Right and the Good in Jaina Ethics

Author(s): Kamalchand Sogani
Publisher: ZZZ Unknown
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RIGHT AND THE GOOD
JAINA ETHICS
IN
By Prof. KAMAL CHAND SOGANI
GORIV la बगबिपावत्यान श्रीमहावीरजी
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UPPIES
Published by : JAINA VIDYĀ SAMSTHĀNA Digambara Jaina Atiśaya Ksetra Sri Mahāvīrajī (Rajasthan)

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RIGHT AND THE GOOD
IN JAINA ETHICS
Lecture to be delivered in the World Philosophy Conference to be held from
December 28, 2000 to January 1, 2001 at Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi)
By Prof. KAMAL CHAND SOGANI Former Professor of Philosophy M.L. Sukhadia University
Udaipur (Rajasthan)
Published by JAINA VIDYĀ SASTHĀNA Digambara Jaina Atiśaya Kșetra Śri Mahāvīrajī (Rajasthan)

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WORLD PHILOSOPHY CONFERENCE
PLATINUM JUBILEE CELEBRATIONS OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL CONGRESS
(DECEMBER 28, 2000 TO JANUARY 1, 2001)
Patron Hon'ble Shri K.R. Narayanan President of the Republic of India
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Hon'ble Shri Ananth Kumar .. 'Union Minister of Culture & Tourism
Co-ordinator & Organising Secretary
Prof. S.R. Bhatt University of Delhi
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Member Secretary Indian Council of Philosophical Research
New Delhi
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RIGHT AND THE GOOD IN JAINA ETHICS
Dr. Kamal Chand Sogani Former Professor of Philosophy
There is no denying the fact that India is a land of spiritualism. The Upanişads, the Gītā, the Buddhist Tripitakas and the Jaina Āgamas - all these regard spiritual realisation as the highest objective of human life. In these works, ethical utterances are intertwined with spiritual expressions. In the present paper, I shall endeavour to reconstruct the Jaina view of ethical philosophy, so that Jaina concepts of right and wrong, good and bad are properly formulated. The fact is that ethics should be confined to the realm of right and wrong, good and bad. The realm beyond this is the realm of metaphysics and mysticism and not of ethics. I shall not, therefore, talk about the supra-ethical character of life, however important it may be from the Jaina point of view. What I intend to discuss here relates to some of the questions that arise in normative ethics and meta- ethics in the context of Jaina ethical views. PRESUPPOSITIONS OF JAINA ETHICS
Before dealing with these questions, let us first deal with the presuppositions which Jaina ethics has made in order to work out its ethical philosophy. (1) The first presupposition refers to the existence of the individual
centres of consciousness which existed in the past, exist at present, and shall exist in future! These are endowed with cognitive, affective and conative tendencies, by virtue of which they see and know, they like pleasure and fear suffering, and they are engaged in beneficial as well as harmful activities.
(2) Secondly, Jaina ethics presupposes that for everything an individual
does, he is responsible (pahu=prabhu)”. No other being can be held responsible for the actions which a person performs. To say that a person is held responsible for an action is to say that he could have done otherwise if he had chosen to do otherwise. Thus the ascription

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of responsibility to man is inconceivable without a free will. If a man is not his own sovereign, he can not be free; therefore he can not be held responsible and also he can not be praised or blamed, punished or rewarded. Frankena rightly remarks: “We must assume that people are normally free to do as they choose. If by nature, they were like ants, bees, or even monkeys, if they had all been thoroughly brain-washed, if they were all neurotically or psychotically compulsive throughout, or if they were all always under a constant dire threat from a totalitarian ruler, then it would be pointless to try to influence their behaviour in the ways that are characteristic of morality. Moral sanctions, internal or external,
could not then be expected to have the desired effects:"4 (3) Thirdly, Jaina ethics assumes that an individual is the doer of
actions, right or wrong, good or bad. That he voluntarily performs actions, follows from the fact of his being a free agent. Again, and as a consequence, he is the enjoyer of the results of those actions.
SECTION (1) (Rightness of action and Jaina ethics) Let us now proceed to deal with the theory of the rightness of action. The equivelant expression in Jaina ethics for the term 'right' and 'good' is 'śubha'. Here the question that confronts us is this : How to determine what is morally right for a certain agent in a certain situation ? Or what is the criterion of the rightness of action? The interrelated question is : what we ought to do in a certain situation ? or how duty is to be determined ? The answer of Jaina ethics is that right, ought and duty can not be separated from the good. In other words, the criterion of what is right, ought and duty is the greater balance of good over bad that is brought into being than any alternative.
Thus Jaina ethics rejects act-deontology (particular actions are intrinsically right or wrong) and rule-deontology (particular rules are intuitively right or wrong). Jaina ethics does not regard certain rules (do not kill, do not steal etc.) as absolutely always right and certin others as

