Right and the Good in Jaina Ethics

Author(s): Kamalchand Sogani
Publisher: ZZZ Unknown

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stand the test of Ahimsā in the comprehensive sense.
SECTION (3)
(Meta-ethical Trends in Jaina ethics) In Jaina terminology the questions which meta-ethics is concerned will reduce themselves to the following: (i) What is the meaning or definition of the terms of like Subha and Asubha? (ii) What is the nature of judgements in which these terms are used ? (iii) How can such judgements be justified and supported ?
The first question that confronts us is : What is good or Subha ? According to Jaina ethics 'Subha' is an experience in tune with Ahiṁsā, as has been discussed in the section 2. The ingredients of this experience (which is complex but unified) are emotions, and knowledge issuing in end-seeking action. Satisfaction on the fulfilment of ends is the accompaniment of the experience. The implication of the definition of
Subha' or 'good' is that goodness does not belong to things in complete isolation from feeling; a thing is good, because it gives rise to an experience in tune with Ahimsā. Besides, that a thing does this is an objective fact and not an imaginary construction. The question, What is 'right' can be answered, according to the Jaina ethics, by saying that right cannot be separated from the good. Thus, right is that which tends to produce experience in tune with Ahiṁsā.
The above definition of good or Subha presented by the Jaina ethics avoids the two extremes of naturalism and non-naturalism, subjectivism and objectivism which are the meta-ethical trends. Now, when the Jaina ethics says that 'Subha' is an experience in tune with Ahiṁsā, it is accepting the merit of both naturalism and non-naturalism. The statement that Subha is an experience in tune with Ahiṁsā accepts value in the world as related to consciousness and leaves room for 'ought' experience. For example, to say that kindness is an experience in tune with Ahimsa implies that we ought to be kind. Besides, that experience is not of the type "liked by me' and so is not subjetive or reducible to feeling but possesses an objective character, and at the same time this experience is not simple, unanalysable but complex and anaylsable, and therefore
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