On The Date Of The Nnyayavatara

Author(s): Piotr Balcerowicz
Publisher: Piotr Balcerowicz
Catalog link: https://jainqq.org/explore/269201/1

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On the Date of the Nyāyāvatāra
PIOTR BALCEROWICZ
The Nyayavatara, a work in thirty-two verses-and hence also called Dvatrimusika--ascribed by tradition to Siddhasena Divakara, is deemed to open a new era in the history of Jaina epistemology. It is mostly in the realm of Jaina epistemic pursuits that the Dvātrinsika might claim the status of an innovative or prototypical work. When we, however, consider the development of logic and epistemology in India on a larger scale, the work seems to lose its flavour of originality and novelty.
The problem of the exact dating of the Nyāyavataral should be solved independently, irrespective of whether the work can be accurately ascribed to a Siddhasona (Divakara?), the celebrated author of a series of Dvåtrinskas, to a Siddhasena (Divakara?), the author of the Sanmati-tarka-prakarana or to some other Siddhasena (?). Just to mention in passing, several features of the Nyaydvatára and the Sanmail-tarka-prakarana evince a discrepant attitude towards the Jaina Canon and tradition of both works, different choice of vocabulary, which was not necessitated by the use of different languages (Sanskrit and Prakrit), and the notions and ideas they use are likewise at variance. Accordingly, it seems to me that both works must have apparently been written by two different people.?
The most comprehensive bibliographic survey of publications on Siddhasena Divakara is fumished by UPADHYE (1971) in his "Introduction (pp. xi-xxvii) and
Bibliographic Survey' (pp. *3.972). A few more publications have been published since the review: MOOKERJEE (1971), DHAKY (1981-82). GRANOFF (1989-1990), DHAKY (1990), DHAKY (1995) and WAYMAN (1996).
The question has been discussed at length in BALCEROWICZ (forthcoming). A detailed comparison of the contents, style and philosophical background of Siddhasena Divákara's Mydydvatra and Siddhasena "Mahamati's Santmaticarka-prakarana (vide infra p. 47 f.), brings me to the conclusion that these two works were written by two different persons. Following the findings presented in BALCEROWICZ (forthcoming), esp. in view of the lack of any hint that the author of STP. knew of Dirniga, I would maintain that STP. must have been composed slightly before or circa 500 C.E.
On the Understanding of Other Culture - Proceedings. pp. 17-57. Copyright © 2000 by Ploir Balcerowicz & Marek Mejor (eds.)

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On subsequent pages I shall try to establish the chronology of the Nyayavatara and its correlation to other, mostly Buddhist, works.
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There is a variance of opinions regarding the date of Siddhasena as the author of the Nyayavatara and the date of the Nyäyävatära, and these fall in four groups: (1) Siddhasena was pre-Dinnagan', (2) Siddhasena flourished soon after Dinnaga and before Dharmakirti", (3) Siddhasena belongs to a post-Dharmakirtian tradition', whereas (4) some hold that his date is still an open question.
The first to notice some chronological dependence of NA was JACOBI (1926: iii), who observed that 'To about the same time [i.c. Saka-year 598 677 C.E.-P.B.] belongs Siddhasenadiväkara whom Haribhadra quotes; for he uses, no doubt Dharmakirti', though he does not name him.' There are two points, according to him, that justify such a conclusion: (1) Siddhasena (NA.5) applies the term abhränta and Dharmakirti was the first to use it in his definition of pratyaksa, thus improving upon Dinnaga's definition-to both pratyakṣa and anumana; (2) Siddhasena (NA.11") 'extends the distinction of svärtha and parartha, which properly applies to anumana only, to pratyaksa also, ibidem 12 f. Apparently, he thought to improve on Dharmakirti by a wholesome generalisation of nice distinctions!" (JACOBI (1926: iii, n. 1)). VAIDYA (1928: xviii-xx) elaborates upon JACOBI's laconic remarks. (3) He further brings up one more important point:
...verses 6 and 7 above of Nyäyävatära unmistakably presuppose Dharmakirti and the later phase of the Yogācāra school, as, without them, it is difficult for us to explain why Siddhasena Diväkara is required to these views and emphatically declare:
सकलप्रतिभासस्य भ्रान्तत्वासिद्धितः स्फुटम् ।
प्रमाणं स्वान्यनिश्चायि द्वयसिद्धौ प्रसिध्यति ॥ ७ ॥ (p. xx).
3E.g. SUKHLAL (1945/a) and SUKHLAL (1945/b), H. R. Kapadia (AJP., 'Introduction', Vol. II, pp. 98 ff.), KRAUSE (1948), DAVE (1962), SUKHLAL-DOSHI (1928), WILLIAMS (1963: 19), MATILAL (1985: 241).
*E.g. Malvania (NASV., 'Introduction', pp. 141 f.) and QVARNSTRÖM (1999: 178). E.g. JACOBI (1926), VAIDYA (1928), MUKTHAR (1948), V.P. Johrapurkar ("Introduction' to VTP., pp. 41 ff.).
*UPADHYE (1971: Xxxv).
'PS.1.C.k3c-d: pratyakşam kalpanapodham nama-jäty-ady-asamyuktam, and NB.1.4: tatra pratyakşam kalpanapodham abhräntam, respectively.
Not NA.12, as VAIDYA (1928: xviii, line 16) has it.
ON THE DATE OF THE NYAYAVATARA
On my part, I would only add that also NA.31 (pramātā sványa-nirbhasi) must have been inspired by similar thoughts as NA.7.
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The first argument is sound. Admittedly, the idea of abhrāntatva of perception was latent in pre-Dharmakirti's literature, but Dharmakirti was the first to use the term. If we were to take this latency of abhräntatva as a serious counter
9 The term bhränta (bhrānti) itself is attested in the pre-Dharmakirtian literature, for instance in MAVBh.1.4; SacAcBh.(2).2 and in several places of MSA. and Comm. thereon (11.13a, 11.15, 11.17, 11.24-26, Comm. ad 10.2 and ad 11.27). In all such passages, however, the term bhränti does not occur in the context of pramana, still less of valid perception (pratyaksa), in the first place. The term refers either to a general error based on the perceiving of subject-object duality in the world (dvaya-bhränti), and is synonymous to māyā (in MSA.), or to the nature of the cognised object (MAVBh.1.4). The latter rests on a rather subtle difference: erroneous is not the cognition as such (the emphasis on the inner, cognitive aspect, viz. erroneous correspondence of an act of cognition), but the way an object is constituted in the cognition (the emphasis on the 'outer', 'objective' side). In none of these texts where we come across the term bhränti is the idea of cognitively valid procedures (pramāna) discussed; at the most, it points to an antithesis of a general, soteriologically relevant outlook of a person, viz. citta-bhränti / bhrântam cittam / kşipta-cittam (SacAcBh.(2).2). This is confirmed by the application of the past passive participle to people MSA.11.18 (loko hy abhräntaḥ), as loci of bhränta-citta. To sum up, none of the occurrences of the term (a)bhränta in Yogacara works seems to have been an inspiration for Siddhasena.
10 An interpretation of non-erroneousness (abhräntatva) is offered by Dharmottara in NBT.3.2: abhrāntam artha-kriya-kşame vastu-rüpe 'viparyastam ucyate. artha-kriyakşamam ca vastu-rupam sanniveśöpädhi-varṇatmakam. tatra yan na bhrāmyati tad abhräntam. Thus, there are two pivotal aspects of abhräntatva, the lack of contrariety (aviparyastatva) and its reference to a thing capable of efficient action (artha-kriyakama-vastu). The first element, viz. the lack of contrariety, or correspondence to facts, may be taken to have been preconceived in the idea of avyabhicäritva in the nonBuddhist literature as early as NS.1.1.4 (indriyártha-sannikarşôtpannam jñānam avyapadesyam avyabhicäri vyavasayatmakam pratyakşam) and NBh. ad loc. (vad atasmin tad iti tad vyabhicari, yat tu tasmin tad iti tad avyabhicäri pratyakşam iti). This tendency can be also observed in Jaina sources, e.g. in TBh.1.32 (p. 30.6, p. 31.1-2): jñāna-viparyayo jñānam iti... mithya-darśana-parigrahad viparita-grähakatvam eteşām (viparyayānām), tasmäd ajñänäni bhavanti. See also PVin.1(1).4 (p. 40, n. 1). However, the second element artha-kriya-samartha, the capability to execute efficient action, is Dharmakirti's innovation, see PV.1.3: pramāṇam avisaṁvādi jñānam arthakriya-sthitiḥ/ avisamvadanam fäbde 'py abhipraya-nivedanät II, as well as PV.2.3: artha-kriya-samartham yat tad atra paramartha-sat / anyat samveti-sat proktam te svasamanya-lakṣaṇe II. Cf. also HATTORI (1968: 14): The concept of "artha-kriya" is

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argument which seems totally unconvincing to me-it would imply that Siddhasena chose the term abhränta intuitively and applied it indiscriminately to both pratyaksa and anumana, as if he had adumbrated that Dharmakirti would once qualify perception as a non-erroneous cognition and inference as erroneous. Coincidentally, his way of expression would tally with the actual term used by Dharmakirti, who would follow him!
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Whereas I completely agree with JACOBI-VAIDYA's first argument, their second argument is not entirely convincing to me. Indeed, we cannot understand the idea of svartha-väkya and parårtha-vakya (NA.10) as well as svartha-pratyaksa and parartha-pratyaksa (NA.11) without Dinnaga's and Dharmakirti's well-known division of svårthanumana and parârthánumäna. It should suffice to remind the reader of NB.2.1-2: /1/ anumanam dvividhä. 121 svårtham parårtham ca. and of NB.3.1-2: /1/ tri-rupa-lingakhyānam parârthânumānam. 121 kärane käryôpacārāt.
There can be no doubt, in my opinion, that the idea of vakyasya parárthatvam necessarily presuposses the idea of vakyasya svårthatvam, and that both these concepts-expressed in NA.10 ff.: parârtham manam äkhyātam vākyam-could only have been developed in the context of svårtha- and pararthânumana.
However, the idea of svartha-pratyaksa and svarthânumana / parârthânumāna central for JACOBI-VAIDYA's reasoning-which is a prerequisite for Siddhasena to establish the thesis of parârtha-pratyaksa, predates Dharmakirti and is found also in the sangraha-sloka (iti sastrartha-sangrahaḥ) of Nyaya-pravesa of Dinnaga's disciple, Sankarasvamin".
unfamiliar to Dignaga, but it is an important criterion for the distinguishing of "svalakṣaṇa" from "sāmānya-lakṣaṇa" in Dharmakirti's system of thought.", HATTORI (1968: 79 § 1.14) and FRANCO (1987: 445 n. 203), esp.: 'the concept of arthakriya does not appear anywhere in Dignaga's writings."
On the other hand, Dharmakirti's definition does go back to the usage of the term bhränta in the Yogäcära school; his novelty was to mould it to the demands of his pramana theory. We should remember about his idea that anumana is bhränta (cf. PVin.II(1).2.6-7, p. 24.6-7: de ma yin la der hdzin phyir || ḥkhrul kyan hbrel phyir tshad ma ñid = atasmims tad-graho bhräntir api sambandhataḥ prama //), which is a proper point of reference here, not the nature of citta / vijñāna.
"sadhanam düşaṇam caiva sábhásam para-samvide / pratyakşam anumanam ca sabhasam tv atma-samvide II. As for a possible objection that the verse might be later, at least the commentator Haribhadra takes it to be a genuine part of the original work (NP.(1). p. 9.12 ff.):...ity adav eva slokaḥ, etc.
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Certainly it is not Šankárasvamin who developed the concept of svartha- and parárthanumana. It was probably fathomed by Vasubandhu', but terminologically conceived and worked out by Dinnaga".
There are, however, two other traits to be noticed in the aphorisms NA.10-11 that point, in my opinion, to Dharmakirti as their source. The first of them is the idea of metaphorical transference (upacara) used in a very similar context. Siddhasena speaks of the term 'inference for others' (parartham manam) which denotes, to be precise, the inferential cognition arisen in another person as a result of an argumentative procedure and/or debate-which is applied through metaphorical transference (upacära) to a 'syllogistic' sentence (väkyam), that is, as a matter of fact, merely a cause of such a cognition in another person. We come across the same idea in NB.3.1-2, and even the wording is to a certain extent similar (one should here take into account stylistic differences necessitated by the succint sutra style and versified kärikäs). Below, both passages in question are given for the sake of convenience, relevant expressions being underlined: 14
/NA.10/ sva-niscayavad anyeşām niscayôtpadanam budhaiḥ/ parartham manam akhyātam vakyaṁ tad-upacarataḥ || NB.3.1-2: tri-rupa-lingakhyānam pararthânumanam, kärane käryōpacärät. Dharmottara's gloss confirms the interpretation: käraṇa vacana = vākya; kārya = [parártha] anumana parártha-mana." Siddharși, whose comments are in a similar spirit, even quotes a verse, that establishes the relation between speech (karana) and resulting cognition (karya). Another striking feature is that the
12 Cf. FRAUWALLNER (1933: 476-477 [297-298]) and HATTORI (1968: 12, n. 60). E.g.: PS.2.1ab: anumanam dvividha svartham tri-rupal lingato parârthânumānam tu sva-drstårtha-prakāśanam; also PS.3.1ab, and PSV.2, K 109a.2-3 V 27a.5 (svårthânumana): tshul gsum pahi rtags las rjes su dpag pahi don (V: rjes su dpag par bya bahi don) mthon ba gan yin pa de ni ran gi don gyi rjes su dpag paho. Cf. RANDLE (1926: 28-9), HATTORI (1968: 78, n. 1.11) and Steinkellner's note 1, p. 21 in PVin.II(2).
"In my analysis throughout I shall use, for the sake of brevity, underlining to mark corresponding phrases in NA. and works of Dharmakirti or of other authors.
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NBT.3.2, p. 150.12-151.1: tasmin kärane vacane karyasyânumānasyopacāraḥ samaropaḥ kriyate. tataḥ samäropät käraṇam vacanam anumana-sabden ócyate. aupacärikaṁ vacanam anumanam, na mukhyam ity-arthah
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vikalpa-yonayaḥ śabda vikalpäḥ śabda-yonayaḥ/
karya-käraṇatā teṣāṁ nártham sabdäḥ sprianty api//
The verse is so far untraced, but it refers most probably to another verse by Dharmakirti, and at any rate-to an idea expressed in PV.1.286.