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absolutely always wrong. The conviction of the Jaina ethics is that actions can not be right or wrong in vacuum. They always produce certain effects either good or bad. Thus Jaina ethics does not condemn the action of telling a lie to enemies, robbers, and even to persons who ask questions when they have no right to ask. Under some circumstances it is right to break a promise, or to take something that belongs to another without his permission. Mill rightly remarks, “It is not the fault of any creed but of the complicated nature of human affairs that rules of conduct can not be so framed as to require no exception, and that hardly any kind of action can safely be laid down as either always obligatory or always condemnable”.S
The above discussion takes us to the view that Jaina ethics holds the teleological theory of right. Since teleologists have often been called Utilitarians, We shall be regarding teleological position as ‘utilitarian position’. The question now arises whether Jaina ethics subscribes to act-approach or rule-approach in deciding the rightness or wrongness of actions. The former is called act-utilitarianisn while the latter, ruleutilitarianisn. Do not kill, Do not tell a lie, Do not hoard, Do not steal and Do not commit adultery-all these rules have as their basis the productivity of good consequences in the society. Since rules have utilitarian basis, they must be selected, maintained, revised and replaced on this basis. Once rules are so framed, they are to be followed even if it is known that they do not have the best possible consequences in certain particular cases.
However, Jaina ethics maintains that sometimes it is not the following of the rule that produces maximum balance of good over bad, but its breaking. May be, keeping this in view, Samantabhadra argues that truth is not to be spoken when by so doing the other is entangled in miseries;.6 Svamī Kumar in the Kārttikeyānupreksā disallows the purchase of things at low price in order to maintain the vow of non-stealing?. Though Jaina Ācāryas allow breaking of the moral rules in exceptional circumstances on utilitarian basis, yet they have warned us time and again that breaking of the rule should not be made common, since it may lead to the

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weakening of faith in rules which are in a way the basis of social order. The Nişītha Sūtra is a compendium of exceptions to moral rules. This work has very carefully laid down the principles of breaking the rules. This implies that Jaina ethics does not allow superstitious rule-worship, but at the same time holds that scrupulous conscientious caution is to be exercised in breaking the rules.
Thus rule-utilitarianism like rule-deontologism does not find favour with Jaina ethics. Rules are merely guiding principles in common circumstances, but when the circumstances are exceptional we have not to look to rules for making any moral decision, but to situations and particular actions from the point of view of producing greater balance of good over bad. This goes to show that every time, as the act-utilitarian suggests, we have to calculate anew the effects of each and every action on the general welfare.
The whole discussion brings us to the view that both acts and rules, specific situations and general principles, are to be taken into account for deciding the rightness or wrongness of actions. This may be called modified act-utilitarianism which can not allow a rule to be followed in a particular situation, when, following it is regarded as not to have the best possible consequences. This means that Jaina ethics accepts the possibility that sometimes general moral principles may be inadequate to the compelxities of the situation, and in this case a direct consideration of the particular action without reference to general principles is necessary. Thus according to Jaina ethics acts are logically prior to rules and the rightness of action is situational.
It is of capital importance to note here that according to Jaina ethics, there is no such thing as a moral obligation which is not an obligation to bring about the greatest good. To call an act a duty is dependent on the fact of producing a greater balance of good over bad in the universe than any other alternative. Duty is not self-justifying; it is not an end in itself. “The very nature of duty is to aim beyond itself. There can no more be a duty to act, if there is no good to attain by it, than to think if there is no truth to be won by thinking”. Thus, duty is an extrinsic good,

