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SOME PROBLEMS IN JAINA PSYCHOLOGY
with the introduction of doubt as a stage in the process of perceptual experience before īhā, the associative integration becomes more difficult to understand from the psychological point of view. This has been very often responsible for terming Thā as speculation. However, we may say that the doubt which intervenes between sensation and ihā, which we have called associative integration, is more a logical expediency than a psychological fact. The Jaina logicians are concerned with finding a logical sequence and consistency in the problem of the theory of the knowledge, rather than in psychological analysis. It is difficult to
maintain that ihā, in the sense of speculation, is a stage which culminates • from doubt or from the comparison of various alternative presenta
tions. In this sense, doubt (saṁsaya) and speculation (ihā) involve an element of discursive thinking which is not possible at this early stage of perceptual experience. It would be more appropriate to say that ihā is the associative factor. It integrates impressions to form a concrete psychosis. In the language of the structural psychologists like Wundt and Titchner, such a process of association and integration is a necessary element in perceptual experience, which is a complex experience. Avāya
From the stage of associative integration (ihā), we come to the stage of interpretation. Sensations are interpreted and a meaning assigned to the sensation. That would be perception. Sensation is the first impresson of something the meaning of which is not cognized. Perception is the interpretation of the sensation, in which the meaning is known. William James says it is knowledge about'. This involves perceptual judgment. When we perceive a red rose, our perception involves the cognition, this is red rose'. The Jainas said that this stage of perceptual judgment is avāya, although it is still in the non-verbal stage. Avāya follows in the wake of īhā, associative integration. In this stage, we reach a determinate experience. The striving for a cognition of the specific nature of the object results in the definite perception of the object. Avaśyakaniryukti defines avāya as determinate cognition.79 In the Sarvārthasiddhi we get a description of avāya as cognition of the true nature of the object through cognition of its particular characteristics.80 Umāsvāti says that upagama, upanoda, apavyādha, apeta and apagata are synonyms of avāya. They mean determinate cognition.81 Nandisūtra gives āvartanatā, pratyāvartanatā, buddhi, vijñāna as synonyms.82 Tattvārthasūtra Bhāşya describes avāya
79 Vešegāvasya kabhāgya, 179. 80 Sarvärthasiddhi, 115. 81 Tattvārthasūtrabhāsya, 115. 82 Nandisutra, 32.
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