Note On Concept Adrsta As Used In Vaisesika Sutra

Author(s): A Wezler
Publisher: A Wezler
Catalog link: https://jainqq.org/explore/269466/1

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A. WEZLER, Hamburg:
A NOTE ON CONCEPT ADRSȚA AS USED IN THE
VAIS ESIKASOTRA
--- 1. The meaning the word adesta has in the VS (Vaijesika Satra) is still controversial. It appears that until recently there was general agreement only in one regard: scholars started from the assumption that there is an original conceptual unity to the word whatever the context in which it occurs. Opinions differed greatly, however, on the precise Bature of the unity. I do not want to survey all of them here; instead I should like to draw attention to two of them only, viz. that of E. FRAUWALLNBR and that of A. THAKUR; these two can, to a large extent, be regarded as representatives.
1.1. FRAUWALLNER, "to whom we owe the most penetrating and reliable analysis of the Vaišepika system", touches upon the concept of adrsta first in connection with what he calls the supplantation of the old atomistic-mechanistic world-view by new ideas "which changing times call forth". In the first place he mentions an idea "which was introduced at an early date into Vaišeșika thought where it was inorganic and destroyed the coherent stractate of the old natural philosophy", viz.the belief in the power of good and bad deeds". On the other hand he observes: "In Vaiscsika thought it was not neccessary to remodel the teaching of the cosmic power of deeds. It was simply assumed that the good and bad deeds of men, functioning as merit and demerit, produce the invisible (adysart), and it was taught that it not only determines the
1. Daoted from W. HALBFASS' article "Kartha, Aparna and Natural Causes
Oberservations on the Growth and Limits of the Theory of Samsara", published in : Karma and Rebirth in Classical Indian Traditions, ed. by W. D. OʻFLAHERTY,
Berkeley, 1980, p. 288. 2. Quoted from E. FRAUWALLNER, Geschichte der indischen Philosophie, Bd. 11,
Salzburg, 1956, p. 901. [60, 63)-The translation from the German original is mine. Numbers within square brackets refer to the pages of the English transla tion (Hirtory of Indian Philosophy, vol. II, tr. by V.M. BEDEKAR, Delhi, 1973).

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Concept of Adrata
Arura Bharart destiny of souls in the cycle of mundane existences, but, like a natural force, also has influence upon the physical world". The latter function of the adrira is explained by him by stating': "Wherever the one of a "natural" phenomenon could not be discovered, the facile caplanation resorted to it is in fact no explanation at all-was that it is caused by the invisible, and thus one got accustomed to dispensing with a penetrating inquiry into the nature of things.
1.1.1. FRAUWALLNER does not discuss when this change of views took place; but from scattered remarks and his exposition as a whole it can be deduced that according to him the introduction of the karman theory antedates the doctrine of "categories. As in other instances also, in FRAUWALLNERY stimulating, yet inevitably speculative to attempt to reconstruct the early history of the natural philosophy and the Vaiseșika system, in this case, too, it is not clear what kind of textual evidence, which observations or deliberations have led him to this view of the development of the system. Indeed, one would really like to know why dharma and adharmidwere not included in the list of gunas-which, to be sure, originally contained only 17 qualities if the karmant theory was in fact adopted by Vaiseikas before they, developed their peculiar theory of categories; for, it is conspicuous" that the relevant sutra, viz. 1.1.5, forms part of those which unmistakably attest to this fatter theory, Was FRAUWALLNER influenced by the fact that the belief in the power of good and bad deeds.... is age-old in India", that it is definitely earlier than the theory of categories? That is to say, was this the consideration that led him to conclude that the karman theory was introduced first into the system 7. . . . .
In this case one would have to make the following objection: The history of ideas in India is by no means lacking in clear examples for the
opexistence, continuing for a long timo, of two or more rival, even incompatible ideas; therefore, it is practically impossible to decide without Additional evidence when by 4 ayatem of thought a certain conception Was abandoned In favour of another, originally allen to it. Aul does not the history of materialiem In India, though still largely veiled in obscurity, also show that there were traditional schools of thought able to withstand the pressure of widely accepted ideas, of a mighty trend of a period 7
1.2. THAKUR, on the other hand, entertains reasonable doubts as regards the historical reliability of Prasastapāda's equation of adtala with dharma and adharma, and he starts from the assumption that Prasastapada might well have been influenced in this case, too, by the then available exegetical Vaiseșika literature no more available to us
By an independeat examination of the occurrencs of the word adesta in the VS he wants to prove his thesis, stated right at the outset, viz. that Kanada "seems to divide the entities into known and unknown ones and to distinguish them by the terms drita and adrsta". That is to say,
THAKUR comes to the conclusion that in most cases adista, especially as a member of the compound adyafakarita, means "unknown"
.
Yet, THAKUR, too, has a peculiar motive for arguing in this manner. While FRAUWALLNER apparently reproached the Vai esikas with having become disinclined to critical thought, it is obviously THAKUR's wish to pass Kanada off as a true forerunner of intellectually sincere modern scientists; for be openly states:30u.... The method adopted by him" (ie., Kanada) is one of our richest heritages. Modern sciences also have adopted it. Nobody will deny the fact that Kanāda developed in the hoary past a scientific attitude which guided him and his followers to ascertain the truth about this mysterious universe", and he does not even hesitate to add later the remark :41 .The spirit of the sage who
3. 0.c., Lc., p. 95[63]. . 4. Quoted from HALBFASS, 1. c., p. 288. 5. The interpretation of the conjunction caused in VS 1.1.5 as given by Prajasta.
pada and the commentators of the VS cannot be accepted as corresponding to this sutra's original intention, HALBFASS (I. c. p. 285, f. 55) draws attention to the inportant testimony of the Jaina author Jinabhadra (probably sixth century and apparently not familiar with Prasastapada's work)" who states explicity that the number of qualities in Vaiorika is seventeen; cf. Visesavaiyakabhaya, ed. D. MALVANIA (Ahmodabad, 1966-1968.) w. 2972 t with
commentary". 6. Quoted from his work noted in f. 2. p. 91 (67).
..7. Cf. his article "Adqpfa and Dharma in the Vaidepika Philosophy" in: Rram,
Journal of the Akhila Bharatiya Sanskrit Parishad, Vol. I (1969). PP. 51-68 and the Introduction to his edition; Valsekadarsana of Kanada with, an Anony
mous commentary, Darbhanga, 1957, p. (18) L. 8. L. c., p. 51.
9. L. c., p. 52. 10. L. c., p. 52. 11. L. c., p. 53.

