Rngog Lotsaba On Sahopalambhaniyama Proof In Dharmakirtis Pramanaviniscaya

SR No.: 269456
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Helmut Krasser
Publisher: Helmut Krasser
Total Pages: 26
Language: English
Classification: Article
File Size: 3 MB

Page 19

H. Krasser rNgog lotsāba on the sahopalambhaniyama...
81
the assumption that the manifold forms are of the nature of a man
ifold (cognition) is to be understood through five alternatives: 1.2.2.2.1. If the mode of existence (spyad pa, caraņa) 50 of the external]
atoms (paramāņu) is the same also in case of the subtle (sükşma) manifestation of cognition, and if everything that manifests is really existent, (then) the gross (form) (sthūla) that manifests in cognition)
is contradictory.51 1.2.2.2.2. If (under the previous conditions the gross (form) that mani
fests is not real, sit follows that) that which is conceptualized (kalpita) is not the object (anartha), insofar as that which manifests in form of
the atoms (paramāņutvena) cannot be conceptualized. 1.2.2.2.3. If the manifestation in a gross (form) is conception (vikalpa),
the manifestation in a clear (form) would be contradictory.52 1.2.2.2.4. It is not reasonable that (the conceptual cognition's) own form
manifests in a gross (form) just in conceptual cognition due to the two ends (i.e. the two kinds of cognition it relies on) (mthar thug pa gñis kyis).53 And even in the case that one assumes that a gross
(P: 'ba'D) zhig kyang 'khrul par brtag par minus soll ci ste mi bden pa yang yod na ni brgya byin gyis kyang shes pa mi bden pa gsal bar byed pa'i nus pa bsnon par minus so II 'dod du zin kyang nams su myong ba thams cad bden pa yin par ni sus kyang gzhag par nus pa ma yin pa'i phyir shes pa'i mi bden pa gsal ba'i nus pa las 'da' bar bya ba ma yin no 1 1?> mi bden pa'i rang bzhin nid ma rig pa'i dbang gis ston par byed kyi (P: pa'i D) bden pa ni ma yin te bden pa dang lhan cig 'brel pa nges pa med pa'i phyir roll (The text of the immediately following passage PVINT 185a 2-5 is quoted in n. 43.]
<i> quoted in Syādvādaratnākara 170,17-19; cf. above fn. 24. <2> This passage is translated in IWATA I 174.
So It is also possible that spyad pa should be corrected to dpyad pa (vicāra): «If the analysis of the atoms also in case of the subtle manifestation of cognition is the same (as in case of the external atoms), and if ... »
51 Cf. dbang po'i (D: po P) rnam par shes pa la gnas pa'i rnam pa gang yin pa de ni cha shas dang bcas pa dang | rdul phra rab gcig la ni cha shas yod pa ma yin pa des na rdul phra rab kyi rang bzhin dang | shes pa la gnas pa 'i snang ba 'di 'gal ba'i phyir rnam pa 'di de'i yin no zhes brjod par nus pa ma yin no || PVINŢ P 165b7-166al (D 142b3f). = «That form which is situated in sense-cognition is endowed with parts, and in a single atom parts do not exist. Therefore the nature of an atom and this manifestation which is situated in cognition are contradictory. Thus one cannot say that this form (in cognition is the form of that (atom).
52 This is the case because the gross form manifests clearly and conceptions are by their nature unclear; cf. n. 49 ($1.2.2.2.3).
53 This enigmatic formulation becomes clearer with the help of the passage of PVINT it relies on, cf. n. 49 ($1.2.2.2.4.), which says: «One cannot say: "Like the conceptual cognition (which ascertains) sun rays to be water manifests itself in a clear way, also the conceptual cognition (which ascertains atoms to be gross) manifests itself in a gross