga
dvárani). Ed. Muni Punyavijaya, Dalsukh Malvania, Amrital Mohanlal Bhojak. Jaina-Agama-Series No. 1, Shri Mahavira Jaina
Vidyalaya, Bombay 1968. AYVD
- Hemacandra: Anya-yoga-vyavuccheda-vatrimvika. Sec: SVM. BALCEROWICZ - Balcerowicz, Piotr: "On the Relationship of the Myüydvatáru and (forthcoming) the Sarumall-tarka-prukurana,' a paper delived at the xr World
Sanskrit Conference, Turin, April 3" - 8", 2000. to be published
in: Indologicu Taurinensia, Turin 2002 BALCEROWICZ 1994 - Balcerowicz, Piotr: Zarys dzinijskiej toonil pomania' (The Outline of
Jaina Epistemology) Studia Indologiczne 1 (1994) 12-67. Warsaw]. BALCEROWICZ 2000 - Balcerowicz, Piotr: 'On the Date of the Nyayivatára,' in: On the
Understanding of Other Cultures. Proceedings of the International Conference on Sanskrit and Related Studies to commemorate the Centenary of the Birth of Stanislaw Schayer (1899-1941), Warsaw University, Poland, October 7-10, 1999, Ed. by Piotr Balcerowicz
and Marek Mejor. Studia Indologiczne 7 (2000) 17-57. [Warsaw]. BALCEROWICZ 2001a - Balcerowicz, Piotr: Jaina Epistemology in Historical and
Comparative Perspective. Critical Edition und English Translation of Logical-Epistemological Treatises: Nyāydvatāru, Nyayavatara-vivsti and Nyawivatāra-rippana with Introduction and Notes. 1-2 Vols., Alt- und Neu-Indische Studien 53,1-2,
Franz Steiner Verlag, Stuttgart 2001. BALCEROWICZ 2001b - Balcerowicz, Piotr: 'The logical structure of the nay method of
the Jainas. Journal of Indian Philosophy 29/3 (2001) 379-403. BALCEROWICZ 2001c - Balcerowicz, Piotr: 'Two Siddhasenas and the Authorship of the
Nyxayvvatara and the Summuti-turka-prakarunal Journal of
Indian Philosophy 29/3 (2001) 351-578. BHARUCHA-KAMAT - Bharucha, F. and Kamat, R.V.: 'Syudveida theory of Jainism in terms 1984
of devial logic', Indian Philosophical Quarterly 9 (1984) 181-187. GANERI 2002 - Ganeri, Jonardon: Jaina Logic. A 7-Valued Paraconsistent System
History and Philosophy of Logic, typescript, forthcoming. GOKILALE 1991 Gokhale, Pradeep P.: 'The logical Structure of Syudada", Journal
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[Reprinted: SHAH (2000: 75-86). JACOB 1907-1911 - Jacob, (Colonel] G.A.: A Hundful of Popular Muxims Current in
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Avatar V
a
arstuce
This contextlessness' (the empty contents of <>) of the naigama-nawa may be the reason why Siddhascna Divakara in his STP does not include the comprehensive viewpoint (nuigama) in his classification of the nayas at all.

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JAINI 1920
NAT
JSK
NAV
PALV
PANDEY 1984
MATILAL 1991
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unlcriar hirits of Gotuma Buddha. For the first time edited in the original Pali by V. Fausball, Vols. 1-6. London 1877-96. (Reprinted: Luzac and Company, London 19631 Juinendra Siddhanta Kasa. ed. by Jinendra Varni, Parts 1-5, Jhanapithu Murlidevi Jaina Grunthamala, Sanskrta Granthanku
38, 40, 42, 44, 48, Bharatiya Jnanapith, Delhi 1997, 1999, 2000. - Yasovijaya: Jaine-farku-bhasa. (1) Dayanand Bhargava (ed., tr.): Mahopadhyayu Yasovijay's Juina Tarka Bhasa With Translation and Critical Notes. Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi-Varanasi-Patna 1973. (2) Mahápadhyayar-Sri-Yusovijayagani-rucita Juina-tarku-bhāsu. Ed. by Sukhlälji Sanghavi, Mahendra Kumār and Dalsukh Malvaniya, Sarasvati Pustak Bhandar, Ahmedabad 1993. (first edition: 1938). Akalanka: Laghiyus-fruyu. In: Nyaya-kumuda-candra of Srimat Prahhacundrācāry. A Commentary on Bharkalarikudeva's Laghiyustruyu. Ed. by Mahendra Kumar Nyaya Sastri, Vol. 1-2, Sri Gurih Duss Oriental Series 121, Sri Satyuru Publications,
Delhi 1991. (1 cd. Bombay 1938-1942). = Akalanka: Lughiyas-truyu-vivptii. Scc: LT. Matilal, Bimal Krishna: "Anekanta: both yes and no?". Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Reseurch 8 (1991) 1-12. [Reprinted: J. Nagin SHAH (2000) Patanjali: Vyükaruna-muhu-bhayya. Sriman-maharşi-Putanjali nirmitum Vukaruna-maha-bhayyum, srimad-upadhyayu-Kuituprunienu Bhasyu-pruipenasriman-Nugesahhuta-virucitaBhasyapradipiddywidbhasitena Sumullusitenu. Ed. Bhargava Sastri Bhikaji Josi, Sivadatta Sarman, Raghunath Kasinath Sastri,
6 Vols., Chaukhamba Sanskrit Pratishthan, Delhi 2000 [reprinted). - Madhyamukavurih Müluma yamuku-karikas de Nagarjuna ave
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[Reprinted: Osnabrück 1970). = Asanga (Maitreyanatha?): Mahayana-sūtrúlurikorun. (1) Muhayana
sutrálu ikaru of Axungu. Ed. by S. Baychi, Buddhist Sanskrit Texts 13. Mithila Institute of Post-Graduate Studies and Research in Sanskrit Learning, Darbhanga 1970. (2) Muhayanusurularikaru. Ed. and transl. Surckha Vijay Limaye, Bihlutheca Inde-Buddhicar Series 94, Sn Satguru Publications / Indian Books Centre, Delhi 1992. = Kumarila Bhatta: Mimanisa-
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