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Aruna Bharat
Concepi of Adesta two different sets of problems and implications, and it may be questioned whether or to what extent there is an original conceptual unity in these two usages. As far as the physical and cozmological usage of adrefais / concerned, its primary function seems to be to account for strange and extraordinary phenomena in nature which would not be explicable otherwise (magnetism, upward movement of fire, etc.), as well as for phenomena which seem to be signs or to contain an element of reward and punishment."
Ji!
seems to have firm faith in the gradual progress of human knowledge cannot be sacrificed". Indians have, no doubt, some right to be proud of the philosophical achievements of the Vaidepika system; the conception of its assumed founder, Kanada, as a thinker who not only frankly con fesses the limits of his comprehension of truth, but is also hopeful as regards the progress to be attained by later generations, however, is clearly inspired by quite modern Western ideas about intellectual since. rity and constant progress.
1.2.1. Nevertheless, the main result of THAKUR's semantic investigation, viz. that adrsta means "not seen, 1.c., not cognized, not known", deserves full attention though it calls likewise for a critical re-examination, That in research into the history of Indian philosophy, one should endeavour to free oneself as far as possible of preconceived idcas need hardly be stressed. Both the scholars, referred to in the foregoing, scem to lie under prejudices: FRAUWALLNER under a too negative one and THAKUR under one too positive.
2. From this background boldly stand out the studies undertaken during the last years by W. HALDFASS", to whom we not only owes veritable revival of research into the Vaisenika system, but who has also set a new and high standard of problem-consciousness and philological cum-philosophical analysis. In a recent article of bish he also deals with "Karma, Adrsta and Natural' Causality", especially in Vaifeşika thought. In examining the sätras in which the word adref occurs he comes to the conclusion that it is obvious that area covers at least
He further remarks" : "Although there is an obvious ethical implication in the second group of cases, the Satra text does not indicate in any way that the adesta, which is supposed to cause these events, is to be understood as inhering in souls (atman). This assumption would seem to be even more remote in cases like the upward flaming of fire, for which no ethical, retributive, or psychological implications are suggested. In cases like this, adesta appears simply side by side with other causes of physical motions like 'gravity' (gurutva) or 'fluidity' (dravatva), which inhere in those material substances which they affect. ... The Vaijesikasutra does not state that the unseen physical power behind such phenomena as the upward flaming of fire and the retributive power of past deeds stored in the soul are identical nor does it state that they are different. We do not know when the identity, which is taken for granted by Pragasta pada and later Vaiseşikas, was first established in an explicit and definite manner.... Yet, even the great systematizer Prasastapada has not been able to harmonize completely or cover the ambiguities and dichotomics inherited from the Vaijesikasutra."
I must say that I find these cautious considerations of a dichotomy in the concept of adyata in the VS at the first go-off most plausible, i.e., much more convincing than the interpretations given by FRAUWALLNER and THAKUR, Therefore, I am inclined to accept HALBFASS' suggestion that wadrata, which may primarily have been a gap-filler in the explication of the universe, subsequently offered itself as a channel for a much mort decidedly dharmic and soteriological re-interpretation of the Vaisepika theory of the universe".
12. The references aro (apart from the articlo mentioned in fn. 1) to the following
articles of his : . . (1) Romarks on the Vaidepika concept of samanya" in: Ajall, Papers ont
Indology and Buddhism. A Felicitation Vol. pres. to 0.H. de A. Wijesekerd
on his 60th birthday, ed. J. TILAKASRI, Peradeniya, 1970, pp. 137-151; (2) "Conceptualization of Being' in Classical Vaiseika" in: WZKS 19 (1975),
pp. 183-198; (3) Zum Begriff der Substanz (drayya) im Vaiderika" in: WZKS 20 (1976), pp.
141-166; (4) "The Vaidepika Concept of gund and the Problem of Universals" in: WZKS
24 (1980), pp. 225-238; and (5) Praia tapada's Concept of Substance" in: Ram, L. Sternbach Felicitation
Volume, Lucknow, 1981, pp. 537-544. 13. Cf. above fn. 1. 14. L. c., p. 285.
149. As to the latter type of phonomena, HALBFASs seems to rely on Candrananda's
interpretations which I, however, consider to be highly doubtful. * 15. L. c., p. 286.
16. L. c., p. 289.