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reference to the idea of the metaphorical transference (upacara) occurs in both works (NA. and NB.) precisely at the moment of introducing the discussion of parartha-anumana and that this is the only occurrence of this idea in both works. Neither the term nor the idea as such is encountered at any other point.
Further, VAIDYA's third point is rather weak, as well. He says: 'These verses [NA.6-7--P.B.) contain the favourite view of the Yogacara School on the subject and the object (gråhya and gråhaka), which both they declare illusory. This view is dependent on the definition of pratyakşa, and though its origin must be sought in Dinnaga's works (emphasis--P.B.), the scholars who brought the idea to perfection are Dharmapala and his pupil Dharmakirti.' (p. xix). Indeed, we find the idea referred to by VAIDYA in Dirnåga's works, c.g. in his PS.L.10" (cf. n. 63): Vasudhararakṣita/Sen-rgyal 156.4: Kanakavarman/Dad-pahi ses-rab 96a-4-5: gantshe snar ba de ggal bya gan ltar snan ba de gsal bya tshad ma dari dehi abras bu ni s had ma daldehi hbras bu ni hdsin rnam rig pa de ylphyir hdsin rnam rig paho de yi phyir
de gsum tha dad du ma byas de gsum tha dad du ma byas II However, we do not find anything in NA.7' that would allude to either Dinnaga's specific theory of triple division of Hana or to Dharmakirti's ideas". What we do find instead is the realist's position that, at least: (1) acts of cognition are real, (2) acts of cognition happen to be true and accurate, (3) acts of cognition are selfvalidatory, (4) acts of cognition are accurate representations of external world, (5) the external world is real
To have Dinnaga's or Dharmakirti's views criticised here we would need an explicit element of swa-samvitti (sva-samvedana) or phala. There are three possible expressions in NA.7 that might refer to sva samvitti (and none to refer to phala): (A) sphujan, (B) sványa-niscayi, (C) dvaya-siddhau. (Ad A) The first of the list is highly improbable, for it never--to my knowledge is used in Buddhist sources to refer to the idea of self-revelatory character of cognition (sVa-samvitt). It is generally used to describe either the veracious, direct, non-inferrential or the
indubitable, etc., character of acts of cognition. It is explained by Siddharşi accordingly by suniscitataya. (AdB) The second of these expressions (as a similar one in NA.31: sványa-nirbhāsi) mentions in fact only two aspects: the cognition (sva) and its counterpart-the object (anya). If sva were to mean a-sanvitti, the primary act of cognition would not be mentioned; if anya were taken to be sva Samvitti, the bahyartha, so fundamental for the realist, would not be mentioned. The expression is explained in NAV. as sva-para-prakasakant, which does not bring anything new to our analysis. However, it is coupled in the NAV. with the third expression. (Ad C) The third expression refers to duality, in the first place, and like in the preceding case-it is highly problematic to take it to allude to Dinnaga's theory of triple division of vijana. However, it is Siddhari's gloss on dvayasiddhau: svarūpártha-laksana-yugma-nispattaw that could be implicative of syasanvitti: in it, svaripa might refer to the self-revelatory character of cognition. It is especially suggestive in view of his statement in NAV1 quoted in n. 20. But even then, the third aspect of an act of cognition (apart from the act as such, an object) its self-revelatory character, is not explicitely mentioned here. As a matter of fact, Siddharsi, so well conversant with Buddhist ideas, would not have wasted the availing opportunity to indicate the idea of sva-samvitti and to utilise it, if he had noticed any allusion to the Buddhist theories of triple or fourfold division of vijana in the aphorism of Siddhasena, In other words, there is nothing in Siddharsi's kloss that might suggest that Siddharsi had seen any point of convergence between the ideas expressed in NA.7 and certain concepts ascribable to Dinnaga, as VAIDYA would like it. To expell our doubts, he concludes, as a matter of fact, with anyatha prameyabhāve pramānábhāvāt, to show that no third element is implied.
In my opinion, NA.7 can be safely taken to disprove the doctrine of illusory character of worldly appearance propounded by the Buddhist idealist (Vidnavādin), whose ideas directly influenced Dinnaga and Dharmakirti'. The aphorism is
"See HATTORI (1968: 107, n. 1.67):
yad-abhasant prameyan fat pramåna-phalate punah/ gråhakkara-saniitti trayan natah pathak-kpiam sakala-pratibhasarya bhrántarvasiddhitah sphuram
pramanann sványa-niscayidveya-siddhau prasidhyati / * On the triple and fourfold division of vijana in the Yogicăra school see HATTORI (1968: 107, n. 1.67).
*As he does in several places, for instance in NAV.1 (the section beginning with: ayam atrabhipraya: sva-samvedanam prati nikhilafananam eka-rüpataya sakar karana-caturalván násty eve bhedah...). NAV.29 (the section beginning with: tathórari-kyta-yogdcara-matam api balad anekanta-prakasa-rajjur avesayety, ckasyapi jinasyaneka-vedyo-vedakakarataya prathanopagateh...and the section beginning with: atha jana-vidy advaita.prakasam alaksitam abhypetye tena bdhuvidhyan dadhano bodho badhyamanarvad bhränta ity abhidadhyat, tad ayuktam ...). NAV.31, ete.
CF. HATTORI (1968: 106, n. 165)

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clearly evocative of such ideas as those expressed, c.g. in MAV.1.1,3, Trims. 1, 297) or viss.lab, 16*. As Siddharşi expresses himself, if there is nothing to be cognised, there can be no cognition. Therefore, to establish the thesis of the existence of the external world is essential for the realist, Similarly, mutatis mutandis, it is crucial for the Buddhist idealist to deny the existence of external object. Furthermore, NA.7 fits quite well into the line of critics of the so-called "Dreaming Argument that was commonly ascribed to the Buddhist and refuted, for instance, by Kumärila (MŠV.4.(Niralambana-vada).23, p. 159.7-8). Uddyotakara (NV. on NBh.4.2.33). Sankara (BSŚBh.2.2.5.29, p. 476.2-3) and by Siddharşigani (NAV.29, the Sunya-vada section).
Therefore, NA.7 is not a very useful indication to establish the date of the Nyaydvatára. However, there is a number of other conspicuous traits, that are instrumental in establishing the time of composition of the treatise quite convincingly as posterior to Dharmakirti. To achieve this. I shall analyse several aphorisms of NA. step by step in order to show Siddhasena's indebtedness to Dharmakirti (especially to NB.) in respect not only of certain loan' ideas but also, partially, of the dialectical structure of the text. Some of the following points are not entirely convincing, when taken singly. Their high number, on the other hand, could not have been a matter of mere coincidence,
[1] The opening line of NA.O (pramana-vyutadandrtham idam drabhyate) closely resembles the formulations of HB. p. 1.5-6: paroksártha-pratipatter anumandsrayatvdt tal-vwtddandrtham sanksepata idam arabhyate.
[2] Practically, the very first ideas expressed in the opening lines of NA. and NB. are very similar and have similar wording:
NA.I: pramanam ... pratyaksan ca parokcam ca dvidha.
NB.1.1.2-3: dvividham samyag-inanam, pratyakşam anumanam ca. The differences are that (1) Siddhasena does not have samyag-janam (this expression is completely absent from NA.), and (2) he has paroksa instead of anumana. The second difference is dictated by the Jaina demand to incorporate šābda agama (testimony, verbal cognition) in the pramanas (as a quasi-separate category, one of the two-alongside anumang--primary sub-divisions of parokra). However, Siddhasena marks an important, widely known shift in Jaina epistemology, to interpret the directness of pratyaksa in terms of sensory organs (aksa indriya), notas it was customary-in terms of the cognitive subiect (aksa =jiva / atman). The commentators are quite explicit about the interpretational shift, which diverts from the Agamic tradition advocated, e.g. by Akalanka among many
others.27
The question is what prompted Siddhasena to introduce this shift? Obviously, these were the demands of the general philosophic discourse in India to be up-todate with and understood by such schools as Nylya or Sarikhya. But I am deeply convinced that what was responsible for that shift to take the senses as the criterion of directness of pratyaksa was, to a larger degree, Dharmakirti's inspiration and his works (predominantly the Nyāya-bindu) as a groundwork for the Nydydyatára. For what other reason would Siddhasena speak of the two-fold division of valid cognition and justify it by referring to Dharmakirtian ideas? And thereby we come to another element of NA.I that resembles Dharmakirti's formulations.
According to Siddhasena, the factor responsible for the division of cognitive acts into pratyaksa and paroksa is not the character of the 'cognising organ' (aksa), either the sense organs (Indriya) or the cognitive subject (jiwa, atman) as such. In his opinion, what is crucial in the categorisation of pramānas is the character of the object of cognition that determines the way the object of cognition is determined, or cognised. Clearly, in this revolutionary rearrangement he goes against the whole Jaina tradition. The expression he uses: meya-viniscayat (NA.Id), can hardly be explicated without Dharmakirti's formulations: tasya visayah svalaksanam (NB.1.1.12), so humanasya visayah (NB.1.1.17) and manam dvividhan visaya
13 abhita-parikalpo 'sti dvayan tatra na vidyate sünyata vidyate tv atra tasyum api 30 vidyote artha-sativdoma-vijäptl-pratibhasan prajayate / W anan ndsti cáspárthas tad-abhāvāt tad apy sat //
2) ama-dharmópacaro hi vividho yah pravartate / vijana-pariname 'sau parināmah sa trividha Ilacitto 'nupalambho sou jānan lokottaram ca tar / ásrayasya paravsttir dvidha dauskulya-hånitah
vijñāpti-matram evdtad asad-arthavabhasanat / * pratyaksa-buddhih svapnådau yatha så ca yada tada / na so'rtho drsyate tasya pratyakarvan kathan matam 1 (to be coupled with NA.6-7).
*In a typical formulation: 'The sensation in the waking state is erroneous, because it is a cognition, like the sensation in a dream agra v edanam bhrántani, pratyayardt, vapna-santvedanavar). See TABER (1994).
- See, cg NAV.l: pratyaksan city-adi: tatra siddhanta-prasiddha-paramarthike pratyakrapeksayåksa-sabdo jiva-paryayalaya prasiddhan, iha t ydvahanikopratyaksa-prastavad akna-dhvanir indriya-vacano grhyate tatas cákra pratigatam prayaram yad indriyam asrityjjshitertha-sdikpat kari jänar tat prahyaksamity arthah.... aksebhyah parato vartata iti parokpam. akro-vapära-nirapetsam mano vapärendsäkpad-artha-paricchedakan yaj janart tar parokram ini bhavah

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dvaividhyat (PV.2.1 ab). Even Siddharşi confirms that what is pivotal for the distinction is, in the first place, the character of extrinsic data apprehended by the cognitive subject, that determines the way of apprehension, irrespective of whether the 'cognising organ' are the senses or the soul. It is only in NA.4d that Siddhasena emphasises the way of cognising, or '[the manner of grasping an object)', for the first time: grahanéksaya. But even then, the tradition in the person of the commentator Siddharşi takes the locution to refer to the existence and the nature of the cognoscible (sce his detailed discussion in NAV.4 apropos of grahanê saya).
Truly, a formulation similar to NA.1 is found also in PS.(1).1.2ab, so Dharmakirti is not the only potential source. However, if we compare what Dinnaga has further to say on the two-fold division of pramana, we discover that he does not mention the reason for the division explicitly, as Dharmakirti and Siddhasena do. but he merely points to the parallelism of the two-fold prameya". Clearly, one can easily understand the statement laksana-dvayani prameyam to be a reason adduced by the author for praryakşam anumanam ca pramane ('there are two cognitive criteria: perception and inference, [because the cognoscible has two characteristics'), as the commentator himself does". However, neither the word 'because' (vasmát / orvāt) nor any direct explanation why pramana is twofold is mentioned by Dinnāga explicitly, as it is by Dharmakirti in PV.2.1bc (Visaya dvaividhyat fakty-asakritah/ artha-kriyāyām ...). Moreover, Diónāga's elucidation of the two-fold character of pramana (laksana-dvayar prameyam) differs
completely in character from Siddhasena's explanation (meya-viniscayat) and Dharmakirti's (visaya-dvaividhyat sakty-asaktitah artha-kriyayam ... ), insofar as it is 'static' or 'taxonomic', viz. plainly juxtaposes two cases of double division (pramana-prameya), whereas Siddhasena and Dharmakirti offer 'intentional'. i.e. actively directed to an object of cognition either by way of determining it (viniscaya, cognitive activity) or by any sort of efficient action (artha-briya). [3] Apart from the noticeable similarity in wording between NA.1 and NB.1.1.2
dence to be observed in the ideas expressed by Dhamakirti and Siddhasena. Siddharşi introduces NA.1 in the following way: tatra taval laksana-samkhya-vipratipatti niracikirşur äha. There is no doubt that Siddharşi regarded NA.1 to aim at-beside enumerating subdivisions of pramana (pratyakşam ca paroksa ca dvidha ... formulating its definition (pramānam sva-parábhäsi jänar bädha-vivarjitam). And, further, there can hardly be any doubt that a descriptive definition of pramana is precisely what Siddhasena in NA.lab does. In the aphorism, he does not only group all cognitively valid procedures under respective categories of direct' and 'indirect', which is a case of a typological definition that demarcates a notion by mentioning specimens to which the definition is applicable (o là tâv yevov OpLOLLOC), but he also attempts a real definition that describes the character and essential aspects or intrinsic characteristics of a thing (
6ėyv É O ZOTIV europxovtov (Oplopol)." Clearly, these two definitions represent two diverse approaches and the latter is intellectually more sublime. Whereas we quite frequently find typological definitions of pramana (viz. statements of its divisions) in Jaina literature, we do not, as a matter of fact, come across any attempt at a descriptive definition of pramana of the second type in any works, both Jaina and non-Jaina, prior NA. Thus, the formulation of a descriptive definition of cognitive criterion seems definitely to be an advancement. And it would perhaps be surprising to find such an innovation in a work of generally secondary character that repeatedly borrows from other works (it relies, for the most part, on the Buddhist legacy and has very little new ideas, genuinely of its own, to offer), if NA. had no predecessor. However, it is Dharmakirti who must have inspired Siddhasena's descriptive definition. The opening verse (if we skip the first two introductory verses of obeisant nature) of the Pramana-siddhi chapter, i.e. PV.1.3 and PV.1.7cd present such a descriptive definition of pramāna that specifies its character and individual features. This
* Cf. also PV.2.63 (arumana-vicārah): na pratyakşa-paroksābhyam meyasyanyasya sambhavah / tasmat prameya-dvitvena pramana-dvitvam isyate Il
NAV.1 ad loc. (on meya-viniscayad): bahir-artham punar apeksya kascic caksuradi-samagri-bala-labdha sattákah svávayava-vypinan kälántara-sacarium sthagita-ksana-vivartam alaksita-paramánu-parimandalyan sannihitar visada nirbhåsam sämänyam akararı säkşal-kurvanah prakásah prathale, tatra pratyaksavyavaharah pravartate. yahpunar linga-sabdádi-dvārena niyatántyatasämänyákarávaloki parisphurata-rahitah khaly amano Tritha-grahaņa-parinamah samullasati sa paroksalām svi-karoti.
pratyaksam anumanam ca pramane (Vasudhararakṣita/Sen-rgyal 13.6: mion sum dar ni rjes sy dpag Ishad ma; Kanakavarman/Dad-pahi ses-rab 94a.4: mion sum dan ni rjes su dpag ishad ma dag ni); here, the difference is the absence of the explicit (sc. with a numeral, not with the dual formel dag) mention of twofold' (dwvidham/dwidha / mam pa gris).
PS.(1).1.2bc: laksana-dvayam/ prameyam ... (Vasudhararakṣita/Sen-rgyal 13.6 - Kanakavarman/Dad-pahi ses-rab 94.5: mtshan nid gris gsal bya).
yasmar - Vasudhararakṣita/Sen-rgyal: ...phyir se na; Kanakavarman/Dad-pahi ses. rab:... gangi phyir.
CE. Aristotelian twofold division in Met.998b (p. 47.12-14): Etepos 8' stal o la των γενών ορισμός και ο λέγων εξ ών έστιν ενυπαρχόντων.

