Rngog Lotsaba On Sahopalambhaniyama Proof In Dharmakirtis Pramanaviniscaya

Author(s): Helmut Krasser
Publisher: Helmut Krasser
Catalog link: https://jainqq.org/explore/269456/1

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rNgog lotsāba on the sahopalambhaniyama proof in
Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇaviniscaya
Helmut Krasser
(Vienna)
Although rNgog lotsāba Blo ldan shes rab alias Blo ldan bzang po? (10591109) was one of the principal exponents of the later phase of the preclassical period of the development of tshad ma in Tibet, from among the huge number of his works only a few have come down to us. A brief topical outline or summary (bsdus don) of the Mahāyānasūtrālamkāra was published in 1985; editions of his commentaries to the Ratnagotravibhāga and the Abhisamayālamkāra“ with an introduction by David Jackson are now under preparation. Thus, information on rNgog lotsāba and his followers, the representatives of the so called Ngog lugs, has been available only from secondary sources. Many of these materials have been collected in Leonard van der Kuijp's pioneer study of the early period of Tibetan epistemology and have been supplemented by David Jackson. From among his works on tshad ma, only two seem to have survived: a commentary on the Pramāņaviniscaya (rNam nges kyi ți ka), and his Tshad ma rnam nges kyi dka' gnas rnam par bshad pa, "Explanation of the difficult points in the Pramāņaviniscaya". 7 The publication of the latter text
Cf. VAN DER KUIJP 1983 p. 31. ? For this periodization cf. VAN DER KUIJP 1989 p. 8-18. 3A list of his work is to be found in VAN DER KUIJP 1983 pp. 34&57. *For references cf. JACKSON 1987 p. 148.
*Cf. VAN DER KUIJP 1983, Chapter 1 «Rngog lo-tsa-ba Blo-ldan shes-rab and the Rngog-lugs of epistemology.
Cf. JACKSON 1987 pp. 127-131 & 165-169, and DAVID JACKSON, "An Early Biography of Nog lotsaba Blo ldan ses rab". In: Tibetan Studies. Proceedings of the 6th Seminar of the International Association for Tibetan Studies. Fagernes 1992. PER KVAERNE (ed.). Vol. I. Oslo 1994, 372-392
Both texts are kept in the Library of the Cultural Palace of Nationalities (CPN); cf. ERNST STEINKELLNER, "Early Tibetan Ideas on the Ascertainment of Validity (nges byed kyi tshad ma)". In: Tibetan Studies. Proceedings of the 5th Seminar of the In

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has been announced for the near future. The work consists of three chapters on pratyakşa, svārtha- and parārthanumāna and covers 124 folios made up of 8 lines; folio no.1 is missing. The manuscript is written in a legible dbu med script sometimes preserving an old orthography, so that in most cases - but not always - we find a subscribed y in front of the palatal vowels such as myed pa for med pa, or dmyigs pa for dmigs pa. Instead of snang ba, snang pa is mostly written and the term dam bca' ba'i don also occurs in the variants dam bcas pa'i don, dam bcwa' ba'i don and dam bcwa ba'i don. In some instances the genitive i such as in pa'i is separated from the preceding consonant by a tsheg so that we read pa 'i. Moreover, the post-post-fixed d (da drag) is used as in gyurd pa. The initial consonant of final particles and the like is quite often omitted, e.g. thalo for thal lo, or 'thade for 'thad de. The use of abbreviations seems to be restricted to thamd for thams cad. Finally, it should be mentioned that units of the text belonging together are separated from each other by writing two or three dots in vertical order between a double shad. Smaller units are separated by using two dots either before or after the shad. This method, however, is not consequently applied. From this manuscript I shall reproduce a small portion, namely rNgog lotsāba's interpretation of Dharmakīrti's sahopalambhaniyama proof as propounded in his Pramāņaviniscaya, in order to gain some insight into his style, into the development of textual analysis, the so called sa bcad technique, and, of course, into his way of understanding the theme and his appropriation of the ideas of his Indian predecessors.
The last section in the pratyaksapariccheda of the Pramāņaviniscaya (PVIN I 78,12-100,26) is devoted to the distinction between a means of cognition and its effect (pramānaphala) in order to prove that any cognition (jñāna) bears two aspects, one grasping or subjective (grāhaka) and one to be grasped or objective (grāhya). The equivalent to this in the Pramāņavārttika is to be found in the pratyakşa chapter vv. 301-366o and vv. 388-39110. Having first explained what should be known as pramāna
ternational Association for Tibetan Studies. Narita 1989. SHÖREN IHARA and ZUICHO YAMAGUCHI (eds.). Narita 1992 (257-273) p. 264". The Lo chen gyi mdzad pa'i rnam nges di ka (CPN no. 5139[1]) is incomplete and consists of 132 folios; the last portion is missing; cf. LEONARD VAN DER KUIJP, "On Some Early Tibetan Pramāņavāda Texts of the China Nationalities Library of the Cultural Palace of Nationalities in Beijing" (unpublished).
The entire section has been translated into English in GEORGE DREYFUS & CHRISTIAN LINDTNER, "The Yogācāra Philosophy of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti". Studies in Central & East Asian Religions 2, 1989 pp. 27-52.
VETTER in his edition of PVIN I refers to the respective parallels. 10 Cf. IWATA I 15ff.

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and its phala in accordance with the doctrine that an external object exists (bāhyārthavada) and that in the end it is not necessary to assume the existence of an object external to cognition (PVIN I 78, 12-90, 16), Dharmakirti proceeds to establish their difference without assuming an external object. In this context he presents two proofs according to the teaching that everything is just cognition (vijñaptimätra). The first of these two proofs runs as follows:12
sahopalambhaniyamad abhedo nilataddhiyoḥ v.55ab
(lhan cig dmigs pa nges pa'i phyir | sngo dang de blo gzhan ma yin ) ...dvicandradivat (zla ba gñis la sogs pa bzhin no). PVIN I 94,22f The passage is normally translated as: «Blue and its cognition are not different from each other, because they are necessarily perceived together ...like the two moons (seen by one suffering from a timira eye disease).» 13
According to rNgog lotsäba who was quite familiar with this topic - he not only cooperated in the translation of the Pramanaviniscaya but also in that of Dharmottara's Tika and Prajñākaragupta's Pramāṇavārttikālamkāra there are two points to be dealt with in this proof: (§1.) the subject of the thesis (dam bea' ba'i don, pratijñärtha), and (52.) the faults of the reason (gtan tshigs kyi skyon, hetudoṣa) as criticized by the opponents. Because with regard to the hetudoças rNgog lotsäba does not provide us with any new information, but only disproves the criticism of Subhagupta as formulated in his Bahyarthasiddhikarika which is refuted in the epistemological tradition of Dharmakirti with more or less the same arguments, I will not discuss them here.
11Cf. the introduction of this sub-section in PVIN I 94, 14: 'di rnam par rig pa tsam ñid yin na...
12 This proof as well as the second one (rig pa zhes bya ba yang de'i bdag ñid yin pa'i phyir, de Itar gsal ba'o || PVIN I 98, 7f) are the subject of Iwata's study on sahopalambhaniyama (cf. IWATA I, II), in which the commentators' interpretations are considered as well. On Subhagupta's criticism of the sahopalambhaniyama proof in his Bähyärthasiddhikärikä together with the reaction on it in the Tattvasamgraha, in Kamalasila's Panjikä, and in Dharmottara's Pramanaviniscayatika and on Haribhadrasüri's refutation of this proof in his Anekantajayapatākā, cf. MATSUMOTO 1980.
13 Apart from the interpretation of saha the various translations do not in essence differ: «[Ferner] gibt es keine Verschiedenheit zwischen Blau und seiner Erkenntnis, weil sie notwendig gleichzeitig wahrgenommen werden.» VETTER transl. of PVIN I 95; «Blue and the cognition of blue are not different from each other, because they are necessarily perceived together.» MATSUMOTO 1980 p. 2; «There [really] is no difference between something blue and the idea of the [blue thing] because [the "two"] must be perceived simultaneously.» DREYFUS/LINDTNER 1989 p. 46 (cf. fn. 8); «Das Blaue und die Erkenntnis davon sind nicht verschieden, weil sie ausschließlich zusammen wahrgenommen werden.» IWATA I 15.

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Concerning the subject of the thesis in this proof, rNgog lotsāba distinguishes ($1.1.) the locus of properties (chos can, dharmin) and ($1.2.) the property to be proved (bsgrub bya'i chos, sādhyadharma). The dharmin is determined to be made up only by the objective aspect consisting of something blue etc. He stresses the point that the subjective aspect should not be regarded as dharmin, for the grāhakākāra in this proof is different from the grāhyākāra. This is due to the fact that the grāhakākāra has to be understood as being real (bden pa, satya) while the grāhyākāra is said to be unreal or false (brdzun pa, alika).
The property to be proved, i.e. abheda, is interpreted as being of the nature of a non-implicative negation (myed par dgag pa, prasajyapratişedha) and he dispels the assumption of its being an implicative negation (ma yin par dgag pa, paryudāsapratişedha). This means that by the negation in the term "abheda" only "the being different" is negated, but it should not be understood in the sense that Dharmakīrti intended the identity of the two aspects.
The determination of the sādhyadharma now is a point where the difference between Dharmakirti's commentators regarding the interpretation of this proof most clearly finds expression. This in part applies to the locus of the properties as well, but the dharmin was not a theme of their discussions and thus their views can be understood only by implication. In order to see the impact of the Indian tradition on rNgog lotsāba we first have to look at the respective interpretations. In roughly presenting the commentators' explanations I will make use of the results of Iwata's study on the topic and more details can be found there. Except for the concepts of Dharmottara who comments on the P Vin and those of Sākyabuddhi and Kamalasila who explicitly relate their statements to the passage of the PVin under consideration, the interpretations of the other commentators are comparable with those of rNgog lotsāba only to a certain degree, for the contexts in which this argument is applied and explained may differ.
Devendrabuddhi in his commentary on PV III 388 deduces from the reason "being necessarily perceived together" the identity (ekatva) of blue. and its cognition.14 Thus the dharmin consists in the subjective and objective aspect and the sādhyadharma is their identity. Sākyabuddhi shares this opinion. He quotes PVIN I 55ab and blames an opponent who takes
14 Cf. IWATA I 113 transl.) & II 9312: «PVP (P No. 5717(b)] 276b1: sngon po la sogs pa dang de rams su myong ba dag ni lhan cig dmigs pa'i phyir tha dad par snang ba can nid yin na yang gcig yin no zhes bya ba'i don to >> = *Although blue etc. and the awareness of it appear to be different, they are identical because they are perceived together.»