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Concept of Adela
Arina Bharatt 2.1. The hypothesis, more hinted at by HALBfAss than expressly stated, to which one is nevertheless inevitably led by his important observations, consists in assuming that the conceptual unity in the two usages', obviously presupposed by Prasastapada and those who have written V9 commentaries in the strict sense, is not original, but the result of the attempt to bring to a common denominator disparate usages of the word, belonging most probably to historically different layers of the VS. As for THAKUR in distrusting the testimony of Prajastapäda, he was on the right track; yet he seems not to have taken into proper account that the extant text of the VS cannot be regarded as a unitary whole, i.c., as a work contposed in one piece. That it, on the contrary, contains many historically different layers which can be and have in part already been distinguished, and must indeed be held apart, is the basic assumption from which any research in the VS has to start today.
cannot be interpreted to stand for dharma and adharman, le, as having the meaning "the invisible' (results and purposes of ritual and ethical activities]
In this connection attention has to be drawn first to the fact that, be sides adysła, the opposite expression, viz., dreta, is likewise attested in the VS. Hence it appears that THAKUR is right at least insofar as the VS distinguishes between entities predicated of as dreta and adesta, respectively, An examination of all the occurrences of desta and adreta in the 1920 yields, as regards the first expression, the result that in two cases, viz., VS 8.13 and 2. 1. 10, even the plural is used; in the first instance with the meaning "seen (i. e. perceived) (things)", whereas in the other case styisible i.e. perceivable) (entities]" seem to be intended. Yet the latter sitra, viz., 2. 1. 10: na ca destånāra sparsa ity adspalingo Väyuh, requires closer study.
2.2 1. THAKUR Obviously regarded the use of adygta in this sūtra as exceptional, for he says": "Of course we find the use of the expres sion a-desta in the sense of not visually cognized' in......VS II. 1. 10". Unfortunately, he does not state explicitly how he interprets the safra as a whole; but from his rendering of adosta it may be deduced that he took it to mean: "And/but since touch (or tangibility) does not belong to the type of visually cognized marks), wind has for its mark [something, not visually cognized, but cognized by the sense of touch)".
The explanations offered by the commentators, including Prabastapäda on the other hand, have to be looked at with utter reserve and examined very critically, for they start from the opposite assumption and, hence, consider it as one of their major objects to bring out into relief an internal consistence, systematic coherence and terminological unity they simply presuppose; In effect,' they cannot but be regarded as highly biased witnesses, and the question whether they still) are aware of an Original irreconcilability is, apart from being hardly answerable, of little importance as regards the necessity of an independent interpretation of the mala text and the method to be applied towards this end,
2.2. HALBFASS' hypothesis does indeed furnish a much better explanation of various strange elements over which one stumbles in teading the Vs. However, one wonders whether over and above its apparent higher plausibility it can be supported by evidence that does not antount to an argumentum e silentio, but is directly based on the usage in the VS. The condition such a piece of evidence has to fulfilis, of course, that in the context of the sátra concerned the expression adesta
18. According to a-still unidentified-quotation from a lost 7) Vaiseșika work,
preserved in Abhayadevasgri's Tattvabodhavidhayini deryasrisidlasendid karaprania Sanmatitarkaprakaranam... Ahmedabad, Sava 1985, p. 685) the prokodnjavanipa was thus described by Vaišeşikas: kartphalalay armagana manandhyogaja) stakaryavirad dharmadharmarapalaya bhedavan adyslakkyo Ba " c. also Kamaladla's Paika on Santarakpita's Tattvasingraha, v. 690 (od. E. KRISHNAMACHARYA, GOS, 30-31, p. 23; ed. Swami
Dwatikadas SHASTRI, Bauddha Bharari Series 1-2, p. 286). 19. Quoted from HALBFASS, 1.c. (cf. fo. 1), p. 285. 20. They can easily be traced with the help of "An Index to the Philosophical
Sutras" by M. HONDA in: Proceedings of the Okayurayama Oriental Research Institute, Vol. I (1954), pp. 244-305. It should, however, be noted that this index is based on Sau karamiàra's satrapatha; a new consolidated Vaidepika
satrapatha and word index is presently being prepared by a student of out i institute, Mrs. U. PLEWNIA-ER. -21. The numbering I follow is always that given in Valeikastra of Kanada with (w the commentary of Candrananda, critically ed. by Muni Śru JAMBUVIJAYNI,
(GOS 136), Baroda 1961, 22. L. c., p. 53.
..
17. Cf.cspocially Vol. ff of E. FRAUWALLNER'S Geschichte der Indischen Philosophie,
Salzburg, 1956, bis-still unpublished article Der ursprüngliche Anfang der Vaisikasutren", my article.Remarks on the Definition "yoga' in the Vaiseika sutra", to bo published in the Felicitation Volume for J. W. De Jono, finally, my monograph : Textkritische und exegetische Untersuchungen zum Valjepikardird, I. Der sechste Adhyaya, still under preparation.

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Concept of Adra
Aruga Bharati
This interpretation is, indeed, in principle conceivable. Yet it would imply that by VS 2. 1. 8. (Fişămi kakudmôn pränteväludhih sasaran iti gotve drstam lingant) either the term linga is defined as referring only to sontcthing visually cognized) or the term distam lagam is exemplified. It has to be admitted that the example given in 2. 1. 8, viz., the characteristic marks of a cow, or rather an animal of the bovine species, might be taken to point in both these directions. However, in this case one would expect 2. 1.9 to read na ca sparsah, "but touch (or tangibility) is not a visually cognized liaga l", not sparsas ca; for, otherwise one would have to make the most unlikely assumption that only lingam is still valid (anuvytta) in 2. 1. 9, that is to say, that the author has, quite needlessly, used a rather obscure wording. Besides, as to the first alternative, the argument could not but be styled as almost foolish: to define first the concept of linga as something that is only seen and to add later that it likewise includes something cognized by the sense of touch, i.e., is ultimately something perceived by any sense-organ whatsoever, would reveal a deplorably low standard of almost pre-logical thinking that should not be imputed even to a philosophical text of a comparatively early period of thought. And, to be sure, there is no evidence that the distinction between characteristic marks' in terms of the sense organ they are perceived by was ever deemed in Indian philosophy to be of significant importance.
thus has tangibility or touch (sparla) as its adspulingam (unperceived mark)"; in another notes she quotes VS 2. 1. 9 and 10, tendets them by "And tangibility is a mark of wind). And tangibility is not the mark of things (which are) peroeived-therefore it is the unperceived mark (with respect) to wind", and adds the explicatoty remark: "This expression which I translate as underceived mark' as contrasted with *perceived mark' is a technical term; it does not mean that the mark itself has not been perceived, but that its connection with its possessor has not been".
That is to say, according to SCHUSTER the VS distinguishes between the technical terms desam lisigam and adorsalingam. Yet she does not come up with any further evidence for the latter one which one would in any case expect to read aestom lingam. Her sole argument being the occurrence of the word adesalingo in VS 2 1. 10, it is her interpretation of this sätra on which critical attention has to be focused.
" 2.2.2.1. The first question that arises here is whether the intepretation of the second part of the sætra, i. e, of ity adystalingo vayuk, as given by her is at all grammatically possible. This much is clear right from the beginning to be precise, this expression cannot be equivalent to "therefore it is the unperceived mark (with respect) to wind"; for, the possibility of a substantival compound having been attracted in gendet to the word it refers to, can be safely ruled out. Adatalingo cannot but be a bahuvi; and, on the assumption made by SCHUSTER, it has to be translated verbatim as therefore wind is soighthing the characteristic mark of which is not perceived". But in view of the undeniable fact that the particular linga of the wind, i.e., sparja, is on the contrary actually perceived, the interpretation to be preferred with SCHUSTER would be"...... is something the characteristic mark of which is an unperceived mark", and this would, according to SCHUSTER's interpretation, have to be taken to ultimately mean. "...... is something the characteristic mark of which is a mark the connection of which with its possessor has not been perceived". It must be allowed that SCHUSTER has assufned a resolution of the compound that is, no doubt, possible, not only according to the better feeling for words the indigenous grammarians cannot be deniedu 25. Viz. 8, L. c., p. 3861. 26. Cf. Värttika 12 on Pan. 2.2.24 (Mahābhagyd, ed. E. KIEL HORN, Vol. 1, 1962,
p. 423.21 f.); although according to Kalyayana and Patanjali one would expect the prior member to be in the locative, it is to be noted that there are also bahurthis of this type with the stem as prior member; cf. J. WACKERNAGEL.
Altindische Grammatik, Bd. II, 1, Göttingen 1957, [109 a 5) as well as A DEPRUNNER'S "Nachtrage", ib., p. 78.
Therefore, one cannot but arrive at the conclusion that drsta in 2. 1. 8 means "perceived, cognized by the senses", that the particular example given was chosen because it is hallowed by tradition, i. c., a mürdhäbhişikta udaliaraņa, and that drsanam in 2. 1. 10 is not a genitivus partitivus, -which, by the way, would also be unnecessarily unequivocal.
2.2.2. There is, however, another interpretation of VS 2. 1. 10 that calls for a more detailed critical examination; it immediately leads into the intricate problems conected with the theory of inference (laingikam janam in the VS. What I am referring to is the study of N. SCHUSTER, the last one to deal with them extensively. She is of the following opinion": "The mark is, normally, something perceived, as horns, dewlap, etc., are the distam lingam' (perceived mark) of the cow",-in a note she refers to VS 2. 1. 8. "In some cases, the connection between the entities and their marks is not perceived-wind (väyu),
23. Laforence in the Vallepikasutras", in: JIPRI (1970-72), pp. 341-395. 24. L. c., p. 342.