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good as a means, this does not deprive duty of its importance in ethical life, just as health does not become unimportant by its being extrinsic good. The pursuance of Anuvratas for the householder and the Mahāvratas for the Muni may be regarded as dutiful actions.
Here it may be said that rightness or wrongness of an action does not depend upon the goodness or badness of consequences, but upon the motive or motives from which it is done. We can find references in Jaina ethical texts wherein good motives are given prime importance for the performance of action producing good consequences. So long as good motives issue in right action productive of good consequences, there is nothing wrong in accepting the dependence of rightness of action on good motive. Jaina ethics seems to tie good motives with the rightness of actions producing good consequences. Its conviction is that if there is good motive like kindness or charitable disposition, right actions are bound to occur. At one stage in man's moral evolution it may be possible; at ordinary man's level this may not happen. Since Jaina ethics, it seems to me, could not evenly face the problem arising from the fact that sometimes good dispositions are not able to produce right actions issuing in good consequences, it made rightness of action productive of good identical with good motive. But the point is that such actions are not so blameworthy as they would have been if they had been done from bad motives. No doubt the agent deserves praise for acting as he did, but the action is wrong.
Jaina ethics seems to confuse that to call an action morally praiseworthy is the same thing as to say that it is right, and to call it morally blameworthy is the same thing as to say that it is wrong. In point of fact these two judgements are not identical. It so often happens that a man may act wrongly from a good motive, i.e. conscientiousness may lead to fanatical cruelty, mistaken asceticism etc. and he may act rightly from a bad motive, for instance, feeling of revenge may be able to check certain criminal actions. However, in the former case we regard the actions as wrong, whereas in the latter we regard them as right. This means that the consideration of motives does not make any difference to

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the rightness or wrongness of actions. In other words, goodness or badness of disposition is to be distinguished from the rightness or wrongness of conduct. Thus if a right action is done from a good motive and the same action is done from a bad motive, though the goodness of the consequences will be the same, yet the presence of the good motive will mean the presence of an additional good in the one case which is absent in the otherlo.
In conslusion, we may say that according to Jaina ethics the criterion of right or wrong is the goodness or badness of consequences. It rejects the view that certain rules ought absolutely always to be followed, whatever the consequences may be. No action is to be unconditionally done or avoided. No action can be our duty irrespective of the goodness of the consequences. The question whether an action is right or wrong does not depend on motive, and the presence of motive whether good or bad constitutes an additional factor in the rightness or wrongness of actions.
SECTION (2)
(Good and the good in Jaina ethics) We have said above that according to Jaina ethics right, ought and duty can not be separated from the good. Now the question that confronts us is : what is intrinsically desirable, good or worthwhile in life according to Jaina ethics. What intrinisic values are to be pursued according to it ? The answer that may be given is this : What is intrinsically good and valuable or what ought to be chosen for its own sake is the achievement of 'Ahimsā of all living beings', the attainment of knowledge etc. But the basic question that remains to be discussed is the definition of good or Subha. Simple enumeration can not lead us anywhere. The question what is good is different from the question, as Moore says, what is the good ? i.e. what things are good ? In order to understand the good' or the Subha’ the first step is to understand, what is good or what is Subha?

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What, then, is good or śubha ? How is śubha or good to be defined ? According to the Jinist, Subha is an experience in tune with Ahiṁsā. The experience in tune with Ahimsā is a complex phenomenon. The ingredients of this experience are analysable into knowing, affecting and active elements. Subha Anubhava is constituted by these elements. It is called śubha Cāritra in Jaina ethics. Subha Cāritra without Ahimsā is inconceivable. Thus good or Subha, according to the Jinist, is definable, since the experience which it entails is complex, therefore, analysable into its constituents. The experience of good is not a simple unanalysable experience. Had it been so, it would have been indefinable.
We can better understand the nature and importance of the question, 'What is good or śubha in the realm, of ethics, when we find that it is like the quesiton,' What is Dravya (substance) in the realm of metaphysics ? The definition of Dravya given by the Jaina Ācāryas is : Dravya is that which is Sat (being). Here being' is used in a comprehensive sense and not in any particular sense. But no particular thing can be apart from being'. Logically speaking, we may say that 'being' is the highest genus, whereas particulars are its species and the relation between the two is of identity in - difference. Similarly, when I say that śubha is an experience in tune with Ahiṁsā', I am using the term 'Ahimsa' in the comprehensive sense and not in a particular sense. But no particular śubha can be separated from Ahiṁsā and Ahiṁsā manifests itself in all particular Subhas. In a logical sense it can be said that. Ahimsā is the highest genus and partcular ahiṁsās are its species, and the relation between generic Ahiṁsā and particular Ahiṁsā is a relation of identity in-differnece. As for example, in non-killing and non-exploitation, though the identical element of Ahimsā is present, yet the two are different. So the above is the most general deifinition of śubha just like the definition of Dravya. It may be noted that we can understand being' only through the particulars, similarly, the understainding of general Ahìṁsā is possible only through the particular examples of Ahimsā, e.g. non-killing, non-exploitation, non-enmity, non-cruelty etc.