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section of PV. is traditionally assumed to offer the first comprehensive definition of pramāņa. Clearly, for both Manorathanandin and Siddharşi the passages of NA.lab and PV.1.3/7cd respectively are cases of a pramana-laksana. Occasionally, a doubt is raised whether Dharmakirti's design was indeed a descriptive definition and that actually it was the subsequent Buddhist tradition of commentators where the idea of a comprehensive descriptive definition developed. Irrespective of whether one assumes that the formulation of PV.1.3 was a genuine descriptive definition or that an idea of such a definition first originated with postDharmakirtian commentators, both sides agree that such a descriptive definition did not exist before Dharmakirti (ergo it is altogether absent from Dinnāga, Sankarasvāmin, etc.). Accordingly, since NA. appears to present such a definition of a descriptive character, it must have been composed after Dharmakirti and PV.6
[4] Late Buddhist sources allegedly refer to NA.2." Surprisingly, NA.2, being a statement of purva-paksa, is the least suitable verse of the whole Dvätrimsikā to serve as an object of anybody's critique. Thus, anyone referring to the verse with the purpose to refute it would have to be highly incompetent and incapable of noticing
that the very verse is refuted by Siddhasena himself in NA 3! Therefore it could hardly be an object of Dharmakirti's critique.' Furthermore, any reference to allegedly such a state of affairs would prove the source of such an information to be
highly unreliable one. Consequently, either Säkyabuddhi cannot have referred to NA 2 or his acquaintance with Jaina tradition would be liable to doubt.
As a matter of fact, NA.2 may plausibly be taken as a prima facie objection ('no purpose is known for stating the definition of cognitive criterion') against formulating a comprehensive definition of pramana of descriptive character, inasmuch as 'cognitive criteria (mind the plural!--P.B.) are well-known and everyday practice is accomplished by them.' Siddharşi takes 'the definition of cognitive criterion' to be "[a statement consisting in mentioning specific properties of cognitive criterion that are capable of distinguishing it from that which has) another form, which is a very accurate explanation of a descriptive definition. Interestingly enough, the reason adduced why such a definition is not necessary in case of pramāna is prasiddhāni pramanāni, where the plural is expressly used. This would point to the more archaic kind of definition based on classification, that would define the notion of pramāna merely by specifying the pramana 'inventory
Thereby NA.2 supports our supposition that what Siddhasena really does is a descriptive definition of pramāna. Accordingly, NA.2 would rather be a record of the historical change and certain resistance against a new approach towards defining pramāna. This would also explain the role of the verse, that might seem unnecessary at first glance, in such a succinct work as NA.is.
[5] The päda c (tad-vyamoha-nivstrik) of NA.3"-which is a rejoinder to the doubt raised in NA.Z whether it is purposeful to state the definition of cognitive criterion (viz. whether the treatise, sastra = NA., has a purpose), since 'cognitive criteria are well-known and everyday practice is accomplished by them'-recalls Dharmakirti's statement found in PV.1.7:
prāmanyam vyavahāreņa sāstram moha-nivartanam /
ajñātártha-prakašo vā svarūpádhigateh param // A statement expressing a similar idea seems to be absent from PS.
[6] Corresponding to the sequence of topics discussed in NB. (truly, it is a typical sequence not restricted to NB.), as a next step, Siddhasena in NA.5 makes his
See: FRANCO (1997: 59-61). esp.: 'Therefore, we can safely conclude that the definition of pramana in general, unlike the definition of each pramana in particular, was not undertaken by any indian philosopher before Dharmakirti's time. Consequently, there is no reason why one should expect Dharmakirti to do so. During the time that separates Dharmakirti from his commentators, some change in the philosophical requirements must have occurred that produced the expectation of a general definition of pramanas. [p. 60). Cl. also STEINKELLNER-KRASSER (1989: 3-5), Cr, C., PVV.1.3 (1:2.17 ff: 3:3.17 ff.): ayam acaryo brhad-acaryiya-pramana-samuccaya-sastre vårttikam cikirşuh svatah-krta-bhagavan-namaskarah tac-chastr árambha-samaye tadacara-kata-bhagavan-namaskara-slokam vakhwat-kamah prathama pramanasāmānya-laksaņam aha ... and PVV.1.7-8 (1: 4.36 T.: 3:8.6 ff.): lad evam avisanvādanan pramana-laksanam uktam. idanim aryad aha..
See: FRANCO (1997: 54-62), e.g.: ....Dharmakirti did not attempt a general definition of the pramanas, but only wanted to prove that the Buddha is a pramana ... '(p. 61).
*I am indebted to Claus Oetke for drawing my attention to the above issue of PV.1.3-7 and its relevance to the problem of dating of NA
57 OVARNSTRÖM (1999: 178): 'In the eighth-century commentary on Dharmakirti's Pramanavarttika (11.5), Sakyabuddhi (or Säkyamati) quotes the second verse of Nāvavatara and claims that this verse is the object of Dharmakirti's critique', and refers to p. 163, n. 38 of Chr. LINDTNER'S 'Marginalia to Dharmakirti's Pramanaviniscaya.' Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd- und Ostasiens 28 (1984) 149–
"NAV.2 ad loc: pramana-laksanasyöktan para-rpa-vyavartandkşamásadharana-pramaņa-dharma-kathana-rupayan.
prasiddhānam pramanānam laksan okta prayojanam/ tad-vyamoha-nitrih svād vyāmüdha-manasam iha //
175.

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polemical statement and declares also inference to be 'non-erroneous because it is a cognitive criterion, just like perception.' (... anumana, tad abhräntar pramanatvat samaksavat...). The use of the term abhränta as well as the polemical character directly points to NB.(1).1.4: tatra pratyakşam kalpandpodham abhrāntam. This issue, that was taken up by JACOBI and VAIDYA, has been already discussed above p. 18 ff. Dharmakirti expressed such ideas that could have served both as a target and inspiration for Siddhasena also in PV.2.45-46 (anumanavicārah)
But this is not the only Dharmakirtian trace to be found in NA.S. Inference is defined by Siddhasena to 'determine the sadhya on account of linga; linga (the inferential sign) is, in its tum, inseparably connected with the sadhya; the determining factor is here the relation of avind-bhava: NA.Sac: sadhyavina-bhuno Tirgår sådhya-niscayakan smrtam/ anumanam. This definition follows, in most-if not all-details, the ideas expressed by Dharmakirti in PV.1.287:
anumanasrayo lingam avina-bhava-laksanam/
vyāpli-pradarsanad dhetoh sādhyenoktañ ca tat sprutam // This striking correspondence does not only concem central elements in inference and their character as well as their mutual connection, but even the choice of vocabulary. The inseparable connection with the probandum as the defining characteristic of the probans reoccurs in NA.13: sadhyavina-bhuvo hetor."
[7]NA.8 may have been influenced by Dinnaga both in terms of vocabulary and notions. Its pada d (mānam sābdam prakirtitam) reminds of PS.(2).5.1 (esp. sābda, sgra las byun pa):
na pramănântaram sābdam anumanät tatha hi tat/
krtakatvadivar svårtham anyápohena bhāşate // (8) In NA.13 Siddhasena takes a closer look at pararthanumana and the conditions of its validity: sadhyavina-bhuvo hetor vaco yat pratipādakam parartham anumanan tar paksadi-vacanátmakam // The phrasing is reminiscent of
NB.3.1: tri-rupa-lingakhyānam pararthanumānam. Clearly, the element of trining criterion of validity of anumana for the Dharmakirtian tradition is absent in NA.. for this idea was not recognised by the Jainas. Instead, syntactically and semantically in the same position, we have the Jaina criterion of validity. viz. vidhyavina-bhuvah. Thus, NA. 13 may be taken as Siddhasena's polemical reply to the Buddhist doctrine of trairūpya.
On the other hand, pädas c-d of NA.13(...anumanam tat pakşádi-vacandemakam) bear close resemblance to (1) NP.(2).2 (NP.(1), p. 1.4-5): tatra paksádi-vacanāni sādhanam paksa-hetu-drstânta-vacanair hi praśnikānām apratito 'rthah pratipadyata iti // as well as to (2) the verse of NM.I: *pakyddi-vacananiti sadhanam, tatra hi svayam/ sadhyatvenepsitah pakso viruddharthanirdytah II. However, this similarity is not decisive at all, inasmuch as all the quotations merely describe the widely known structure of any 'syllogistic' reasoning, that is composed of respective links, viz. members of syllogism'.
19 In the definition of paksa, NA.14ab: sadhyabhupagamah raksah pratyakyddy-anirakrtah/, we come across other formulations that bear obvious similarity especially to NB.(2).3.37: svarūpendiva svayam isto 'mirakrtah paksa in (but also to NB.(2).3.49-53). Dharmakirti's svarūpena stands for sådhyatvena, which is confirmed both by Dharmakirti himself in the next two sutras (NB.(2).3.39-40: svarüpenéti sadhyatvenéstah, svarūpendiveti sadhyatendivesto na sädhyatvendpi) as well as by Dharmottara (NBT.(2).3.37 ad loc.: svarüpendivél sådhyatvendiva). Dharmottara explains anirāktah as pratyakşády.anirāktah (NBT (2).3.37 ad loc.: evam-bhūtah san pratyaksády-anirakato yo 'ythah sa paksa ity wcyate.), and if we suppose that he expressed original ideas of Dharmakirti (and I believe he did in this regard) Siddhasena's formulations express almost the same idea as Dharmakirti did in NB., barring Dharmakirti's specific delimiting use of eva as well as svayam.
However, there can hardly be any doubt that the formulations of NA.14ab: sådhvibhupagamah paksah pratyakşddy-aniräktah, go back to PV.4.86 (1: p. 378, 3. p. 390):
sadhyabhyupagamah paksa-laksanam teşv apakşată /
niräkte badhanatah sese "laksana-vrttitah Il The idea itself goes back to Dinnāga and NM. (* svayan sädhyatvenopsita pakse vinuddharthånirākrtah), as it was pointed out by Manorathanandin in PVV., p. 378.26. Another plausible source for NA.14 might be PS.3.2:
"ayathabhinivesena dvitiya bhrantir isyale / gatis cer para rüpena na ca bhränteh pramåndta Il abhipräyd visantvidad api bhränteh pramanata / gatir apy anyatha drsa. paksas cayam kptôttarah //
Cf. also PV.3.31: karya-karana-bhavad vā svabhavad va niyamakat / avina-bhavaniyamo 'darsanan na na darsanāt //, etc.
sgra las byun pa rjes dpag las Ishad ma gian min de Itar de byas sogs pa biin du ran don la gžan sel bas ni rjod par byed The verse is quoted in TSaP. ad TSa. 1514 (p. 441.6-7), with a minor alteration (anumanät tatha hi sah (tat)/).
Cf. Manorathanandin's Vrti ad loc: fatha ca tesu sastressadisu pañcasu vyavartyes madhye nirarte pratvaksádi-badhite badhanato 'paksata viruddhartha.