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Aruma Bharat
Concept of Adrsla
... The other assumption of hers, however, viz., that Vaidepikas in order to name a characteristic mark the connection of which with its possessor has not been perceived" have coined a technical term adppaLingam, or adesamlingant, is highly problematic.
2.2.2.2. This assumption, which seems to have suggested itself to SCHUSTER because of the expression dragon Tingam in 2.1.8, has the following implications: One would have to assume 1. that both these terms are extraordinarily pregnant expressions
insofar as-in strong contrast to what is actuaily denoted by them--the meaning intended would be a mark the connection
of which with its possessor has (not) been perceived"; 2.. that VS 2.1.15 (vayur iti samikar selt pratyak zábhavad destan
Tingam na vidyate), whatever the argumentative function it may have within the given context, is either redundant--because according to SCHUSTER it is stated already in the forgoing that in the case of wind the particular mark is of the adrsta type (in the sense assumed by her for this term)-or it is nonsensicalbecause in none of the preceding sutras the existence of a dosta
linga would have been asserted; 3. that the stage reached in the development of reflexion on
inference as a means of valid cognition could not but be considered to be quite anvanced, since the VS would, on her assumption, clearly distinguish between two types of conclusive marks both based on whether their connection with their possessor has been perceived or not, i. c., on the basis of the lingin being perceptible; that is to say, one would have to assume that the VS makes a distinction similar to that drawn by Candramatis between drapasamanya and adesfasamanya", however what
SCHUSTER in fact supposes--and it now appears that it was this assumption that has inspired her to offer this peculiar interpretation-is the influence of the Samkhya philosopher Vrsagana, for she says, " "...... it looks very much as though much of what the Vallepikasätras discuss was borrowed directly from
the Şastitantra". As to the first implication, already the manner in which I have stated it above indicates that I consider the existence of a technical term adrsalingam, or adestam lingam, to be extremely doubtful. Even if it is assumed that the counterpositive term despam lingam was created first and later re-interpreted so as to mean a mark the connection of which with its possessor has been perceived, one still fails to understand why Vaiscşikas should have coined the term adržalingam, or adestam lingam, that is indeed open to misconception. Just because it is neatly parallel to the other one ?
There is, however, no evidence to show that desam lingam in VS 2.1.8 does not mean what is actually denoted by it, viz., "a mark that has been perceived". This does not, of course, preclude the possibility of a later re-interpreation of the term, either within the stages of development comprised by the extant VS itself or in the course of its reception by later commentators or Nyāya-Vaiseșika authors of independent works. In fact, dream lingam is met with again in Bhäsarvajna's Nyayasära and -bhūsanal According to his definition this term is equivalent to pratyakayogyárthanumāpakam; that is to say, dysamlingam is conceived as a mark that allows to infer an object which could in principle also be perceived", and which must have been previously actually perceived, for Bhäsarvajna gives in his Bhasana the additional explanation": "pratyakayogyată ca parvadestalvenaivivagantyate/yasmad yo'rthah parvam pratyak gena drstah, sa eva delantarilah kåläntarito vänumlyate 'tas tad anumanam disfarthavigayatvend desfamuktam/...
Hence it follows that Bhasarvajna, too, though fully aware of the decisive role which the connection between linga and lingin plays in
27. The reading sati sannikarze, found in Candrananda and anonymous Vyakhya (cf.
the edition of the VS noted in fo. 7, p. 21), is most probably of later
origin. 28. H.UI. "'The Vaijepika Philosophy according to the Dalapadartha-Sastra....".
London, 1917, p. 97 and E. FRAUWALLNER'S article "Candramati und sein Dalapadarthalsstram" in Studia Indologica, Festschrift fur W. Kirfel, Bonn, 1955,
pp. 73 fr. 29. In fa. 13 (l. c., p. 73) FRAUWALLNER remarks: One is tempted to see in this
expression of the Chinese translation) "the Indian samanyato delam, the Chineso rendering, however, rather points to dejasamanyam and addnyam...".
30. L. c., p. 352. c. also p. 349. 31. Srimaddeirya bhusarvajapalasya Nyd yasdrasya sopa Wakhyan Nyayo
bhi t tadetar.... Svam Yogindrananda....ampaditard, Vanes, 1968,
p. 229. 32. 0.c., p. 272. 33. 0. c., p. 230.