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the sādhyadharma to be a mere negation of the difference (bhedapratişedhamātra) for his ignorance regarding the intention of Dharmakīrti. 15 Santarakṣita's position is not clear.16 Kamalaśīla, however, explicitly determines that the dharmin consists of the blue and its cognition and that the sadhyadharına is their non-difference.17 In Prajñākaragupta's Alamkāra there are several passages which indicate that he understands the term "abheda" in the meaning of "identity”. He explains, for example, that in the drstanta used by Dharmakīrti, dvicandradivat, the two moons seen by one suffering from a timira eye disease are identical (ekata).18 In the same way, Ravigupta claims the identity of blue and its cognition.19 Finally, we should have a look at Dharmottara's comments in his Pramanaviniscayaţikā, the text of which was translated by rNgog lotsāba and on which he wrote a topical summary (bsdus don).20
In the PVINŢ there is no passage where Dharmottara identifies the dharmin. However, as he explains that in Dharmakīrti's verse abhedah
15 Cf. ...cig car dmigs pa nges pa'i phyir sngon po de blo tha dad med (PVIN I 55ab) ces bya ba la sogs pa gsungs pa yin no || tha dad pa dgag pa tsam de bsgrub par bya ba yin gyi tha dad pa med do zhes bya ba (P; D: zhes pa) ni ma yin te de yang bshad na bstan bcos mdzad pa mi mkhas par ston par 'gyur ro|| PVȚ P (5718 Ne) 255b1f (D (4220 Nej 207a2f) = «If one explains that the property) to be proved is the mere negation of difference but not the "non-difference" 1) (as formulated by Dharmakirti) one demonstrates that the śāstrakāra is not learned. Cf. IWATA I 141f & II 10775.
1) As bhedapratiscdhamätra here probably is to be interpreted as prasajyapratişedha, the term tha dad pa med (pa) may be understood in the meaning of "identity".
16 Cf. IWATA I 184ff.
17 Cf. dharmy atra nīlākārataddhiyau. tayor abhinnatuam sadhyadharmaḥ yathoktah sahopalambhaniyamo hetuh. idrsa eväcäriye sahopalambhaniyamāt (PVIN I v. 55ab) ityadau prayoge hetvartho 'bhipretah. TSP 691,23-25. = «The locus of the property in this (proof) are the blue aspect and its cognition. Their not being different is the property to be proved. The reason, as it is stated (by Santarakṣita), is the being necessarily perceived together. Such a meaning of the reason is intended in the formulation as applied by the teacher: "because they are necessarily perceived together" etc.>>
18 Cl. ayam eva bhedahetur yad uta bhinnayogaksemata. indudvayapratibhāsasya tu bhinnayogakscmābhāvāt ekataiva. PVBH 410,11f = «Only the fact of having a different fate i.e. cause and effect) is cause of a difference. The two moons that appear, however, do not have a different fate. Therefore they are merely identical. Cf. also abhinnayogakşematväd ekatvam arthasya jñānena durvāram ... PVBH 430,32 = «The object's identity with cognition cannot be denied, for it does not have a different fate. These and some other passages are referred to in IWATA I 145.
19 PVT (P 5722) 167a3: de'i phyir tha dad par snang yang lhan cig par dmigs pa'i phyir don dang shes pa dag gcig nid yin no || = *Although they therefore appear to be different, blue and its cognition are identical because they are perceived together.>> Cf. IWATA I147 & II 11188 20 Cf. VAN DER KUIJP 1983 p. 34.

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has to be construed with nilataddhiyoḥ,21 meaning that blue and its cognition are not different from each other, the dharmin can be understood as consisting of the blue and its cognition, as was clearly stated by Kamalaśīla who seems to rely on Dharmottara in this point. In determining the sādhyadharma Dharmottara does not use the terms prasajya- and paryudāsapratişedha applied by rNgog lotsāba, but only speaks of a mere negation (pratişedhamātra) of difference. However, that prasajyapratişedha is intended can be seen from his denial that the property to be proved is identity.22 Moreover, he specifies the subjective aspect to be real (vastu)23 and the objective aspect to be unreal (asatya)24.
21 Cf. sngo (D: sngon P) dang de'i blo dag gzhan ma yin zhes bya ba ni tha dad pa med pa'o || bsgrub par bya ba'i cha 'dir bstan pa'i phyir gsungs pa ni l gang gi phyir (P VIN I 94,20) zhes bya ba'o || PVINT P 182b6-7 (D 157a3-4) = «Blue and its cognition are not different from each other, i.e. non-different. In order to show the part to be proved he said "for".
22 don gzhan pa'i rang bzhin nid ma yin te (PVIN I 94,21) zhes bya ba ni bsgrub par bya ba ston pa'o || 'di skad du 'di dag gcig par ni bsgrub par bya ba ma yin gyi l'on kyang tha dad bdag' dgag pa tsam yin no zhes ston pa yin no || ci'i phyir tha dad pa dgag pa tsam bsgrub par bya ba yin gyi gcig ñid du ni bsgrub pa ma yin no zhos smra! ...P 182b8-183a2 (D 157a5-6) = «[The formulation:] "It is not of the nature of an other thing" (na ... arthāntararüpatvam) shows the property) to be proved. It shows that it is not to be proved that the two are identical, but the mere negation of the being of different nature (is to be proved). (Question:] Why do you say that the property) to be proved is the mere negation of difference but not their identity? ... >>
1) The reading of bdag is problematical. Derge reads either bdag or pa dag. Peking reads only dag. The variant tha dad (pa) dag dgag pa would be equivalent to bhinnayor pratisedhaḥ which does not make sense. tha dad bdag dgag pa could translate a Sanskrit bhinnātma(tva) pratisedha meaning «negation of their being of different nature». Perhaps the correct reading is, as in the following pūrvapaksa, just tha dad pa dgag pa. IWATA II 122139 and MATSUMOTO 1980 p. 18f both interpret tha dad (pa) dag dgag pa in the sense of bhedapratişedha.
23 rnam par shes pa mi (P: ni D) bden pa gsal (D: bsal P) bar nus pa ma rig pa'i bdag ñid can ni dngos po yin gyi brtags (P: brtag D) pa ni ma yin no | sc PVinȚ P 177b2f (D 152b2) = «The cognition which is capable of illuminating something unreal (asatya) (and) which is of the nature of ignorance (avidyā) is real (vastu), but it is not imagined (kalpita).» (cf. IWATA I 179 & II 126165). Cf. also ... mi bden pa gsal bar byed pa'i rang bzhin yang rdzun pa ni ma yin no | PVINŢ P 177b5f (D 15266) = «... and the aspect which illuminates something unreal is not false (alika).»
24 gang gi phyir gang ji sñed snang ba de kho na ltar thams cad bden pa ni ma yin te 'khrul pas med pa yang snang ba'i phyir ro | PVINT P 182b8 (D 157b5) = «For not everything is real in just that way as it appears in cognition), because due to an error (consisting of avidya)") something non-existing also appears in cognition).
1) Cf. de'i phyir ma rig pa'i nus pa dang ldan pa'i shes pa mi bden pa'i rang bzhin gsal ba'i byed pa yin pa'i phyir ma rig pa'i dbang gis gsal ba yin no zhes brjod pa la ni kha na ma tho ba yod pa ma yin no|| PVNȚ 184b6f (D 158b5f) quoted in Syādvādarat näkara 170,1719 (identified in IWATA II 123144, transl. in I 174): etena Dharmottareņa yad abhidadhe

