Right and the Good in Jaina Ethics

Author(s): Kamalchand Sogani
Publisher: ZZZ Unknown

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of our power to know and our power to feel"34.
The third question in meta-ethics is to ask how our ethical judgements can be justified. That the ethical judgements are objectively true need not imply that their justification can be sought in the same manner as the justification of factual judgements of ordinary and scientific nature. The reason for this is that value can not be derived from fact, ought from is. In factual judgements our expressons are value-neutral, but in ethical judgements we can not be indifferent to their being sought by ourselves or by others. That is why derivation of ought from is, value from fact is unjustifiable. The value judgements, according to Jaina ethics, are selfevident and can only be experienced directly. Thus they are selfjustifying. The conviction of the Jaina ethics is that no argument can prove that 'Hiṁsā' is bad' and 'Ahimsā is good'. What is intrinsically good or bad can be experienced directly or immediately. The justification of right can be sought from the fact of its producing what is intrinsically good, i.e. from the fact of its producing experience in tune with Ahimsā.
· I am grateful to professor S.R. Bhatt (Co-ordinator and Organising Secretary) for inviting me to deliver the endowment lecture entitled
Jaina' in the Platinum Jubliee session of the Indian Philosophical Congress.
REFERENCES
1. Kundakunda, Pañcāstikāya, 27, 30 2. Ibid. 122 3. Ibid. 27 4. Frankena, Ethics, P.59 5. Mill, Utilitarianism, Chapter II, P.23 6. Samantabhadra, Ratnakaranda srāvakācāra, 55 7. Svami Kumar, Kārttikeyānupreksā, 335 8. Blanshard, B, Reason and Goodness, P.332 9. Moore, Ethics, P.116 10. Moore, Ethics, P.115 11. Amrtacandra, Purusārthasiddhupāya, 44 12. Āyāro, 2.3.64 13. Ibid. 1.6.122
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