Note On Concept Adrsta As Used In Vaisesika Sutra

Author(s): A Wezler
Publisher: A Wezler

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56
Aruna Bharatt
Concept of Adpspa
57
that by their nature lie beyond the range of (normal human) perception; and, to be sure, there is no evidence whatsoever nor even the least likelihood that this bipartition was originally connected with ethical and retributive conceptions.
This conclusion does not, of course, necessarily imply that adega when used as a prior member of the compound adgatakarita must have the meaning "something unperceived or imperceptible"; yet, I think, the assumption has become much more likely that the VS has indeed originally accounted for strange and otherwise unexplicable phenomena by resorting to a cause "not perceived or unperceivable", i.e., a cause that could not be determined and for that very reason also not classified as regards the category to which it belongs.
3.2. HALBPASS' hypothesis can thus be supported by an additional philological argument and may, hence, be said to gain still greater likelihood. Therefore, one will not rest satisfied with the repeated remark of FRAUWALLNER's that the two qualities, merit (dharmak) and demerit (adharma)), are frequently subsumed under the name 'invisible' (adt stam)". Certainly this is true; for, e. g., Prasastapada, while interpreting the conjunction ca. in VS 1.1.5 as intending the inclusion of seven other qualitites, actually enumerates only six, i.e., substitutes the term adista for dharma and adharma and only by stating the final total to be "saptaiva" does he make it clear that adosta is used by him as a comprehensive term for the two. However, what FRAUWALLNER does is obviously not admissible; that is one may not deduce from an observation of the corresponding usage in Prasastapāda and other later Vaisesika authors that adrsta as used in the VS has but one conceptually unitary meaning. Likewise abortive is THAKUR's attempt to gainsay the fact that adestais introduced into the VS "to ensure the retributive efficacy of actions which have a ritual and moral significance".
In view of THAKUR's interpretation of the term, however, it seems advisable to try to decide also whether adysja in such contexts is used in the sense of not perceived"---which might amount to "not yet perceived [by me, but, I trust, perceptible to later philosophers)"-or, on the contrary, in the sense of "not perceivable, i.e., because by its nature it lies outside the range of perception".
There is strong evidence for the latter possibility: for, this drsaadesta dichotomy reminds one of the similar distinction drawn by Mimäntsakas and Dharmasastrins between acts that have a vísible motive or purpose and those to which an unseen or spiritual purpose is to be ascribed. Yet, there is another parallel, in terms of chronology and historical relation even closer, namely NS 1.1.8: sa (abdah) dvividho drsiddyfartharvát. Pakşilavamin's explanation can be relied on in this case; for he sayge : yasyeha drtyate'rthaḥ sa drstärthak/yasyantutra pratiyafe so desfärtha sevam tpilauktkavákyānām vibhaga fall. The NS's distinction, though referring to fabda as a nieans of valid cognition, is tantamount to a dichotomy of things perceptible and things imperceptible here, i. e. in this world of ours. Therefore, the assurtiption seems to be warranted that it is this very distinction, albeit conceived of as a general one, the author(s) of the VS originally had in mind.
Yet, it is, of course, not enough just to state that adesta used in such contexts comprises both the concepts of dharma and adharma; instead, one has to pose the question when and why this use of the word adrsla was introduced into the VS. As to this, in the light of the observations and considerations of HALBFASS, the assumption suggests itself that this happened when the "soteriological re-orientation of the Veisepika system took place. That is, by expanding the concept adista from its older use in physical and cosmological contexts in such a manner that it now became a wider concept also covering both dharma and adharma, an outwardly seamless connection between two highly different ranges of understanding was established, and two different sets of Sūtras were bound together superficially, merely by the identity of a word.
In view of the palpable difficulties even the great systematizer" Prasastapāda had in trying to keep to an original conceptual unity, one
64. On which of. P.V. KANE, History of Dharmasastra. ..., Vol. II, 2nd ed: Poona, . 1973, p.836 fr. . .! 65. Nyayasstra of Gautama, A System of Indian Logic, ed. by G. JA (POS 58),
Poona 1939, D. 21.
66. Geschichte der indischen Philosophie, Bd. II, Salzburg, 1956, pp. 141 and 235
[98 and 1691. 67. Prasastapadabhasya (Padarthadharmasangraha) with Commentary Nyayakandall
of Sridharabhalta (Ganganatha-Jha-Granthamala 1), Varanasi, 1963, p. 27: calabdasamuccita cu gururva-dravatya-sneha siiskara adza sabda saptaively
evan caturviisatir gund/ 68. Quoted from HALDFASSI. c. (fr. 1), p. 286.