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SOME PROBLEMS IN JAINA PSYCHOLOGY
defines dhāranā as final determination of the object, retention of the cognition thus formed, and recognition of the object on future occasions.87 According to Umāsvāti, retention develops through three stages: (i) the nature of the object is finally cognized; (ii) the cognition so formed is retained; and (iii) the object is recognized on future occasions. Avaśyakaniryukti defines dhāraņā as retention.88 Jinabhadra says that retention is the absence of the lapse of perceptual cognition. Like Umāsvāti, he also mentions three stages: (i) the absence of the lapse of perceptual judgment; (ii) the formation of the mental trace; and (iii) the recollection of the cognition on future occasions. In this description, the absence of the lapse, aviccuti, (mental trace), vāsanā, and recollection (smrti), are three stages included in the conception of dharanā. Pūjyapāda Devanandi defines dhāraņā as the condition of the absence of forgetting, in future, of that which has been cognized by avāya.89 Akalanka says that it is absence of forgetting what has been cognized by perceptual judgment.90 But some logicians like Vādideva do not accept dhāraņā as a condition of recall in future. Dhāraṇā is a stage of perceptual cognition and cannot last up to the moment of recall. They say it is only establishing perception for a certain length of time.
Thus, we find that some logicians make dhāraṇā mere retention of perceptual experience, while some others would make it also a condition of recall of that experience at a future time. Those who deny that it is a condition of recall say that it cannot be a cause of recall although it is a remote condition of recall, because recall does require retention of an experience. Vādideva says that the recollection of an experience is due to a special capacity of the soul, which may be called sarnskāra.91 Hemacandra entirely agrees with Vadideva's interpretation, although he tries to reconcile the two views. He says that retention is also a condition of recall.92 Hemacandra says that the condition is only the causal stuff capable of effecting recollection of past experience. It is only a mental trace, saṁskāra. It is the continued existence of a cognition for a definite or indefinite length of time. He further says that the mental trace, or saṁskāra, is a species of cognition, and not different as the Vaišesikas have stated. If it were not cognition, it would not produce recollection, which is cognitive in nature. Hemacandra reconciles his view of retention as the condition of recall with the view of retention as the absence of the lapse mentioned in Visesavas yakabhāsya. He says that retention is the absence of the lapse of perception. But it is included
87 Tattvārthasūtrabhäsya, I. 15. 88 Viseşāvasyakabhāsya, 179. Dharanam puna dharanam 180; aviccuti dhārană tassa. 89 Sarvärthasiddhi, I. 15. 90 Tattvārtharajavarttikā, I. 15. 4. 91 Syādvādaratnākara, II. 10. 92 Pramānamimānsā, I. 1. 29. Smrtiheturdhāranā.
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