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Thus the definition of Subha as the experience in tune with Ahimsa is the most general definition like the definition of Dravya as that what is Sat. The former can be thought of evaluatively, just as the latter can be thought of factually i.e. value neutrally.
It is alright that good is definable as the experience in tune with Ahimsa, but it may be asked: what is Ahimsa? Now the question, what is Ahimsa in the value-world is like the question what is Sat in the factual world? Just as Sat is understandable through the particular examples of things like pen, table, book etc., so also Ahimsa is understandable through the particular examples of Ahimsa, like nonkilling, non-exploitation, non-enmity, non-cruelty etc. When it is so easily understandable through examples, the craving for the definition of Ahimsa is pedantry serving no purpose. Ahimsa can be taught by examples, just as in arithmetic 2+2 = 4 can be taught to a child with the help of an example like two balls + two balls = 4.balls and gradually the child learns to do big sums without examples. In the same way Ahimsa can be understood gradually. The argument of understandability can not be adduced in the case of Subha without definition. For understanding Śubha, definition is a necessity, but a similar necessity does not exist for Ahimsa in view of the above-mentioned facts..
It may be noted that the Puruṣārthasidhyupāya defines Ahimsa by saying that the non-emergence of attachment etc. on the surface of self is Ahimsa11. This definition of Ahimsa has its own significance but this is not the type of definition required by the socio-ethical consciousness of mankind. To adopt the above definition of Ahimsa is tantamount to adopting the realm of mysticism, which does not concern us here. Our enquiry in ethics is concerned with the pursuit of Subha (good) and avoidance of Asubha (bad).
Now it may be asked how does Jaina ethics arrive at Ahimsa in defining 'Śubha'. What is its meaning?
Presuppositions of Ahimsā : (1) Ahimsa presupposes, first, a world of living beings, both human and non-human, along with the fact that each of them is constantly affecting the other and is being affected by the

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other either evenly or unevenly. Secondly, Ahiṁsā presumes that life is dear to all!2 and for all living beings pain is disturbance, fearful and unpleasant !3. This is also expressed by saying that just as pain is unpleasant for oneself, so also it is unpleasant for all living beings 14. Thus without these two presuppositions the talk of Ahimsā is inconceivable.
But these two presuppositions are psychological in nature and the statement of Ahimsā is evaluative in nature. The former are factual or descriptive assertions, while the latter is a normative or a value-assertion. Does this mean that value-assertions can be derived from factual assertions, ethical conclusions can be drawn from non-ethical premises, 'ought' can be derived from ‘is'? I simply wish to say that for the Jinist Ahimsā is not a logical deduction from the above-mentioned presuppositions : it is an independent occurring in the context of the stated presuppositions. Had it been a deduction like the angles of a triangle as equal to two right angles, the whole of mankind would have understood Ahimsā immediately. Thus though the Jinist maintains the autonomy of normative ethical discourse by maintaining the distinction between facts and values, yet it holds that there is some connection between fact and value. Though the two, fact and value are no doubt distinct, yet they are not unrelated to each other. The relation is not of entailment but is empirical. 'Life is dear to all' does not entail ‘we ought not to kill life' but at the same time it can not be said that there is no connection between the two. The connection is empirical, not logical.
Meaning of Ahiṁsā : (1) Comprehensive meaning of Ahiṁsā : The oldest Jaina Āgama Āyāro (Ācārānga) remarkably pronounces that none of the living beings ought to be killed, ought to be ordered, ought to be enslaved, ought to be distressed and ought to be put to unrest's. It is a unique and unparalleled statement in the entire Jinist literature. I need not say that it basically embraces all the aspects of social experience in its normative perspective. The political organisation, the economic orientation and the institutional set up can easily derive inspiration from this ethịcally significant statement. Owing to the all-inclusive nature of

