Rngog Lotsaba On Sahopalambhaniyama Proof In Dharmakirtis Pramanaviniscaya

Author(s): Helmut Krasser
Publisher: Helmut Krasser

Page 17

H. Krasser Ngog lotsāba on the sahopalambhaniyama ...
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like a composite whole (avayavin) cognition too would contradict (its) unity through (its) many parts;47 1.2.2.1.2. coloured (rakta) as well as uncoloured parts) are not excluded in case of the gross (form) (sthūla) in cognition;48 if the (cognition's] unity cannot be negated by the different parts alone, it cannot be negated] by the coloured and uncoloured ones either; 1.2.2.1.3. if, although the unity can be negated by these coloured and uncoloured parts), it cannot [be negated] by the different parts (alone), a composite whole cannot be negated. 1.2.2.1.4. Finally, (if one asks:) [The gross form) may not be an unity in the state of being coloured and uncoloured at the time when it is not denied that it manifests as having different parts, (then) however, due to which circumstances (go ci ste) should (the gross form] at another time being characterized by another phase (kşaņa) not be an unity? (If this were the case) then a composite whole (too) would
be reasonable. 1.2.2.2.49 [The proof that establishes a valid cognition) that invalidates
however, this part still belongs to the pūrvapaksa which ends with med pa'i phyir ro. My translation: «[Objection:) Why do you say that the property) to be proved is the mere negation of difference but that they) are not to be proved to be identical? For (ni = hi) it is reasonable that (they) are identical. Because, if the objective aspect is not real although it is illuminated, how could consciousness in turn be known to be real? Further, if cognition illuminates something unreal (asatya), it illuminates the objective aspect) when it is real as well, because by something real not the slightest fault is undertaken. (Answer:) If that objective aspect - given that it might be so (gal te de Itar = yady evam) - were a unitary thing, it would not be reasonable to be endowed with contradictory properties that are due to its parts. And if those different parts are a unit, why do you not assume a substance that is a composite whole? What is the difference (between them)? ... >
17 Cf. yan lag can 'gog pa'i ñes pa de nid ni du ma'i thun mong gcig gi rang bzhin gyi nes par yang bita bar bya'o || PVINT P 166b8 (D 14362) = «The very same fault that negates a composite whole is also to be seen as the fault of a unitary nature that is common to a manifold (object).
48 It is possible that the text shes pa'i rags pa la should be corrected to shes pa'i rags pa las.
19 This paragraph corresponds to PVINT 183b3-185a2 (D 158a6-159a2): gal te de Ita na gzung ba'i rnam pa'i rang bzhin du ma yin no zhe na
($1.2.2.2.1.] 'di la yang ji Itar rdul phra rab rnams drug gis (P: gi D) cig car sbyar bas dngos po med pa de bzhin du shes pa'i rdul phra rab mnams la yang thal bar 'gyur ro Illus can nid la skyon 'dir 'gyur gyi lus can ma yin pa la ni ma yin pa ma yin nam lus can zhes bya ba rwa zed de ba ni med kyi 'on kyang tshad chung (D: tshung P) ngu mang po rnams phan tshun gyi rang bzhin gyi yul yongs su spangs nas skyes (D: skyed P) pa'i phyir yul rgyas pa dang ldan par gyur pa (P: 'gyur ba D) ni lus can yin la de ni rnam par shes pa la yang bye brag med pa'i phyir kun rdzob tu yod par mtshungs par thal bas de ni du mar yang rigs pa ma yin no ll gzhan yang rnam par shes pa'i rdul