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svarupenda nirdesyah Svayam isto nirayah
pratyakarthinumanapta-prasiddhena svadhamini //" Clearly, the word adi of the phrase pratyaksădi of NA 14b might allude to the categories (pratyakartha?), anumana, apla, prasiddha cnumerated in Dinnaga's anirektah pratyak drtharumānapla-prasiddhena, but it does not necessarily have to, since Siddharsi (NAV.14 ad loc.: adi-sabdad anumana-sya-vacana-loka grhyante) takes adi to stand for anumana-sya-vacang-loka. Another predecessor of DharmakIrti in this regard was Sankarasvamin".
Out of all these possible sources, NA.14 has most in common with Dharmakirti in terms of (1) exact wording (sadhyabhyupagamah paksa ...), (2) replacement of Dinnlgan ista with abhyupagama, (3) affinity in the explicit correlative sadhya (instead of Dinnagan svarupenaiva nirdesya) to abhyupagama/ista.
[10] The description of hetu and its role in the inference for others (pardrthånumána) in NA.17 is not so conspicuously similar to NB. in phrasing Nevertheless, semantically both expositions are quite akin to each other. That in NA. 17 we still deal with pararthanumana is clear from the context itself, but also Siddharsi leaves not doubt (NAV.17 ad loc: pararthanumanasye vacangriparudd ...). Thus, in both cases we have the pronouncement of the logical reason' (hetos ... prayogo, NA.) or the announcement of the inferential sign (lingdkhyanan, NB.) as the principal element of the inference for others (pardirthdnumana) and the idea that there is no difference in demonstrative force between the two formulations of the logical reason: NA.17: hetos tarhópapatya va syat prayogo "nyathapi val
dvi vidho 'myalarenápi sadhwa-siddhir bhaved iti / NB.3.1.3-7: //tri-rúpa-lingåkhyanan pararthanumanam./3/ tad dw-vidham. /4/ prayoga-bhedāt. // sadharmya-valdharmyavac ceti. 16/ nanayor arthatah kaścid bhedah. ni ayatra prayora-bhedat
The idea expressed by Dharmakirti goes back to his PV.3.16 and PVSV. ad loc."
(11) In NA.20 Siddhasena maintains that drstanta is not an essential part of syllogistic reasoning, inasmuch as the relation of invariable concomitance (vap) suffices to prove the thesis. This is a continuation of the 'economical' trend in Indian loric-that starts with Vasubandhu and his Väda-vidhana and Vadavidh -to limit the number of necessary "syllogistic' members, to simplify the reasoning procedures and to make such procedures universally binding, without any need for further empirical justification than the premises themselves NA.20: antar-vyāptydiva sadhyasya siddher bahir-udährtih
vartha syarrad-asadbhave pyevanin nyaya-vido vidull NB.(2).3.121: tri-rūpo heturuktah. tavata cartha-pratitir iti na prihag drstanto nama sadhana wayavah kascit. tena násya laksana prthag
uyate gatárthatvar. Siddhasena was not so much innovative as it might seem at first glance, inasmuch as it is Dharmakirti (NB.(2).3.121) who had intuitively foreshadowed such an idea before him, when he had claimed that the example (drsanta) is not a separate member of the proof (sadhanavayava). It is much more natural and less surprising to find the direct continuation of the economical' trend, that had started with Vasubandhu, in the Yogacara tradition and Dharmakirti's works, rather than in the Jaina tradition in the person of Siddhasena, where we do not find such an "economic' tendency before Siddhasena. In my opinion, Siddhasena verbalised what had already been latent in Dharmakirti's statement, even though Dharmakirti himself had not been able to do without the example, which he had considered an
The above Sanskrit reconstruction of PS3.2 follows FRAUWALLNER (1957/b: 885) and TILLEMANS (1997: 178, n. 2). Tibetan text reads as follows rangi no bo kho na bstan bdag 'dod rangi chos can lamron sume don dan rjes dpag dan yid ches grags pas ma bual ba'o Il ["TILLEMANS 1997 reads nar.] PS.3.2 must have been in its turn the source for NB.(2).3.37.
* NP.(2).2.1: tatra pakrah prasiddho dharmi prasiddha-visesana-visistataya svayani sadhyavenépsitah pratyakşády-viruddha iti vākya-sesah.
"In PV.3.15 (p. 180] Dharmakirti first recalls the triple character of het defined by Dinnaga in Nyaya mukha: hetos frisy api rupesu niscayas fend varnitah / asiddha viparitartha-vyabhicari-vipaksatah ll. Then (PV.3.16ab) he states the reason for expressing the concomitance by way of dissimilarity (valdharmiya vacana): vyabhicalvipaksena waidharmyo-vacanam ca yat/, only to quote Dinnaga in PVSV.(1).3.16ab: yad dha esa tavan nyayo yad ubhayam vaktavya viruddh dnaikantika-pratipakena tel. The rule is further explained by Dharmakirti in PVSV. as follows: sadharmyadanam vineddha-pratipaksena, vaidharmya-vacanamanaikantiko-pratipaksena Thereupon, in PV.3.16cd and PVSV. ad loc, he adds that: yady adrsti-phalari fac ca yad! tena vipakse 'darsanam khyapyale fad anukte pi gamyate II. Cl. also PVSV.(1).3.24-25 fp. 185): tasmåt svabhāva-pranibandhad eva hetuh sådhya gamayati sa ca tad-bhava-laksanas tad-utpatti-laksanova. sa evdvind-bhavo drsnabhyart pradariyate.
"CE. FRAUWALLNER (1933) and FRAUWALLNER (1957/a).

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integral part of the logical reason (hetu), indispensable to authenticate the general principle by taking recourse to its instantiations (relevant portions underlined): NB.(2).3.122: hetoh sapaksa eva sattvam asapaksac ca sarvato vyavarti rūpam uktam abhedena, punar višesena karya-svabhāvayor wkta-laksanayor janma-lanmatranubandhau darsaniyayuktau. tac ca darśayat-yatra dhūmas atrágnir, asaty agnaw na kvacid dhumo yatha mahanasetarayor, yatra kytakarvan tatranityavam.anityarvabhavo krtakarvasambhavo yatha ghadkasayoriti darsaniyam, na hy anyatha sapaksa-vipaksayoh sad-asatte yathokta-prakāre sakye darsavitum, tar-käryata-niyamah karya-lingasya, swabhāva-lingasya ca svabhävena vyaptih asmins carthe darsite eva drstånto bhavati, etāvan-matra-rüpatvat tasyatl. Dharmakirti expressed a similar idea already in his PV.3.27: tad-bhava-hetu-bhavau hi drstante tad-avedinah / khyāpyete, viduşam vācyo hetur ewahi kevalah/). Siddhasena, however, has to his credit that he clearly states the conditions of internal formal validity of the proof and dismisses the need to quote any instantiation: the proof is valid because the premisses are valid and the relation between them is universally binding.
[12] Siddhasena states explicitly five conditions that invalidate paksa-and adds that there are, in fact, several varieties of paksabhasa-in NA.21:
pratipadyasya yah siddhah paksabhäso 'ksa-lingarah/
loka-sva-vacanābhyāṁ ca badhito 'nekadha mataḥ // These five pakşdbhåsas are in concord with the list exemplified by Siddharsi in NAV.: (1) pratipadya-siddha, (2) pratyakşa-badhita, (3) anumana-badhita, (4) loka-badhita, (5) Sva-vacana-bädhita. Having enumerated five varieties of paksåbhāsa, it would be redundant and pointless on Siddhasena's part to say by way of recapitulation in a succinct kariká that these varieties are numerous: anekadha matah, unless he had other varieties, not mentioned already by name, in mind. That being the case, he probably referred to other enumerations well-known from other sources.
In fact, Siddhasena's enumeration overlaps with Dharmakirti's list of fallacies of the thesis, enumerated in NB.(2).49-53. Interestingly, Dharmakirti subsequently (NB(2).3.54%) adds a few more conditions and the failure to meet them would
render the paksa defective as well. Thus, Siddhasena by anekadha matah-may have referred to Dharmakirti's catalogue of defective paksas. But not necessarily to Dharmakirti's. He may have as well referred, e.g. to NP.(2).3.1".
In any case, NA.21 can in no way attest that Siddhasena was posterior or prior to Dharmakirti. It merely points to certain similarities between Siddhasena's list and the Buddhist tradition. Probably, it was the tradition of Sankarasvamin and Dharmakirti that Siddhasena alluded to by anekadha matah.
[13] In Siddhasena's subsequent aphorism, we find further similarities with NB., though they are less of linguistic nature (similarities in formulations) but rather of methodological character. Analogously to the structure of NB, Siddhasena-after describing fallacious theses-proceeds to discuss fallacious logical reasons (herabhasa). However, both the authors first look back to their previous definitions of a correct, not defective hetu: NA.22: anyathanupapannatvam hetor laksanam iritam /
tad-apratiti-sandeha-viparāsais tad-abhata // NB.(2).3.55-56: tri-ripa-lingákhyānam pararthanumanam i ty uktam fatra frayanan rūpanām ekasyapi rūpasyanuktau sadhanabhasah.uktāv apy asiddhau sandehe vi pratipadya
pratipādakayoh. Incidentally, it is the only case in both works that the authors first remind the render/hearer of the definition of a correct syllogistic member/term, and only then deal with its particular fallacies.
Likewise incidentally, both the authors first state general factors that invalidate a correct heru, either singly or jointly, and subsequently enumerate resulting fallacies one by one. There are two such general invalidating factors for Dharmakirti, viz. asiddhi and sandeha (NB.3.56,109): various combinations (with regard to
** /49/ (2) tatra pratyaksa-niräkyo yatha: afrāvanah sabda iti. /50/ (3) anumangnirakato yatha: nityah sabda it. /51/(47) pratiti-nirākoto yatha: acandrah sasiti. /52/ (5) sva-vacana-nirakato yatha: nanumanam pramānam./53/ Il calvärah pakşábhāsa niräktā bhavanti.
"evan siddhasya, asiddhasyapi sādhanatvenábhimatasya, svayam vidina tada sadhayirum anisasya, ukta-matrasya nirāktasya ca paryayena sadhyah tendiva
svarūpendbhimato vadina isto iniräktah paksa id paksa-laksanam anavadyan darsitant bhavati.
sådhayirum isto 'pi pratyaksadi-viruddhah paksabhāsaḥ, tad yatha: (1) pratyaksawiruddhah, (2) anumāna-Viruddhah, (3) agama-viruddhah. (4) loka-vinuddhah (5) sva vacana-viruddhah. (6) prasiddha-visesanah (7) aprasiddha-visesyah, (8) aprasiddhóbhayah. (9) prasiddha-sambandhas céti // tatra...
sl Either in NA.(according to Siddharsi) or in NA.17 (hetos tathópapatya va syāt prayogo nyathapi vå,sce NAV. ad loc: anyathapi vety anenavayave samudayopacárad anyathanupaparti laksayari).
NB.3.1: tri-rūpa-lingakhyanam parárthánumanam; cf. also NB.(2).2.5.11-12.

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trairūpya) are responsible for particular varieties of herv-abhäsa. For Siddhasena, however, there are three polemically, as it were such factors: tad-apratiti, sandeha and viparvasa; thus Dharmakirti's asiddhi factor would seem to bifurcate into Siddhasena's tad-apratiti and viparyāsa. For instance, for Siddhasena the fallacies of NB.3.58 and 59. would be probably a case of viparyāsa, whereas the fallacy of NB.3.60" should rather be considered a case of tad-apratiti. One could analyse all the remaining cases of fallacious hetus (ensuing from the combination of the factors asiddhi and sandeha) found in NB. and map them onto the triple classification of Siddhasena in the same manner. Practically, it would mean to decide which of the asiddhi cases of Dharmakirti would correspond to tad-apratiti cases of Siddhasena, and which to his viparasa cases. However, we do not have any explicit statement in the far too succinct NA., nor in NAV., that would provide us any algorithm of such a mapping, and the issue is open to our conjectures only.
Interestingly, in NP., for instance, to which NA. might be thought to have occasionally referred to, we do not find any trait of such invalidating factors as asiddhi and sandeha, or anything similar
(14) Also NA.23 and the classification of particular varieties of herv-abhāsas points to secondary sources of Siddhasena's ideas. There seem to be only two such potential sources, i.e. NB. and NP.: NA 23: asiddhas tv apratito yo yo 'nyathdivopapadyate/
viruddho yo 'nyathápy atra yukto 'naikāntikah sa full NB.(2).3.109: evam eşām trayāņām rūpāņām eka kasya dvayor dvayor w rūpayor asiddhau sandehe vayatha-yogam asiddhaviruddhanaikāntikās trayo hetv-abhäsäh.
NP (2).3.2. asiddhanaikāntika-viruddha hetv.abhāsaḥ Il However, NB. is a more probable source, inasmuch as the sequence of fallacies (asiddha, viruddha, anaikāntika) listed in NA. is exactly the same as that of NB.,
not of NP., where the two last varieties are interchanged (asiddha, anaikāntika. vinuddha). Dinnaga has the aniscita (or sandigdha) variety, istead of anaikintika.
What is striking is that Siddhasena has only three varieties of hery-abhasa, like Dharmakirti and Sankarasvamin, unlike Dinnaga. Moreover, Dharmakirti outspokenly rejects Difināga's subvariety, i.e. viruddhavyabhicărin". NB.(2).3.110: viruddhávyabhicáry api samsaya-hetur uktah. sa iha kasmän noktah. We do not find any polemical trait in NA., which could even suggest that Siddhasena adopted Dharmakirti's criticism of viruddhavyabhicarin. Apparently he subscribed to the criticism unhesitatingly.
It is worth noticing that NA. diverges also from the tradition of Kumarila, whose triple classification-into asiddha, sandigdha, viruddha in MSV-is more akin to Dinnaga's: MSV.5.4.75 p. 264 mentions the classification (samsayadi-viparyayah): subsequently (1) the threefold asiddha fallacious reason is mentioned in MŚV.5.4.76-83ab; (2) sandigdha and (3) viruddha occur in MSV.5.4.83cd-107 lee in MSV.5.4.83cd: sandeha-viparitata-heti catraniräkriau)besides, (2) sandigdha is further found in MSV.5.4.84b-96b, whereas (3) viruddha is mentioned in MSV.5.4.96cd-107ab. Kumārila nowhere in the Anumana-pariccheda section uses the term anaikantika as a herv-abhäsa, he has sandigdha instead, like Dinnaga, unlike Dharmakirti, Sankarasvamin and Siddhasena. However, Parthasarathi Misra follows the general post-Dharmakirtian typology in his classification, while commenting on Kumärila (p. 264.11 ad MSV.5.4.75): samprati het-abhäsän asiddhanaikantika-viruddhan prapanicayan ...
[15] NA.24-25 reveal further similarities pointing to NB. as its possible inspiration. One of them is the phraseological affinity as regards the use of drsantadosa, instead of drsfantábhasa, in both works. Both Siddhasena and Dharmakirti use the expression paksabhasa as well as similarly tad-abha and hetv-abhasa. However, both of them deviate from the general use of derivatives of a bhas to technically denote logical fallacies, when they refer to drsanta by the term dosa, and to drstanta only:
NA 24: sadharmyenátra drstanta-dosa ..., NA.25: vaidharmyendira drstanta-dosa ..... NB(2).3.123, 128-129: /123/ etendiva drstanta-dosa api nirastā bhavanti. /128/ sadharmyena drstanta-dosah. 7129/ vaidhamyendpi: paramánuvar karmavad äkāšavad iti sadhyady-vyatirekinah.
"NB.(2).3.57-9: /57/ ekasya napasya dharml-sambandhasydsiddhau sandehe vasiddho hetv-abhasah. /58/ yatha: anityah sabda iti sadhye caksuşatvam ubhayasiddham (not proved for both parties). 759/ cetanas tarava iti sadhye sarva-tvagapaharane marana prativady-asiddham, villan endriyayur-nirodha-laksanasya maranasyanendbhyupagamåt, tasya ca tarus asambhavi (not proved for the opponent).
*NB.(2).3.60: acetanah sukhadaya iti sädhya utpattimattvam anityatva vā sāmkhyasya svayan vādino 'siddham (not proved for the proponent himself).
**Cf. also RANDLE (1926: 68-69, 79).

