Right and the Good in Jaina Ethics

Author(s): Kamalchand Sogani
Publisher: ZZZ Unknown

Page 15

Ahimsā the Puruşārthasiddhupāya seeks to explain falsehood-truth, stealing-non-stealing, unchastity-chastity, possesion-non-possession etc as forms of Hiṁsā-Ahimsāl6. This way of expression regards Ahiṁsā as the essence of all virtues, thus giving supreme status to Ahimsā it deserves.
(2) Narrow meaning of Ahiṁsā : The above meaning of Āyāro and the Puruşārthasiddhupāya is representative of the extent which Ahiṁsā is supposed to include, although most of the Jaina texts seem to include in Ahiṁsā only non-killing!7. It should be borne in mind that if Ahimsa is understood only in the sense of non-killing, it is narrow and socially not of wide significance. In fact, killing is the last limit of Hirsā and not the only expression of Himsā. There are hundreds of expressions of Hiṁsā and Ahimsā below that last limit.
After defining Subha or good in terms of Ahimsā in the comprehensive sense, we now propose to discuss, what is the good or the Šubha according to the Jinist? In other words, the question now confronts us is : What kinds of things are intrinsically good according to the Jinist. This means that there are ends which are to be desired for their own sake. The Jinist does not subscribe to the view recognised by Dewey that there are no ends intrinsically good or worthwhile in themselves. The Jinist view is that not all things are instrumentally good. There are goods which are final and intrinsic and should be pursued for the goods themselves.
This brings us to the distinction between 'good as a means' and ‘good in itself'. What I wish to say is this : the question what is the good i.e. what things are good comprises two things namely (1) good as a means, and (2) good in itself 8. But the definition that 'Good is an experience in tune with Ahimsa is applicable to both. “Whenever we judge that a thing is good as a means', we judge both that it will have a particular kind of effect, and that effect will be good in itself”. It may be noted that ethical judgements regarding ‘good as a means’, may not be universally true; and many, though generally true at one period, will be generally false at other”19, whereas ethical judgements regarding