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Ahimsā the Puruşārthasiddhupāya seeks to explain falsehood-truth, stealing-non-stealing, unchastity-chastity, possesion-non-possession etc as forms of Hiṁsā-Ahimsāl6. This way of expression regards Ahiṁsā as the essence of all virtues, thus giving supreme status to Ahimsā it deserves.
(2) Narrow meaning of Ahiṁsā : The above meaning of Āyāro and the Puruşārthasiddhupāya is representative of the extent which Ahiṁsā is supposed to include, although most of the Jaina texts seem to include in Ahiṁsā only non-killing!7. It should be borne in mind that if Ahimsa is understood only in the sense of non-killing, it is narrow and socially not of wide significance. In fact, killing is the last limit of Hirsā and not the only expression of Himsā. There are hundreds of expressions of Hiṁsā and Ahimsā below that last limit.
After defining Subha or good in terms of Ahimsā in the comprehensive sense, we now propose to discuss, what is the good or the Šubha according to the Jinist? In other words, the question now confronts us is : What kinds of things are intrinsically good according to the Jinist. This means that there are ends which are to be desired for their own sake. The Jinist does not subscribe to the view recognised by Dewey that there are no ends intrinsically good or worthwhile in themselves. The Jinist view is that not all things are instrumentally good. There are goods which are final and intrinsic and should be pursued for the goods themselves.
This brings us to the distinction between 'good as a means' and ‘good in itself'. What I wish to say is this : the question what is the good i.e. what things are good comprises two things namely (1) good as a means, and (2) good in itself 8. But the definition that 'Good is an experience in tune with Ahimsa is applicable to both. “Whenever we judge that a thing is good as a means', we judge both that it will have a particular kind of effect, and that effect will be good in itself”. It may be noted that ethical judgements regarding ‘good as a means’, may not be universally true; and many, though generally true at one period, will be generally false at other”19, whereas ethical judgements regarding