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Indeed, also Śankarasvamin has dṛṣṭanta-dosa twice, but in a slightly different context, viz. that of refutation. Generally, when he discusses fallacious examples, he uses the standard term drsfântábhasa, e.g. NP.3.3: drsfântâbhaso dvividhaḥ: sadharmyeṇa vaidharmyena ca // The only two occurences of dratanta-dosa are found in NP.(2).6,756
38
Conspicuously, drstânta-dosa occurs as exemplification of disanani, in the series of sadhana-dosa, paksa-dosa, hetu-dosa and drstânia-dosa." Another occurrence of dosa (however, pratijña-dosa, not dṛṣṭánta-dosa) in NP. is attested in the concluding lines of NP.(2).3.1, that summarise the discussion on paksabhäsa". Also here, the term dosa has a more general meaning than the technical term äbhāsa, and the peculiarity of the usage of pratijña-dosa is confirmed by the closing uktāḥ paksabhäsäḥ. The usage of dosa in NP. confirms the fact that in works preceding Dinnaga, Dharmakirti or Sankarasvamin-e.g. in NS., VS., NBh., PBh., etc.-dosa is employed to denote general defects and is not used specifically as a terminus technicus in the sense of abhāsa.
[16] There is a structural similarity to be observed: both Siddhasena (NA.24) and Dharmakirti (NB.(2).3.122-3) explicitly define fallacious examples by referring to the definition of a correct hetu. Accordingly, NB.3.122 recapitulates the definition of correct hetu as well as conditions of its validity. The successive statement of NB.3.123 (etenaiva distanta-dosa api nirasta bhavanti; vide supra p. 37) shows that fallacious examples are refuted by referring to the correct definition of heru, and all fallacies of the example share the same characteristic. Similarly, Siddhasena relates the deficiency of drṣtântâbhāsas to deficient logical reasons and, with apalakṣaṇahetütthäḥ, he expresses the idea known from the work of Dharmakirti.
*(6) sādhana-doṣôdbhāvanāni düṣaṇāni // sädhana-doṣo nyūnatvam. pakṣa-doṣaḥ pratyakṣadi-viruddhatvam, hetu-doso 'siddhânaikantika-viruddhatvam. drstanta-dosaḥ sadhana-dharmâdy-asiddhatvam. tasyódbhavanam präśnika-pratyayanam düşaṇam (7) abhūta-sädhana-doṣódbhāvanāni düşaṇābhäsäni ll sampūrṇe sädhane nyūnatvavacanam, aduşta-pakse paksa-dosa-vacanam. siddha-hetuke 'siddha-hetukam vacanam. ekanta-hetuke 'nekânia-hetukam vacanam. aviruddha-hetuke viruddha-hetukam vacanam. aduşta-dṛṣṭante duşta-dṛstânta-dosa-vacanam. etāni düşaṇābhāsāni, na hy ebhiḥ para-pakso düşyate, niravadyatvät tasya Ility uparamyate II.
57 NP.6: sädhana-doşódbhāvanāni düşaṇāni II sädhana-doşo nyūnatvam. paksadosaḥ pratyaksádi-viruddhatvam. hetu-doso 'siddhanaikantika-viruddhatvam. drstantadosah sadhana-dharmády-asiddhatvam. tasyódbhavanaṁ präśnika-pratyayanam düşaṇam II.
58 eşam vacanani dharma-svarupa-niräkaraṇa-mukhena pratipadan asambhavataḥ sadhana-vaiphalyatas céti pratijñā-doṣaḥ II uktäḥ paksabhäsäḥ //
ON THE DATE OF THE NYAYAVATARA
[17] Strangely, in NA.24-25 Siddhasena refers to some tradition by nyaya-vidiritäh as regards the classification of fallacious examples. However, there seems to have been no earlier (or contemporary) Jaina source he could have referred to. Thus, in default of any extant evidence attesting to a Jaina tradition which offered a typology of fallacious examples, one is prone to assume-unless we find any indication to the contrary-that, apparently, he must have referred to a general Indian tradition, where we do find such a typology of sädharmya- and vaidharmyadrstântábhāsas.
39
Besides, he also seems to have taken it for granted that the reader/hearer could easily determine what is meant by sadhyadi-vikaladayah in NA.24. This task would naturally be quite easy for anyone who was acquainted with NB.(2).3.124-125. At the same time, however, his elliptical formulation sädhyâdi-vikaladayaḥ was, polemically as it were, unequivocal enough to rule out the three remaining varieties, viz. (A7) ananvaya, (A8) apradarsitánvaya and (A9) viparitânvaya, formulated by Dharmakirti (NB.(2).3.126-127), which could by no means have been hinted at by the formulations of NA.24.
Similarly, the sixfold classification of dissimilar drṣtäntäbhāsas systematised in NA.25 (sädhya-sadhana-yugmānām anivṛtteś ca samsayat) closely corresponds to the first six fallacious examples of NB.(2).3.129-132: (VI) sädhyavyatirekin, (V2) sädhanavyatirekin, (V3) sadhya-sädhanâvyatirekin, (V4) sandigdha-sädhyavyatireka, (V5) sandigdha-sadhana-vyatireka, (V6) sandigdha-sädhya-sädhanavyatireka. Seemingly, NA. and NB. are at variance as regards terminology, for Siddhasena's formulation: sädhya-sadhana-yugmānām anivṛtteś ca samsayat, differs from Dharmakirti's (VI)-(V6). In my opinion, however, anivṛttes and samsayat of NA.25 indicate rather plainly -vyävrtta and sandigdha- as the last and first elements of the compounds (V1)-(V3) and (V4)-(V6), respectively. Optionally, we could have (VI) sädhyânivṛtta, (V2) sadhananivṛtta, (V3) sadhya-sadhananivrtta, (V4) samsayita-sädhya, (VS) samsayita-sadhana, (V6) samsayita-sadhya-sadhana, which is not different at all from the idea expressed in NB.(2).3.129-132.59
59 True, theoretically speaking, one could also interpret NA.25 to enforce the acceptance of only (1) sädhyavyatirekin, (2) sädhanavyatirekin, (3) sädhyasadhanavyatirekin-to use Dharmakirti's terminology-and only one or more varieties out of (4) sandigdha-sädhya-vyatireka, (5) sandigdha-sadhana-vyatireka, (6) sandigdha-sädhya-sädhana-vyatireka, but not necessarily all of them. While anivrtteḥ is unquestionably construed with sadhya-sadhana-yugmänäm, the expression samsayar might be conjectured to be taken separately, without any dependence on all elements of sädhya-sädhana-yugmānām. In this respect, attention should be drawn to an instance of different conceivable ways of construing an aphorism of NA. by

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As for another possible source of insipration, also NP.(2).3.3 distinguished-in accord with the prevalent tradition of those days-two general categories: similar and dissimilar fallacious examples (drstäntäbhäso dvividhaḥ: sädharmyena vaidharmyena ca //). However, a closer look at Sankarasvamin's varieties reveals essential differences, apart from the terminological ones. Accordingly, I see no way how the formulations of fallacies of examples based on similarity found in Nyayapravesa could be interpreted to have influenced Siddhasena's sädhyadivikalâdayah. As regards Nyaya-pravesa on fallacies of examples based on dissimilarity, the influence might have been restricted to (V1), (V2) and (V3) only.
40
[18] Also NA.26, where criticism refutation (düşana) and its fallacy (düṣaṇabhasa) are discussed, might have partly been inspired by Dharmakirti's NB.(2).3.137-140. Thus, NA.26a-c: vädy-ukte sädhane prokta-doṣānām udbhavanam düşanam, reveals a certain similarity-in terms of both formulations and ideas to the duşaṇa-section of NB.(2).3.137-8: /137/ düşaṇā nyünatády-uktiḥ. /138/ ye purvam nyunatâdayaḥ sadhana-dosa uktās teşām udbhavanam düşanaṁ. tena parestartha-siddhi-pratibandhät. Less conspicuous, though, is the remaining portion of the second hemistich of NA.26: niravadye tu düsanabhāsa-nämakam ||
commentators which we encounter in the case of NA.8: drstêstävyähatäd väkyät paramarthabhidhayinaḥ I tattva-grähitayotpannaṁ mānam sabdam prakirtitam // The aphorism is explained differently by the commentators, viz. (1) NAV. ad loc.: drstena pramanavalokitenestaḥ pratipadayisito 'vyähato 'nirākṛtaḥ samarthyad artho yasmin väkye tat-tatha; and (2) NAT. ad loc.: drstenêty-ädi. ayam bhinnadhikaranas tri-pado bahu-vrihiḥ yadi va isto vyahato 'rtho yatra tad iştávyahatam vakyam, tadanu drstena pramana-nirņitena istävyähatam iti tat-puruşah (cf. BALCEROWICZ (1999: 4, n. 8)). Definitely, such an unnatural interpretation-i.e. to take anivrtteś to refer to all elements of the triad sadhya-sadhana-yugmānām, while limiting the scope of samsayat to selected element(s) of the compound sädhya-sadhana-yugmānām-would be a mere guesswork, and one would rather, as a rule, construe sädhya-sädhana-yugmanām with both anivṛttes and samsayat, and obtain six varieties of dissimilar drstântábhāsas. One would not, in any case, obtain any further varieties mentioned by Dharmakirti in NB.(2).3.133-135: (V7) avyatireka, (V8) apradarsita-vyatireka and (V9) viparitavyatireka. Thus, Siddhasena apparently does not accept without reservation the Buddhist typology by rejecting (V7), (V8) and (V9).
NP.(2).3.3.1: tatra sädharmyeṇa tavad drstántábhäsaḥ pañca-prakāraḥ, tad yatha: (1) sadhana-dharmasiddhaḥ, (2) sädhya-dharmasiddhaḥ, (3) ubhaya-dharmasiddhaḥ, (4) ananvayah, (5) viparitánvayas cêtill tatra....
61
6 NP.(2).3.3.2. vaidharmyenapi drstântabhasaḥ pañca-prakāraḥ, tad yatha: (1) sädhydvyävrttaḥ, (2) sädhanävyävrttaḥ, (3) ubhayävyävrttaḥ, (4) avyatirekaḥ, (5) viparita-vyatirekaś céti Il tatra...
ON THE DATE OF THE NYAYAVATARA
The
corresponding duṣaṇabhasa-section of NB.(2).3.139-140 reads: /139/ düsanabhäsäs tu jätayaḥ. /140/ abhūta-dosódbhāvanāni jäty-uttaraniti. The reoccurring element duṣaṇabhasa is not decisive at all, whereas Siddhasena's niravadye could be a vague echo of Dharmakirti's abhūta-dosa.
As a matter of fact, NA.26c-d (niravadye tu düşanābhāsa-namakam) betrays more affinity to the closing section of NP.(2).7: abhūta-sadhana-dosôdbhāvanāni dusanabhäsäni ... etāni düşaṇabhāṣāni, na hy ebhiḥ para-pakso düşyate, niravadyatvat tasya Il ity uparamyate // It is this section, in all probability, that influenced both Dharmakirti's NB.(2).3.139–140 (düṣaṇābhāsās tu jätayaḥ, abhūtadosódbhāvanāni jäty-uttaraniti.) and the portion of NA.26c-d in question.
[19] The twenty-sixth aphorism (the exposition of dusana) is the last section of the Nyayavatāra, where possible influences from Dharmakirti's side-in terms of Siddhasena's direct use of Dharmakirti vocabulary or his response to Dharmakirti's ideas are easily detectable. Strangely enough, the topic dealt with in NA.26 closely corresponds to the final issue discussed by Dharmakirti in NB. Thus, the conspicuous absence of further possible Dharmakirtian traces in NA.-theoretically derivable from other works of Dharmakirti-points, in my opinion, to the fact that Siddhasena-while composing NA.-closely followed the structure and the contents of NB., up to NA.26.
In the remaining aphorisms (28-32) Siddhasena discusses issues peculiar to Jainism (viz. corollaries of kevala-jñāna and syad-vada) and there could hardly have been any Buddhist influence to be noticed in any case: [27] the character of absolute cognition (kevala-jñāna); [28] the result of valid cognition in general; the results of absolute cognition (kevala-jñāna); the results of valid cognitive procedures other than kevala-jñāna; [29] the multiplex character of reality; the domain of cognitive acts; the domain of viewpoints (naya); [30] the character of viewpoints (naya); the description of the doctrine of seven-fold modal description (syad-väda); [31] the character of the cognitive subject, the soul (jiva); [32] the eternal character of Jaina epistemology.
[20] The phrase pramaṇa-phala occurring in NA.28 is occasionally taken to be a proof of its dependence on Dinnaga. It is commonly assumed that the phrase in
62 Cf., c.g. QVARNSTRÖM (1999: 178): 'Furthermore, the Nyāyāvatära (28) uses the signature element of Dignaga, namely "pramaņaphala"; in his note 61, he further draws the reader's attention to the work of G. Dreyfus and Chr. Lindtner: 'The Yogācāra Philosophy of Dignaga and Dharmakirti". Studies in Central & East Asian Religions. Vol. 2, Ed. by Per K. Sørensen et al. Copenhagen 1989: 27-52.