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Concept of Adysta
inference", uses the term distam lingam not figuratively, but in the sense (the word desione actually expects to have when attributed to linga. Thus Bhāsarvajra's conception comes close to what SCHUSTER read into de stam lingam in VS 2.1.8; yet, significantly enough, the term Bhasarvajna uses for a linga of the opposite type, i.e., "a mark that allows to infer an object which by its nature is outside the range of perception" (svabhāvaviprakrsparthanumāpakam") is samanyato destam! This distinc. tion, however, is Bhäsarvajña's own, and though probably influenced also by the VS, has to be regarded as a later development. SCHUSTER cannot be said to have adduced a circumstantial proof for the assumption that the author of Vs 2.1.8-10 had in mind an equally eleborate dichotomy. Whatever the reason that inspired SCHUSTER to make her bold assumption--the occurrence of the complex expression adesalingo in VS 2.1.10 or the alleged influence of Vragana or both these points taken together there is no reason to believe in the existence of a term adpstalinigam, or adestam lingam.
to the nature of a cow by which it can be inferred that an animal which is only partially in the field of vision is a cow, or bulloj".
"To continue now with the last, i. e., third implication : It may well be that Vrsagana exercised influence on some parts of the VS. But as far as the particular influence assumed by SCHUSTER is concerned, it would fail to account in a convincing manner for the change in terminology: for, one would have to assume that in the VS, Vrsagana's visesato drsam was replaced by distam lingam and his sámányato destam by adrsalingam (or adestam lingam). This would in many respects be a terminological step backwards, a passage from preciseness to ambiguity the motive for which would be anything but intelligible. Of decisive importance, however, is the fact that Vrsagana's distinction between viseşato dystam and samanyato dystam has nothing at all to do with the perceptibility of the connection between linga and lingin. Instead it aims at the character of the object inferred, viz., whether it is a particular thing (e. g., the particular fire), perceived already previously, or something general (e. g. a fire), that either in a given situation happens to be outside the range of perception or that by its very nature cannot be perceived at all. : Now, SCHUSTER seems to assume that the relation between Vrsagana's distinction and that allegedly found in the VS consists in that the object inferred by a vijesato distam anumanam (drsamlingamt) has already perviously been perceived, whereas in the case of a sámányato desta inference (adrsalinga) it has not been perceived at all; and on the basis of her, I think, untenable interpretation of VS 2. 15-17, she further
It has, however, to be admitted that it is not possible to argue against SCHUSTER in the following manner also : Since dyste in VS 3.1.14 (pravyttinivytti ca pratyagātmani dyste paratra lingam ) agrees in gender and number with the dual subject and not with lingam, drstam in 2.1.8 too cannot be taken to be an attribute of lingam. For, the syntactical differences obtaining between these two sutras must not be overlooked, and the existence of a (terminologically) fixed expression dystan lingam does not, of course, preclude the possibility of a 'free' use of the participle desta. This means that inspite of the apparent internal connection between VS 3.1.14 and 2.1.8, established by the term drifa (i. e., by the fact that in both cases something perceived is spoken of as forming a conclusive nark), it is advisable to keep both formulations apart and to take 2.1.8 to mean : "......this (iti) is the mark perceived with reference
34. Cf. his definition of anumand, d. c., p. 194: santyagavinabhavend paroksanu.
bhavasadhanant anuntanant, and its explanation by the Bhaja. 35. O.c., p. 272. 36. Candrananda gives the following explanation : pratyagarmeti jarfram/Sarfra
pravyftinivyer drste amandmanumāpayatab/Sarfrae prayatnawatadhishitati hitahitaprayfinivittimattvad ghajarat/ The interpretation of prafyasatman apart, this seems to correspond to the author's intention.
- 37. Cf. Candrananda's introductory remark on VS 2.1.9: yatha aprafyak paycinie
govyakta karhancid grhyamad visanadayo lingach dystam anumapakas tatha. If it is all the marks (referred to in VS 2.1.8) taken together and not just one of them that constitute the linga of a cow, then one wonders which situation Candrananda had in mind when exemplifying the operation of this mark; for it is hardly imaginable that all the marks are perceived, yet not the possessor itself. A further question posed by VS 2.1.8 is why, instead of the marks themselves. the possessor as characterized by them is named; Candrananda's explanation. viz. vipanyadibhijabdals tadvat pratipädakair apy arthavyaparad dharma era yyapadi yante, is not at all convincing: it seems rather that the author of VS 2.1.8 wants to describe the actual cognition of a person who sees an animal and
thus knows that it is characterized by horns, etc." 38. On Vrsagana's theory of cognition ef. in the first place E. FRAUWALLNER's article
"Die Erkenntnislehre des klassischen Samirkhya-Systems", in: WZKSO LI (1958),
Pp. 84-739. 38a. L. c., p. 248.

Page #8

Anna Bharart
Concept of Adesta
makes the assumption that Kaņāda himself distrusted the conclusiveness of a sámányato.desta inference (adrptalinga). However, the wording of VS 2. 1. 8 does not by any means indicate that its author refers to a special inference by which a particular, individual cow, that was previously perceived, is now cognized. Of, at least, equal importance is another quite unplausible consequence of SCHUSTER's assumption: one would have to assume that in 2. 1. 9 only lingam is still valid (as in the case of THAKUR's interpretation of 2. 1. 8; see above). Besides, the fact, too, admitted by SCHUSTER herself that in the case of ether no doubts are raised against the samányato di sta inference by which its existence is established, namely in VS 2. 1. 20, does not speak in favour of her assumption.
observe its connection with what possesses it; therefore wind, the possessor of tangibility, has no perceived mark (drstan lingam) and no particular possessor can be established by seeing from the general'. To compound the reader's amazement, no further attempt at an inference of wind is even made, and the Vaifesika Satras, which are supposed to admit only two means of cognition, perception and inference, conclude that the only way to know that wind exists is from scripture".
Therefore, one cannot but arrive at the conclusion that, whatever the influence Vrsagana may have exercised on the VS elsewhere, at this particular point it is nowhere tangible, in any case not in the sense apparently assumed by SCHUSTER.
I do not of course, want to dispute that Vrsagaña (in paving the way for his rational exposition of Sāmkhya metaphysics) was aware of the distinction between an anumāna that allows to infer the existence of an object in principle perceptible and an inference for things lying outside the range of perception (at undriya bhāvah), but obviously this was not the dichotomy intended by the terms viberato drsam and sámányato dostam, FRAUWALLNER too, only assumes. Vrsagana's influence on Candramati, but he does not at all overlook the differences between the inference theories of both these philosophers which he explains by statingant that the latter "has altered many an element".
SCHUSTER contrasts VS 2. 1.9 f. with 2. 1. 10 ff., I. e., the sûtras intend to prove the existence of ether (akafa); It is most significant that neither in 2.1.20 itself nor in one of the immediately following sätras the expression adrsant liagant is used; instead the term actually used is linga only; likewise due attention has to be given to the fact that objections like those raised in 2.1, 15-17 against the inference of wind are lacking in this case, and that on the other hand the objections of 2.1. 15-17 agree (except for the very first word) Verbatim with those raised in 3.2. 6-8 against the proof for the existence of the soul, although in 3.2.4 the term used is again not adosta linga, but almalingani. Therefore, the conclusion Suggests itself that a 'term' ad salingam, or adestam lingant does not exist at all. But there are further and even more convincing arguments that can be brought forward against the central hypothesis framed by SCHUSTER. It should, however, be borne in mind that in the following I shall only summarize what has been dealt with elsewhere by me in greater detail
As to the second implication, it too involves considerable difficulties; they are indicated by SCHUSTER herself, yet obviously not realized in their full significance, for she states. "The case is somewhat different with wind (väyu). First, sūtras 2.1. 8-10 contrast the perceived marks of the Cow (horns, etc.) with the 'unperceived mark' of wind which is tangibility (sparia). Tangibility is, nonetheless, the mark, perceptible as sound is, and following the model of the argument for sound and physical space, one would expect it to suffice as proof for wind. Satras II. 1. 15-17, however, find it not sufficient as a mark because it is impossible to
* First, it should be noted that Dianaga who in his Pramānasamuccaya devotes considerable space to a critical examination of the theory of knowledge as taught by the Vaiseşikas, apparently does not know of a distinction between die stam lingam and adestalingam, or adestam lingam. Otherwise, one would expect him to have mentioned it at least in the con text of the criticism he directs against the Vaisesika theory of inference and he would have framed his refutation of the Vaiseșika "proof for the existence of ether, etc." in a different manner : his argument against this particular inference, viz., that neither the charmin nor its connection with
386. CS. his article mentioned in fo. 28, p. 79. 39. L. c., p. 342 f. 40. Read : ether!
41. Viz. in the study referred to above in fn. 17. 42. For the sake of convenience refer to the appendix p. XXXI ff. in Jambgvijaya's
edition of the VS (ef. above, fo. 21) as well as to his "saptaman parišsami", 1978.
.