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As can be easily seen, from among the interpretations of the Indian commentators that of Ngog lotsāba is quite close to the perception of Dharmottara. rNgog lotsāba as well as Dharmottara understand the property to be proved to be of the nature of a prasajyapratişedha and both consider the subjective aspect to be real and the objective one to be unreal or false. In determining the locus of property, however, they differ insofar as Dharmottara regards both aspects to constitute the dharmin while rNgog lotsāba denies the grāhakākāra's being part of it. The reasons for this interpretation put forward by rNgog lotsāba are that in this argument the subjective aspect must be different from the objective one and that the negation of difference is an activity towards the objective aspect. But what does he mean by this? The purpose of this section of the PVIN is, as already mentioned, to establish that any cognition (jñāna) bears two aspects25 according to the vijñaptimātratā-theorem.26 It must be added that Dharmakīrti is still arguing on the level of sāmvyavahārikapramāņa.27 This means, as rNgog lotsāba explains afterwards ($1.2.1.), that on this level the subjective aspect is said to be existent (yod pa, sat), for it is not only experienced as being illuminated but it is also reliable (mi slu ba, avisamvādin). Thus it is real (bden pa, satya). The objective aspect is, although experienced as being illuminated, not reliable, for its reliability is invalidated by a correct or valid cognition (tshad mas gnod pa, pramāṇabadhita)28 and thus it is false (brdzun pa, alika). This constitutes the difference between them.29 Moreover, the objective aspect cannot be real, for then neither of the two kinds of connections ('brel pa, pratibandha)
- tasmäd avidyāśaktiyuktam jñānam asatyarūpam ādarśayatīty avidyāvaśāt prakāśata ity ucyata ity anavadyam iti = «Therefore a cognition that is connected with ignorance shows an unreal form. Thus it is no fault to state that (cognition) by force of ignorance illuminates (an unreal form).
25 Cf. des na blo ni tshul gñis pa v. 59c de'i phyir yul dang shes pa'i rang bzhin dag gis blo tshul gñis su grub pa yin no|| PVIN I 100,4-6 = «Thus, mind is two-fold. Therefore it is established that mind by way of the form of the object and that of cognition is two-fold.
26 Cf. above fn. 11.
? Cf. sāņuyavahārikasyaitat pramāṇasya rūpam uktam. PVIN I 100,20 = «What we have explained is the nature of a valid cognition of everyday life.»
28 For the translation of the term tshad ma, pramana as "valid cognition" which I adopt in the following, cf. TOM J.F. TILLEMANS, Persons of Authority. The ston pa tshad ma'i skyes bur sgrub pa'i gtam of A lag sha Ngag dbang bstan dar... Stuttgart 1993 pp. v-vi.
C. 1.2.1. lan ni dzin pa ni myong va dang mui slu ba vod pas | de god par brjod kyi bzung pa ni gsal bar tshor yang tshad mas gnod pas myi slu ba myed de des na gsal bar tshor bar khyad par myed kyang gang yang gnod byed myed par grub pa'i myi slu ba yod pa de ni bden la de myed pa ni brdzun pas na khyad par grub bo ||

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would be possible. A causal connection, tadutpatti, contradicts their existence at the same time, 30 and identity, tādātmya, of two really existing entities is not possible by definition.31 These seem to be the main reasons for rNgog lotsāba's position.
What does this explanation mean for Dharmakīrti's sahopalambhaniyama proof? According to this interpretation the verse (sahopalambhaniyamād abhedo nīlataddhiyoh | v. 55ab) should be translated as follows:
«Because blue and its cognition are necessarily perceived to
gether, (blue) is not different (from its cognition). >> If we now look at rNgog lotsāba's own translation of this passage lhan cig dmigs pa nges pa'i phyir | sngo dang de blo gzhan ma yin | such an interpretation is, as is the case with the Sanskrit version, neither supported nor contradicted, although one is inclined to understand nilataddhiyoḥ as referring to both, sahopalambhaniyamad and abhedo. However, this understanding obviously contradicts a later formulation of Dharmakīrti in verse 59ab where he says that even in the case that an external object exists, blue and its cognition are not different from each other. This he explains as follows: «By the two (reasons explained above, namely] "being perceived together" and "consciousness" it is established that the manifestation of blue and the like (in cognition) and its consciousness are not different from each other even in the case that an external object exists.>> 32 In this statement the dharmin definitely is not the objective aspect alone but consists of the blue and its cognition. Did rNgog lotsāba consciously deviate from Dharmakīrti or is it possible that he overlooked this statement?
I do not think either is the case, for rNgog lotsāba's interpretation exactly follows Dharmakīrti's own explanation of the sahopalambhaniyama proof which says: «For blue is not of the nature of a thing that is different from its) awareness, although it appears to be different because the two are necessarily perceived together, like the two moons (seen by one
30 This means that rNgog lotsāba understands saha- in the sahopalambhaniyama proof as meaning "at the same time". On the different interpretations of saha- cf. IWATA I 66-103.
31 Cf. $1.2.1. gzhan yang bzung pa bden par gsal bar thal ba yang ma yin lebden pa dang 'brel pas myi 'thad pas ste dus cig pa dang rang bzhin myi gcig pa la 'brel pa gñis ga 'gal ba'i phyir dang 1 gsum pa yang myi srid pa'i phyir rol
32 < de phyir snang don blo de dag | phyi don yod kyang tha dad min "> v. 59ab than cig dmigs pa dang rig pa dag gis phyi rol gyi don yod kyang sngon po la sogs pa snang .. ba dang de rig pa dag tha dad med par grub bo || PVIN I 98,29-100,3.
Quoted in Isvarapratyabhijñāvivịttivimarsini III 32,14: bähye 'py arthe tato 'bhedo bhāsamānārthatadvidoh ); identified in ELLIOT M. STERN, "Additional Fragments of Pramāņaviniscaya I-II." WZKS 35, 1991 (151-168) p. 161.

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suffering from a timira eye disease).» 33 Here Dharmakīrti only speaks of the non-difference of the blue from its awareness, but not of their being mutually not different. Thus, in this passage, the dharmin consists of the blue and its non-difference from its awareness is the property to be proved (sādhyadharma). Further, in the whole following section up to the second proof by means of consciousness (rig pa) (PVIN I 97,7), there is not a single remark which could be understood in the sense that the cognition's nondifference from the blue is intended. In the same way, in the explanation of the second proof, Dharmakīrti only states that the blue is not a thing that is different from its awareness. 34 As we now should not assume that Dharmakīrti in his explanation of this verse in prose formulates a new idea different from that in the verse, the verse has to be understood in the very same way.
The contradiction to the passage mentioned above (PVIN I 98,29-100,3) can be explained in such a manner that the argument expressed in the verse has to be formulated in two different ways. When formulated from the standpoint of the vijñaptimātratā, only the non-difference of the blue is intended and it is only the blue that constitutes the dharmin. And when it is applied assuming an external object (bāhyārtha), the presuppositions are different and the mutual non-difference of blue and its cognition is to be proved. This also seems to be the reason why rNgog lotsāba translated the verse in such a way that it may be applied according to both views.
We now have seen that rNgog lotsāba in his interpretation of the sahopalambhaniyama proof, with one exception, follows Dharmottara's expla.nation and that he ignores the comments of the other Indian predecessors. In determining the dharmin of this proof on the vijñaptimātrata level he is more precise when he regards it to consist of the grāhyākāra alone. At other occasions in his dKa' gnas rnam bshad, however, he does not follow Dharmottara at all but refutes his views.35 These facts corroborate Sākya mchog ldan's account of rNgog lotsāba's assimilation of Dharmottara's ideas, for
3 gang gi phyir tha dad par snang ba nid yin yang sngon po ni nams su myong ba las don .gzhan pa'i rang bzhin nid ma yin te de dag lhan cig dmigs pa nges pa'i phyir | zla ba gñis la sogs pa bzhin noll = na hi bhinnāvabhāsitve 'py arthāntararūpatvam nilasyänubhāvät, tayoh sahopalambhaniyamād, duicandradivat PVIN I 94,20-21.
sngon po la sogs pa myong ba las don gzhan ma yin na ni de'i bdag rid du gyur pa de Itar gsal ba'i phyir sngon po la sogs pa myong bar 'gyur ro || PVIN I 98,9-12 = anarthäntaratve tu niläder anubhavāt tadātmabhūtah prakāśate tathä nilädyanubhavah syat. Kašika II 100,4f; identified in STERN 1991 p. 161 (cf. fn. 32).
35 Cf. 'di la slob dpon chos mchog nid na re ...... zhe 'ol 'di yang bden pa ma yin tel... dk'a' gnas rnam bshad 44a8 and slob dpon chos mchog na re ......zhe'oll de ni ma yin te...44b1f.

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he reported that rNgog lotsāba «refuted many points in the exposition of Dharmottara that he took to be unacceptable, having retained as they were those (passages) he thought were acceptable.»> 36
Regarding his sa bcad technique one can see by the paragraph numbers which I added that the text was well organized according to this method, although we do not always find the beginning of a paragraph indicated by a dang po or gñis pa. However, the text under consideration does not allow a statement as to the extent to which the imposition of a logical structure upon a text commented on by means of topical outlines was developed by rNgog lotsāba, for the da' gnas rnam bshad is, as the title already indicates, not a detailed explanation of all the points of the PVin, but only of the difficult ones. The topical outlines we find here seem to indicate the main points that rNgog lotsāba considered to be essential for his teaching of the Pramāņaviniscaya and the different opinions of his Indian predecessors concerning some specific subjects. For he not only refers to Subhagupta's comments, although without mentioning his name (82.), or to Dharmottara's view,37 but in other parts of his rNam bshad he also refutes the opinions of Prajñākaragupta, śāntabhadra and others.38
As to rNgog lotsāba's style, one may say that his remarks are very short and in many cases only comprehensible after having understood the detailed discussion in Dharmottara's PVinȚ which he quite often summarizes in a few words.
Regarding the sahopalambhaniyama proof in the Pramāņaviniscaya, he finally provides us with a new interpretation that is not to be found in the Indian tradition and which accords well with Dharmakīrti's formulations.
Tshad ma rnam nges kyi dka' gnas rnam par bshad pa
on sahopalambhaniyama (PVIN I 94,18-98.6) Additions in the manuscript are indicated by ; my additions to the ms. by (22x); my corrections by rrr (corr. : yyy); variant readings such as gzung - bzung ba - pa, kyi - gyi, ste-te, cig - gcig and the like are not corrected. Omissions of an
36...chos mchog gi bshad pa las thugs yul du 'thad pa rnams thad sor bzhag nas mi 'thad pa la dgag pa mang du bshad do I Sakya mchog ldan, Tshad ma'i mdo... (Collected Works Vol. 19 pp. 1-137) pp. 29,3-30,4; transl. JACKSON 1987 p. 167. A longer portion of this text dealing with rNgog lotsāba together with a translation is given in VAN DER KUIJP 1983 pp. 49-56.
37 Cf. above fn. 35.
38 Cf. slob dpon shes rab 'byung gnas sbas pa dang zhi ba bzang po la sogs pa na re ...... zhe'o || de ni myi 'thad de ... 46b4-6; ... des na kha cig ... thal ba 'dir 'gyur ro zhe'o || de ni thal ba ma yin le ...43b7f; kha cig na re ...... zhes zer ro | de ni myi thad de... 44a6; gzhan na re ... ... zhe'o || de 'ang myi thad de ... 44a7.