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question goes back to Dinnaga, e.g. PS.(1).1.8cd-10. In these verses Dinnaga asserts that the result of pramāna is pramana itself, or introspective cognition which consists in the determining of an object (sva-samvitti, artha-riscaya). Precisely the same idea (āmánubhāva, artha-viniscaya) is echoed in PV.2.306-307ab, 3390 Generally, the idea is discussed at length by Dharmakirti both in his PVin.(1).78.12-100.26 and in PV.2.301-366, 388-391. Accordingly, NA.28 might be taken to be a rejoinder of both Dinnāga and Dharmakirti, and there seems to nothing decisive to be found in NA 28 that would exclude any of the two authors.
On the other hand, any attempt to look for inspiration of NA.28 in works of either Dinnaga or Dharmakirti seems to me to be a result of misapprehension of the true import of the aphorism. In it, Siddhasena does not discuss the problem whether pramana-phala can or cannot be equated with pramana itself, which is the major concern of Dinnaga and Dharmakirti. What is intended in the verse are rather extraepistemological issues of both soteriological (kevala) and mundane (sesa) character, viz. the result of pramana is the cessation of nescience' (afna vinivartana), whereas the result of specific kinds of cognition is two-fold. The first category subsumes happiness and indifference (sukhôpekse) in case of the perfect knowledge (kevala), being a prerequisite of liberation (moksa) and commonly taken by the
lainas to be tantamount to the destruction of nescience. Since it results from the destruction of karman" it is necessarily associated with innate happiness, etc. that are inhibited by karman. The other-pragmatic, as it were category of results refers to the faculty of appropriation and avoidance' (ädäna-hana-dhi) in case all the remaining kinds of (mundane) cognition. Consequently, what really the verse is reminiscent of is rather NBh.1.1.3. yadā jānant tada hanópádanopekabuddhayah phalam, with all the three elements of hana, upadana / adana and apeksā, as a result (phala) of cognition (ñana).
What is important to remember is that there are numerous similarities, more and less conspicuous, and not all of them are decisive when taken alone. Some of these similarities indicated on the preceding pages may equally well point to a tradition or author prior to Dharmakirti, viz. to Dinaga or Sankarasvamin. Some of such similarities may be due to the general style of writing, of arranging a philosophical treatise, of structuring a philosophical discourse, etc. We should remember that both the Nydya-bindu and the Nyayavatāra were primarily handbooks of logic and their purpose was predominantly didactic. Nonetheless, the accumulation of evidence only enforces those of them that are quite conclusive and convincing. To sum up. my impression is that in all dubious cases, when both NP. and NB. seem relevant as possible sources of Siddhasena's ideas, Siddhasena probably took recourse to Dharmakirti rather than to Sankarasvamin, inasmuch as in all those rare cases when there are clear similarities to be found between NA. and NP., they are also traceable in NB. However, not all cases of similarities between NA. and NB. can be shown with regard to NA. and NP. In other words, the development of certain ideas that had taken place in the period connecting Sankarasvamin and Dharmakirti, was reflected in the contents of NA. and some ideas still absent from NP. that were later either introduced or modified by Dharmakirti, found their way into NA. Similarly, certain influences to be found in NA. point both to Dinnaga and to Dharmakirti. However, Siddhasena seems to be acquainted with certain new developments or ideas that first developed with Dharmakirti (not necessarily only in NB.) and are not found in Dinnaga's works.
Paradoxically as it were, would it not be thinkable to claim that it was Siddhasena who influenced Dharmakirti and who was the intermediary stage between Dinnaga and Dharmakirti? For at least three reasons we should dismiss such a possibility.
savyipara-pratitivar pramānam phalam eva sat // swa-sant with phalar vatra tadnipo hy artha-niscayah / visaykaratdivdsya pramanam tena mlyate Il yad-dbhdsam prameyan tar pramäņa-phalate punah / grähakákara-yanvilli trayari ndtah prthakkrtam Il. For the Sanskrit text, see HATTOKI (1968: 97, n. 1.55-107, n. 1.67). Tibetan text reads as follows: Vasudhararakṣita/Sen-rgyal 15a.5-15b.4: Kanakavarman/Dad-pahi fes-rab 956.5-96.5:
bya dan beas par togs pahi phyir bya dan boas par togs pahi phyir tshad mahi hbras bu nid du ndod || horas bu id du yod shadma || rah rig layari hdir hbras bu
yai na ranrig hdir hbras bu de y no bo las dones
de y no bo las dones yul gyi shanba hdi Rid hdi
yal gisan ba nid de hdipi Ishad made yis hjal bar byed
tshad made yis hjal bar bya gan she shanba de gsal bya
gan Itar snan ba de gral bya Ishad ma dan dehi hbras buni tshad ma dari dehi hbras bu ni hdsin ram rig pa de vi phyir! hdsin ram rig paho de yi phyir de gsume tha dad du ma byas il de gsum tha dad du ma byas
tasmát prameyddhigateh sadhanan meya-rüpata / sadhane yatra tal-karmasambandho na prasiddhyati Il si ca fasyarma-bhutiwa tena ndrthantaran phalam/ yadd savisayari Manar Adnanse 'rtha-vyavasthiteh/ tadd ya dimnubhavah sa evártha-viniscayah //
"Cf. TS.10.1: moha-ksayaj jana-darfandvaranántaraya-kayic ca kevalam.
Cf, e.g. TBh10.7 (p. 231) v.23 fl. (samsara-visayatitam muktanamavyayant sukham).
"Cf. also FRANCO (1997:65).

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There is, in the first place, a continuous tradition in epistemic concepts referred to by both Dharmakirti and Siddhasena that go back to Dinnaga. Dharmakirti himself refers to Dinnaga so explicitly that would seem highly implausible to believe that he had availed himself of the Jaina epistemological tradition with respect to the number of points mentioned above in 99 1-20, without even a single mention of it one would expect Dharmakirti embarking on at least an accidental discussion of a few issues he had supposedly taken over from the Jainas. Secondly, Satkari MOOKERJEE, who believed Siddhasena to flourish in the sixth century and to precede Dharmakirti," puzzled over what was in his opinion Dharmakirti's lack of reaction as regards Siddhasena's interpretation of the intrinsic invariable concomitance (antar-vypl) and the superfluous character of the example as an exemplification (hahir-udähti) external to the most elementary constituents of the proof formula, as well as the definition of the logical reason as 'inexplicability otherwise. This becomes no longer a query when we assume that Siddhasena was postDharmakirtian. Moreover, it is for precisely the same reason that also Patrasvamin should be taken to flourish after Dharmakirti. Thirdly, the concepts of svartha-vákya and pardrtha-vákya (NA.10) as well as svártha-pratyakpa and parartha-pratyaksa (NA.11) would have with certainty evoked a refutal from the side of Dharmakirti, had he known about it. Likewise, Dharmakirti would have certainly commented upon the idea of non-erroneousness of inference (anumanam ... abhrantan) proven by its being a cognitive criterion alone (pramanarvat), found in NA.5. The same holds true for the idea of inexplicability otherwise' (anyathanupapannata). Thus, any supposition that Siddhasena preceded Dharmakirti can safely be dismissed.
Accordingly, depending on whether we follow the widely accepted dating of Dharmakirti, viz. c. 600-660 or the results of latest research by KIMURA (1999) who assigns the years 550-620 for Dharmakirti, we would have for the terminus post quem Siddhasena as the author of the Nyayavatara circa 620 or 660, respectively,
There is still another factor to be taken account of, viz. the question of the defining characteristic of the logical reason (hetu) characterised as the fact of being otherwise inexplicable' or 'inexplicability otherwise' (anyathanupapannata,
avathinupapatti) in NA 22: anyathupapannarvan hetor laksanam iritam. The author clearly refers to an earlier source and the idea did not originate with him in his NA. Independently, we find the idea reported and criticised by Santaraksita in TSA (1).1364 ff. (p. 405 r.) in the context of the validity of inference (anumana)." The most famous and relatively often quoted verse is TSa. 1369:
anyathanupapannalar yatra tatra trayena kim
nanyathanupapannatvaniyatra tatra trayena kim // . Significantly enough, Santarakṣita TSa.(1).1364, p. 405.1) mentions Patrasvamin as the source of the idea: anyathey-adina patrasvami-matam asankate..., and the treatise in question is the lost Tri-laksana kadarthana by Patrasvamin, identified occasionally with Pätrakesarin / Pátrakesarisvamin - Vidyananda. For obvious reasons this Patrasvamin cannot be Vidyananda (c. 850), the author of the Slokavårttika on Umisvati's Tattvartha-sútra- SUKHLAL-DOSHI (1928) and CHATTERJEE (1978: 331) would have it-but some else who preceded Santaraksita (6 725-788)", the teacher of Kamalaśīla. Since the author of NA. alludes to his
"The relevant section is edited and translated in KUNST (1939: 11-53). See also PATHAK (1930-31) 71-83
Strangely enough, Santarakṣita in TSa. interchanges the pádas ab with cd. The verse is also found in (1) TSVA. p. 203 [the discussion of anyathamupapafil and the refutation of tri-lakrana is found there on pp. 198-217). (2) TBV. Vol. II, p. 569.28-29. (3) PMI 2.1.
9 33 (p. 45.17-18). Hemacandra's criticism against the Buddhist idea of trairūpya in PMI 2.1.9 933 (p. 45.1-16) closely follows the exposition of Patrasvåmin's aphorisms quoted in TSa attesting to the authenticity of the quotation. Hemacandra, instead of the terms anyathanupapatti, uses the expression avina-bhava, cf. PMI 2.1.9 (p. 43.34-35): svarthan swa-niscita-sadhyavina-bhavalka-laksanat sadhanát addhya Janam. The formulation addhydvind-bhāvaika-laksanat resembles both Patrasvamin's Tri-laksana-kadarthana (tendika-laksano hetu pradhanyad gamako ste nah/ - TSa. 1379) as well as NA.Sac: sadhyavina-bhuno lingar sadhya-niscayakan smptam! anumanam.
A reference to the work is found in DHAKY (1995: 43), who refers to Jugal Kishor Mukhtar: 'Sammatisütra aur Siddhasena' (Hindi), Jaina Sahitya aur Itihasa par Vilada Prakåsa, Calcutta 1956: 538-543 [the work was not available to me).
CR. UPADHYE (1971: 14-15), PATHAK (1930: passim) and PATHAK (1930-31: passim), who refers to him as Pitrakesari Vidyananda or as Pátrakesarisvämi.
CE. STEINKELLNER-MUCH (1995: 56). ** CC. BHATTACHARYYA (1926: ixvi-ixvii): 'In that case Patrasvamin must be an earlier author than both Santarakṣita and Vidyananda, and he must have first
See: MOOKERJEE (1935: 398), * See: MOOKERJEE (1935:4-5): 'What however strikes us is the intriguing situation created by Siddhasena's reference to antarvyāpti and the definition of her (probans) as anyathamupapanna in the verse 20 and 22 respectively. It is nothing short of enigma that this innovation of the Jaina logicians did not evoke a reply from Dharmakirti.
See: FRAUWALLNER (1961). Cf. also STEINKELLNER-MUCH (1995: 23).