Page #9

50
Aruns Bharati
the dharma are proved", would have a different form had he referred to a Vaišeşika argument which already admitted that in these cases the connection between the linga/dharma and the lingin/dharmin is not seen or perceived. And, to be sure, there is no reason whatsoever to believe that what Dianaga's criticism is directed against is only the inconsistency of the VS in which the inference for wind adduced first is refuted later, while in the case of ether no such scruples are voiced.
Secondly, apart from the fact that SCHUSTER's interpretation of VS 2.1.17 (tasmäd ägamikam) does not stand a critical examination", it is to be noted that she either did not realize or overlooked that in fact another inferential proof for the existence of wind is adduced later, viz., in 2.1.18 and 19, and that these latter two sūtras have, judged from a synchronic point of view, the function of a siddhänta. As to the entire portion of the VS beginning with 2.1.8 and ending with 2.1.19, SCHUSTER obviously fails to recognize its true dialectical structure; this becomes particularly conspicuous in the case of 2.1.15-19 where in reality the first three sutras form the objections. of an opponent against 2.1.9 ff. and the following two sutras are meant to refute them," Regarding the relation in which VS 2.1.15-17 stand to 3.2.6-8 it can be shown not only that the latter have served as a model for the former, i.e., that 2.1.15-17 are of later origin than 3.2.6-8, but also that the opponent of 2.1.15-17 is only fictitious in the sense that the doctrine itself could never have existed; for, it can hardly be assumed that an adherent of a rival school ever denied the existence of the substance' wind alone. The reason for the later insertion of 2.1.15-17 is most probably that a transmitter or redactor of the VS came to realize that the objections raised in 3.2.6-8 against the ātmānumāna are likewise valid with reference to the proof for the existence of wind as given in 2.1.9 f. and, hence, did his best to fill in this gap in the argument by adapting the objections formulated in 3.2.6-8 to
43. Cf. Jambavijaya, o. c., p. 198.
44. In the study noted in fa. 17 it will be shown in great detail that agamikam (note that this is a neutre) cannot but mean what Candrananda gives as explanation, viz. pravādamātram, "nothing but an (traditional) assertion [of your's that lacks any proof whatsoever]."
45. In this respect Candrananda's interpretation of these two satras, introduced by naitat, is clearly correct.
r
46. But these latter, in their turn, were apparently equally unknown to Dinnaga.
Concept of Adria
the new context (2.1.15-17) and by adding what he considered a convincing counter argument (=2.1.18 and 19)
n
51
Although SCHUSTER already in the introductory passage of her article speaks of her impression that "there seem to be dfinite strata within those sections of the satras dealing with inference", she obviously did not take into account this possibility as regards the section of the VS now under discussion: nonetheless, this text-critical interpretation suggests itself to any critical and unbiased mind. Her view that it was Kanāda himself who", "rejects this possibility" (viz., of proving the existence of wind by means of an samanyato desta inference) "because no particular entity can be inferred by this method, only something in general", is rather strange, to say the least; in any case, it is untenable.
As soon as the real dialectical purpose of VS 2.1.15-17 is taken into account, i.e., as soon as these sutras are recognized to be formally objec tions, one cannot but admit that the opponent in 2.1.15 denies (na) the existence (vidyate) of a ditam lingam. Because of the argument adduced in the preceding part of this sutra, viz., vayur iti sannikarse pratyakşa bhavad, however, it cannot be gainsaid that the author's conception of the term drstam lingam includes the essential condition that the connec tion between the linga and its possessor must have been perceived previously, i.e., that he takes the expression to mean that the character of being a conclusive mark of something perceived is likewise realized by having perceived previously both, liaga and lingin, together.
Yet, this observation does not invalidate what has been stated above on this term in 2.1.8; the criticism of 2.1.15-17 as a whole attests to a much more advanced stage of reflexion on logical problems, and these latter stras can be shown, as already mentioned, to be of later origin; therefore, it may be assumed without hesitation that this is a later, more elaborate interpretation. Had the author of VS 2.1.8 himself realized
46a. Viz., that the existence of wind is proved by the word "wind" because the word was created by persons who are asmadrisisja", i. e., who have perceived wind before coining its name.
47. L. c., p. 341.
48. L. c., p. 342.
49. Cf. Candrananda's explanation: yatha byai gaus iti goi caka sannikars sati pratyakşeṇa viṣāṇādini tadyogitaya drstani kadacil lingam, naivan traca vayoḥ sannikarze sati ayah vayu iti pratyaksena tadguyataya spárja upalabdho yemanapalabkyamanan kadacid vayum anumapayetl