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initial consonant of final particles etc., e.g. thalo instead of thallo, are indicated by thal-lo etc.; thamd is the abbreviation used in the ms. for thams cad. It also should be noted that the tsheg before a shad never is ommitted, but always written.
.
(45a6] Ihan cig dmyigs pa nges pa'i (PVIN I v.55a) gtan tshigs ni 1. dam bcas pa'i don dang l: 2. gtan tshigs kyi skyon spang pa gñis kyis shes par bya'o 1: 1. | de la dam bca' ba'i don yang 1.1. chos can kyi rang bzhin dang :|
1.2. bsgrub bya'i chos dpyad pa (corr.: spyad pa] gñis so 1: 1.1. | de la chos can ni 'dir sngon po la sogs pa gzung 7 pa'i rnam pa
kho na yin gyil 'dzin pa ni ma yin te 'dzin pa ni gzung pa las tha dad par sgrub pa'i skabs yin pa'i phyir ro tha dad pa ldog pa yin pas gzung pa myed pa las tha dad par 'thad do | des na tha dad pa dgag
pa ni gzung pa'i rnam pa la bya ba yin gyil 'dzin pa la ni ma yin no 1.2. | bsgrub par bya ba'i chos ni 'dir myed par dgag pa'i rang bzhin yin
gyi 8 ma yin par dgag pa ni ma yin no || de yang 1.2.1. myed par dgag pa la gnod pa spang pa dang | 1.2.2. ma yin pa la gnod pa bsgrub
pa gñis kyis nges par bya'o | 1.2.1. | dang po ni gal te gzung pa'i rnam pa gsal bar tshor ba myed na
'dzin pa yang yod par myi 'grub pas thams cad 'jig par thal ba dang | gzhan myed pa(r) dgag pa shes pa'i rang bzhin ma yin pa gsal na (45b) phyi rol gyi don namshes pa gzhan tha dad par yang gsal bar thal bas gzung 'dzin grub par thal lo || de Ita na 'dzin pa myi 'grub pa dang gzung pa gzhan bden par thal lo zhe na l: lan ni 'dzin pa ni myong pa dang myi slu ba yod pas de yod par brjod kyi bzung pa ni gsal bar tshor yang tshad mas gnod pas myi slu ba myed de des na gsal bar tshor 2 bar khyad par myed kyang gang yang gnod byed myed par grub pa'i myi slu ba yod pa de ni bden la de myed pa ni brdzun pas na khyad par grub bo || gzhan yang bzung pa bden par gsal bar thal ba yang ma yin te bden pa dang 'brel pas myi 'thad pas ste dus cig pa dang rang bzhin myi gcig pa la 'brel pa gñis ga 'gal ba'i phyir dang | gsum pa yang myi srid pa'i 3 phyir ro || de ni myed pa(r) dgag pa'i
phyogs la gnod pa spang pa'o :. 1.2.2. | ma yin pa la gnod pa sgrub pa la gñis ste | 1.2.2.1. rnam pa
rnams shes pa cig gi rang bzhin yin pa la gnod pa dang | 1.2.2.2. du
ma'i rang bzhin yin pa la gnod pa'o 1.2.2.1. | dang po (corr. : dang pa ni rnam pa bzhis rig par bya ste
1.2.2.1.1. yan lag can bzhin du shes pa yang cha du mas cig pa 'gal ba dang 1.2.2.1.2. kha bsgyur ba dang ma bsgyur 4 ba yang shes pa'i

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rags pa la myi ldog pa dang | cha dad pa tsam gyis cig dgag par myi nus na kha bsgyur ba dang ma bsgyur bas kyang mui nus pa dang 1.2.2.1.3. des cig dgag par nus kyang cha tha dad pas myi nus na yan lag can dgag par myi nus pa'o | 1.2.2.1.4. tha ma ni gal te cha tha dad par snang pa 'gog byed ma yin na de'i tshe kha bsgyur ba dang ma bsgyur ba'i gnas skabs su 5 cig ma yin mod gzhan gyi tshe skad cig gzhan kyi mtshan ñid go ci ste cig ma yin te des na yan lag
can 'thad do zhes bya ba’o | | 1.2.2.2. || du ma'i phyogs la gnod pa la rnam pa Ingas shes par bya ste
1.2.2.2.1. rdul phra rab kyi spyad pa shes pa'i snang pa phra rab la yang 'dra ba dang | snang pa thams cad bden par yod na rags pa snang ba 'gal (ba) dang | 1.2.2.2.2. rags pa snang ba myi bden na rdul phra 6 rab du snang pa brtag par myi nus shing brtags pa don myed pa dang | 1.2.2.2.3. rags par snang pa rnam rtog yin na gsal bar snang pa 'gal ba dang | 1.2.2.2.4. rang gi rnam pa mthar thug pa gñis kyis rnam par rtog pa nid la rags par snang pa myi 'thad pa dang | de la rags pa snang pa khas blangs kyang myed pa gsal bar 'grub pa'o | 1.2.2.2.5. | tha ma ni gal te rnam par rtog pa don myed pa la don du zhen pas de ltar 7 snang pa myi 'gal lo zhes brjod na don myed par rang gsal ba 'gal ba dang | gzhan gyis gsal na rnam par shes pa'i myed pa gsal ba'i nus pa grub pa dang | ma rig pas (corr. : rang rig pas) gsal na de myed par 'gal ba dang | yod na shes pa'i myed pa gsal ba'i nus pa 'grub pa dang | myed pa gsal ba'i nus pa khas myi len na 'khrul pa myed par thal-lo | dam bca'i don to
gtan 8 tshigs kyi skyon spang pa ni 2.1. ma grub pa dang 2.2. 'gal ba dang | 2.3. thun mong gi ma nges pa dang | 2.4.ldog pa la the
tshom za ba'i ñes pa ste bzhi spang pa'o | 2.1. | dang po ni gzhan na re 'di ni ma grub ste | 'di ltar lhan cig
dmyigs pa nges pa'i gtan tshigs kyi don ni shes pa ma dmyigs par shes bya dmyigs pa myed pas shes bya dmyigs pa shes pa dmyigs pas khyab pa'i don (46a) yin la de yang khyab byed 'gal ba dmyigs par 'dod pa yin na zla ba dang gyad la Ita ba ni shes pa ma dmyigs kyang shes
bya 'ba'zhig dmyigs pas lhan cig dmyigs pa nid ma grub bo 2.2. l yang na 'gal ba yin te lhan cig gi sgra ni tha dad par brjod pa
yin no des na tha dad pa'i khyad par can du dmyigs pa'i phyir tha dad pa yin no zhes bya bar 'gyur na de ni zlog pas 2 khyab pas 'gal
ba'i phyir rol 2.3. | yang na thun mong gi ma nges pa yin te sangs rgyas kyi thugs
dang de'i shes bya dag lhan cig dmyigs kyang shes bya rgyud gzhan ni

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shes pa'i khyad pon kyang shes pa don tha myi dad had myed
shes pa dang tha myi dad pa ma yin pas sam sems dang sems las byung ba dag lhan cig du mtshungs par dmyigs kyang tha dad pa myed
pa ma yin pas so || yang na snang pa dang gzugs kyis ma nges so 2.4. | gal te thun mong gi 3 ma nges pa ma yin du chug kyang ldog pa
la the tshom za ba ni bzlog par myi nus ste | tha dad pa la lhan cig dmyigs pa myed pas khyab pa 'am | lhan cig dmyigs pa dang 'gal ba
grub pa myed pa'i phyir ro zhes bya ba ni rtsod pa rnam pa bzhi'o || 2.1.a. | 'di la lan ni ma grub pa ni ma yin te zla ba dang gyad la Ita ba
na yang shes pa'i khyad par tha dad pas de ma dmyigs kyang de'i shes bya dmyigs 4 mod kyi l 'on kyang shes pa tsam myed pa ma dmyigsso de lta na ni shes pa'i khyad par dang don tha myi dad pa ni myi sgrub kyi 'on kyang spyi dang yin no || gang las tha myi dad myed par sgrub par bya ba'i spyi de la ltos te ni lhan cig dmyigs pa yod pa yin te shes pa tsam dang bral ba'i zla ba dang gyad ni mthong pa
myed pa'i phyir ro || des na ma grub pa ma yin no [2.2.a.) (The refutation of this pūrvapakşa is lacking) 2.3.a. | thamd mkhyen pa'i shes bya yang de'i mkhyen s pa ma dmyigs
"kyang rgyud gzhan la rang rig pas dmyigs pa'i phyir rornal 'byor pa can gyis rgyud gzhan de ma bzung par thams cad mkhyen pa ni thugs 'ba'zhig 'dzin pa'i phyir to | sems dang sems las byung pa ni lhan cig dmyigs pa tsam yang myed na nges pa la ga la yod | gzugs dang snang pa ni 'og nas spong ngo | des na thun mong gi ma
nges pa ma yin no 2.4.a. | Idog 6 pa la the tshom za ba ni khyab pa sgrub pa’i tshad ma ston
pas 'gog par 'gyur roll

