On The Date Of The Nnyayavatara

Author(s): Piotr Balcerowicz
Publisher: Piotr Balcerowicz

Page 12

PIOTR BALCEROWICZ
Indeed, also Śankarasvamin has dṛṣṭanta-dosa twice, but in a slightly different context, viz. that of refutation. Generally, when he discusses fallacious examples, he uses the standard term drsfântábhasa, e.g. NP.3.3: drsfântâbhaso dvividhaḥ: sadharmyeṇa vaidharmyena ca // The only two occurences of dratanta-dosa are found in NP.(2).6,756
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Conspicuously, drstânta-dosa occurs as exemplification of disanani, in the series of sadhana-dosa, paksa-dosa, hetu-dosa and drstânia-dosa." Another occurrence of dosa (however, pratijña-dosa, not dṛṣṭánta-dosa) in NP. is attested in the concluding lines of NP.(2).3.1, that summarise the discussion on paksabhäsa". Also here, the term dosa has a more general meaning than the technical term äbhāsa, and the peculiarity of the usage of pratijña-dosa is confirmed by the closing uktāḥ paksabhäsäḥ. The usage of dosa in NP. confirms the fact that in works preceding Dinnaga, Dharmakirti or Sankarasvamin-e.g. in NS., VS., NBh., PBh., etc.-dosa is employed to denote general defects and is not used specifically as a terminus technicus in the sense of abhāsa.
[16] There is a structural similarity to be observed: both Siddhasena (NA.24) and Dharmakirti (NB.(2).3.122-3) explicitly define fallacious examples by referring to the definition of a correct hetu. Accordingly, NB.3.122 recapitulates the definition of correct hetu as well as conditions of its validity. The successive statement of NB.3.123 (etenaiva distanta-dosa api nirasta bhavanti; vide supra p. 37) shows that fallacious examples are refuted by referring to the correct definition of heru, and all fallacies of the example share the same characteristic. Similarly, Siddhasena relates the deficiency of drṣtântâbhāsas to deficient logical reasons and, with apalakṣaṇahetütthäḥ, he expresses the idea known from the work of Dharmakirti.
*(6) sādhana-doṣôdbhāvanāni düṣaṇāni // sädhana-doṣo nyūnatvam. pakṣa-doṣaḥ pratyakṣadi-viruddhatvam, hetu-doso 'siddhânaikantika-viruddhatvam. drstanta-dosaḥ sadhana-dharmâdy-asiddhatvam. tasyódbhavanam präśnika-pratyayanam düşaṇam (7) abhūta-sädhana-doṣódbhāvanāni düşaṇābhäsäni ll sampūrṇe sädhane nyūnatvavacanam, aduşta-pakse paksa-dosa-vacanam. siddha-hetuke 'siddha-hetukam vacanam. ekanta-hetuke 'nekânia-hetukam vacanam. aviruddha-hetuke viruddha-hetukam vacanam. aduşta-dṛṣṭante duşta-dṛstânta-dosa-vacanam. etāni düşaṇābhāsāni, na hy ebhiḥ para-pakso düşyate, niravadyatvät tasya Ility uparamyate II.
57 NP.6: sädhana-doşódbhāvanāni düşaṇāni II sädhana-doşo nyūnatvam. paksadosaḥ pratyaksádi-viruddhatvam. hetu-doso 'siddhanaikantika-viruddhatvam. drstantadosah sadhana-dharmády-asiddhatvam. tasyódbhavanaṁ präśnika-pratyayanam düşaṇam II.
58 eşam vacanani dharma-svarupa-niräkaraṇa-mukhena pratipadan asambhavataḥ sadhana-vaiphalyatas céti pratijñā-doṣaḥ II uktäḥ paksabhäsäḥ //
ON THE DATE OF THE NYAYAVATARA
[17] Strangely, in NA.24-25 Siddhasena refers to some tradition by nyaya-vidiritäh as regards the classification of fallacious examples. However, there seems to have been no earlier (or contemporary) Jaina source he could have referred to. Thus, in default of any extant evidence attesting to a Jaina tradition which offered a typology of fallacious examples, one is prone to assume-unless we find any indication to the contrary-that, apparently, he must have referred to a general Indian tradition, where we do find such a typology of sädharmya- and vaidharmyadrstântábhāsas.
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Besides, he also seems to have taken it for granted that the reader/hearer could easily determine what is meant by sadhyadi-vikaladayah in NA.24. This task would naturally be quite easy for anyone who was acquainted with NB.(2).3.124-125. At the same time, however, his elliptical formulation sädhyâdi-vikaladayaḥ was, polemically as it were, unequivocal enough to rule out the three remaining varieties, viz. (A7) ananvaya, (A8) apradarsitánvaya and (A9) viparitânvaya, formulated by Dharmakirti (NB.(2).3.126-127), which could by no means have been hinted at by the formulations of NA.24.
Similarly, the sixfold classification of dissimilar drṣtäntäbhāsas systematised in NA.25 (sädhya-sadhana-yugmānām anivṛtteś ca samsayat) closely corresponds to the first six fallacious examples of NB.(2).3.129-132: (VI) sädhyavyatirekin, (V2) sädhanavyatirekin, (V3) sadhya-sädhanâvyatirekin, (V4) sandigdha-sädhyavyatireka, (V5) sandigdha-sadhana-vyatireka, (V6) sandigdha-sädhya-sädhanavyatireka. Seemingly, NA. and NB. are at variance as regards terminology, for Siddhasena's formulation: sädhya-sadhana-yugmānām anivṛtteś ca samsayat, differs from Dharmakirti's (VI)-(V6). In my opinion, however, anivṛttes and samsayat of NA.25 indicate rather plainly -vyävrtta and sandigdha- as the last and first elements of the compounds (V1)-(V3) and (V4)-(V6), respectively. Optionally, we could have (VI) sädhyânivṛtta, (V2) sadhananivṛtta, (V3) sadhya-sadhananivrtta, (V4) samsayita-sädhya, (VS) samsayita-sadhana, (V6) samsayita-sadhya-sadhana, which is not different at all from the idea expressed in NB.(2).3.129-132.59
59 True, theoretically speaking, one could also interpret NA.25 to enforce the acceptance of only (1) sädhyavyatirekin, (2) sädhanavyatirekin, (3) sädhyasadhanavyatirekin-to use Dharmakirti's terminology-and only one or more varieties out of (4) sandigdha-sädhya-vyatireka, (5) sandigdha-sadhana-vyatireka, (6) sandigdha-sädhya-sädhana-vyatireka, but not necessarily all of them. While anivrtteḥ is unquestionably construed with sadhya-sadhana-yugmänäm, the expression samsayar might be conjectured to be taken separately, without any dependence on all elements of sädhya-sädhana-yugmānām. In this respect, attention should be drawn to an instance of different conceivable ways of construing an aphorism of NA. by