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SOME PROBLEMS IN JAINA PSYCHOLOGY
public arguments to which the individual is exposed. In the first situation, we are obliged to make assertions, develop arguments and state conclusions with a view to communicating and demonstrating them to others. In the second type of situations, we find ourselves reading in the newspapers or magazines arguments presented implicitly or explicitly in deductive form. In all such situations the rules of logic are valuable grounds for valid arguments.60 Although this distinction between the two deductive situations presented by Vinacke does not exactly correspond to the svārtha and parārtha anumāna, the analysis of the first situation corresponds to Parārtha ānumānā. Parārtha anumāna expresses itself in elaborate argument in syllogistic form.
Conditions of Inference
The aim of inference is to attain some new knowledge of a thing on the basis of whatever has been already known. It arises out of the necessity to know something more, as also out of doubt and anxiety regarding the thing to be known. Where perception is available, inference is not necessary, because we need not reflect much to know objects present to our senses. Inference is not possible regarding either things unknown or things definitely known. It functions only with regard to things that are doubtful.61 Doubt is a condition of inference. It implies not only absence of certain knowledge about something, but also a positive desire or will to know it. Modern Naiyāyikas do not accept this view, because, they say, there may be inference even when there is no doubt and in the presence of certainty. Similarly, there may be inference even when there is no will to infer. The inference aims at proving that which is yet unproved, as there is a desire to prove the object. At the same time, as Hemacandra says, it is incapable of being contradictory. Therefore, it is generally accepted by all schools that a logical discourse does not come into play in regard to matters which are unknown or definitely established.62 That a state of doubt is a motive of inference is very often recognized in psychology and philosophy. Doubt sets us thinking and gives rise to efforts towards the solution of a problem. The Jaina philosophers, in fact all Indian philosophers, have stated that desire to know is an additional factor for inference. So, too, Miss Stebbing shows that doubt is a psychological condition of inference.63
Inference consists in establishing the relation between the major and the minor term. Knowledge of such a relation depends on the
60 Vinacke (L. E.): Psychology of Thinking, Ch. VI, p. 87. 61 Nyāyabhāşya, I, 1, 1. 62 Pramānamimānsā, I, 2, 13 and Commentary. 63 Stebbing (S.): Modern Introduction to Logic, p. 215.
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