Page #10

Aruna Bharat
Concept of Adyga
the importance of the connection between linga and lingin, he could not bave expressed himself the way he actually does, nor argued in the manner of 2.1.9 f.! That is to say, my own interpretation of 2.1.15 ff. implies that the author of 2.1.8 ff. (which belong to an earlier stratum of the VS) was like the author of NS 1.1.5*-aware of the fact that inference presupposes perception, but was yet unable to recognize what was, to be sure, discovered only later and called avinabhava, vyäpti, etc., i.e., he had taken the step from linga, "characteristic mark", as used in everyday language, to the logical term linga, "conclusive mark", but had not yet clearly realized what is implied unconsciously by the laukika word, viz, that the connection of the mark with its possessor should have been perceived previously.
Inspite of the apparently higher level of reflexion revealed by desian lingam as understood by the author of VS 2.1.15 (ff.) it has to be admitted that bis denial of the existence of a perceived mark" makes sense-not on SCHUSTER's assumptions, but-only if in the foregoing this
existence had been asserted either explicitly or implicitly. The only kr sūtra he can be said to is 2.1.10. Therefore, one cannot but arrive at
the conclusion that SCHUSTER's interpretation of this sätra does not correpond to its original intention.
(the other invisible or inperceptible entities, i.e., 'substances', being excluded because in order to prove their existence other specific marks are adduced). As to syntax, I take adrsalingo to be equivalent to adyste or adratasya liagam yasya sah and to be the subject of the sentence. The construction is admittedly a bit awkward: nevertheless, it is, to be sure, not only possible, but also the only one that really makes sense in the narrower and wider context. The complexity of this formulation was apparently felt also by the commentators; as only too often, they do not, however, try to explain it literally, but confine themselves to reformulate its gist.
2.2.4. After what has been said in the foregoing it need hardly to be emphasized that this hypothesis passes muster more easily than that framed by SCHUSTER. But my hypothesis also leads to further questions. Thus, what should perhaps be stressed is that there is every appearance that the conception of linga evident in VS 2.1.8-10 forms the oldest stage in the development of the Vaiseșika theory of inference. This conception is-similar to that of the NS-characterized, as already suggested, by a palpable lack of reflexion on the true nature of logical reason, and this is why it was rejected by later logicians, c.g., by Dinnaga.
The analysis of 2 1.8-10 has, however, yielded the result that here the author distinguishes de facto between a mark that allows to infer something which is in principle itself perceivable and a mark by which the existence of something can be inferred that by its nature lies beyond the range of perception. Nevertheless, this distinction like that of NS 1.1.5 between purvavar and sesavat on the one hand and samanyato drscom on the other-does not imply that the logical character of the linga and its connection with its possessor had already been reflected upon; on the contrary, e.g., the Nyasabhasya on NS 1.1.5 clearly shows that this was not the case, and the further development of Indian logic no less corroborates this assumption.
2.2.3. Thus, the way is cleared for another and, I think, much better interpretation of VS 2.1.10. I propose to translate it thus : "But (ca) since touch (or tangibility) is not a charactefistic and conclusive mark] of [entities]" that are seen (i.e., perceived), that of which [this] conclusive mark (namely touch, or tangibility) (allows inference) is (an entity] not seen (.e., perceived), (namely] wind".
That is to say, I take the sutra to be a rather complex, pregnant argument in three steps, viz. : (1) sparsa is not a characteristic and conclusive mark of visible or perceivable entities; (2) therefore, it must be that of something invisible or not perceivable; (3) the invisible or imperceptible entity the existence of which can be inferred by sparsa is wind
In
However, it may be questioned whether in the VS, e.g. in 2.1.20 and 3.2.4, a still older stage is attested, one characterized by the fact hat not even the perceptibility or imperceptibility of the object to be
50. Cf. my article "Dio droifache" Schlussfolgerung im Nyayasatra 1.1.5" in LIJ
XI (1969), pp. 190-211, 51. Quoted above. 52. It looks very much as though VS 2.1.10 is based on the assumption that it has
still to be determined to which category these entities belong: ses below. 53. Candrananda adds by way of explanation : yadi khaly ayante kpiryadisparlo
'bhavispad gandharasarapai sahopalabhemahi....'
54. That is to say, my translation is, for stylistic reasons, not in every respect
faithful to the original. A literal translation would be: "....(i. c. perceived). ..that of which the characteristic mark (i.e. touch or tangibility) is one that
allows to infer wat is not seen (i. c. not perceived), is wind."

Page #11

Concept of Adrsta
Aruna Bharats inferred is taken notice of. I do not dare to decide this question, but I gather the impression that this assumption is confirmed by the criticism Dinoaga directs against the Vaiscsika theory of inference.
It was mentioned above that the kind of influence by Vraagana on VS 2.1.8-10 assuned by SCHUSTER is most unlikely. What has prompted her to make this assumption was obviously the belief that this approach has been suggested by FRAUWALLNER; for she expressly states that it is FRAUWALLNER's suggestion that the Vaigesika inference theories should be exaittined in the light of Samkhya epistemology that I am here pursu. ing". Now, when going through the two articles of FRAUWALLNER'S referred to by SCHUSTER, one fails to detect such a general suggestion; instead what is actually found are quite explicit and clear statements show ing that FRAUWALLNER himself while reckoning with specific influences exercised by Vragana on the VS, nevertheless saw them only in the first ahnika of adhyaya III; for he says: "It is here that we meet with a theory of inference that is likewise independent of dialectics and that is based on the stable connection between two things, the different types of which connection one seeks to determinc. Here, too, perception falls back on the second position behind the theory of inference; and the Vaisenika system makes tise also of inference by way of exclusion" (.er, parijera or rather avgra as called by Visagana),
A.D.". In a footnote he adds the remark that "this bipartition is met with in the Valsesikasaras only at two points (II, 1,15-17 and III, 2,6-8)", which he, however, considers to be later additions".
As regards the last three stras-2.1.15-17 are of no importance in this respect since they were modelled on 3.2.6-8-to account for the objections raised here by a Buddhist opponent, it is not necessary to assume the influence of Vrsagana or Dinnaga. The arguments brought - forward in these sutras against the Vaigesika proof for the existence of the soul (diman) can have been likewise inspired by Ch'ing-mul; that is to say, similar objections were raised already by earlier Buddhist thinkers.
On the other hand FRAUWALLNER advocates the opinion that "already the bipartition of inference" (viz., into darasamanya and adys fasāntanya was taught by him", i.e., Candramati, is a striking proof of his dependence from Samkhya". . That is to say, according to FratWALLNER a further influence of Vregana can be shown only on the Vaiścsika author Candramati whom he dates between 450 and 550
As to the Vaiseșika theory of inference as a whole, FRAUWALLNER speaks only of "beginnings of such a theory in the VS "which due to their complex stratification call for a separate discussion". Since unfortunately he could no longer deal with these in fact intricate) problems, his own interpretation of VS 2.1.8-10 is unknown. Yet, from his remark just quoted it can be inferred that he, too, was of the opinion that on the whole the Vaisesika inference theories attest to a stage in the development of reflexion on logical problems that can hardly be called advanced. In any case, this much becomes highly probale : FRAUWALLNER did not, apparently, consider even privately, as it were, an influence of Vrsagana's teaching upon VS 2.1.8-10, not to speak of indicating or asserting it.
3.1. Returning now to our starting point, viz., the term ada as used in the VS, the first result to be noted is that in VS 2.1.10 adest is used as an expression that stands in contradistinction to drsa in the same stra. Since it is not prior to 2.1.11 that an argument is brought for. ward to prove that wind is a material 'substance', adesta and perhaps also drsia in 2.1.10 have to be taken to refer to entities in general, i.e., of which, in the context, it has not yet been decided as to which category they belong. Therefore, one cannot but draw the conclusion that the VS, at least at some point of its development, makes the basic distinction between elements of reality that can in principle be perceived and others
55. L. c., fn, 1, p. 386. 56. Via, in fa. 1, p. 386, these articles are noted above in fns. 28 and 38. 57. L. c. (cf. fr. 38), p. 134. 58. For significant arguments against FRAUWALLNER's assumption that the divisions
of sambandha into different types as taught in the VS is influenced by V agana,
c. SCHUSTER, I. c., p. 368. 59. L. c. (cf. fn. 28), p. 79. 60. CM. above fo. 29. 61. L., p. 80. Note that FRAUWALLNER's hypothesis regarding the relative chrono
logy of Candramati and Praiastapada is questioned by B. K. MATILAL, Nyaya. Valserika Literature (1 History of Indian Literaturs, ed. by J. GONDA, VI.2), Wiesbaden, 1977, pp. 63 L .
62. C. the book of H. Ui (noted in fa. 28), pp. 86 ff., as well as M. WALLISER, Die
buddhistische Philosophie in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung. 3. Tell: Die mittlere
Lehre des Nagarjun... Heidelberg, 1912, p. 106 f. 63. L. c. (cf. fn. 28), fn. 30, p. 79.