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Translation 39 The reason "being necessarily perceived together" (sahopalambhaniyama) is to be understood through 1. (an examination of the subject of the thesis (pratijñārtha), and 2. through the exclusion of the faults of the reason (hetudoşa). 1. From among these (the examination of] the subject of the thesis also
consists of two examinations: 1.1. that of the nature of the locus of properties (dharmin), and 1.2. that of the property to be proved
(sādhyadharma). 1.1. From among these here in this proof) the locus of properties is only
the objective aspect (grāhyākāra) consisting of blue etc., but it is not the subjective one (grāhaka), for (this) is the section (skabs, prastāva) in which the difference of the subjective (aspect) from the objective one is affirmed (sgrub pa, vidhi). As (the subjective/objective aspect?] consists of the exclusion (ldog pa, vyāurtti) of that which is different, it is reasonable that it is different from that which is not an objective (aspect) (gzung pa myed pa, agrāhya).40 Thus the negation of difference is an activity towards the objective aspect, but not towards the
subjective one. 1.2. The property to be proved here is of the nature of a non-implicative
negation (myed par dgag pa, prasajyapratişedha), but not an implicative negation (ma yin par dgag pa, paryudāsapratişedha). And this is to be ascertained through 1.2.1. the exclusion of a valid cognition] that invalidates (bādhaka) the non-implicative negation, and through 1.2.2. the proof of a valid cognition) that invalidates the implicative.
(negation). 1.2.1. Objection:41 If the objective aspect is not experienced as being
illuminated (gsal ba, prav kāś ), the subjective one is also not estab39 In the following notes I quote passages of Dharmottara's PVINT on which rNgog lotsāba's explanations are based. However, as these passages are often quite long and space here is limited, I shall translate only the shorter ones and of the longer ones only those parts which are necessary for understanding Ngog lotsāba's enigmatic formulations. Passages which are translated in IWATA I, II and MATSUMOTO 1980 are not translated, but are referred to in the footnotes. Finally, Sanskrit equivalents of several Tibetan terms have been supplied for the sake of convenience and easier understanding.
1° Or: «As the difference consists of an exclusion (ldog pa, vyāurtti), it is reasonable that the subjective/objective aspect?] is different from that which is not an objective (aspect)». The meaning of this argument is not clear!
" The idea of the following objection is to be found in PVIN I 96,8f: visayasya jñānahetutayopanidheh prāg upalambhah pascāt samvedanam iti cet. Much parallel material is collected in IWATA II 155". In this discussion an opponent wants to establish

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lished to be existent (sat). Thus, it would follow that all (aspects) are abandoned. And if a non-implicative negation [of being something] different which is not of the nature of cognition is illuminated, it follows that an external object or something else that is cognized is illuminated as being different as well.42 Thus, it follows that the objective (as well as] the subjective (aspect) are established. In this way it follows that the subjective (aspect) which is not established [as long as the objective one is not experienced] and the objective (aspect) which is different [from it] are real.
77
Answer: As the subjective (aspect) is experienced and reliable (avisamuadin), it is said to be existent (sat). However, the objective (aspect) is, although it is experienced as being illuminated, not reliable, for it is invalidated by a valid cognition (pramäṇabadhita). Therefore, although [the two] are not different, insofar as [both of them) are experi enced as being illuminated, that one whose reliability is established to be without an invalidating [cognition] is real (satya), while the (other one) without [such a reliability] is false (brdzun pa, alika).43 Thus the difference is established. Moreover, it does not follow either that the objective (aspect) is illuminated as being real, for being connected with the real [subjective aspect] it is not reasonable. [This is so] because the two [kinds of] connection [i.e. tädätmya and tadutpatti] contradict [their] having the same time (ekakala) and not being of one and the same nature (anekarupa), and because another kind [of connection] is not possible. This was the exclusion of [a valid cognition]
-
that cognition of the object is different from the cognition of that cognition, because it is the condition for the latter. Thus the reason "sahopalambhaniyama" would not be established.
42 This argument is not clear to me!
43rNgog lotsaba's answer is based on the following passage of Dharmottara: ñams su myong ba nges pa'i rang bzhin mi shu ba ni spang bar nus pa ma yin te | de ni khas blang bar bya ba yin pa'i phyir ro || yang gang ñams su myong yang gnod par byed pa mthong pa'i phyir slu ba de ni spang bar bya ba yin te | dper na zla ba gnis kyi rang bzhin Ita bu'o gnod par byed pa med pa'i phyir 'khrul pa mi 'grub po zhes1) gang 'chad par 'gyur ro || de bzhin du rnam 'grel las kyang | gnod byed rig pa dam pa ni | med na ñams myong spang bya min?)
zhes so || dga' ba la sogs pa'i rang bzhin yang dag pa'i rig pa ni spang bar bya ba ma yin te gnod par byed pa med pa'i phyir ro || des na gcig ma yin no zhes bya bar gnas so|| PVINT P 185a2-5 (D 159a2-4); the passage is translated in IWATA I 180.
1)
PVIN II 45,19f: gnod par byed pa med pas 'khrul pa mi grub pa'i phyir ro ||
(= badhakabhävad bhräntyasiddheḥ PVSV 16,4f)
2) not identified.
44 Cf. mi bden pa'i rang bzhin ñid ma rig pa'i dbang gis ston par byed kyi bden pa ni

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Aspects of Buddhism that invalidates the assumption of a non-implicative negation. 1.2.2. In the subsection of the proof of a valid cognition) that invalidates
the implicative (negation) there are two (proofs]:45 1.2.2.1. (one that establishes a valid cognition) that invalidates (the fact that (manifold) forms are the nature of a unitary (eka) cognition, and 1.2.2.2. (one that establishes a valid cognition) that invalidates (the fact that they
are the nature of a manifold cognition. 1.2.2.1.46 The first one is to be known through four alternatives: 1.2.2.1.1.
ma yin te bden pa dang lhan cig 'brel pa nges pa med pa'i phyir ro || PVINŢ P 185a2 (D 159 alf) = «By force of ignorance (avidya) (cognition) shows something of an unreal nature, but not something real. For [two) connected (things), that are real and together at the same time) (saha) are not ascertained. A more detailed refutation of the two kinds of connection is to be found in Kamalaśila's TSP 694,23-695.12.
45 In the following refutation rNgog lotsāba makes use of the arguments applied by Dharmakirti in PVIN I 84,12-86,10 in order to prove that cognition does not resemble its object.
16 This paragraph has its equivalent in PVINŢ P 183a2-183b3 (D 157a6-157b5): <1 ci'i phyir tha dad pa dgag pa tsam bsgrub par bya ba yin gyil gcig nid du ni bagrub pa ma yin no zhes smra gcig tu ni (ni D: om. P) 'thad pa yin (yin D: ma yin P) te i gang gi phyir gal te gzung ba'i rnam pa gsal ba yang mi bden na rig pa yang bden pa fid du gang gis rtogs (P: rtog D) par byed 1" yang gal te rnam par shes pa mi bden pa gsal bar byed na bden par yang gsal bar byed debden pas ni nes ba cung zad kyang bya pa med pa'i phyir rol
($1.2.2.1.1.) gal te de Itar gzung ba'i rnam pa de gal te gcig gi ngo bo yin na ni phyogs chas byas pa'i 'gal ba'i chos dang Idan pa mi 'thad do || phyogs cha tha dad pa de yang gcig nid yin na ni yan lag can gyi rdzas gcig ci'i phyir mi 'dod de khyad par ci yod |
($1.2.2.1.2.) yan lag can gyi rdzas la ni kha bsgyur ba dang ma bsgyur ba yod pa'i phyir 'gal gyi | blo la ni ma yin pa'i phyir 'di nid khyad par yin no zhe na shes pa ma yin pa'i rags pa gcig ma shes pa yang rung ste khyad par ci yod del blo'i rang bzhin nid ni rags pa'i ñes pa ñams pa ma yin no ||
($1.2.2.1.3.) gzhan yang kha bsgyur ba dang ma bsgyur ba la sogs pa dang ldan pa kho na ni 'gal ba ma yin gyil on kyang phyogs cha tha dad pa yang yin no zhes mang du bshad zin to || de'i phyogs cha tha dad pa'i rgyu mtshan gyis kyang 'gal ba na gal te rnam par shes pa gcig yin na ni yan lag can yang gcig nid yin la 'di du ma nid yin na ni khyad par med pa'i phyir shes pa'i rags pa yang du ma nid do ||
($1.2.2.1.4.) gzhan yang rgyu can ces bya ba ni don dam par yod pa ma yin nol skad cig ma'i rdzas la ni gang du kha bsgyur ba dang | g.yo ba dang bsgribs pa yod pa dang med pas byas pa'i tha dad pa ma mthong ba de nid rdzas gcig tu 'gyur roll g.yo ba la sogs pas byas pa'i tha dad pa'i gnas skabs su tha dad pa mthong bas gzhan du yang rjes su 'jug par byas pa ni ma yin pas tshad ma ,'ga'zhig yod pa yin noll de'i phyir rags pa thams cad la phyogs gzhan dang 'brel pas cha shas yongs su bcad pa las gyur pa'i 'gal ba'i chos 'du bar mthong bas tha dad pa med pa spang bar bya ba yin no zhes rigs pa yin no II
This passage is translated in IWATA I 181 (text: II 128171) and MATSUMOTO 1980 p. 18. Both of them understand it in such a way that the purvapakşa ends with zhes smra and that the following sentence already is part of the answer. Consequently, they prefer the reading of Peking (gcig tu ni 'thad pa ma yin te). To my understanding,