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'good in itself ' are universally true. In both these kinds of good, the criterion of good as Ahiṁsā is to be adhered to. I may say in passing that the principle that the end justifies the means' need not be rejected as immoral if the above definition of good is accepted. For our present purpose. the good means good in itself or the things which are intrinsically good.
Now the answer to the question, what is the good, i.e. what kinds of things are intrinsically good according to the Jinist, is as follows:
1. The first thing which is the good for the Jinist is the Ahimsā of all living beings20. The Jinist classifies living beings (Jīvas) into five kinds, one-sensed to five-sensed Jivas. The Jinist uses this classification as the measurement of the degree of Ahiṁsā. The classification of Jīvas is in the ascending order of the importance of Jīvas owing to the fact of having evolved consciousness known from the number of senses manifested. As for example two-sensed Jīvas are more evolved than the one-sensed Jīvas, five-sensed Jīvas are more evolved than the one, two, three, and four-sensed Jīvas. Thus Ahiṁsā will be directly proportionate to the Ahimsā of the Jīvas classified. The good ‘Ahiṁsā of all living beings' means the Ahimsā of these living beings. Though this measurement of Ahiṁsā emphasizes the number of senses for calculating Ahimsā, yet in certain situatations Ahiṁsā can not always be commensurate with the number of senses affected.
The Puruşārthasiddhyupāya seems to be aware of this fact. Therefore, it says, though Himsā may be committed by one yet there may be many who will have to suffer the consequences; it may be commited by many, the consequences may be suffered by one. Besides, in spite of the two persons following the same course of Himsā, divergence at the time of fruition may be exhibited on account of the differences in their states of mind. Moreover, he who does not explicitly commit Hiṁsā, may also reap the fruits of Himsā because of his continual inclination towards indulging in Hissa; and he who apparently employs himself in the acts of Hissā may not be liable to the fruits of Hiṁsā. Thus we may conclude that in judging the acts of Hiṁsā and Ahimsā, it is the internal state of
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mind that counts. This does not mean that the outward commission of Hiṁsā has no relevance. The importance of the internal state of mind should not be over-emphasized. The Purusārthasiddhyupāya tells us that he who exclusively emphasizes the internal aspect at the expense of the external forgets the significance of outward behavioural.
2. The second thing which is the good or good in itself according to the Jinist is the virtuous disposition and action and the appreciation for the virtuous. The virtuous are those who have disposition not to act unjustly22, who have disposition to bestow fearlessness on the fearful-3, to treat the distressed, the thirsty and hungry with kindness24, to act charitably towards the needy25. Besides, the virutous practise forgiveness26, straightforwardness27, humbleness28, egolessness29, nonacquisitiveness30, self-control etc. Such persons should be treated respectfully, so much so that they may not feel hurt in society3.
3. The third thing which the Jinist may call the good is knowledge. In other words, the experience of knowledge in tune with Ahimsa is the good. It is significant to acquire and give to others knowledge of facts and values. It may be noted that since knowledge is liable to be misused the Puruşārthasiddhupāya advises us to acquire knowledge only after having cultivated right attitude 32 and right attitude is the Ahiṁsā attitude. In a similar vein the Samaņasuttaṁ tells us that vast knowledge without right attitude is of no use.
According to the Jinist, three things are the good i.e. intrinsically good-Ahimsā of all living beings, virtuous disposition and action and the appreciation of the virtuous and knowledge. There may be other things which are good, but they can, on analysis, be shown to be the combination of two or more of the above goods. For example, Vatsalya (mutual love), which is the good, is a combination of virtuous disposition with knowledge and the emotion of love. Aesthetic enjoyment which is again the good is a combination of happiness with the knowlede of the art object. Thus Jaina ethics upholds the doctrine of value pluralism; and this theory of the good or intrinsic goodness may be styled Ahiṁsāutilitarianism, by which all the goods represented by Jaina ethics can
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stand the test of Ahimsā in the comprehensive sense.
SECTION (3)
(Meta-ethical Trends in Jaina ethics) In Jaina terminology the questions which meta-ethics is concerned will reduce themselves to the following: (i) What is the meaning or definition of the terms of like Subha and Asubha? (ii) What is the nature of judgements in which these terms are used ? (iii) How can such judgements be justified and supported ?
The first question that confronts us is : What is good or Subha ? According to Jaina ethics 'Subha' is an experience in tune with Ahiṁsā, as has been discussed in the section 2. The ingredients of this experience (which is complex but unified) are emotions, and knowledge issuing in end-seeking action. Satisfaction on the fulfilment of ends is the accompaniment of the experience. The implication of the definition of
Subha' or 'good' is that goodness does not belong to things in complete isolation from feeling; a thing is good, because it gives rise to an experience in tune with Ahimsā. Besides, that a thing does this is an objective fact and not an imaginary construction. The question, What is 'right' can be answered, according to the Jaina ethics, by saying that right cannot be separated from the good. Thus, right is that which tends to produce experience in tune with Ahiṁsā.
