Rngog Lotsaba On Sahopalambhaniyama Proof In Dharmakirtis Pramanaviniscaya

Author(s): Helmut Krasser
Publisher: Helmut Krasser

Page 20

82
Aspects of Buddhism
(form) manifests in that (conceptual cognition), it is established that
(cognition) illuminates something non-existent. 1.2.2.2.5. Finally, if one says that the manifestation in such a way (i.e.
in a gross form) is not contradictory because it is (only) conceptual cognition (vikalpa) that ascertains (its own nature which is not the object (anartha) as [being the object, 54 it follows that it would be contradictory that conceptual cognition), not being the object, illuminates itself; if it is illuminated by something else (i.e. cognition), the cognition's capability of illuminating something non-existent is established; if it is illuminated by ignorance (avidya)'s, this ignorance) being non-existent is contradictory, and if this ignorance) is existent, the cognition's capability of illuminating something non-existent is established; and (finally) if we do not assume the capability of illuminating something non-existent, there would not exist any erroneous cognition (bhrānti) (at all). [This was the examination of) the subject of the thesis (pratijñārtha). The exclusion of the faults of the reason (hetudoșa) consists of the exclusions of four (faults): 2.1. (the reason) is not established (asiddha); 2.2. it is contradictory (viruddha); 2.3. it is inconclusive for being too general (sādhāraņānaikāntika); 2.4. it has the fault that its being absent (from the dissimilar instances (vipakşa)] is doubtful
(vyatirekasamsaya). 2.1. Regarding the first, some others say: «This (reason is not estab
lished, for if the reason "being necessarily perceived together" means that perception (upalabdhi) of the object of cognition (ñeya) is pervaded (vyāpta) by perception of cognition, because there is no per
way." (This is) because of the following: [The conceptual cognition which ascertains sun rays to be water) is determined to manifest clearly due to the fact that the cognition which grasps the individual (svalakşaņa) of the sun rays, the conceptual cognition of water which occurs at the same time (and) which manifests, and the two conceptual cognitions of them) are unified [i.e. identified with each other). However, in the case under consideration there is no conceptual cognition of a gross (form) at all which, due to the co-occurence (sahacaritvät) with any other cognition), could be conceptualized to manifest clearly, which experiences a gross (form), and which manifests clearly. Moreover, as the cognition of the conceptual cognition experiences only that which is of its own nature, there does not exist a gross (form). Therefore it would not manifest.»
5* This idea is based on PVIN II 2,8f: rang gi snang ba don med pa la don du mngon par zhen nas 'jug pa'i phyir ... svapratibhāse 'narthe 'rthādhyavasāyena pravartanāt...
5s Without correcting rang rig pa (svasamvedana) to ma rig pa (avidyä) the text does not make sense. The correction is based on the equivalent discussion found in the PVINT passage quoted above (n. 49 ($1.2.2.2.5.]), which is introduced by the following purvapaksa: 'di sam du ma rig pa'i dbang gis de Itar gsal ba yin no sñam na