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like a composite whole (avayavin) cognition too would contradict (its) unity through (its) many parts;47 1.2.2.1.2. coloured (rakta) as well as uncoloured parts) are not excluded in case of the gross (form) (sthūla) in cognition;48 if the (cognition's] unity cannot be negated by the different parts alone, it cannot be negated] by the coloured and uncoloured ones either; 1.2.2.1.3. if, although the unity can be negated by these coloured and uncoloured parts), it cannot [be negated] by the different parts (alone), a composite whole cannot be negated. 1.2.2.1.4. Finally, (if one asks:) [The gross form) may not be an unity in the state of being coloured and uncoloured at the time when it is not denied that it manifests as having different parts, (then) however, due to which circumstances (go ci ste) should (the gross form] at another time being characterized by another phase (kşaņa) not be an unity? (If this were the case) then a composite whole (too) would
be reasonable. 1.2.2.2.49 [The proof that establishes a valid cognition) that invalidates
however, this part still belongs to the pūrvapaksa which ends with med pa'i phyir ro. My translation: «[Objection:) Why do you say that the property) to be proved is the mere negation of difference but that they) are not to be proved to be identical? For (ni = hi) it is reasonable that (they) are identical. Because, if the objective aspect is not real although it is illuminated, how could consciousness in turn be known to be real? Further, if cognition illuminates something unreal (asatya), it illuminates the objective aspect) when it is real as well, because by something real not the slightest fault is undertaken. (Answer:) If that objective aspect - given that it might be so (gal te de Itar = yady evam) - were a unitary thing, it would not be reasonable to be endowed with contradictory properties that are due to its parts. And if those different parts are a unit, why do you not assume a substance that is a composite whole? What is the difference (between them)? ... >
17 Cf. yan lag can 'gog pa'i ñes pa de nid ni du ma'i thun mong gcig gi rang bzhin gyi nes par yang bita bar bya'o || PVINT P 166b8 (D 14362) = «The very same fault that negates a composite whole is also to be seen as the fault of a unitary nature that is common to a manifold (object).
48 It is possible that the text shes pa'i rags pa la should be corrected to shes pa'i rags pa las.
19 This paragraph corresponds to PVINT 183b3-185a2 (D 158a6-159a2): gal te de Ita na gzung ba'i rnam pa'i rang bzhin du ma yin no zhe na
($1.2.2.2.1.] 'di la yang ji Itar rdul phra rab rnams drug gis (P: gi D) cig car sbyar bas dngos po med pa de bzhin du shes pa'i rdul phra rab mnams la yang thal bar 'gyur ro Illus can nid la skyon 'dir 'gyur gyi lus can ma yin pa la ni ma yin pa ma yin nam lus can zhes bya ba rwa zed de ba ni med kyi 'on kyang tshad chung (D: tshung P) ngu mang po rnams phan tshun gyi rang bzhin gyi yul yongs su spangs nas skyes (D: skyed P) pa'i phyir yul rgyas pa dang ldan par gyur pa (P: 'gyur ba D) ni lus can yin la de ni rnam par shes pa la yang bye brag med pa'i phyir kun rdzob tu yod par mtshungs par thal bas de ni du mar yang rigs pa ma yin no ll gzhan yang rnam par shes pa'i rdul

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para rab nam su vong bar gyur Pa rnams la | Tags pairnam pa mama su muong ba ni bzlog par nus pa ma yin nornam par shes pa'i bdag nid gcig la ni rags pa yod pa ma yin zhing | rnam par shes pa'i rdul phra rab mang po rnams kyang so sor rags pa'i rang bzhin ma yin noll ji Itar phyi rol gyi rdul phra rab shes pa gcig la snang ba rnams kyi so sor snang ba'i chos rags pa yin pa de bzhin dul 'dir yang shes pa gcig la snang ba'i phyir rags pa nid du snang bar 'gyur ba yang ma yin te du ma rnams gzhan 'ga' zhig gis kyang ma bzung ba'i phyir ro || de'i phyir ñams su myong ba'i rjes su 'brangs pa na Tags pa gsal bar snang bar nam su muong bar mi gour ba chiu na nams su muong ste | de'i phyir gang dang ldan pas yod pa ma yin pas rags pa'i bdag ñid la ston par byed pa shes pa'i med pa gsal bar byed nus pa yang yod pa nid do 11
($1.2.2.2.2.) rags pa'i rnam pa med na rnam par shes pa'i rdul phra rab gzhan ci zhig lus la de brtag pas kyang ci zhig bya ste gang gi phyir rags pa'i rnam pa 'di nid de kho na nid ma yin par mi 'gyur ba dang | rnam par shes pa yang med pa gsal bar byed pa'i nus pa dang ldan par mi 'gyur bar bya ba'i phyir gzung ba'i rnam pa rnam par shes pa'i bdag ñid du brtags pa yin na gzung ba'i rnam pa mi bden pa dang rnam par shes pa yang med pa gsal bar byed pa'i nus pa dang ldan par khas blangs na rnam par shes pa'i rdul phra rab rtog pa ni don dam pa yin no 11
($1.2.2.2.3.) rags par snang ba rnam par rtog pas sprul pa yang rigs pa ma yin te! gsal bar snang ba'i phyir dang | rnam par rtog pa rnams ni gsal bar snang ba ma yin pa'i phyir rol
($1.2.2.2.4.) ji ltar smig rgyu dag la chur rnam par rtog pa gsal bar snang, bzhin du rags par rnam par rtog pa yang yin no zhes ni brjod (D: rjod P) par minus te gang gi phyir smig rgyuli rang gi mtshan nid 'dzin pa'i rnam par shes pa dang dus gcig tu jug pa'i chu'i rnam par rtog pa snang ba dang rnam par rtog pa dag gcig tu byed pa'i phyir gsal bar snang bar nges par 'gyur na 'dir ni gang zhig dang (dang D: om. P) Ihan cig rgyu ba las rags pa'i rnam par rtog pa gsal bar snang bar rtog (P: rtogs D) par 'gyur ba rags pa ñams su myong ba gsal bar snang ba ni 'ga' yang yod pa ma yin noll gzhan yang rnam par rtog pa'i rnam par shes pa yang bdag ñid kyi rang bzhin gang yin pa de kho na nams su myong bar 'gyur ba yin na de la ni rags pa yod pa ma yin te de'i phyir snang bar mi 'gyur roll
($1.2.2.2.5.) rnam par rtog pa'i rnam par shes pa ni rang gi bdag ñid don med pa la don du lhag par zhen nas 'jug pa yin no zhe na don med pa ston pa ni nges par brtags pa na med pa gsal bar byed pa nid du gnas pa yin te gang gi phyir don med pa gsal ba na bdag rid gsal bar byed pa 'am gzhan gsal bar byed par 'gyur ternam pa gzhan ni mi srid pa'i phyir rore zhig (D: shig P) bdag nid ni gsal bar byed pa ma yin ternam par shes pa rid gsal ba'i rang bzhin yin pa'i phyir dang | don med pa ni dngos po ma yin pa'i yang phyir ro || gzhan gyis gsal bar byed na yang de gsal bar byed pa ni shes pa'i bdag nid de nid mi bden pa gsal bar byed par skyes pa yin no |
'di sñam du ma rig pa'i dbang gis de ltar gsal ba yin no sñam na gal te ma rig pa de dngos po med på yin na dngos po med pas dngos po med pa gsal bar byed do zhes bya ba'i Ishig gi tshul 'di cir yang mi rung ngo || ci ste dngos po yin pa de Ita na yang de ni rnam par shes pa'i rang bzhin nid yin na de las kyang dngos po med pa ji ltar gsal te dngos po dang dngos po med pa dag la ni 'brel pa 'ga' yang yod pa ma yin no Il Page #19

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the assumption that the manifold forms are of the nature of a man
ifold (cognition) is to be understood through five alternatives: 1.2.2.2.1. If the mode of existence (spyad pa, caraņa) 50 of the external]
atoms (paramāņu) is the same also in case of the subtle (sükşma) manifestation of cognition, and if everything that manifests is really existent, (then) the gross (form) (sthūla) that manifests in cognition)
is contradictory.51 1.2.2.2.2. If (under the previous conditions the gross (form) that mani
fests is not real, sit follows that) that which is conceptualized (kalpita) is not the object (anartha), insofar as that which manifests in form of
the atoms (paramāņutvena) cannot be conceptualized. 1.2.2.2.3. If the manifestation in a gross (form) is conception (vikalpa),
the manifestation in a clear (form) would be contradictory.52 1.2.2.2.4. It is not reasonable that (the conceptual cognition's) own form
manifests in a gross (form) just in conceptual cognition due to the two ends (i.e. the two kinds of cognition it relies on) (mthar thug pa gñis kyis).53 And even in the case that one assumes that a gross
(P: 'ba'D) zhig kyang 'khrul par brtag par minus soll ci ste mi bden pa yang yod na ni brgya byin gyis kyang shes pa mi bden pa gsal bar byed pa'i nus pa bsnon par minus so II 'dod du zin kyang nams su myong ba thams cad bden pa yin par ni sus kyang gzhag par nus pa ma yin pa'i phyir shes pa'i mi bden pa gsal ba'i nus pa las 'da' bar bya ba ma yin no 1 1?> mi bden pa'i rang bzhin nid ma rig pa'i dbang gis ston par byed kyi (P: pa'i D) bden pa ni ma yin te bden pa dang lhan cig 'brel pa nges pa med pa'i phyir roll (The text of the immediately following passage PVINT 185a 2-5 is quoted in n. 43.]
quoted in Syādvādaratnākara 170,17-19; cf. above fn. 24. <2> This passage is translated in IWATA I 174.
So It is also possible that spyad pa should be corrected to dpyad pa (vicāra): «If the analysis of the atoms also in case of the subtle manifestation of cognition is the same (as in case of the external atoms), and if ... »
51 Cf. dbang po'i (D: po P) rnam par shes pa la gnas pa'i rnam pa gang yin pa de ni cha shas dang bcas pa dang | rdul phra rab gcig la ni cha shas yod pa ma yin pa des na rdul phra rab kyi rang bzhin dang | shes pa la gnas pa 'i snang ba 'di 'gal ba'i phyir rnam pa 'di de'i yin no zhes brjod par nus pa ma yin no || PVINŢ P 165b7-166al (D 142b3f). = «That form which is situated in sense-cognition is endowed with parts, and in a single atom parts do not exist. Therefore the nature of an atom and this manifestation which is situated in cognition are contradictory. Thus one cannot say that this form (in cognition is the form of that (atom).
52 This is the case because the gross form manifests clearly and conceptions are by their nature unclear; cf. n. 49 ($1.2.2.2.3).
53 This enigmatic formulation becomes clearer with the help of the passage of PVINT it relies on, cf. n. 49 ($1.2.2.2.4.), which says: «One cannot say: "Like the conceptual cognition (which ascertains) sun rays to be water manifests itself in a clear way, also the conceptual cognition (which ascertains atoms to be gross) manifests itself in a gross