The above definition of good or Subha presented by the Jaina ethics avoids the two extremes of naturalism and non-naturalism, subjectivism and objectivism which are the meta-ethical trends. Now, when the Jaina ethics says that 'Subha' is an experience in tune with Ahiṁsā, it is accepting the merit of both naturalism and non-naturalism. The statement that Subha is an experience in tune with Ahiṁsā accepts value in the world as related to consciousness and leaves room for 'ought' experience. For example, to say that kindness is an experience in tune with Ahimsa implies that we ought to be kind. Besides, that experience is not of the type "liked by me' and so is not subjetive or reducible to feeling but possesses an objective character, and at the same time this experience is not simple, unanalysable but complex and anaylsable, and therefore
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definable as has been explained above .. The second question of meta-ethics that draws our attention is : What is the nature of ethical judgements according to the Jaina ethics ? The question under discussion reduces itself to this. Are ethical judgements expressive of any cognitive content in the sense that they may be asserted true or false ? Or do they simply express emotions, feelings, etc ? When we say that Hiṁsā is evil, are we making a true or false assertion or are we experiencing simply a feeling ? Or are we doing both ? According to the cognitivists, the ethical judgement, 'Hiṁsā is evil is capable of being objectively true and thus moral knowledge is objective, whereas the non-cognitivists deny both the objectivity of assertion and knowledge inasmuch as, according to them, ethical judgements are identified with feeling, emotions etc. Here the position taken by the Jaina ethics seems to me to be this that though the statement, 'Himsā' is evil'is objectively true, yet it cannot be divested of the feeling element involved in experiencing the truth of the statement. In moral life knowledge and feeling can not be separated. By implication we can derive from the Tattvārthasūtra that the path of goodness can be traversed through knowledge (Jnana) and feeling and activity. Thus the conviction of the Jaina ethics is that the knowledge of good and right is tied up with our feelings and that in their absence we are ethically blind. In fact, our feelings and knowledge are so interwoven that we have never a state of mind in which both are not present in some degree. so the claims of cognitivists and non-cognitivists are onesided and antagonistic to the verdict of experience. Blanshard33 rightly remarks, “Nature may spread before us the richest possible banquet of good things, but if we can look at them only with the eye of reason, we shall care for none of these things; they will be alike insipid. There would be no knowledge of good and evil in a world of mere knowers, for where there is no feeling, good and evil would be unrecognisable". Again ‘a life that directs itself by feeling even of the most exalted kind will be like a ship without a rudder'. Thus the nature of ethical judgement according to the Jaina ethics is cognitive-affective. “The achievement of good is a joint product
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of our power to know and our power to feel"34.
The third question in meta-ethics is to ask how our ethical judgements can be justified. That the ethical judgements are objectively true need not imply that their justification can be sought in the same manner as the justification of factual judgements of ordinary and scientific nature. The reason for this is that value can not be derived from fact, ought from is. In factual judgements our expressons are value-neutral, but in ethical judgements we can not be indifferent to their being sought by ourselves or by others. That is why derivation of ought from is, value from fact is unjustifiable. The value judgements, according to Jaina ethics, are selfevident and can only be experienced directly. Thus they are selfjustifying. The conviction of the Jaina ethics is that no argument can prove that 'Hiṁsā' is bad' and 'Ahimsā is good'. What is intrinsically good or bad can be experienced directly or immediately. The justification of right can be sought from the fact of its producing what is intrinsically good, i.e. from the fact of its producing experience in tune with Ahimsā.
· I am grateful to professor S.R. Bhatt (Co-ordinator and Organising Secretary) for inviting me to deliver the endowment lecture entitled
Jaina' in the Platinum Jubliee session of the Indian Philosophical Congress.
REFERENCES
1. Kundakunda, Pañcāstikāya, 27, 30 2. Ibid. 122 3. Ibid. 27 4. Frankena, Ethics, P.59 5. Mill, Utilitarianism, Chapter II, P.23 6. Samantabhadra, Ratnakaranda srāvakācāra, 55 7. Svami Kumar, Kārttikeyānupreksā, 335 8. Blanshard, B, Reason and Goodness, P.332 9. Moore, Ethics, P.116 10. Moore, Ethics, P.115 11. Amrtacandra, Purusārthasiddhupāya, 44 12. Āyāro, 2.3.64 13. Ibid. 1.6.122
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14. Samaņasuttam, 150 15. Āyāro, 4.1.1 16. Amrtacandra, Purusārthasiddhupāya, 42 17. Pujyapäda, Sarvärthasiddhi, VII. 13 18. Moore, Principia Ethica, P.22 19. Ibid . 20. Samantabhadra, Svayambhūstotra, 119 21. Amrtacandra, Puruşārthasiddhupāya, 50 22. Vattakera, Mülācāra, 10/15 23. Uttarādhyayana, 18/11 24. Kundakunda, Pañcāstikāya, 137 25. Pujyapāda, Sarväthasiddhi, VII.11 26. Samanasuttam, 84 27. Ibid 28. Ibid 29. Ibid 30. Ayāro 1.2.117 31. Pūjyapāda, Sarvārthasiddhi, VII.11 32. Amrtacandra, Puruşārthasiddhupāya, 33 33. Blanshard. B, Reason and Goodness, P.68 34. Ibid. P. 68
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