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predecessors and Säntaraksita mentions only Pätrasvamin, it must have been the latter who was responsible for the idea of anyathdrupaparnava." Had it been Siddhasena who introduced the idea, Santaraksita would not, in all probability, have missed the opportunity to mention this. Certainly Pätrasyimin is post-Dinagan, for his Tri-laksana kadarthana was conceived to refute the latter, but his dating is quite uncertain. It is surprising, nonetheless, that Santaraksita seems nowhere to allude to the NA. or its author. Consequently, the widespread opinion assuming that NA. is the first Jaina treatise on epistemology per se loses its weight, inasmuch we can safely assume that Siddhasena had his predecessor in the person of Pātrasvamin.
As regards the terminus ante quem, in view of the fact that the verse no. 4 of the Nyayavatara is incorporated into SDSa as verse no. 56, it should be assigned to the date of Haribhadrasüri. A supposition that it is SDSa 56 that was the source which NA.4 was borrowed from and that NA.4 is merely an interpolation seems inadmissible to me. NA.4 fits ideally the argumentative structure of the text: (1) NA.I states the definition of pramana, as well as the types and a general criterion of such a division, (2) NA.2 is polemical concerning the meaninglessness of formulating a definition for a well-known term/idea of pramana, (3) NA.3 is a rejoinder to the objection, (4) NA.4 defines the two main divisions of pramana along with a specific reason for such a division, (5) NA.5 opens a section dealing
with erroneousness of pramanas, etc. The use of vocabulary in NA.4 is not unusual for NA. Coincidentally, two adjacent verses, viz. NA.4 and NA.5, are stylistically and structurally quite akin pada a-b: reason (aparoksataya, sadhyavina-bhuno Magdt) + 'object+ verbal derivative in the meaning of a present participle Cartharya grähakant, sadhya-niscayakan) + ... + pada e subject (pratyaksam, anumanan) ... Admittedly, the similarity is not a crucial argument in favour of the same authorship of the two verses, however, there is nothing that could speak against a common authorship. The argument gains on strength in view of the fact that Haribhadrasüri quotes the verse no. 2 of NA. in his Asaka" and refers to its author as Mahamati
In view of the above, DHAKY'S (1995: 44) claim"-to handle the discomfort that Haribhadra himself ascribes one of the verses to a Mahimati—that both NA.2 and 4 were taken from lost dvitrinsikas of Siddhasena Divikara is highly debatable to me. Not only NA.4 seems to represent an original karika of NA., but the same holds good in the case of karika 2. We could not make head or tail of NA.2 (the objection) if we did not have NA.1. Moreover, NA 3 (the rejoinder) would be pointless without NA 2 All the lost dvitrinsikas of Siddhasena Divakara as a reference source in
propounded the theory that valid reason is that the existence of which cannot be maintained unless it is invariably concomitant with the major term ... cir. 700 A.D.'.
"Cf. MUKTHAR (1948) [according to UPADHYE (1971:"30)]: '7) The Nyayavatára is composed centuries later than the Sanmari-sútra, because it shows the influence of Pātrasvami (later than Samantabhadra) as well as Dharmakirti and Dharmottara'; and V.P. Johrapurkar ("Introduction to VTP., pp. 41 ff.) quoted in n. 5 above. See also DHAKY (1995: 42-3): ...the first foot of the karika 22 concerning the hetu-laksana (character of probans) reflects sense agreement, even partial verbal concordance with the verses from Patrasvămi's (Pätrakesari's) Trilaksanakadarthana cited by the Buddhist scholiast Santaraksita in his Tattvasangraha (c. 2 quarter of the 8 century A. D.)" SHASTRI (1990: 31) is a bit more reserved and does not take for granted that Patrasvamin was anterior to Siddhasena: "Nyayavatāra also defines hetu in the same manner.'
"Both NA.1 and 4 go against the prevalent Jaina tradition to subsume cases of sensory cognition, inference and verbal testimony under paroksa, whereas pratyaka was taken to denote extra-sensory and extra-mental acts of cognition (viz. avadhi, manah-paryaya and kevala). For Siddhasena the criterion of directness (akra) was not the cognising subject, or the soul (akşaajivaatman), but like in the general pramana tradition--the senses (aka indriya).
The work is not available to me. I am forced to rely here on Pl. Dalsukhbhai MALVANIA (1979: 287-288). Cf. also UPADHYE (1971: xxiv) and DHAKY (1995: 44).
UPADHYE (1971: xxiv) is right to point out that Haribhadra, in his Asaka, quotes the Mydyavatara 2, by referring to its author as Mahlmati. Elsewhere, however Haribhadra speaks plainly about the author of the Sanmatias Divakars and Srutakevalin. This enforces the supposition against the authorship of Siddhasena Divakara of NA
*A formidable objection, however, to the above-postulated identification (Siddharsi was the author of both NA. and NAV.-P.B.) as well as the period determination (ninth tenth century for NA.-P.B.) can be raised on the grounds of the ascription of a verse, which appears as the karika 2 of the Nydydatára, to Mahamati (Siddhasena Divakara) by Yakinis nu Haribhadra sûri (active c. A. D. 745-785) in his Astaka". And the karid 4 figures as a part of the Saddarsana-famcaya of the same Haribhadra suri". Since Haribhadra suri ascribed the particular verse (karika 2) to Siddhasena Divlikara, it must be so. However, this karika could be originally from some dwitrindika, one of the lost 11 of Siddhasena Divakars, perhaps the Pramanadvatrindika, from which Gandhahasti Siddhasena quotes in his sa-bhâsyaTattvarthadhigama-sútra v The karika 4 in the Sad-darsana amcaya may likewise have been taken from one of the unavailable datrimfika of Siddhasena Divikara. Alternatively, if that verse is Haribhadra's own, Siddharsi must have borrowed it from the Saddarsana, In any case, Haribhadra and Siddharsi could have common sources from which they apparently may have drawn.'

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different interpretations of a karika, or diverges from the contents of NA., e.g. in the
case of NA 40
argumentation resemble rather a kind of fasa-visana. Naturally, as long as we do not have all dvätrinsikas written by Siddhasena Divakara, we cannot, theoretically speaking, preclude the possibility that the verses indeed were taken from some lost dvatriitsika. But such an argumentation is not very constructive. I see no reason to doubt the authenticity of karikas 2 and 4 as long as they for a consistent logical part of the Nyayavatāra as a whole and bear stylistic similarities to adiacent karikas, especially when the counter-arguments begin with 'perhaps' and are of merely could-or-may-have-been nature.
Further, the identification of Siddharşi as the author of both NA. and NAV.. postulated by DHAKY, has very weak foundations. In the first place, there is ample evidence that Siddharsi (the author of NAV.) is not Siddhasena (the author of NA.) and that the two texts were written by different authors, inasmuch as Siddharşi refers to the author of NA, explicitly, although not by name, but by the term dcārya or sūtra-kry, to cite a few cases only: [1] Introductory lines of NAV.3: /3/adhunácaryo grhitas tävakino 'bhiprāyo 'smábhir it para pratyayayaris tanmatam anudrávya tad evinumanyamānas tathapi laksanókieh sāphalyam avedayann aha: ... (2] the final sentence of NAV.3. tad var pramana-laksana sámányena praripadya tad-gatam kucodyam paryaháry acáryena; (3) NAV.13: yad varyantábhyasena parikarmita-matitvat tavatdiva prastuta-prameyam avabudhya tada hetu-pratipadanam eva kriyate, seabhidhänasya śrot-samskärákäritaya nairarthakydd ity-adau hetu-pratipādanam sūtra-kota parartham anumanam uklam, (4) NAV.29: ata evacāryasya na tal-laksanádi-svarüpa-kathane 'pi mahanadarah. Additionally, in some cases (e.g. on NA.8), Siddharsi does offer at least two
Thus, we can safely take the date-brackets for the Nyāyavatara to be firmly fixed after 620 C.E. (Dharmakirti) and Patrasvamin and before c. 800 C.E. (Haribhadrasüri)." As for the date of Haribhadrasuri, JACOBI (1926: Introducti assigns Haribhadra to c. 750, whereas UPADHYE (1971: xxv) to c. 750-800 C.E. and DHAKY (1995:44) to c. 745-785. However, the terminus post quem for Haribhadra is Arcata, since the latter is quoted in Haribhadrasūri's NPV.9.15-194. Arcața, the teacher of Dharmottara, can be assigned to c. 730-790 or 720-780.87
Finally, as regards the name of the author of the Nyayavatara, we are indeed in a quandary. Probably the earliest indication of his name is, as it has been mentioned above (p. 47). Haribhadrasuri who makes mention of him under the appellation "Mahamati'. The subsequent source from which we learn that NA. was composed by a Siddhasena is NAVV. of Santisūri. The author of NA. is explicitly identified there in at least four places. In the last reference Säntisüri is even more specific to give the full name of the author as well: Siddhasenarka". All other references we
I have dealt briefly with the style of NA.4 above. The same is even more true for NA.2 that is closely followed by NA.3 (the most conspicuous similarities underlined):
12/ prasiddhani pramānani vyavahāras ca tat-kotah/ + pramana-laksanasyoktau jriyate na pravojanam // /3/prasiddhanári pramanānām laksan kta prayojanam
lad-vyamoha-nittih späd vyāmüdha-manasām iha //
DHAKY (1995: 43) is so far right that indeed Siddharşi nowhere mentions the author of Nyayávatára by name: 'As noted in the beginning, Siddharsi does not ascribe the Nyayavatara to Siddhasena Divakara or to a different Siddhasena or for that matter to any other author.' However, he clearly misses the point when he further claims: 'Nor does he mention it as a composition of a purvācārya, vrddhācārya, or some cirantandcărya. Also, in his verse by verse exposition, he nowhere uses qualificatory phrases such as sāstrakära, sūtrakára, kärikäkära, acarya, etc. which may have denoted a second, an earlier revered personage, as the karikas' author."
* Siddhasena emphasises the way of cognising, or the manner of grasping (an object]', whereas Siddharşi takes the expression to refer to the existence and the nature of the cognoscible. See p. 26 above.
Thus, I cannot but side with the opinion already expressed in VAIDYA (1928: xx): "The terminus a quo would be the date of Dharmakirti and the terminus ad quem that of Haribhadra."
" Acc. to STEINKELLNER-MUCH (1995: 119) the original title found to the colophon is Nyaya-pravesa-tika šisya-hita. "See: STEINKELLNER-MUCH (1995:64) and FRAUWALLNER (1961: 148).
NAVV.365 7 (p. 95.8): srisiddhasena-ghanta-sphusa-gihsalakan fuddham avapya vimalanii vihitam mayditat II, [2] NAVV.21.$ 2 (p. 78.9-10): evan-rūpasya
arthah.. [3] NAVV.53.9 2 (p. 107.18) siddhasenasya sütra-kartuh.... (4) NAVV.1.$ 11 (p. 13.14-15): tar kirit svåtantryena? na ty dha-siddhasenarka-sútritam itt. siddhasena eva jaga-jantu-mano-mohasamantām asitamah samáhápoha-karität arka iva arkah, tena sutritam.
Indeed, Säntisūri speaks of Siddhasenårka, not of Siddhasena Divākara, as UPADHYE (1971: xxiv) would have it: i) ... The earliest author, as far as I know, who specifies the name of Siddhasena Divakara as the author of the Myayavatara is Santisuri of the 11" century A.D. or so.' Nevertheless, I would side with UPADHYE in asserting that 'Arka' is just another name for "Divākara'. Thus, I see absolutely no justification for the contention of DHAKY (1995: 49, n. 9), who-commenting on the clause: siddhasena eva jaga-jantu-mano-moha-samtal-tamasitamah-samih poha-karitat

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encounter in the Jaina literature of this period are to Siddhasena Diväkara as the author of other works, but none to him as the author of NA." In view of the extant evidence, the opinion of MUKTHAR (1948)" still holds good that the author of the Nyayavatara is apparently different from the author of the Sanmati-tarka-prakarana and from the author of the twenty-one dvātrimsikäs ascribed to Siddhasena Diväkara. Strangely enough, the available colophons of NA. and NAV. contain no reference to the name of the author of NA. Since even the point is not clear whether the author of NA. was a Siddhasena, not to mention the problem of deciding which Siddhasena he could have been," I would-for the sake of convenience-suggest to tentatively call the author of the Nyayavatara Siddhasena Mahämati, after the specific identification of Haribhadrasuri.
50
arka iva arkaḥ, tena sūtritam-maintains that ""Arka" here is not in the sense of "Diväkara" but "essence". Clearly, arka here is an epithet of Siddhasena, who is compared to the sun (arka iva; arka-divä-kara), and by him (tena) the idea discussed before is composed in a sutra form (sütritam). If we took arka as DHAKY would like it, the whole clause could hardly be construable.
50 Cf., eg. [1] UPADHYE (1971: xiii): 'Haribhadra is one of the earlier authors to mention Siddhasena Divakara and his Sanmati. First, he calls him Śrutakevalin; and secondly, he tells us that his name was Diväkara (p. 1). Then he has a pun on the name that he was like Divakara, sun, to the darkness of Duḥṣama-kala.' [2] UPADHYE (1971: xvii): ...Pujyapáda...quotes Siddhasena's Stuti III.16 in his Sarvärthasiddhi (II.10; VIL.13). [3] H. R. Kapadia (AJP., 'Introduction', Vol. II, pp. 98 ff.): "Haribhadra refers to Siddhasena in his Sammaipayarana, in his Anekantajayapatäkä as well as in his Pamcavatthuya (vv.1047-8), calling him Suyakevali. Jinadasagani (c. 676 A.D.) refers to him thrice in his Nisihavisehacunni. [4] DAVE (1962): "So Siddhasena is earlier than Mallavadi and the tradition puts him as a contemporary of Vikramaditya who flourished in 57 B.C.' [according to UPADHYE (1971: 53)] and 'Akalanka and Vidyananda quote the Sanmati. [according to UPADHYE (1971: 59)].
91 The following points are clear: (1) The Dväs were not composed in the present order; (2) they are not of one and the same Siddhasena; (3) the Nyäyävatāra is one of them; (4)... No indisputable evidence is brought forth for the common authorship of the Dvas, Nyäyävatära and Sanmati.... There were thus three clear and distinct Siddhasenas: (1) the author of Sanmati; (2) the author of Nyayavatara; (3) and another, the author of some Dva.s.' [according to UPADHYE (1971: 28)].
92 It is not established that Arka was indeed used by Säntisūri as a synonym of
Diväkara,
AJP.
BALCEROWICZ 1999
BALCEROWICZ 1995 - Balcerowicz, Piotr: 'Sankarasvamin:
BALCEROWICZ
(forthcoming)
CHATTERJEE 1978
DAVE 1962
DHAKY 1981-82
Balcerowicz, Piotr: 'On the Relationship of the Nyayavatära and the Sammati-tarka-prakaraṇa.' Presented at the X World Sanskrit Conference, Turin, April 3-8, 2000. BHATTACHARYYA 1926- Bhattacharyya, B.: 'Foreword' to TSa.(1).i-cxvii. BSSBh Sankara: Brahma-sutra-sänkara-bhasya. Ed. with the commentaries: Bhasya-ratna-prabha of Govindananda, Bhamati of Vacaspatimiśra, Nyaya-nirnaya of Anandagiri; ed. by J.L. Shastri, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi 1980 [Reprinted: Delhi 1988]. Chatterjee, Asim Kumar: A Comprehensive History of Jainism (up to 1000 A.D.), Firma KLM Private Ltd., Calcutta 1978.
- Dave, P. N.: Siddhasena Diväkara: A Study. A Thesis submitted to the University of Bombay for the Ph.D. degree, September 1962 [After UPADHYE (1971: 51)].
- Dhaky, M. A.: 'Some less known verses of Siddhasena Diväkara." Sambodhi 10 (1981-82) 169-173.
DHAKY 1990
ON THE DATE OF THE NYAYAVATARA
DHAKY 1995
BIBLIOGRAPHY
-Haribhadra Süri: Anekänta-jaya-patäkä. Ed. with his own commentary and Municandra Suri's supercommentary. Vol. 1 & 2, Ed. H. R. Kapadia, Gaekwad's Oriental Series 88, 105, Oriental Institute, Baroda 1940, 1947.
51
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Nyaya-praveja"Wprowadzenie w logike" ("Introduction to Logic"). Part One: I. Polish Translation, II. Sanskrit Text, III. Notes § 1, Abbreviations and Bibliography. Studia Indologiczne (Warsaw) 2 (1995) 39-87. - Balcerowicz, Piotr. "Taxonomic approach to drstántábhasa in Nyaya-bindu and in Siddharsigani's Nyayavatara-vivrti Dharmakirti's typology and the Jaina criticism thereof. In: Dharmakirti's Thought and Its Impact on Indian and Tibetan Philosophy (Proceedings of the Third International Dharmakirti Conference-Hiroshima, November 4-6, 1997). Ed. by Shoryu Katsura, Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften: Beiträge zur Kultur- und Geistesgeschichte Asiens Nr. 32, Wien 1999: 1-16.
Dhaky, M. A.: 'The Date and Authorship of Nyāyāvatāra." A typescript of a paper-presented to me by the author in 1990prepared for publication in B. K. Thapar Felicitation Volume [the edition was not available to me].
- Dhaky, M. A.: 'The Date and Authorship of Nyäyävatära.' Nirgrantha (Ahmedabad, eds. M. A. Dhaky, Jitendra Shah) 1 (1995) 39-49.