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(form) manifests in that (conceptual cognition), it is established that
(cognition) illuminates something non-existent. 1.2.2.2.5. Finally, if one says that the manifestation in such a way (i.e.
in a gross form) is not contradictory because it is (only) conceptual cognition (vikalpa) that ascertains (its own nature which is not the object (anartha) as [being the object, 54 it follows that it would be contradictory that conceptual cognition), not being the object, illuminates itself; if it is illuminated by something else (i.e. cognition), the cognition's capability of illuminating something non-existent is established; if it is illuminated by ignorance (avidya)'s, this ignorance) being non-existent is contradictory, and if this ignorance) is existent, the cognition's capability of illuminating something non-existent is established; and (finally) if we do not assume the capability of illuminating something non-existent, there would not exist any erroneous cognition (bhrānti) (at all). [This was the examination of) the subject of the thesis (pratijñārtha). The exclusion of the faults of the reason (hetudoșa) consists of the exclusions of four (faults): 2.1. (the reason) is not established (asiddha); 2.2. it is contradictory (viruddha); 2.3. it is inconclusive for being too general (sādhāraņānaikāntika); 2.4. it has the fault that its being absent (from the dissimilar instances (vipakşa)] is doubtful
(vyatirekasamsaya). 2.1. Regarding the first, some others say: «This (reason is not estab
lished, for if the reason "being necessarily perceived together" means that perception (upalabdhi) of the object of cognition (ñeya) is pervaded (vyāpta) by perception of cognition, because there is no per
way." (This is) because of the following: [The conceptual cognition which ascertains sun rays to be water) is determined to manifest clearly due to the fact that the cognition which grasps the individual (svalakşaņa) of the sun rays, the conceptual cognition of water which occurs at the same time (and) which manifests, and the two conceptual cognitions of them) are unified [i.e. identified with each other). However, in the case under consideration there is no conceptual cognition of a gross (form) at all which, due to the co-occurence (sahacaritvät) with any other cognition), could be conceptualized to manifest clearly, which experiences a gross (form), and which manifests clearly. Moreover, as the cognition of the conceptual cognition experiences only that which is of its own nature, there does not exist a gross (form). Therefore it would not manifest.»
5* This idea is based on PVIN II 2,8f: rang gi snang ba don med pa la don du mngon par zhen nas 'jug pa'i phyir ... svapratibhāse 'narthe 'rthādhyavasāyena pravartanāt...
5s Without correcting rang rig pa (svasamvedana) to ma rig pa (avidyä) the text does not make sense. The correction is based on the equivalent discussion found in the PVINT passage quoted above (n. 49 ($1.2.2.2.5.]), which is introduced by the following purvapaksa: 'di sam du ma rig pa'i dbang gis de Itar gsal ba yin no sñam na

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ception of the object of cognition without perception of cognition, and if this (reason) moreover is assumed to consist of a perception of that which contradicts the pervading (property) (vyāpakaviruddhopalabdhi),56 then, in case that many people watch the moon or wrestlers (gyad, malla), the object of cognition alone is perceived, although the cognitions (of the other persons are not perceived. Thus, the reason)
"being necessarily perceived together" is not established. 57 2.2. Moreover, (the reason) is contradictory, because it is contradictory
due to the fact that it is pervaded by the property that is the opposite (zlog pa, viparyaya) (of the property to be proved). (This is the case) under the presupposition that (zhes bya bar 'gyur na) they are different, because the word "together” denotes their being different (and) therefore they are perceived to possess the characteristic
(visesaņa) of difference.58 2.3. Moreover, (the reason) is inconclusive for being too general, because
it is the case that, although the cognition (thugs) of Buddha and
Se gang zhig gang dang than cig dmigs pa nges pa de ni de las tha dad pa ma yin te dper na zla ba gcig las gris pa bzhin no || sngon po la sogs pa'i gzung ba'i rnam pa yang shes pa dang lhan cig dmigs pa nges pa yin no || tha dad pa ni lhan cig dmigs pa ma nges pas khyab pa yin te 'brel pa med pa'i phyir ro || de dang 'gal ba ni lhan cig dmigs pa nges pa yin tedes na khyab par byed pa 'gal ba dmigs pas tha dad pa bkag pa yin no | PVINT P 189b7-190al (D 163a1-3) = yad yena niyatasahopalambham, tat tato na vyatiricyate, yathaikasmāc candramaso dvitiyah niyatasahopalambhas ca jñānena saha grāhyākāro niladir ily... bhedah sahopalambhāniyamena vyāptah, pratibandhābhā. vāt. tasya viruddhah sahopalambhaniyamah, tena vyäpakaviruddhena bhedo nirākriyate. JAMBOVIJAYA 1981 p. 137 (P. 110); translated in IWATA I 1811.
57 This objection reflects the opinion of Subhagupta as formulated in his Bāhyārthasiddhikarikā. The following objections as well, namely that the reason is contradictory (viruddha), inconclusive (anaikāntika) and doubtful (sandigdha), are based on BASK. This purvapaksa corresponds to BASK vy. 72-74 (text and transl. in MATSUMOTO 1980 pp.3, 5), whereas rNgog lotsāba has reformulated the first part in accordance with the passages of the PVINŢ quoted in n. 56 & n. 62 and shortened the second part. More detailed it is available in TSP 692,11-16: punah sa (= Subhagupta] evāha - yadi sahasabda ekārthah, tada hetur asiddhah. tathā hi natacandramallapreksāsu na hy ekenaivopalambho nilādeh. näpi nilatadupalambhayor ekenaivopalambhah. tathā hi nilopalambhe 'pi tadupalambhānām anyasantānagatānām anupalambhät. yadă ca sarvaprāṇabhrtām sarve cittaksaņāḥ sarvajñenāvasīyante, tada katham ekenaivopalambhah siddhah syöt. kiñca anyopalambhanişedhe saty ekopalambhaniyamah sidhyati. na cānyopalambhapratişedhasambhavah, svabhāvaviprakrstasya viddhipratiședhāyogāt. The passage is summarized in IWATA I 88; cf. also his notes in II 78170-72.
58 This corresponds to BASK v. 71: tatra bhadantaśubhaguptas tu aha - sahasabdas ca loke 'smin naivanyena vina kvacit | viruddho 'yam tato hetur yady asti sahavedanam ! quoted in TSP 692,2-3; text and transl. in MATSUMOTO 1980 pp. 3, 5; summarized in IWATA I 88; cf. also II 16745.

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its object (jñeya) are perceived together, another person's) (mind-)continuum (santānāntara), which serves as object of Buddha's) cognition, is (by its nature) cognition (of the person) and is (nevertheless) not non-different (from Buddha's cognition). Or (it is inconclusive) because the mind (citta) and the mental factors (caitta) are not nondifferent, although they are perceived together as if they were the same (mtshungs par).59 Moreover, (the reason) is inconclusive because of
light (snang pa, aloka) and colour-form (rūpa).60 2.4. Even if [the reason) may be one that is not inconclusive for be
ing too general, (it is inconclusive because] doubt regarding (its) absence (vyatireka) (from the dissimilar instances (vipakşa)] cannot be eliminated.61 (This is the case because neither the being pervaded of the difference by not being perceived together nor something that contradicts the being perceived together is established. These are the
four kinds of objections 2.1.a. The answer to this sis as follows]: [The reason) is not unestab
lished. For, even in the case that (many persons) watch the moon or wrestlers, it may be that the object of their cognition is perceived, although the particular cognitions (jñānaviseșa) (of the other persons) are not perceived due to their difference (from one's own cognition). However, the absence of cognition as such (mātra) is not perceived. Although it is not established in this way that the particular cogni
59 This opinion corresponds to BASK v. 68 and to a probable commentary on it by Subhagupta which is not available and which seems to be the source of the following quotation by Kamalasila: atha sahasabda ekakālavivakṣayā, tada buddhavineyacittena cittacaittais ca sarvatha | anaikāntikatā hetor ekakālavivakşayā 1 (BASK 68) yathā kila bhuddhasya bhagavato yad vijneyam santānāntaracittam, tasya buddhajnanasya ca sahopalambhaniyamo 'py asty eva ca nănātvam, tathā cittacaitlānām saty api sahopalambhe naikatvam ity ato 'naikantiko hetur iti TSP 692,17-21; the verse is translated in MATSUMOTO 1980 p. 4f; summarized in IWATA I 88; cf. also the references in II 7962.
6. The reason is therefore assumed to be inconclusive, because light and colour are perceived together but are obviously different. The case of aloka and rüpa is already discussed by Dharmakīrti (PVIN I 94,25ff).
61 This objection summarizes the opinion expressed in BASK vv. 65-67 and 81 which is also to be found in TSP 694,9-20. Cf. the section «(b) inconclusiveness II (kk 65-67, 81) in MATSUMOTO 1980 p. 7 and p. 27115
The formulation of this purvapakşa by rNgog lotsāva shows a great similarity to the passage of Dharmottara already quoted above (n. 56): tha dad pa ni lhan cig dmigs pa ma nges pas khyab pa yin tel 'brel pa med pa'i phyir rol de dang 'gal ba ni lhan cig dmigs pa nges pa yin te l = bhedah sahopalambhāniyamena vyāptah, pratibandhābhāvāt. tasya viruddhah sahopalambhaniyamah. In the objection, however, khyab pa has to be understood in the sense of vyāpti, for otherwise it cannot be construed with tha dad pa
la.

