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PIOTR BALCEROWICZ
On subsequent pages I shall try to establish the chronology of the Nyayavatara and its correlation to other, mostly Buddhist, works.
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There is a variance of opinions regarding the date of Siddhasena as the author of the Nyayavatara and the date of the Nyäyävatära, and these fall in four groups: (1) Siddhasena was pre-Dinnagan', (2) Siddhasena flourished soon after Dinnaga and before Dharmakirti", (3) Siddhasena belongs to a post-Dharmakirtian tradition', whereas (4) some hold that his date is still an open question.
The first to notice some chronological dependence of NA was JACOBI (1926: iii), who observed that 'To about the same time [i.c. Saka-year 598 677 C.E.-P.B.] belongs Siddhasenadiväkara whom Haribhadra quotes; for he uses, no doubt Dharmakirti', though he does not name him.' There are two points, according to him, that justify such a conclusion: (1) Siddhasena (NA.5) applies the term abhränta and Dharmakirti was the first to use it in his definition of pratyaksa, thus improving upon Dinnaga's definition-to both pratyakṣa and anumana; (2) Siddhasena (NA.11") 'extends the distinction of svärtha and parartha, which properly applies to anumana only, to pratyaksa also, ibidem 12 f. Apparently, he thought to improve on Dharmakirti by a wholesome generalisation of nice distinctions!" (JACOBI (1926: iii, n. 1)). VAIDYA (1928: xviii-xx) elaborates upon JACOBI's laconic remarks. (3) He further brings up one more important point:
...verses 6 and 7 above of Nyäyävatära unmistakably presuppose Dharmakirti and the later phase of the Yogācāra school, as, without them, it is difficult for us to explain why Siddhasena Diväkara is required to these views and emphatically declare:
सकलप्रतिभासस्य भ्रान्तत्वासिद्धितः स्फुटम् ।
प्रमाणं स्वान्यनिश्चायि द्वयसिद्धौ प्रसिध्यति ॥ ७ ॥ (p. xx).
3E.g. SUKHLAL (1945/a) and SUKHLAL (1945/b), H. R. Kapadia (AJP., 'Introduction', Vol. II, pp. 98 ff.), KRAUSE (1948), DAVE (1962), SUKHLAL-DOSHI (1928), WILLIAMS (1963: 19), MATILAL (1985: 241).
*E.g. Malvania (NASV., 'Introduction', pp. 141 f.) and QVARNSTRÖM (1999: 178). E.g. JACOBI (1926), VAIDYA (1928), MUKTHAR (1948), V.P. Johrapurkar ("Introduction' to VTP., pp. 41 ff.).
*UPADHYE (1971: Xxxv).
'PS.1.C.k3c-d: pratyakşam kalpanapodham nama-jäty-ady-asamyuktam, and NB.1.4: tatra pratyakşam kalpanapodham abhräntam, respectively.
Not NA.12, as VAIDYA (1928: xviii, line 16) has it.
ON THE DATE OF THE NYAYAVATARA
On my part, I would only add that also NA.31 (pramātā sványa-nirbhasi) must have been inspired by similar thoughts as NA.7.
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The first argument is sound. Admittedly, the idea of abhrāntatva of perception was latent in pre-Dharmakirti's literature, but Dharmakirti was the first to use the term. If we were to take this latency of abhräntatva as a serious counter
9 The term bhränta (bhrānti) itself is attested in the pre-Dharmakirtian literature, for instance in MAVBh.1.4; SacAcBh.(2).2 and in several places of MSA. and Comm. thereon (11.13a, 11.15, 11.17, 11.24-26, Comm. ad 10.2 and ad 11.27). In all such passages, however, the term bhränti does not occur in the context of pramana, still less of valid perception (pratyaksa), in the first place. The term refers either to a general error based on the perceiving of subject-object duality in the world (dvaya-bhränti), and is synonymous to māyā (in MSA.), or to the nature of the cognised object (MAVBh.1.4). The latter rests on a rather subtle difference: erroneous is not the cognition as such (the emphasis on the inner, cognitive aspect, viz. erroneous correspondence of an act of cognition), but the way an object is constituted in the cognition (the emphasis on the 'outer', 'objective' side). In none of these texts where we come across the term bhränti is the idea of cognitively valid procedures (pramāna) discussed; at the most, it points to an antithesis of a general, soteriologically relevant outlook of a person, viz. citta-bhränti / bhrântam cittam / kşipta-cittam (SacAcBh.(2).2). This is confirmed by the application of the past passive participle to people MSA.11.18 (loko hy abhräntaḥ), as loci of bhränta-citta. To sum up, none of the occurrences of the term (a)bhränta in Yogacara works seems to have been an inspiration for Siddhasena.
10 An interpretation of non-erroneousness (abhräntatva) is offered by Dharmottara in NBT.3.2: abhrāntam artha-kriya-kşame vastu-rüpe 'viparyastam ucyate. artha-kriyakşamam ca vastu-rupam sanniveśöpädhi-varṇatmakam. tatra yan na bhrāmyati tad abhräntam. Thus, there are two pivotal aspects of abhräntatva, the lack of contrariety (aviparyastatva) and its reference to a thing capable of efficient action (artha-kriyakama-vastu). The first element, viz. the lack of contrariety, or correspondence to facts, may be taken to have been preconceived in the idea of avyabhicäritva in the nonBuddhist literature as early as NS.1.1.4 (indriyártha-sannikarşôtpannam jñānam avyapadesyam avyabhicäri vyavasayatmakam pratyakşam) and NBh. ad loc. (vad atasmin tad iti tad vyabhicari, yat tu tasmin tad iti tad avyabhicäri pratyakşam iti). This tendency can be also observed in Jaina sources, e.g. in TBh.1.32 (p. 30.6, p. 31.1-2): jñāna-viparyayo jñānam iti... mithya-darśana-parigrahad viparita-grähakatvam eteşām (viparyayānām), tasmäd ajñänäni bhavanti. See also PVin.1(1).4 (p. 40, n. 1). However, the second element artha-kriya-samartha, the capability to execute efficient action, is Dharmakirti's innovation, see PV.1.3: pramāṇam avisaṁvādi jñānam arthakriya-sthitiḥ/ avisamvadanam fäbde 'py abhipraya-nivedanät II, as well as PV.2.3: artha-kriya-samartham yat tad atra paramartha-sat / anyat samveti-sat proktam te svasamanya-lakṣaṇe II. Cf. also HATTORI (1968: 14): The concept of "artha-kriya" is
