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THE TATTVAS
3
at a point in the life-story of nature when they were not. This is a deathblow to the idea of a beginning, and its force will be felt by any one who seriously puts himself the question: how can a simple (noncompound) substance be brought into existence? It should be remembered that a simple substance, or reality, differs from a compounded effect of simple elements in so far as it is not the product of two or more substances, but is an unanalysable, unbreakable, indestructible thing in itself. Creation of these simple realities from pure nothing is out of the question, because nothing is devoid of all qualities, including existence and substantiality. If any one still wishes to adhere to the notion of a creation of all things from naught, let him put to himself the question, how can the different elements possibly owe their existence to one source? This would convince him that nothing can never be turned into a concrete, substantial 'something' by means of any process whatsoever.
The conclusion we arrive at, then, is that the idea of a beginning of the elements is not entertainable in philosophy. Now, since there are no air-tight compartments to keep these elements separate from each other, and since the world-process* is the result of the interaction and
* Theology, no doubt, holds that the world-process is maintained by the word of its God without whose command nothing whatsoever can ever take place in the universe, but then theology has no reply to give to the question : why should things be endowed with different attributes if they can function only in obedience to the word of a god! If we do not deceive ourselves with false conclusions, we shall observe that different sub stances exercise different functions, so that none of them can perform the function or another. If it were otherwise, water might be imagined to perform the function of fire. fire of air, air of consciousness, and so forth. But the supposition is so highly absurd that no sane mind has ever considered it possible. We must, then, assume that each substance has its own special function which cannot be performed by anything else. But what is function, if not the particular mode of existence of a substance? This amounts to saying that no substance can exist if its function be annihilated even for a moment, o.g., fire will cease to be fire the moment it ceases to perform its specific function of burning and production of heat. Now, the supposition that the substances of nature stand in need of the command of a god to perform their functions is possible only on the assumption that they do not function except when ordered to do so by hitn. But this is a clear case of impossibility, for a substance cannot both exist and not exist at the same time, its function being only the particular mode or manner of its existence. It follows, therefore, that no one can possibly interfere with the function of existing substances.