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KRAUSE 1948
KUNST 1939
MALVANIA 1979
MATILAL 1985
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MAVBh. Met.
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Kashi Prasad Jayaswal, Research Institute, Patna 1971. FRANCO 1987 - Franco, Eli: Perception, knowledge and disbelief a study of
Jayarl'scepticism. Alt und Neu-Indische Studien 35, Franz Steiner Verlag. Stuttgart 1987 (Reprinted: Motilal Banarsidass,
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40 (1933) 300-304 (Reprinted: FRAUWALLNER (1982: 479 483)). FRAUWALLNER - Frauwallner, Erich: "Vasubandhu's Vidaviddhi.' Wiener 1957/a
Zeitschrift für die Kunde Morgenlandes (1957) 104-146
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Pramonavdrikabhaya.' Journal of the American Oriental Society
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148. FRAUWALLNER 1982 - Frauwallner, Erich: Kleine Schriften. Hrsg. von Gerhard
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pariccheda of Dignaga's Pramana-samuccaya, edition of Tibetan translations and the Sanskrit text as well as the English translation
of the Chapter 1. Harvard University Press 1968. Hв.
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Text und rekonstruierter Sanskrit Text; Teil II: Obersetzung und Anmerkungen Veröffentlichungen der Kommission für Sprachen
und Kulturen Süd- und Ostasiens 4, 5; Wien 1967. JACOBI 1926 - Jacobi, Hermann: "Introduction and Contents to Haribhadra:
Samardleca-kaha Jaing Praktia Work Volume I: Text and
Introduction, Bibliotheca Indica, Calcutta 1926: i-XXX. KIMURA 1997 - Kimura, Toshihiko: "New Chronology of Dharmakirti', in: In:
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PIOTR BALCEROWICZ
ON THE DATE OF THE NYĀYÁVATĀRA
NASV.
PVin.(1)
Süd- und Orfestungen der Kostrom. Hrsg
PVin.11(1)
NAT. NAV. NAVV. NB. NBh. NBT. NM. NP.
PVin.(2)
ortelen
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hgyur, Mdogrel. Gran-Tshogs Rig-pal, Vol. 130, No.5700. = The Pramana-värttikam of Acarya Dharmakirti with Sub
commentaries: Svópajnia-wit of the Author and Pramana-varttikayrtti of Manorathanandin. Ed. by Prof. Dr. Ram Chandra Pandeya, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi 1989. - Dharmakirti's Pramānāviniscayah, I. Kapitel: pratyaksant. Hrsg.
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Tib. Text und Sanskrittexte von Ernst Steinkellner. Veröffentlichungen der Kommission für Sprachen und Kulturen Süd- und Ostasiens 12, Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, Wien 1973. - Dharmakirti's Pramanaviniscayah, 2. Kapitel: Svarthanumanam.
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Akademie der Wissenschaften, Wien 1979. - Dhammakirti: Pramana-virttika-swópavla-vtti. See: PV. = Manorathanandin: Pramana-vārtika-vrtti. See: PV. - Qvarnström, Olle: "Harbhadra and the Beginnings of Doxography
in India' In: Approaches to Jaina Studies: Philosophy, logic, Rituals and Symbols (Proceedings of the International Conference on Approaches to Jaina Studies: Philosophy, Logic, Rituals and Symbols, 31.03-2.04.1995 Toronto). Ed. by N.K. Wagle and Olle Qvarnström, South Asian Studies Papers 11, University of
Toronto: Centre for South Asian Studies, Toronto 1999:169-210. = Randle, H.N.: Fragments from Dignaga. Prize Publication Fund,
Royal Asiatic Society, London 1926 [Reprinted: Motilal
Banarsidass, Delhi 1981). - Asanga: Sacitka Acirika ca Bhumih (A Section of Yogacara
bhumi). (1) Wayman, Alex (Ed.): 'The Saccifika And Acittika Bhum-Text and Translation' In: Buddhist Insight-Essays by Alex Wayman. Ed. with an Introduction by George Elder, Buddhist Tradition Series VII, Delhi 1984 (Reprinted Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi 1990; 1" ed.: Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies (Tokyo) 7/1 (1960) 375-379). (2) See: SCHMITHAUSEN (1987: 220-2, 'Appendix I').
her,
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- Siddhasena Divakara: Nyāyavarára. (1) Ed. with Siddharsigani's
Vivil and Devabhadra's Tippana, by Bhagavandas Harakhchand; Ahmedabad-Patan 1917. (2) Ed. with Siddharşigani's Vivpti and Devabhadra's Tippana, by P. L. Vaidya, Shri Jain Shwetamber Conference, Bombay 1928 [reprinted in Vaishali Institute Research Bulletin 1, Vaishali 1971: 1-95). = Myayávatdra-sitra-värttika of Sri Santi Sürl critically edited in
Sanskrit with notes. indices etc. in Hindi (with the Yrtti] by Dalsukh Malvania, published by Singhi Jain Sastra Sikshapitha,
Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, Bombay 1949. - Devabhadra's Myayavatara-lippana. See: NA. = Siddharşigani: Myayavatāra-vivsti. See: NA. -Sri Santi Sūri: Nyayavatāra-wärttika-vrtti. Sec: NASV. = Dharmakirti: Nyayo-bindu. See: DhPr. - Vätsyāyana Paksilasvämin: Nyāya-bhagya. See: NS. = Dharmottara: Nyaya-bindu-rika. See: DhPr. = Nyāya-mukha of Dignåga. Ed. Giuseppe Tucci, Heidelberg 1930. - Sarkarasvamin: Nyāya-pravesa. (1) (Part One:) Nyaya-pravesa of
Dinnaga with Commentaries of Haribhadra Suri & Parsavadeva! ed. by A. B. Dhruva, Oriental Institute, Baroda 1930. (2) See:
BALCEROWICZ (1995: 72-77). = Haribhadrasuri: Nyaya-pravesa-vrtti. Sce: NP.(1). - Aksapāda Gautama: Nyāya-sutra. Mahamunt Vätsyāyan's Myaya bhäsya on Gaulama-Nyaya-sutras With Prasannapada Commentary of PL Sudarsanacarya Shastri. Ed. Dvärikādāsa
Sastri, SS 10, Sudhi Prakāśanam, Varanasi 1986. = Uddyotakara: Myaya-väritika. Nyaya-darsana - Nyaya-sutra) with Vätsyāyana's Bharya, Uddyotakara's Vārttika, Vācaspati Misra's Tātparyarika and Visvanatha's Vytl. ed. by Taranatha Nyaya-Tarkatirtha and Amarendramohan Tarkatirtha, Kalikāta
samiskota-grantha-mala 18, Calcutta 1936. = KB. Pathak: Santaraksita's reference to Kumarila's Attacks on
Samantabbadra and Akalarkadeva.' Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute 11 (1930) 155-164. K.B. Pathak: 'Dharmakirti's Trilaksanahetu attacked by Pátrakesari and defended by Santaraksita. Annals of the
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NPV.
PVSV. PVV. OVARNSTRÖM 1999
RANDLE 1926
PATHAK 1930
SacAcBh.
PATHAK 1930-31
PBL
PMi.

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PIOTR BALCEROWICZ ON THE DATE OF THE NYAYAVATARA 57 TILLEMANS 1997 Trims. TS. TSa. TSaP TAVA. UPADHYE 1971 SCHMITHAUSEN 1987 = Schmithausen, Lambert: Alayavijnana-On the Origin and the Early Development of a Central Concept of Yogacara Philosophy. Part I: Text, Part II: Notes, Bibliography and Indices. Studia Philologica Buddhice, Tokyo IV/IVb, The International Institute for Buddhist Studies, Tokyo 1987. SDSa. = Haribhadrasuri: Sad-darsana-samuccaya. Ed. with the Commentaries of Tarka-rahasya-dipika of Gunaratnasuri and Laghuvrtti of Somatilaka Suri and an Avacurni; by Mahendra Kumar Jain, with the Introduction of Pt. Dalsukh Malvania, JMJG SG 36, Benares 1981. SHASTRI 1990 = Shastri, Indra Chandra: Jaina Epistemology. P. V. Research Series No. 50, P. V. Research Institute, Varanasi 1990. STEINKELLNER = Steinkellner, Erst; Krasser, Helmut: Dharmottaras Exkurs zur KRASSER 1989 Definition gultiger Erkenntnis im Pramana-viniscaya. Beitrage zur Kultur- und Geistesgeschichte Asiens No.2, Osterreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, Wien 1989. STEINKELLNER = Steinkellner, Ernst; Much, Michael Torsten: Texte der MUCH 1995 erkenntnistheoretischen Schule des Buddhismus-Systematische Ubersicht uber die buddhistische Sanskrit-Literatur II. Abh. der Akad. der Wissenschaften in Gottingen, Philologisch-Historische Klasse, Dritte Folge 214, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Gottingen 1995. SUKHLAL 1945/a = Pt. Sukhlalji Sanghavi: "Pratibhamurti Siddhasena Divakara.' Bharatiya Vidya, III.i, Bombay 1945: 9-20 (in Hindi) (See: UPADHYE (1971:*18)] SUKHLAL 1945/6 = Pt. Sukhlalji Sanghavi: 'Sri Siddhasena Divakarano Samayano Prasna.' Bharatiya Vidya, III, Bombay 1945: 152 f. (in Gujarati) (See: UPADHYE (1971:*21)]. SUKHLAL-DOSHI = Pt. Sukhlalji Sanghavi; Bechardas Doshi: 'Sanmati-tarka and its 1928 Importance.' Jaina Silver Jubilee Number, Bhavnagar 1928 (Sam. 1985): 109-121 (in Gujarati) [After UPADHYE (1971:*12)]. TABER 1994 = Taber, A. John: 'Kumarila's Refutation of the Dreaming Argument: the Niralambanavada-adhikarana.' In: Studies in Mimamsa-Dr. Mandan Mishra Felicitation Volume. Ed. R. C. Dwivedi, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi 1994: 27-52. TBh. = Umasvati: Tattvarthadhigama-bhasya. See TS. TBV. = Abhayadevasuri's Tattva-bodha-vidhayini on Siddhasena Divakara's Sammati-tarka-prakarana. Ed. by Sukhlal Sanghavi and Becardas Dosi; Vol. I & II, Rinsen Buddhist Text Series VI 1,2; Kyoto 1984 (Reprinted from the original edition published in 5 Vols., Gujarat-pura-tattva-mandir-granthavali 10, 16, 18, 19, 21, Gujarat-pura-tattva-mandir, Amdavad, 1924-1931). = Tillemans, Tom J.F.: 'Dharmakirti on prasiddha and yogyata.' In: Aspects of Buddhism: Proceedings of the International Seminar on Buddhist Studies, Liw, 25 June 1994, eds.: Agata Bareja Starzynska, Marek Mejor = Studia Indologiczne (Warszawa) 4 (1997) 177-194. = Vasubandhu: Trinsika-vijnapti-karika. See: VMS. = Umasvamin: Tattvartha-sutra. Ed. together with Tattvarthadhigama-bhasya by M.K. Mody, BI No.1044, Calcutta 1903-5. = Santaraksita's Tattva-sangraha together with Kamalasila's Panjika. Ed. by Embar Krishnamacharya with a Foreword by B. Bhattacharyya, 2 Vols., Gaekwad's Oriental Series 30-31, Baroda 1926 (Reprinted: 1984). = Kamalasila: Tattva-sangraha-panjika. See: TSa. = Vidyananda Patrakesarisvamin: Tattvartha-sloka-vartikalamkara. Ed. by Manoharalal, Ramacandra Natha Rangaji, Bombay 1918. = Upadhye, A. N.: Siddhasena Divakara's Nyayavatara (edited by the late S.C. Vidyabhusan with English Translation, Notes etc.) and with the Vivrti of Siddharsi as well as The Text of 21 Dvatrimsikas and the Sammai-suttam; Vinayavijaya's Nayakarnika edited by... with an Introduction, Bibliographic Review, Indices etc.; Jaina Sahitya Vikasa Mandala, Bombay 1971. = Vaidya, P. L.: 'Introduction to Nyayavatara. See: NA.(2): vii-xliii. = Vasubandhu: Vimsatika. See: VMS. = Vasubandhu: Vijnapti-matrata-siddhi (Vimsatika and Trimsika). Deur traites de Vasubandhu, Vimsatika et Trimsika, 1 Partie Texte, Sthiramati's Bhasya. Ed. by Sylvain Levi, Bibliotheque de l'Ecole des Hautes Etudes, Paris 1925. = The Vaibesika-sutra of Kanada with the Commentary of Candrananda. Ed. Muni Jambuvijayaji, GOS 136, Baroda 1961. = Bhavasena: Visva-tattva-prakasa. Ed. by Vidyadhara Pasusa Johrapurkar, Jivaraja Jaina Granthamala, Sholapur 1964. = Wayman, Alex: 'The Nyayavatara and Buddhist Logical Works by Dignaga and Ratnakarasanti.' Nirgrantha 2 (1996) 1-8, eds. M. A. Dhaky, Jitendra Shah, Ahmedabad. = Williams, R.: Jaina Yoga. London Oriental Series 14, New York Toronto 1963. VAIDYA 1928 Vims. VMS. vs. VTP. WAYMAN 1996 WILLIAMS 1963