Page #12

56
Aruna Bharatt
Concept of Adpspa
57
that by their nature lie beyond the range of (normal human) perception; and, to be sure, there is no evidence whatsoever nor even the least likelihood that this bipartition was originally connected with ethical and retributive conceptions.
This conclusion does not, of course, necessarily imply that adega when used as a prior member of the compound adgatakarita must have the meaning "something unperceived or imperceptible"; yet, I think, the assumption has become much more likely that the VS has indeed originally accounted for strange and otherwise unexplicable phenomena by resorting to a cause "not perceived or unperceivable", i.e., a cause that could not be determined and for that very reason also not classified as regards the category to which it belongs.
3.2. HALBPASS' hypothesis can thus be supported by an additional philological argument and may, hence, be said to gain still greater likelihood. Therefore, one will not rest satisfied with the repeated remark of FRAUWALLNER's that the two qualities, merit (dharmak) and demerit (adharma)), are frequently subsumed under the name 'invisible' (adt stam)". Certainly this is true; for, e. g., Prasastapada, while interpreting the conjunction ca. in VS 1.1.5 as intending the inclusion of seven other qualitites, actually enumerates only six, i.e., substitutes the term adista for dharma and adharma and only by stating the final total to be "saptaiva" does he make it clear that adosta is used by him as a comprehensive term for the two. However, what FRAUWALLNER does is obviously not admissible; that is one may not deduce from an observation of the corresponding usage in Prasastapāda and other later Vaisesika authors that adrsta as used in the VS has but one conceptually unitary meaning. Likewise abortive is THAKUR's attempt to gainsay the fact that adestais introduced into the VS "to ensure the retributive efficacy of actions which have a ritual and moral significance".
In view of THAKUR's interpretation of the term, however, it seems advisable to try to decide also whether adysja in such contexts is used in the sense of not perceived"---which might amount to "not yet perceived [by me, but, I trust, perceptible to later philosophers)"-or, on the contrary, in the sense of "not perceivable, i.e., because by its nature it lies outside the range of perception".
There is strong evidence for the latter possibility: for, this drsaadesta dichotomy reminds one of the similar distinction drawn by Mimäntsakas and Dharmasastrins between acts that have a vísible motive or purpose and those to which an unseen or spiritual purpose is to be ascribed. Yet, there is another parallel, in terms of chronology and historical relation even closer, namely NS 1.1.8: sa (abdah) dvividho drsiddyfartharvát. Pakşilavamin's explanation can be relied on in this case; for he sayge : yasyeha drtyate'rthaḥ sa drstärthak/yasyantutra pratiyafe so desfärtha sevam tpilauktkavákyānām vibhaga fall. The NS's distinction, though referring to fabda as a nieans of valid cognition, is tantamount to a dichotomy of things perceptible and things imperceptible here, i. e. in this world of ours. Therefore, the assurtiption seems to be warranted that it is this very distinction, albeit conceived of as a general one, the author(s) of the VS originally had in mind.
Yet, it is, of course, not enough just to state that adesta used in such contexts comprises both the concepts of dharma and adharma; instead, one has to pose the question when and why this use of the word adrsla was introduced into the VS. As to this, in the light of the observations and considerations of HALBFASS, the assumption suggests itself that this happened when the "soteriological re-orientation of the Veisepika system took place. That is, by expanding the concept adista from its older use in physical and cosmological contexts in such a manner that it now became a wider concept also covering both dharma and adharma, an outwardly seamless connection between two highly different ranges of understanding was established, and two different sets of Sūtras were bound together superficially, merely by the identity of a word.
In view of the palpable difficulties even the great systematizer" Prasastapāda had in trying to keep to an original conceptual unity, one
64. On which of. P.V. KANE, History of Dharmasastra. ..., Vol. II, 2nd ed: Poona, . 1973, p.836 fr. . .! 65. Nyayasstra of Gautama, A System of Indian Logic, ed. by G. JA (POS 58),
Poona 1939, D. 21.
66. Geschichte der indischen Philosophie, Bd. II, Salzburg, 1956, pp. 141 and 235
[98 and 1691. 67. Prasastapadabhasya (Padarthadharmasangraha) with Commentary Nyayakandall
of Sridharabhalta (Ganganatha-Jha-Granthamala 1), Varanasi, 1963, p. 27: calabdasamuccita cu gururva-dravatya-sneha siiskara adza sabda saptaively
evan caturviisatir gund/ 68. Quoted from HALDFASSI. c. (fr. 1), p. 286.

Page #13
. Aruna Bharati cannot simply take for granted that this development was a conscious one. It is likewise possible that we have to do here with a phenomenon of terminological interference that become possible because of the lack of vigilance when the term adista-dharma and adharma-was taken over by Vai esikas and incorporated into the text of the VS. It should be noted that apart from VS 5.2.19, i.e., a sutra that for other reasons, too, seems to be of later origin", the use of ades!a-dharma and adharma-is confined to the second ahnika of adhyaya VI. While in the VS itself no attempt is made to reconcile the disparate usages of the word, the indigenous commentators did feel the need for an explanation; for to them the internal consistence and hence also the terminological unity of the mula text was a matter of course. That in reality the whole of adhyaya VI of the VS was inserted only later is not something they could have thought of or would have admitted. However, it is precisely this what I hope to show in a study still under preparation.70