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OTHER SOURCES OF EMPIRICAL KNOWLEDGE
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knowledge of the vyāpti, universal relation between the major and the middle term. Knowledge of the major term, which is of the nature of authentic cognition of a real fact and which arises out of the middle term either observed or expressly stated, is in fact called inference. It is a cognition which takes place subsequent to the apprehension of the middle term (linga grahaņa) and the recollection of the vyāpti.64 Regarding the vyāpti Das Gupta points out that the Jainas, like the Buddhists, prefer antarvyāpti (e. g., relation between smoke and fire) to bahirvyāpti (relation between the place containing smoke and the place containing fire). 65 The Buddhists showed that vyāpti may be based on essential identity, causality, tādātmya and tadutpatti. Experience cannot be the sure ground of vyāpti. But the Vedantins make it the result of inductive generalizations based on simple enumeration. The Naiyāyikas agree with the Vedāntins in showing that vyāpti is established on the basis of uncontradicted experience.
Just as inference depends on the knowledge of the vyāpti, it also depends on the knowledge of the relation between the middle and the minor term. This is often called paksa dharmatā. In inference, the minor term becomes related to the major through its relation to the middle term. Chatterjee points out that, while the validity of the inference depends on vyāpti, the possibility of inference depends on the relation of the minor with the middle term which is also called paksatā. Vyāpti is the logical ground of inference, while paksatā is the psychological ground of inference.66 Keśava Miśra explains the process of inference as follows: In the first stage the operation leads to the perception of invariable connection between the major and the middle term. This is arrived at from frequent observations of the occurrence of the two in the past.
For instance, smoke is observed on a hill. We then remember the relation which perception has established between smoke and fire. This gives rise to reflection in the form that there is on the hill smoke, which is always accompanied by fire. Then we arrive at the inference that there is fire on the hill. Keith points out that this value of the conception of inference as a mental process is enforced in minute detail by the Nyāya school.67 From another point of view, stress is laid on the fact that the subject, the minor term, must be something regarding which there is a desire to establish something else. This desire may be for one's own satisfaction or for that of others. Bosanquet also considers such a mental activity of inferring as the decisive feature of inference.68
64 Pramānamimāṁsā, 1, 2, 7 and Commentary. 65 Das Gupta: History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, p. 389. 66 Chatterjee (S. C.): The Nyāya Theory of Knowledge, Ch. XII, 277. 67 Keith (B.): Indian Logic and Atomism, p. 113. 08 Bosanquet (B.): Logic, Ch. VII.
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