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tion and the object which is not different (are perceived together), it is (established that cognition) in general ([jñāna)sāmānya) and (the object are perceived together). With regard to that (cognition) in general from which the object) is to be proved not to be different there exists (the property of] being perceived together, because a moon or wrestlers being without cognition as such are not observed. Therefore (the reason) is not unestablished.62
(2.2.a.) (The refutation of this pūrvapakşa is lacking] 2.3.a. [The reason is not inconclusive for being too general either.763
Because the object of the cognition of the all-knowing (Buddha) too [i.e. the other person's mind continuum), although his cognition is not perceived by the other person), is perceived in the other person's
(mind-/ continuum through self-consciousness.64 . [It is also not inconclusive) because the all-knowing (Buddha) grasps
only mind insofar as one abiding in Yoga (yogavāhin) does not grasp
mind
62 The answer is similar to those of Dharmottara and Kamalaśīla: gar dang gyad la Ita ba la sogs pa rnams la gang shes bya dmigs par mi 'gyur ba'i shes pa ni 'ga' yang yod pa ma yin noll de bas na (D: ni P) shes bya mi dmigs par shes pa (dmigs par shes pa P: om. D) dmigs pa 'am | shes pa mi dmigs par shes bya dmigs pa ni 'ga' yang yod pa ma yin no zhes rnam pa gzhan nid 'gog pa yin gyi | dmigs pa thams cad la tha dad pa nid 'gog pa ni ma yin no || PVINŢ P 185b3-5 (D 159b1f); na ca natacandramallapreksāsu kaścij jñānopalambho 'sti yo na jñeyopalambhah, jñeyopalambho va na jñānopalambhaka iti kuto 'siddhatā. TSP 693,1-3; cf. MATSUMOTO 1980 p. 21.
63 One is forced to add such an introductory statement, for otherwise the following formulation of the reason cannot be construed. As the immediately preceding part, the refutation of $2.2., is also missing, one might think of a scribal error. However, rNgog lotsāba adds another proof for the reason's not being inconclusive which also lacks the predicate to be proved and which is not connected with the first formulation by a conjunctive or disjunctive particle such as dang or 'am. Therefore and also because the remaining part of the refutation is quite short, it is also possible that rNgog lotsāba for some reason wanted to finish this section very quickly and just noted the most important points without formulating full sentences.
64 Similar Dharmottara's refutation which is preserved in Sanskrit in Kamalasila's Panjikā: gang yang bcom ldan 'das kyi (P: kyis D) shes bya dang thugs (D: thug P) la lhan cig dmigs pa nges pa yod kyang | tha dad pa med pa ni ma yin no zhes smras pa de ni mi rigs te i gang gi phyir de la ni lhan cig dmigs pa nges pa ñid med de tha dad pa nid du rgyud gzhan gyis rang gi sems dmigs pa'i phyir ro || de nid kyi phyir sems dang sems las byung bas kyang 'khrul par 'gyur ba ma yin te de dag rnams kyang so sor bdag nid yang dag par rig pa'i phyir ro | PVINT 185b5-7 (D 159b2-4); (näpi buddhavijñeyacittenānaikāntiko hetuh), na hi tatraikopalambhaniyamo 'sti, prthak prthak sarvair eva cittasya samvedanāt, ata eva na' cittacaittair vyabhicärah, tesām api pratyekam ātmana eva samvedanāt. TSP 693,19-21; cf. MATSUMOTO 1980 p. 21.
1) cf. TS Pib (Peking, vol. 139, No. 5765) 160b8 ... 'khrul pa ma yin le

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another (person's) continuum.65
As it is not the case that the mind and the mental factors are only perceived together, which (arguments] could there be for a necessity. (niyama) [of being perceived together)766
[The objection] regarding light and colour-form will be refuted later [by Dharmakirti himself].67
Therefore [the reason] is not inconclusive for being too general. 2.4.a. Doubt regarding [the reason's] absence (vyatireka) [from the dissimilar instances (vipaksa)] is eliminated by showing a valid cognition that establishes the pervasion (vyäpti).
IWATA I, II
JACKSON 1987
Aspects of Buddhism
MATSUMOTO 1980
Abbreviations
TAKASHI IWATA, Sahopalambhaniyama: Struk tur und Entwicklung des Schlusses von der Tatsache, daß Erkenntnis und Gegenstand ausschließlich zusammen wahrgenommen werden, auf deren Nichtverschiedenheit. Teil I Studie; Teil II Anmerkungen. Stuttgart 1991.
DAVID P. JACKSON, The Entrance Gate for the Wise (Section III). Sa-skya Pandita on Indian and Tibetan Traditions of pramana and Philosophical Debate. [2 vols.] Wien.
SHIRO MATSUMOTO, Sahópalambhaniyama. Sotoshu Kenkyuin Kenkyusei Kenkyu Kiyo 12, 1980, pp. 1-34 (-298-265).
65 This means that the Buddha, being without defilements, is free of the dichotomy of grahya and grähaka. This idea is expressed in a more detailed fashion in TSP 693,6-13. The first part (693,6-8) is translated in MATSUMOTO 1980 p. 13; cf. also his note p.3138.
66 As for Dharmottara's and Kamalasila's explanations, cf. n.64.
67 That is PVIN I 94,25-96,7; cf. PVINT P 186b1f (D 160a5f): gzugs dang snang ba dag gis 'khrul par dogs pa la | bshad pa | gzugs dang snang ba dag la ni de'i shes pa skyed par rung ba gang yin pa de thob pa'i mtshan ñid dam (=PVIN I 94,25f) ste | ngo bo gang yin pa'o | |. Kamalasila's refutation: ata eva na rupalokair vyabhicärah, kevalalsyapy alokadarsanat. rūpasyäpy alokarahitasya kaiścit präniviseṣair upalambhat. tasmad vipakse bhāvāsambhavan nänaikantiko hetuḥ, TSP 694,6-8.
<1> PVIN I 96,2-4: snang ba 'ba' zhig kyang mthong ba'i phyir dang | snang ba med pa'i gzugs kyang srog chags kyi bye brag 'ga' zhig gis mthong ba yin pa'i phyir... (no Skt. equivalent for dang).

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PVBH
PVIN I
PVINT
TSP
87
Pramanavarttikabhāṣya Värttikalamkara of Prajñākaragupta, edited by R. SANKRTYAYANA. Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series, vol. 1. Patna, 1953. Tib. P 5719.
TILMANN VETTER, Dharmakīrti's Pramanaviniscayaḥ, 1.Kapitel: Pratyakşam. Einleitung, Text der tibetischen Übersetzung, Sanskritfragmente, deutsche Übersetzung. Wien 1966. Pramāṇaviniscayatika (Dharmottara): P 5727 (Dse), D 4229.
Tattvasangrahapañjikä (Kamalasila): Tattvasarigraha of Santarakṣita with the Commentary of Kamalasila. Ed. Dvarikadas Shastri [2 vols.]. Varanasi 1981/82.
VAN DER KUIJP 1983 LEONARD W.J. VAN DER KUIJP, Contributions to the Development of Tibetan Buddhist Epistemology. From the eleventh to the thirteenth century. Wiesbaden.
VAN DER KUIJP 1989 LEONARD W.J. VAN DER KUIJP, An Introduction
to Gtsang-nag-pa's Tshad-ma rnam-par nges-pa'i ti-ka legs-bshad badus pa. An Ancient Commentary on Dharmakirti's Pramanaviniscaya, Otani University Collection No. 13971. (Otani University. Tibetan Work Series, Vol. II) Kyoto, pp. 1-33.

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Aspects of Buddhism Abbreviations ALB The Adyar Library Bulletin BHSD Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Grammar and Dictionary, by Franklin Edgerton, vol. II: Dictionary, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, First Edition 1953, Reprint 1985 sDe dge edition of Tibetan canon IIJ Indo-Iranian Jurnal Journal of the American Oriental Society JAOS JIABS JRAS Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland Journal of Indian Philosophy : Peking edition of Tibetan canon IPH Taisho Shinshu Daizokyo, The Tripitaka in Chinese WSTB WZKS(O) Wiener Studien zur Tibetologie und Buddhismuskunde Wiener Zeitschrift fur die Kunde Sud- (und Ost)asiens Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenlandischen Gesellschaft ZDMG